Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism

Rise and Fall of a Policy

Leonie Murray

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• Print ISBN: 9780415545327
• eBook ISBN: 9781134125548
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

This volume re-examines the evidence surrounding the rise and fall of peacekeeping policy during the first Clinton Administration. Specifically, it asks: what happened to cause the Clinton Executive to abandon its previously favoured policy platform of humanitarian multilateralism?

Clinton, Peacekeeping and Humanitarian Interventionism aims to satisfy a large gap in our understanding of events surrounding 1990s peacekeeping policy, humanitarian intervention and the Rwandan genocide, as well as shedding some light on US policy on Africa, and the issues surrounding the current peacekeeping debate.

Leonie Murray takes an unorthodox stance with regard to the role of public opinion on peacekeeping policy, and delves deeper into the roles that the legislature, the military, and in particular, the executive had to play in the development of US peacekeeping policy in the 1990s. The conclusions reached concerning the role of the United States and the International Community in the face of the Rwandan Genocide are of particular note in their departure from the accepted wisdom on the subject.

This book will be of interest to students of peacekeeping, international relations, US foreign policy and humanitarian intervention.

1 Policy change and public opinion

Introduction

On 3–4 October 1993, 17 US Rangers and one elite Delta Force operative were killed in a firefight on the streets of south Mogadishu, Somalia, and an ‘ominous shadow’ was cast over Washington DC and the future of US/UN relations.⁹ Constituents reportedly swamped telephone lines in the offices of the Legislature. Outraged by television scenes of a dead American helicopter pilot dragged triumphantly through Mogadishu’s streets, the US public as a unanimity (testified Congress) wanted the United States out of Somalia.¹⁰ Unified Congressional pressure was too much for President Clinton, who immediately reproached the United Nations for the deaths of the Rangers, scheduled the extraction of US forces from Somalia and began to consider, very carefully, his government’s commitment to UN peacekeeping and multilateralism.

The Legislature continued to dwell on public estrangement from multilateralism and disaffection with the UN; its performance, wastefulness and corruption. Indeed, it seemed one could make a career from ‘UN-bashing’ in Washington; prominent Republican critics included former UN Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick, Senator Bob Dole, former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, and in particular, Senator Jesse Helms, who as Michael Hirsh writes, ‘made an obsession’ of attacking the UN.¹¹ Criticisms ranged from the absorption of national sovereignty and subordination of US foreign policy to that of the organization (an ‘obvious threat to US national interests’), to corruption and ineptitude in the international bureaucracy.¹²

Upon entering office President Clinton had set in motion a review designed to re-evaluate the role of the United States in relation to peacekeeping. The resultant review document, Presidential Review Document 13 (PRD13), had been thought so progressive as to create waves when a draft version was leaked to the press earlier in the year. Following the Somalia incident, the innovative PRD13 became Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD25), the stringent and restrictive set of policy guidelines that signalled the operational death of US initiatives and participation in peacekeeping.¹³

So it would seem that the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of its previously favoured policy platform of peacekeeping and interventionism was a direct result of the massive and overwhelming public negativity towards peacekeeping, multilateralism and the UN caused by the trauma of viewing firsthand the defeat and defilement of America in Somalia. Many commentators, both media, governmental and academic, agree with this assessment of events; consequently, it is hardly surprising that such an attitude persists. This study suggests, however, that such an appraisal entirely misinterprets the public mood. As we shall observe, the American public was by no means overwhelmingly negative in response to the Somali debacle, nor were/are they critical of the UN, peacekeeping or multilateralism in general. In fact, US public opinion has demonstrated consistent positivity regarding all manner of UN activities, including peacekeeping. Nevertheless, it appears that the perception of a negative public was just as potent as its true existence, and that perception was sufficient, in combination with other factors, to engender retreat on behalf of the Clinton Administration.

This chapter will seek out and discuss the linkages between public opinion, Congress, the Executive Branch, the news media and policy change with regard to the implications and impact those linkages had on relations between the United Nations and its most influential member state, the United States. Analysis of collated survey results will clearly demonstrate that the US public was not as negative as was emphasized by the media, and indeed, Congress.¹⁴ Finally, we shall see how imperfect data-gathering techniques by policy-makers, reliance on a self-reinforcing triangular relationship between Congress, the Executive and the news media, as well as problems of reliability in the media, have created a situation wherein it was virtually impossible for policy-makers to understand public opinion. Consequently, responsibility for the retrenchment of the Clinton Administration from its earlier enthusiasm for multilateralism, peacekeeping and the UN cannot be placed, by Congress or anyone else, on the American people.

