Soviet-Vietnam Relations and the Role of China 1949-64

Changing Alliances

Mari Olsen

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134174126
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de l'armée et de la marine

This new book analyzes how the Soviet leadership evaluated developments in Soviet-Vietnamese relations in the years from 1949 to 1964.

Focusing on how Soviet leaders actuallyperceived China's role in Vietnam relative to the Soviet role, it showshow these perceptions influenced the Soviet-Vietnamese relationship. It also explains how and when Moscow's enthusiasm for the active Chinese role in Vietnam came to an end – or, in other words, from what point was Beijing's involvement in Vietnam perceived as a liability rather than an asset, in the strategies of Soviet policy makers.

This book is an excellent resourcefor all studentswith an interest in Soviet-Vietnamese relations and of strategic studies and international relations in general.

1 Choosing sides
The Democratic Republic of Vietnam and the World, 1945–1949

The Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) was established in August–September 1945, in the immediate aftermath of the Japanese surrender in the Second World War. In the so-called August Revolution, revolutionary committees paying allegiance to the Communist-led Vietminh¹ seized power in all main parts of Vietnam and established the new Democratic Republic, with Ho Chi Minh as president. The insurrection was brought about on local initiative, with no significant involvement by either the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) or the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU). Indeed, the successful August Revolution seems to have taken Communists worldwide by surprise, and there was virtually no reporting of the events in Indochina in the international Communist press.²

After the August Revolution, the DRV leaders, in particular President Ho Chi Minh, initiated an active search for allies. In the latter part of the 1940s, he and his envoys actively sought support from both the United States and the Soviet Union, but without any significant effect. The purpose of this chapter is first and foremost to analyse the role of these initial contacts between the Vietnamese and the Soviets in the period leading up to Soviet recognition of the DRV in January 1950, while at the same time evaluating Soviet views of the early years of the Franco-Vietnamese war, and also the first Chinese Communist Party (CCP) attempts to support the Vietnamese Communists.

The DRV’s search for allies

One author has argued that ‘Vietnam’s post war diplomatic contacts with the region and the world began in Thailand in 1945, and not in China in 1950’.³ In the years before Soviet and Chinese recognition of the DRV in January 1950, while the Vietminh was waging a guerrilla war against French colonial forces, there was little contact between Soviet and Vietnamese leaders. However, during these years several attempts were made by the Vietnamese side to build a relationship. Although the attempts at securing Soviet support for the struggle against the French failed, they form an important background for the establishment of a Soviet–Vietnamese relationship in the years following Soviet recognition of the DRV. They also highlight the important fact that the Vietnamese Communists were able to conduct foreign affairs independently before the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949–50 and may help to explain why the China factor became the single most important denominator in Soviet policies towards Vietnam in the following two decades.

Between the August Revolution and the outbreak of war in December 1946, Ho Chi Minh and his government searched for allies who would both secure him support against the French reconquest of southern Vietnam and contribute to the construction of the DRV in the north. While searching for allies, the DRV government tried to build alliances or solicit support for their new state within Southeast Asia, with the United States, the Soviet Union and the Chinese (Chiang Kai-Shek government/the Guomindang). The very first efforts of this kind were made in the immediate aftermath of the August Revolution when Ho Chi Minh sent parallel series of cables to both Stalin and Truman asking for recognition and support.⁴ Nothing came out of either. Cooperation with Chiang Kai-Shek also broke down when he agreed with France to withdraw the Chinese occupation troops from northern Indochina.⁵ After the outbreak of full-scale war from 1947, the DRV government used Bangkok as its main diplomatic outlet.⁶

