Political Freedom

George G. Brenkert

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• eBook ISBN: 9781134967155
• Topic: Philosophy
• Subtopic: Philosophy History & Theory

This book examines the underlying theoretical issues concerning the nature of political freedom. Arguing that most previous discussions of such freedom have been too narrowly focused, it explores both conservativism from Edmund Burke to its present resurgence, the radical tradition of Karl Marx, as well as the orthodox liberal model of freedom of John Locke, John Stuart Mill and Isaiah Berlin. Political Freedom argues that these three accounts of political freedom - conservative, liberal and radical - all have internal weaknesses which render them unsatisfactory.
In the second part of the book George Brenkert develops an alternative theory of political freedom. Using the guiding concept of empowerment, his model explores individual rights, democratic participation in government and workplace, and the need to provide the material and educational resources to allow individuals to effectively exercise their rights to self-determination. It is a clear and bold attack on the view that there is no link between freedom and power.

Part I

Political Freedom and Political Philosophy

DOI: 10.4324/9780203004630-1

The first step to the understanding of men is the bringing to consciousness of the model or models that dominate and penetrate their thought and action.

(Berlin 1981: 159)

I Problems of Political Freedom

Debate over political freedom is at the center of much of our public life. Here are three familiar examples.

Conservatives argue that a free society would instil traditional religious, moral, and social values in each individual. Thus, in the name of freedom, the selling of pornographic material ought to be banned as injurious to the moral fiber of society. Liberals contend that a free society would maintain certain minimal standards of noninterference, while letting individuals do what they choose. Thus, they conclude that the sale of pornographic material ought not to be banned among consenting adults. Finally, radicals claim that pornography oppresses women. Since a free society would not permit the oppression of its members, the sale of pornography ought to be banned.

Liberals contend that political freedom requires that all adult citizens be permitted to participate in the political process through voting and office holding. Only in this way can individuals control government power and protect their private affairs from unwarranted political intrusion. Radicals agree that freedom requires participation in the affairs of society. They claim, however, that participation does not have simply an instrumental importance and that it cannot be found within a society whose public affairs are political in nature. Conservatives maintain that people may be free not only within a political society but may also be politically free even if their access to voting and office holding is limited by various substantive conditions, such as property holding or literacy.

Liberals and conservatives argue that a person’s material resources are irrelevant to whether or not he or she is free. Having a certain amount of wealth may make one’s freedom more valuable, but does not alter the fact that one can be free even if poor. However, radicals reject this view, claiming instead that a free society would provide the material circumstances whereby individuals could realistically acquire the freedom others say they have. Material resources, they argue, do not simply make one’s freedom more valuable, like a glossy shine on one’s auto, but are part and parcel of freedom itself.¹

Obviously such examples could be multiplied endlessly. Four features of these disputes are noteworthy. First, they involve practical problems which are unavoidable. Whether stores are permitted to sell pornographic materials, citizens allowed to participate in political processes, or material resources provided to the poor are questions which, though subject to compromise and disguise, must be addressed. Secondly, these problems are of considerable importance. How they are resolved affects the daily lives of people, even those who profess indifference to political issues. Thirdly, these disputes appear to continue endlessly. Thus, they raise the question whether one set of responses to these disputes can be said to be better or more rational than others. Contrariwise, must we simply look to “the likings and dislikings of society, or of some powerful portion of it”? (Mill 1956: 10). Finally, such disputes concerning political freedom are not unique. They also arise in our discussions of justice, democracy, and equality, as well as power, family, and class.

Accordingly, it seems that we face a dilemma. We cannot avoid saying something about disputes over political freedom, but the endlessness of such disputes raises the question whether we can say anything meaningful. It is not surprising then that so many despair of political disputes, try (unsuccessfully) to avoid them, or treat them simply as matters of subjective opinion. If we are to discuss political freedom, we need to know not only why we have these disputes but also whether there are routes we might take to reduce or resolve them. Only if these questions are satisfactorily answered would it make sense to discuss which view of political freedom we should adopt and how we should respond to particular problems of political freedom.

In the following chapter, I argue that though political disputes are not subject to any final resolution and hence may continue endlessly, this is not a reason to despair or conclude that they are simply matters of opinion. Instead, because reason and evidence are fully appropriate in them, political disputes may be genuine disputes. They are not simply empty expressions of emotion. We can show which views are better than others and hence on what side the preponderance of reason lies. Accordingly, it makes sense to ask which political views we ought to adopt. Though the remainder of this chapter seeks to convince the reader of these views, the larger proof I offer lies in the chapters that follow.