A multilateralist public: survey results

Congressional calls for an end to multilateralism, and demands that the US distance itself from the United Nations in the latter half of the 1990s, had little to do with the majority of public attitudes. Systematic analysis of poll data clearly demonstrates that the American public was not as hostile as Congress and the media emphasized. A closer examination reveals that the universal clamour that Congress maintained arose after the 3–4 October incident simply did not occur.

According to many in the United States Legislature of the mid to late 1990s, the constituents they professed to represent, and indeed American citizens in general, were not interested in involvement in international affairs, were unhappy with the United Nations, opposed American contribution to UN peacekeeping ventures (militarily and financially), and in general disapproved of the organization, its performance and its practices. This attitude, it was maintained, stemmed from a backlash against multilateralism resulting from the so-called ‘Somalia debacle’. However, collated survey data regarding the issues of internationalism, multilateralism, UN performance, peacekeeping (specific missions), UN dues, and domestic voting behaviour relating to the UN, appear to paint a remarkably different picture.

Internationalism – moving into multilateralism

In general, Americans prefer to remain actively engaged in world affairs with 62 per cent, 65 per cent and 61 per cent in favour of such a proposition, as the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) discovered, in surveys conducted in 1990, 1994 and 1998 respectively. Just days after the Somalia incident, 88 per cent of respondents to a Program on International Policy Attitudes (PIPA) poll agreed that ‘[b]ecause the world is so interconnected today, it is important for the United States to participate, together with other countries, in efforts to maintain peace and protect human rights’.¹⁵

On the whole, Americans do not want their country to perform the role of world policeman, as many politicians believe. This was even the case, and remarkably so, during the height of the Gulf War, when a Los Angeles Times poll reported 75 per cent of respondents answering in the negative to the question: ‘[s]hould the US be playing the role of world Policeman?’¹⁶ When asked who should be the world policeman by the Americans Talk Issues Foundation (ATIF), the US or the UN, a strong 76 per cent replied that the UN should perform the duty.¹⁷ In addition, an overwhelming 85 per cent of poll participants in PIPA’s April 1995 survey agreed that ‘[t]he only way for the US to not always be the “world policeman” was to allow the U.N. the means to perform some policing functions. U.N. peacekeeping is a way we can share the burden with other countries.’¹⁸ Americans strongly believe in cooperating with other allies and international organizations such as NATO, and in particular, the United Nations. When asked in 1998 if their country should ‘take action alone in responding to international crises if it does not have the support of its allies’, 72 per cent answered that they should not, and 66 per cent of respondents, when queried in 1995, disagreed that ‘[w]hen there is a problem in the world that requires the use of military force, it is better for the US to act on its own, rather than working through the U.N. because they can move more quickly and probably more successfully’.¹⁹ Moreover, a considerable majority of 90 per cent answered favourably when presented with the following statement: ‘[i]t is important for the United States to build unified support in the UN before making a major foreign policy decision’ by an ABC News poll.²⁰

An equally large 89 per cent of participants in a CBS/New York Times survey believed that it was important, ‘[n]ow that the Cold War is over . . . [for the US] to cooperate with other countries by working through the UN’, and when UNA-USA/Wirthlin asked in both 1995 and 1998: ‘[i]s it important that America be an active member of the United Nations’, and PIPA, the same question in 1995, respondents answered that it was indeed important, by 82 per cent 93 per cent, and 62 per cent majorities respectively. ²¹ Furthermore, as Table 1.1 illustrates, of responses to questions regarding whether the US should cooperate fully with the UN, taken over eight years, majorities were in favour of full cooperation.²²

Use of force through the UN

Eighty-seven per cent of participants in a Newsweek survey answered in agreement to the statement: ‘[t]he US should commit its troops only as part of a United Nations operation’.²³ This was quite a remarkable result, and as Steven Kull writes, ‘[w]hile it is unlikely that such a large number really meant that the United States should never use force unilaterally, it does demonstrate how strongly Americans prefer multilateralism’.²⁴

When the ATIF asked the question: ‘[w]hen faced with future problems involving aggression, who should take the lead – the US or the U.N.?’, once in 1991, and again in 1995, respondents answered 85 per cent and 69 per cent in favour of a UN lead approach. When PIPA asked: ‘[a]s a general rule, when it becomes necessary for the US to use force, do you think it best for the US to . . . act as part of a United Nations operation?’, 69 per cent replied ‘yes’, and 59 per cent responded that the ‘US should try to use force only in concert with the United Nations’ rather than ‘use force in our own national interest regardless of the United Nations’.²⁵

The percentage response to the question: ‘[w]hen there are conflicts among other countries where the US has an interest, should the United States be prepared to use US forces so that the conflicts are resolved the way we think they ought to be, or should we support the use of United Nations forces so that they are resolved in a way that tries to accommodate all sides?’, posed twice by UNA-USA/Wirthlin in 1992 and 1995, rose from 55 per cent to 69 per cent between the years concerned.²⁶ Finally, a plurality of 48.5 per cent agreed that it was best for the US to ‘act as part of a United Nations operation’ when it became necessary for the country to use military force, and a further 25 per cent added that it would be best to act as part of a NATO operation, underlining further the general multilateralist sentiment among Americans, and perhaps a frustration with the constraints on the UN’s ability to act more forcefully.