Although the Thai government did not recognize the DRV, it allowed the opening of a ‘Representational Office of the Democratic Republic of Vietnam’ in Bangkok in the late summer of 1946. The office was set up with the help of Vietnamese nationals in Thailand and began to operate fully from 14 April 1947. The office was tolerated by the progressive national government of Pridi Banomyong. According to one Vietnamese author, the Bangkok office received money and funds from Pridi, who also allowed the Vietnamese to set up a war base at the frontier where soldiers could receive training before being sent back through Laos and Cambodia into Vietnam. Bangkok was a very important liaison point for the Vietnamese because the DRV’s diplomatic mission there could initiate and maintain contacts with other Southeast Asian countries and world powers through their Thai embassies. The office was not recognized as a legitimate legation or embassy but played a significant role in the DRV’s foreign affairs. Bangkok would function as the DRV’s main opening to the world until the conservative coup in Thailand in 1948, after which Rangoon took over some of Bangkok’s role. Thailand’s new ruler from 1948 deprived the DRV representative office of its diplomatic status, and it was forced to reduce its activity.⁷

During 1947, Bangkok was the scene of encounters between Vietnamese and American officials, as well as Vietnamese and Soviet officials. Ho Chi Minh’s encounters with American officials in France and Vietnam during 1946 had been characterized by a friendly and respectful atmosphere. The American attitude towards colonialism and the independence of the Philippines may have provided some of the Vietnamese leaders with hope that the United States could support them against France or at least put a moderating pressure on France.⁸ During early 1947, shortly after the outbreak of full-scale war between the Vietnamese and the French, the DRV launched a four-month diplomatic initiative to secure the support of the Truman administration. The initiative was led by Dr Pham Ngoc Thach, deputy minister in the Office of the President and one of Ho Chi Minh’s closest advisors. From April to June, Thach approached the Americans in Bangkok with several proposals. Among these were calls for recognition, requests for assistance in mediating the conflict with the French, for loans for Vietnamese rehabilitation, for economic concessions to US businesses in Vietnam, and appeals for technical assistance and cultural exchange. However, just like Ho Chi Minh’s attempt to secure American support immediately after the August Revolution, Pham Ngoc Thach’s initiatives in the first half of 1947 failed.⁹

The DRV began constructing their fragile new state in a period of international turmoil. On the eve of the Cold War a growing fear of Communism was slowly spreading among American policy makers. Despite many favourable assessments from American officials in both Vietnam and other Southeast Asian countries, Ho Chi Minh’s government received no support for its case from the Truman administration and began to realize that it was necessary to turn to other countries for support. The DRV’s approaches to the United States must be evaluated within the context of the Vietnamese relationship with the French. In the aftermath of the war anti-colonial sentiments prevailed in the international arena with one distinct exception – the French attitude towards its former colony Indochina. In order to prevent a French re-colonialization of the area, the Vietnamese needed a strong and independent ally for support.

Parallel to the approaches to the Americans, the DRV leaders also sought support from the Soviet Union. As in the case with the Americans, in the latter half of the 1940s, contact with Moscow was initiated and maintained largely through the DRV delegation in Bangkok. Ho Chi Minh had strong links with the Communist world from his prewar work with the Comintern, his role within the French Communist Party, and, not least, his long-term stays in Moscow. Still, in the immediate period after the August Revolution, the DRV government was not successful in securing material support from any of its future Communist allies.¹⁰ At that point Mao Zedong did not yet hold power in China and was far away. So was the Soviet Union.

Soviet sources describe how the first encounters between Soviet and Vietnamese officials took place in early spring 1947.¹¹ From 23 March to 2 April, a Soviet delegation led by comrades Zhukov and Plishevskii participated at the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi.¹² During the conference the Soviets met with Tran Van Giau, former leader of the August Revolution in Saigon and southern Vietnam, who led the Vietnamese delegation to the conference. Tran Van Giau described the situation in Vietnam as a disaster and appealed, on behalf of Ho Chi Minh, for assistance from Moscow. According to Giau, ‘the French were gradually tightening the rope around the virtually unarmed Vietnamese units,’[. . .] ‘and would crush the Democratic Republic completely within 4 to 5 months’.¹³ That would happen regardless of the fact that Ho Chi Minh and the Communist party had the full support and respect of the Vietnamese people. ‘Vietnam needs immediate assistance’, he continued and emphasized that the major problem was the lack of weapons. The Vietnamese government primarily needed money in order to purchase weapons through China. In addition, Tran Van Giau reminded the Soviet delegates that diplomatic support through the United Nations would also be very much appreciated.¹⁴

The meetings between Tran Van Giau, Zhukov and Plishevskii took place around the same time as Pham Ngoc Thach began his approaches to the Americans in Bangkok. However, in the first years after Second World War the Soviet Union was primarily concerned with developments in Europe. In postcolonial Asia, Moscow first and foremost paid attention to Indonesia,¹⁵ and of course China and Korea, but showed little interest in the national liberation struggle in Indochina before 1950.

Soviet strategies in Southeast Asia

Previous accounts of Soviet relations with Southeast Asia in general, and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in particular, suggest that during the early years of the DRV’s existence the Soviet Union appeared to have been appropriately sympathetic to the Vietminh cause, although non-committal concerning any specific assistance the Vietnamese might expect.¹⁶ In the early post-war years the Soviet Union did not want to disturb its relations with Paris, where the Communists were part of the government until March 1947. This fact undermines the suggestions that the Soviet Union, as early as 1947, played the role as moderator for the Southeast Asian Communist parties.

In his work Soviet Strategies in Southeast Asia, Charles B. Mclane distinguishes between two separate developments when characterizing Moscow’s colonial strategies in the period from 1947 to 1950. From 1945 to 1947 Moscow seemed to follow a relatively moderate strategy. A change came, according to Mclane, towards the end of 1947, when Zhdanov presented a more militant line in Soviet foreign policies. This was further enhanced with the acceptance of Chinese views (Liu Shaoqi) through 1949 and early 1950 – views that were clearly more aggressive in terms of assisting Communist revolutions than the initial Soviet stand. Another equally important development according to Mclane was the shift of focus from Europe to Asia. This shift apparently began with the Calcutta Conference in 1948, and continued with the CCP’s establishment of the PRC in the fall of 1949.¹⁷

In the first years following the Second World War, Stalin’s attention was focused on Europe. Naturally enough, the Soviet leaders were much more concerned about their relationship with France, Great Britain and the United States than with the events in Indochina. There are no records of worldwide appeals on Vietnam’s behalf from the Soviet side. When negotiations between Ho Chi Minh and the French broke down in December 1946, and the Franco-Vietminh War broke out, the Soviet Union apparently never even considered intervening. Ignoring the fact that the Franco-Vietminh war was the first case of conflict between a colonial subject and an imperialist power in an Asian country, Moscow underestimated a war that would seriously affect the course of events throughout the East.¹⁸ The Soviet reluctance to get directly involved in the Vietnamese situation underlines how much importance Moscow attached to a reasonable relationship with the West European states, especially France, and the United States.

In a speech at the founding of the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) in September 1947 in Poland, Soviet Politburo member Andrei Zhdanov presented the so-called ‘two-camp’ thesis. He divided the world into two distinct camps, an imperialist one led by the United States and the other that of anti-imperialism, socialism and peace.¹⁹ Within that context the DRV was described as ‘associated’ with the anti-imperialist camp, and the Vietminh war was termed ‘a powerful movement for national liberation in the colonies and dependencies’.²⁰ The speech marked a watershed in Soviet post-war strategies. It affirmed a policy already decided upon by Stalin and the CPSU Central Committee and was an event that set the tone of international relations during the Cold War.²¹

In his speech Zhdanov encouraged Communists abroad to be more energetic in their ways of advancing the common goal. He underlined that through economic power the Americans aimed at organizing Western Europe and countries politically and economically dependent on the United States such as Near Eastern and South American countries and Chiang Kai-Shek’s China into an anti-Communist bloc. The Russians, on the other hand, were in the process of forming another bloc together with the so-called new democracies in Eastern Europe, Finland, Indonesia and Vietnam and with the sympathy of India, Egypt and Syria. With this division into blocs, Zhdanov announced what may be seen as the rebirth of the ‘two-camp’ view of the world that was characteristic of Soviet foreign policy in the late 1920s and early 1930s.²²