II Political Disputes and Endless Disputes

There have been a host of explanations why political disputes continue endlessly. Some are cognitive in nature: people are intellectually rigid, factually misinformed, conceptually confused, and/or begin with different assumptions about human nature. Other explanations portray the language of politics as either simply expressive of emotions or as having suffered a breakdown such that it is no longer able to sustain rational or objective argument.² Finally, there are psychological and evaluative accounts that point to the role of self-interest, the need for power or dominance, and different risk assessments.

Quite clearly several of these factors may play a significant role in our political disputes. Misinformation, conceptual confusion, and self-interest, for example, often stand in the way of resolving particular controversies. Theoretically, however, each of these could be eliminated such that political disputes could be resolved. On the other hand, claims that political language is simply emotive or that it can no longer sustain rational argument have been shown to be unacceptable.³

It does not follow that we need not worry about the endlessness of our disputes. Far from giving soothing assurances at the outset, I think it is important to see that the problem is actually more difficult than often thought.

Quite standardly it is held that at the crux of each political dispute is a concept (core meaning or “exemplar”) around which various interpretations or conceptualizations occur. For example, Lukes suggests that the core concept of power is that A affects B in a “nontrivial or significant manner” (Lukes 1974: 26). Berlin says that “the essence of the notion of liberty, both in the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ senses, is the holding off of something or someone” (Berlin 1969: 158).⁴

This core meaning can, however, be interpreted or applied according to diverse criteria. For example, Gallie suggests that at the core of the concept of democracy is “a demand for increased equality” (Gallie 1956: 184). Criteria according to which this core concept has been interpreted include: “the power of the majority of citizens to choose (and remove) governments”; the “equality of all citizens … to attain to positions of political leadership and responsibility”; and “the continuous active participation of citizens in political life at all levels” (Gallie 1956: 184f). These criteria might be variously linked to the core meaning of “democracy” to produce different conceptualizations of this concept.

On this view, then, disputes concerning these concepts are over the criteria by which the core meaning is to be interpreted. The core meaning, as distinct from the different conceptualizations, anchors the debate. Though debates over these criteria may be endless, there is at least a focus around which the debate rages which ensures its unity. Disputants are not simply talking about different issues. This core meaning is one of the factors which allows for rational discussion over the political issues at stake. Accordingly, if we can settle upon the core meaning of the concepts used in our political disputes, we can begin to seek a resolution of these disputes.

However, this standard view of the disputes surrounding political concepts is mistaken. It treats the matter as less complicated than it really is and, thus, incorrectly identifies the reason why political disputes continue endlessly.

When we engage in political disputes, for example over freedom, we may not be able to identify some single core meaning which is then variously interpreted or conceptualized. In fact, what seems more likely when we dispute over freedom, justice, or equality is that we have not only different conceptualizations but also have different concepts in mind. The complexity of these concepts stems from the fact that each of them does not have a self-same core meaning which is interpreted according to different criteria. Rather, more radically, there are various different meanings identified with “the” concept in question. In this sense, for example, the words “free” or “freedom” seem simply to be different umbrella terms which apply ambiguously at times to these different meanings or concepts.

For example, the following have been identified with freedom: lack of coercion, the presence of opportunities, the ability to do what one wants, self-determination, rational action, and self-realization. It is not obvious, however, that one could plausibly argue that all are conceptualizations (though in different ways) of some selfsame concept (or core meaning) of freedom. Rather, they seem to constitute more than one, and perhaps several, concepts of freedom. Similarly, it seems unlikely that merit, equality, desert, and entitlement are all criteria for a single concept of justice. Instead, different concepts of justice focus on these different “criteria.” This is not to say that the meanings constituting these different concepts of justice or freedom do not overlap. I think they do. But there is not a self-same (core) meaning which defines the basic concept of freedom or justice.⁵ Thus, the complexity which attaches to such concepts is much greater than many think.

To defend this view two things must be done. On the one hand, reasons must be given why we need not assume that there is some common core of meaning at the crux of such disputes. On the other hand, we must also explain what unifies such debates; why they can, nevertheless, be coherent.

The view that there must be a common core meaning to each concept around which various conceptualizations are formed assumes that this core is analytically tied to the concept, all other criteria or meanings being merely synthetically linked. Thus, for example, it might be argued that “freedom is the lack of coercion” is an analytic statement, one which captures the core meaning of “freedom.” As such, its denial would be contradictory. However, “freedom requires material means” or “freedom is the ability to determine one’s own destiny” are synthetic statements. Their truth or falsity would depend upon what empirical connections they have with individuals lacking coercion.

