Turkish Foreign Policy and Turkish Identity

A Constructivist Approach

Yucel Bozdaglioglu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2004
• eBook ISBN: 9781135941581
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Middle Eastern History
• Index: History

By using the core insights of the constructivist approach in International Relations, this book analyzes the foreign policy behavior of Turkey. It argues that throughout its modern history, Turkey's foreign policy has been affected by its Western identity created in the years following the War of Independence.

Chapter 1
Introduction

Political realism has dominated international relations theory for a long time. This tradition became more prominent especially in the post-World War II era due in most part to the emergence and persistence of the Cold War.

Realism has been criticized frequently during the last few decades and “demands for a ‘new paradigm’ have been made.”¹ Liberals have been the major participants in the critiques against realism.² As Alexander Wendt puts it,“…the debate is more concerned today with the extent to which state action is influenced by ‘structure’ (anarchy and the distribution of power) versus ‘process’ (interaction and learning) and institutions.”³

Along with neoliberals, critical social theorists called constructivists have joined the debate.⁴ Constructivists have contested the most important neorealist assumption that “state egoism in anarchy begets self-help.”⁵ In other words, “while neorealist pessimists assume international politics will always consist of self-regarding and relative-gain-seeking states, constructivist optimists assume that what is, need not always be.”⁶ According to constructivists, the causes of state egoism do not justify always treating it as given. Their main argument is that the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than material; and these structures shape actors’ identities and interests. They suggest that collective identity could emerge endogenously at the systemic level and such a process would generate cooperarion.⁷

My theoretical work enters the debate within the field of international relations over the appropriateness of neorealism and consequently the existing rational choice models as explanations of state behavior. Does the existence of cooperation or conflict depend upon the rational calculation of the costs and benefits of states or are cooperation and conflict better understood as a question of the social identities of the relevant actors? In order to answer these questions, this book builds upon elements of constructivism developed by Alexander Wendt and argues that state identity is a key factor in explaining international relations, including anarchy and cooperation.

Turkey, in this regard, constitutes a unique case study to assess the validity of the constructivist perspective as an alternative explanation of how foreign policy preferences, and consequently interests, are formulated. Turkey holds a special place in the international system because “it is on the very borderline between ‘North versus South”’⁸ and ‘East versus West.’ In addition to its exceptional geographical position, Turkey also holds a special place among different civilizations: the Muslim Middle Eastern and the Western. “It is a country with a predominantly Muslim population, but at the same time, it represents a unique version of a secular state approximating a Western-style democracy.”⁹ It houses various ethnic and social groups with different religious and ethnic identities.

Given its geographical and cultural positions in the international system in general and Middle Eastern and European subsystems in particular, some scholars suggested that “Turkey should look simultaneously to the East and West” and try “to optimize the benefits of geographic location by developing close relations with all the major blocs that Turkey interacts with, without necessarily developing a complete economic and political union with any particular bloc.”¹⁰

Despite the apparent advantages of this kind of foreign policy, Turkey, throughout its modern history, fully identified itself with the West, especially with Europe, and established close relations with the United States, while she maintained a very low profile in her relations with the Muslim Middle East, from which she derived much of her cultural heritage. This book argues that an analysis of Turkish identity is crucial to an understanding of Turkey’s Western-oriented foreign policy because Turkey’s decision to integrate itself into the West was tied to Turkey’s new western identity constructed in the years following the Independence War.

The Westernization movement in Turkey goes back to the period when the Ottoman Empire started to decline in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. When Europeans started to defeat the Ottoman army, Ottoman statesmen sent missions to Europe and opened embassies in various Western capitals in order to understand the West’s military superiority. When these missions discovered that the West’s superiority came from the use of science and technology, the Ottoman politicians tried to bring the new technology into the country by establishing engineering, medical, military and civil service schools with secular and positivist curricula. Even though they were trying to adopt only the material aspects of Western civilization, they could not prevent the spread of positivist ideas and cultural values of the West among the new classes created by the secular educational system. Although it started out as short-term practical measures to save the Empire, the pace and the scope of the Westernization movement increased in the second half of the nineteenth century and by the end of the century, many Western laws and practices had been adopted and a basically secular educational system had been established.