Table 1.1 ‘The United States should cooperate fully with the United Nations.’ Exception is PIPA (1995) which asked ‘[s]hould the US cooperate fully with the UN?’

UN performance

Of nine instances, as demonstrated in Table 1.2, in which surveys asked participants whether they felt the UN was doing a good job or a poor one in trying to solve the problems it has had to face, only two even managed a clear minority (42 per cent and 45 per cent).²⁷ The other eight responses were more positive, with positive responses representing a majority or plurality of respondents. Furthermore, when asked by ATIF whether they ‘approved’ of the job the UN was doing, participants replied that they did: in 1991 with 78 per cent, and again in 1995 with a 59 per cent majority.²⁸

As Table 1.3 illustrates, when asked how ‘favourable’ their attitudes towards the UN were, respondents to surveys displayed just how positive their feelings were.²⁹ Apart from one anomaly, collated results demonstrated a wholly upbeat response.

UN peacekeeping

The positivity regarding UN performance displayed clearly by aggregate data carried through to perceptions of peacekeeping. When asked whether they ‘favor or oppose the idea of U.N. peacekeeping’ by PIPA, of respondents to the February 1994 survey, 84 per cent answered in the affirmative. A further 67.3 per cent agreed in April 1995, as well as 66 per cent of the February 1994 poll, concurring that ‘U.N. peacekeeping helped contribute to stability in the world’.

Table 1.2 ‘Is the UN doing a good job or a poor job in trying to solve the problems it has had to face?’

Table 1.3 ‘How would you describes your feelings towards the UN?’

In a remarkable show of support, 92 per cent of participants to a 1996 UNA-USA/Wirthlin survey responded that UN peacekeeping should be a priority of the UN system, and when, in 1994, the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations (CCFR) asked: ‘[s]hould the US be part of a U.N. peacekeeping force in a troubled part of the world?’, 51 per cent of poll participants answered ‘yes’ with a further 23 per cent feeling that it would depend on other factors, while respondents to the 1998 poll were 57 per cent in favour.³⁰

Commentators feared that when queried specifically with regard to contributing American soldiers to peacekeeping missions, support would drop off significantly; however, this does not appear to be the case. When poll participants were asked whether they favoured such an option, support appears definite, as Table 1.4 suggests. Support was evident even shortly after the deaths of the 18 US Rangers in Somalia, when NBC reported that 71 per cent of poll participants favoured the contribution of US troops to UN peacekeeping missions.

Strengthening the UN

Most Americans favour strengthening the UN and believe this should be a priority in US policy, as Table 1.5 demonstrates. Not only is support evident for strengthening the UN in general, but when faced with specific ways in which the organization might be strengthened, majorities of 69 per cent-83 per cent favoured proposed measures, as PIPA’s November 1995 survey demonstrates.³¹ The American people also seem to desire a UN capable of more forceful action. When in April 1995 PIPA asked: ‘[d]o you think the U.N. should make greater efforts to strengthen following through on its threats to use military force even if this means sometimes taking some risk, or do you think that the U.N. should not do this kind of thing?’, 74 per cent answered that the UN should.

Table 1.4 ‘Do you favour contributing US troops to UN peacekeeping operations?’ PIPA (February and July 1994) responses combine ‘in general’ and ‘in some’

Table 1.5 ‘Is strengthening the UN important/a priority?’ Combines ‘top’ and ‘some’ priority and ‘very’ and ‘somewhat’ important

The same study questioned whether as ‘a general rule, when the U.N. tries to deal with a violent conflict’, respondents would like to see ‘A. Only mediate between the parties [or] B. First try to mediate but if this fails, and at the same time many civilians are being killed, consider bringing in a substantial military force to stop the killing?’, 64 per cent approved of option ‘B: use force if necessary’. In addition, in February 1994, 83 per cent of PIPA participants favoured sending in UN peacekeepers in a conflict zone, ‘[w]hen atrocities are being committed against large numbers of people’, and 81 per cent, when ‘gross human rights viol...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction
• 1 Policy Change and Public Opinion
• 2 Executive Decision-Making
• 3 Congressional Accountability?
• 4 Somalia
• 5 Rwanda
• Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibilography