State of Malaysia

Edmund Terence Gomez

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781134328406
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia dell'Asia

This book provides an overview of the current state of Malaysia, looking at political and economic developments and at governance, and discussing the impact of ethnicity, patronage and the reform movement. Apart from discussing issues such as Islamisation and identity transformations within Malaysian society, it reviews policies like privatisation and provides an examination of business enterprise, exploring how control of 'corporate Malaysia' is interlinked with political developments. This study's primary focus is an analysis of why the reform movement failed to secure substantial support in the late 1990s even though many Malaysians then appeared ready to hold the government accountable for its poor record of a democratic and transparent form of governance. This volume also assesses the likelihood of change as a result of the retirement of Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad

1 Testing Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy

William Case

Introduction

Malaysia has often been characterised as an exemplary pseudo-democracy, its government steeled with single-party dominance (see Zakaria 1989). In this configuration, the government has limited, but not fully extinguished civil liberties, while distorting, but not tightly rigging electoral procedures. Indeed, elections retain much competitiveness, with the opposition gaining up to 45 per cent of the popular vote at the federal level, while winning some state assemblies outright. Despite systematic electoral abuses, then, such as district malapportionment, gerrymandering and highly partisan use of state-owned facilities and media outlets, rule-bending has never been so severe that major opposition parties have resorted to boycotts, street actions or other anti-system strategies. Accordingly, Malaysia’s government has earned some legitimacy for its lengthy tenure through the modicum of electoral uncertainty that it allows. As the long-time prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad, advises, ‘Our way is through general elections. If [the people] like us they will elect us. If they don’t they can elect someone else’ (New Straits Times 21 April 2001).

Hence, as it is practised in Malaysia, pseudo-democracy involves a pattern of limited civil liberties, but at least moderately competitive elections, driven by, yet in turn helping to sustain, a government that centres on a single dominant party. To win elections in even these conditions, the government must, however, do more than truncate civil liberties. In attracting necessary thresholds of constituent support, the government must provide positive inducements of clientelist patronage and populist distributions, a general prosperity through which to fund these benefits, and a galvanising repertoire of ‘mentalities’ and tactical appeals. It may be, though, that pseudo-democracies, in allowing governments greater policy latitude than fuller democracies do, while sparing governments the deep mass resentments that can mar harder forms of authoritarianism, provide the political wherewithal with which best to carry out these functional tasks. Elections, then, prefaced by curbs on civil liberties, lift what in a fuller democracy might constitute a government plurality into a slight electoral majority, while boosting a slight majority into an extraordinary one. It is this amalgam, then, of policy autonomy and societal acquiescence, the reproduction of electoral padding – and the elite-level consensus that results – that gives pseudo-democracy much of its intrinsic stability.

Nonetheless, the performance of even governments that operate pseudo-democracies must falter episodically, and as clientelist and populist resources dwindle, economies contract, and mentalities thin, so too can elite- and mass-level compliance. Geddes (1999: 139) argues strongly that single dominant parties remain ‘remarkably resilient’ amid economic crises and sundry other pressures. However, if social grievances grow intense, they may finally test this party’s pseudo-democracy, sweeping over the curbs on civil liberties. In these circumstances, elections do less to inflate the government’s standing than to trumpet the rise of the opposition. To be sure, a government may react to its electoral defeat either by accepting or repudiating it. Either way, the pseudo-democracy is destabilised, with elections heralding a transition to a new type of regime characterised by fuller democracy or harder authoritarianism. This chapter, then, seeks to investigate the recent stresses in Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy, as well as the origins of this regime type and its long record of stability.

Pseudo-democracy’s origins in Malaysia

Through British colonial rule, Malaysia acquired parliamentary procedures and a competitive party system, relatively high levels of bureaucratic and judicial capacity, and reasonably professional security forces. This amounted to a ‘tutelary’ experience marked by rule-bound competitiveness, offering what Weiner (1987: 3–34) understands as a favourable precondition for stable democracy. However, the British also bequeathed to their Malayan possession a set of developmental patterns, social structures and elite-level expectations that weakened democracy’s prospects. As Diamond (1989: 13) reminds us,

British rule – like all colonial rule in the developing world – was highly authoritarian. If it educated elites in democratic values and ways, while permitting quite limited but gradually expanding indigenous representation and competition, its first and most important goal was the preservation of its own authority.

British colonial experience thus involves a mixed legacy, causing politics during the first decade of independence to mutate into a distorted form of ‘consociational democracy’ (Lustick 1979: 325–44; Case 1996), later a paradigmatic pseudo-democracy.

More specifically, the British geared the Malayan economy to commodities exports, thereby preventing the emergence of any significant industrial base, as well as any complex and free-standing local bourgeoisie. Further, in order to perpetuate this dependence, the British constructed a classic plural society (Furnivall 1956), one in which indigenous, and hence ‘sovereign’ Malay sultans and bureaucrats oversaw a co-ethnic mass base of cultivators. At the same time, immigrant Chinese and Indians were deployed in the tin mines and rubber plantations that made up the economy’s modern sectors. These immigrants were, however, regarded as sojourners who, even if occasionally accumulating wealth, were effectively denied citizenship and political rights. Colonial officials defended this configuration as a harmonious one. It sooner amounted, though, to a mutually negating social structure wherein nominally ascendant, but collectively indigent Malays were pitted against more economically rewarded, but disenfranchised non-Malays. Finally, when negotiating decolonisation after World War II, the British convened ethnic leaders in a series of meetings (Means 1976: 122–24). This strategy exalted the statuses of local elites, thus encouraging elite-level aspirations and collaborative behaviours. It did little at the mass level, however, to unite the disparate ethnic communities of plural society in shared notions of national identity and democratic procedures.

Unremarkably, then, the terms of independence satisfied collaborating elites. These elites presided over their new democracy in consociational ways, forming a trio of ethnic political parties – the United Malays’ National Organisation (UMNO), the Malayan (later Malaysian) Chinese Association (MCA), and the Malayan (later Malaysian) Indian Congress (MIC) – then formed a grand coalition called the Alliance. They also shared out their respective resources in politics and business. Top UMNO politicians ceded to leading Chinese business people in the MCA control over the economic ministries, then gained seats on the boards of Chinese-owned companies in turn.

Following Independence in 1957, however, social grievances simmered over delays in development and the inequalities between ethnic segments that could be mobilised. During the 1960s, Malaysia’s free markets, only slightly moderated by import substitution, perpetuated dependence on British investors and commodity markets. Where a local business community and urban middle class began to take root, it remained almost wholly Chinese and Indian.

The Alliance won the first two parliamentary elections held after independence in 1959 and 1964, but in 1969, elections finally gave vent to rising discontents, posing a sharp challenge to the government. Many Malays, gathering at the fringes of rapidly urbanising areas, there to view the comparative prosperity enjoyed by the Chinese, began to question the value of the UMNO’s holding office when it refused to better their economic lot. At the same time, the Chinese bristled over the MCA’s apparent inability to raise their political and cultural standings. In this situation, significant numbers of voters from both communities turned from the collaborative Alliance to more avowedly sectarian parties in opposition. Many Malays voted for the Pan-Malaysian Islamic Party (Parti Islam se-Malaysia, PAS), while many non-Malays supported the Democratic Action Party (DAP) and the Malaysian People’s Movement (Gerakan). Although the Alliance retained power at the federal level, it was gravely weakened, and it lost control over two state assemblies. The Malays appeared stunned by the UMNO’s setback. The Chinese, meanwhile, celebrated this outcome, holding ‘victory’ processions in the capital city of Kuala Lumpur. Malays soon confronted Chinese, culminating in a watershed event of ethnic rioting known as the 13 May incident (Von Vorys 1973).

In the wake of this upheaval over economic stagnancy, persistent ethnic inequalities and the temporising of independence-era elites, a faction of new elites gained ascendancy in UMNO, then moved dramatically to reconfigure Malaysia’s political economy in ways more compatible with structural conditions. In brief, UMNO drew most of the opposition parties into the ruling coalition, now re-badged the Barisan Nasional (BN, or National Front), then firmly established its party dominance (see Mauzy 1983). Fortified by greater state power, UMNO penetrated deeply into the economy. UMNO created a range of state enterprises through which to pursue more vigorous policies of import-substitution. It also embarked on a concerted programme of affirmative action. Labelled the New Economic Policy (NEP), the new state enterprises that had been erected were staffed with Malays, while ethnic quotas were imposed on private sector employment and equity stakes. In these ways, the developmentalist visions of a late-industrialising country, the mass-level aspirations of the Malay community and the acquisitiveness of Malay elites could be systematically fulfilled through import-substitution, exclusionary populism and clientelist patronage, made manifest in a stream of state positions, licenses, contracts, generous lending and, during the 1990s, a skewed privatisation of state assets, followed by a renationalisation amounting to bailouts.

In this way, UMNO re-energised much of its Malay following. Through the NEP, however, most rigorously enforced during the 1970s, the government also alienated many Chinese and Indians. Non-Malay resentments were then articulated by the DAP which, alone among the opposition parties, avoided absorption into the UMNO-centred BN. Moreover, during the 1980s, UMNO’s commitments to breakneck industrialisation appeared to breed ‘social ills’ that began to trouble many Malays. These respective concerns were expressed by PAS which, in having withdrawn from the BN, acquired a more strident Islamicist demeanour.

In these conditions, the government recognised that it possessed enough support that it could afford to hold elections. In order to restrict the PAS and the DAP in their mobilising activities, the BN greatly tightened controls over civil liberties (Munro-Kua 1996). A new sedition law, controls over the media, some ‘draconian’ constitutional amendments that forbade student organising and bureaucratic disclosure and more frequent use of preventive detention under the Internal Security Act (ISA) underscore the contraction of Malaysia’s consociational democracy into a pseudo-democracy. In these circumstances, while still tolerating levels of electoral competitiveness that must be assessed as meaningful, the government curbed civil liberties enough that it was able to win all seven parliamentary elections that were held after the 13 May incident, extending its run over a quarter-century from 1974 to 1999. Plainly, UMNO, having established it single-party dominance, recognised its capacity to operate, and to derive the legitimating benefits from, a pseudo-democratic regime.