The problem with this view is the following. It has been plausibly argued that its underlying assumption, that there is a sharp analytic-synthetic distinction, stems from a faulty view of language. Though this point cannot be argued here, Quine and Putnam, among others, have shown that this sharp distinction “breaks down when we confront concepts with multiple and variable criteria” (J.N. Gray 1978: 390). With such concepts as freedom, justice, and politics, it seems doubtful that there is some uncontested central or core meaning. Instead, there may be a number of different meanings which are variously identified with “the” concept in question. Thus, even though Berlin suggests that “the essence of the notion of liberty, both in the ‘positive’ and the ‘negative’ senses, is the holding off of something or someone” (Berlin 1969: 158) his suggestion quite clearly focuses on negative freedom (the lack of coercion), rather than positive freedom (self-mastery or self-determination). Others, such as McCloskey, speak unabashedly of multiple concepts of freedom. Even Berlin is ambiguous in that sometimes he claims there are two different concepts of freedom, while at other times he claims there are simply two different conceptualizations of freedom.⁶

It is pointless then to dispute which of the various different meanings or concepts of freedom is the “true” one. One need simply look in the Oxford English Dictionary to see that freedom has (and has had) a number of different meanings. The attempt to reduce these to one schema, formula, or core meaning is mistaken. Lippman made the point some time ago, that we cannot simply reject other meanings of “freedom” as inappropriate. To try to do so is to misrepresent a process of conceptual legislation as one of neutral semantic description.⁷

Further, even if we agreed on “the” meaning of “freedom” it would be open to others to reject that account, because (they might contend) it simply reflects how the word’s meaning has been corrupted within the current political context. Accordingly, if someone showed that there was one concept that all people used, it would still be arguable whether we should continue to use that concept.

Hence, the view that disputes involving political concepts focus on some core meaning or concept which receives different interpretations or conceptualizations should be given up.⁸ The common core which many have sought to identify for concepts such as freedom or justice not only need not be particularly helpful in guaranteeing the unity of debate over that concept,⁹ but also it may prevent people from recognizing the internal complexity of the concept involved. Attempts to identify one such common core have the effect of making such disputes overly abstract and Procrustean.

III The Focus of Debate

If such disputes are not about the same common exemplar or core meaning, how can disputes regarding political freedom be coherent? Would we not be dealing with apples and oranges? Wouldn’t our arguments simply pass one another? I think not.

Rather than trying to identify the core meaning of political concepts such as freedom, we need to characterize the general space or area within which questions concerning each of our basic political concepts arise. Thus, for example, freedom concerns how, to what extent, and in what ways our lives (or those of certain institutions) are determined by restraint, coercion, power, authority, and the individual him or herself.¹⁰ In short, freedom occupies a certain area, space, or dimension in our lives concerning the forms of determination in which an individual stands to others and to various institutions.

This is a formal characterization of freedom. It refers to a space that may be filled in various ways. The identification of this aspect of our lives is not itself a concept of freedom. However, questions concerning this area are questions concerning freedom. Clearly, within this area there may be different concepts of freedom as well as different interpretations of those concepts. Prior to experimentation and discussion, there is nothing absurd or contradictory in any one of a number of possible formulations of the concept.¹¹ Thus, it is not so much the content of the concept, but the context into which it fits that may form a fairly constant point of reference.

Perhaps an example will help. Suppose two people are arguing over whether to put a chair, a stool, or a couch in the corner of a room. On one level chairs, stools, and couches form three different concepts. Of course, on a more general level they could be said to be instances of the same concept, i.e. things on which people may sit. But this general statement hardly uniquely identifies chairs, stools, or couches. It is not the core meaning of any of them. What unifies this debate and makes it genuine is that one or the other of these pieces of furniture is to be fitted into this space which calls for something on which people may sit. To place a couch in this space is, ipso facto, to exclude placing either a chair or stool there. To defend the chair is to defend a different set of relations to others than a couch would permit. Still, the debate remains unified and genuine.

Similarly, in our lives problems concerning restraint, authority, power, and the determination of individual action inevitably arise. This space concerns freedom. Defense...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Half Title Page
• Series Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Dedication
• Preface
• Part I
• Part II
• Notes
• reference
• Index