Although the message inherent in Zhdanov’s speech was aimed at all Communist parties in the world, only the European Communist parties were present during the founding meeting of the Cominform. There were no representatives from any colonial or previously colonial country. To convey the message to these parties the Cominform decided to hold an Asian conference in mid-November the same year. But the message at this conference only partly reflected the new line in Communist policy. The key note address to the participants at the conference was delivered by Asia expert and historian Evgenii Michalovich Zhukov. He acknowledged the need for a more vigorous role for Communist parties in the colonies, an attitude that to a much larger degree reflected a way of thinking that was more characteristic of pre- than post-Zhdanov attitudes towards the Eastern question. At the same time, records from the conference did not confirm the idea of a more active Soviet policy towards the colonial world, but rather added more confusion to the state of Moscow’s intent in these countries.²³ The same Zhukov who gave the opening speech at the Asian conference was the one who met with Tran Van Giau in New Delhi in late March or early April 1947 to discuss the situation in Vietnam. As an academic his role was more as an advisor than a policy maker, but his views on Soviet policies towards the colonies were influential in the post-war years.

Vietnamese diplomatic initiatives in Bangkok and Moscow

We have seen how the attempts made by Tran Van Giau to solicit support from the Soviet Union in the spring of 1947 were unsuccessful. Judging by previous accounts on the Soviet–Vietnamese relationship, the Soviet attitude towards the revolutionary struggle in Vietnam was more sympathetic after the Zhdanov speech. Thus the picture ought to change after September 1947, but Soviet archival sources do not support this view. In the period after the Cominform meeting Moscow was equally hesitant once the issue of practical economic or military assistance was raised. At this time there was also considerable suspicion of Ho Chi Minh as a rightist deviator who had dissolved the Indochinese Communist Party.²⁴

Pham Ngoc Thach, who during spring and summer had been in charge of approaches to the US government, met with the Soviet envoy to Switzerland, Anatolii Georgevich Kulazhenkov, in Bern in early September of 1947.²⁵ Pham Ngoc Thach, then described as deputy state secretary of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the Republic of Vietnam, was in Switzerland under the pretext of being treated for tuberculosis. His main aim was to make an illegal trip to France, where he was supposed to present his credentials to the leading French Communists Maurice Thorez and Jacques Duclos. He came to the Soviet mission in Bern to provide information about the current situation in Vietnam. Describing how the DRV government organized the fight against the French army, he emphasized the lack of weapons in the Vietnamese army. Military units did not have the necessary equipment, and the government did not have enough foreign currency to buy what they needed. There was also a lack of senior cadres to take the command. Owing to the situation the CCP decided to assist Vietnam and send in a group of military advisors.²⁶

On the current situation in Southeast Asia, Pham Ngoc Thach underlined that during the fight for independence Communist parties had been founded in most countries and had an important influence among the populations. He emphasized Vietnam’s role as the proliferation centre of Communist influence in Southeast Asia. On his way to Europe Pham Ngoc Thach had met with Communist leaders in other Southeast Asian countries such as Malaysia and Burma. He also told them that the Vietnamese Communist Party (‘Kompartii Vietnama’)²⁷ had planned a congress of all Southeast Asian Communist parties in 1947, but that this had proved impossible due to the ongoing war between Vietnam and France. With regard to the French Communist Party (PCF) Thach reported that they had so far not discussed the question of Vietnam and had done nothing substantial to hinder the French imperialist war against the republic.²⁸

Within the PCF the attitude towards support for the Vietminh changed in 1947. They offered only very prudent political and diplomatic support to the DRV in 1946 w...