Testing Malaysia’s pseudo-democracy

Notwithstanding the restrictions inherent in Malaysia’s long-standing pseudo-democracy, UMNO’s single-party dominance was abruptly challenged in the most recent general election, held in November 1999. Although the BN won this election, taking 55 per cent of the popular vote, UMNO, as the centrepiece of the ruling coalition, was sharply diminished. Indeed, the party is estimated to have lost the support of half, perhaps more, of the ethnic Malay electorate.

Prior to this election, a number of factors had eroded the standing of UMNO and its leader, Mahathir. The economic crisis of 1997–98 shook the confidence of many Malaysians in the government’s capacity for economic management. The ensuing split between Mahathir and his deputy and finance minister, Anwar Ibrahim, culminating in the latter’s expulsion from UMNO, arrest and long prison sentence, also stirred doubts about government commitments to judicial independence and social justice. The government’s bailing out of favoured business elites, while urban middle-class and rural populations endured economic uncertainties, encouraged resentments over perceptions of cronyism, that coincided with a new burst of Islamicist fervour.

These sentiments found expression in calls for reform, helping to vitalise the opposition parties and civil society (see Weiss 2000). The PAS, though committed to the formation of an Islamic state, and the DAP, officially multiethnic, but most responsive to the cultural grievances of the Chinese, embarked on a rapprochement, bridging the gap between their respective poles with smaller political parties and NGOs. Organised ethnic Malay groups like the Islamic Youth Movement of Malaysia (ABIM) and the Malaysian Islamic Reform Society (JIM) rallied around PAS in forming the Malaysian People’s Movement for Justice (Gerak). Predominantly Chinese NGOs like Malaysian People’s Voice (Suaram) gathered with the DAP and the Malaysian People’s Party (PRM) in forming the Coalition for People’s Democracy (Gagasan). Various multi-ethnic and women’s groups also affiliated with these gathering social movements which, in anticipation of elections, sprouted a new monitoring apparatus, Malaysian Citizen’s Election Watch (Pemantau). Finally, a new NGO that was simply labelled Adil (Justice), led by Wan Azizah Wan Ismail, the wife of Anwar Ibrahim, emerged as a linchpin between Gerak and Gagsan. Upon its gaining registration in early 1999 as the National Justice Party (Parti Keadilan Nasional), it was able also to rally the PAS, the DAP and the PRM under the banner of the Barisan Alternatif (BA, or Alternative Front) through which squarely to challenge the ruling BN.

Faced by this rise in civil society and evident new synergies between opposition parties, the government responded in pseudo-democratic ways, most notably, by manipulating flows of communication. The BA was barred from mainstream electronic and print media outlets, most of which are owned by the state, the ruling parties or closely allied business people. The government then staged a concerted media ‘blitz’, celebrating its long record of rapid industrialisation and social peace, while foreshadowing the chaos that it claimed would result if the BA came to power. It also supplemented its curbs on civil liberties with promises of pay rises and greater payments for civil servants and pensioners, while increasing development spending in rural Malay areas. Finally, the government tampered with procedures on the electoral dimension, preventing an estimated 680,000 newly registered voters, most of them young people thought to favour the opposition, from casting their ballots, ostensibly on the grounds that time had been too short to update the electoral roll.

In spite of these conditions, the government was able to win only 55 per cent of the popular vote. Non-Malay parties in the BN performed well, with their constituents remaining suspicious of long-standing PAS commitments to creating an Islamic state. Of course, many young Chinese had grown so alienated by the government that notwithstanding the PAS’s Islamicising aims they expressed support for the opposition; their impact was, however, blunted by the brevity of the electoral roll. Much more serious, then, from UMNO’s perspective was its abandonment by upwards of half of the Malay voters, despite the disenfranchisement of new registrants. Thus, where UMNO confronted the PAS directly, especially in the northern ‘Malay states’, it was frequently beaten, with the Islami...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Illustrations
• Contributors
• Preface and Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• Introduction: Politics, Business and Ethnicity In Malaysia: A State In Transition?
• 1. Testing Malaysia’s Pseudo-Democracy
• 2. Transethnic Solidarities, Racialisation and Social Equality
• 3. The Internet, Reformasi and Democratisation In Malaysia
• 4. Political Crisis and Reform In Malaysia
• 5. Real Change? Elections In the Reformasi Era
• 6. Governance, Affirmative Action and Enterprise Development: Ownership and Control of Corporate Malaysia
• 7. Privatisation, Patronage and Enterprise Development: Liberalising Telecommunications In Malaysia
• 8. Islamisation, Patronage and Political Ascendancy: The Politics and Business of Islam In Malaysia