The Kemalist revolution that began in the 1920s was the radical and inevitable result of these modernization and westernization efforts that the Ottoman Empire had been undergoing for almost a century. However, it differed from previous attempts at modernization in that whereas the Ottoman reforms aimed at creating new institutions while retaining the old ones, thus creating a “duality,” the Kemalist reforms sought to completely abolish the old ones. It was not confined to only science and technology; it aimed at creating a new state, a new society, and an individual in line with those of the West.

For the Kemalist elite there existed only one civilization, and it meant European civilization. If Turkish society was to modernize, it would do so in every aspect of social, political and cultural life. The most important implication of this thinking was the exclusion of Islam from the definition of the state. In the Ottoman Empire, Mam was the basis of state legitimacy and the source of individual identification. The republican elite, in their efforts to create a national and secular state, sought to cut the ties linking the society and individual to the Ottoman past and the Islamic Eastern civilization by completely discarding Islam from the public sphere. There was only one civilization, which was superior to Eastern civilization, and Turkey had to be a part of it in order to survive. This policy in turn led to the suppression of other identities, mainly ethnic and religious, and exclusion of them from the political process. The reforms throughout the republican era served to realize this purpose. They show “how indigenous ruling elites have imposed their notions of a Western cultural model, resulting in conversion almost on a civilizational scale.”¹¹ Later, the republic’s principles, named Kemalism after Mustafa Kemal Ataturk and incorporated into the Constitution in 1937, came to define the basic character of the Turkish State.

Another characteristic of the modernization process was its being a top-down process carried out by bureaucratic-authoritarian political and military elites, who were the products of the Ottoman reforms. After the death of Ataturk, they consolidated their power and came to dominate Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. As Hakan Yavuz pointed out, “foreign relations filtered down from the secular elite’s self-ascribed European identity, which in turn was the basis of framing ‘Turkish national interest.”’¹² They took further steps in westernizing the country and in making Turkey an actual ally of the West. The process began when Turkey signed the tripartite agreement with Britain and France in 1939 and gained further impetus when Turkey joined NATO, the Council of Europe, and other Western political and economic organizations. It was in the context of the Cold War that Turkey was able to establish close relations with the West. At the same time, Turkey stayed aloof from Middle Eastern politics, a brief period of the Baghdad Pact in 1955 being the only exception. To be a part of the West in every aspect and gain recognition as a Western state thenceforth has come to occupy the center of Turkish foreign policy.

“The ‘West’ to which Turks feel they belong or wish to belong” however, “means Europe more than the United States.”¹³ It was Europe that inspired the generations of Westernists in Turkey as they struggled to modernize the country. To be a part of the West means to be “European.” The last step in this direction was membership in the European Union (EU). “According to Turkish policy-makers, membership in the new European Community was a logical extension of Turkey’s inclusion in the other Western organizations, since it was seen as the economic dimension supplementing and cementing the Western alliances.”¹⁴ Turkey applied for membership in the European Union (then European Community (EC)) on July 31, 1959. Despite the presence of economic difficulties in the Turkish economy, “the increased importance of security concerns encouraged the EC to waive economic objections to Turkey’s accession.”¹⁵

On September 12, 1963, Turkey and the EU signed the Ankara Agreement, which defined the preparatory, transitional, and final stages, whereby Turkey gained associate member status. Even though economic and political difficulties prevented Turkey from implementing the terms of Ankara Agreement and resulted in the deterioration of Turkish-EU relations, Turkey finally decided to apply for full membership on 14 April 1987. However, “the decision of the European Union to defer Turkey’s membership for an indefinite period was greeted by both the Turkish elite and the public at large with deep disappointment and resentment.”¹⁶

The EU’s decision coincided with a period in which a debate concerning Turkey’s national identity was taking place among the Kemalists Westerners, on the one hand, and the Islamists on the other. In the 1970s, Islamists had already resurfaced on the Turkish political scene, exploiting the failure of the Kemalist modernization project and demanding a change in the founding principles of the state. At that time, Mam as a political force was not strong enough to challenge the identity of the state and the westernization project. The 1980s and 1990s, however, witnessed a gradual rise of Islamic sentiment in Turkey that resulted in the electoral success of the Islamic Welfare Party (WP) in the 1995 national elections. The leaders of the WP heavily exploited the attitudes of Europeans toward Turkey and promised to change the direction of Turkey’s foreign policy away from Europe toward the Muslim world. During their short stint in power in 1996–1997, the WP initiated some Pan-Islamic projects and seriously challenged Turkey’s Western identity.

The 1980s and the 1990s also witnessed the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the emergence of new Turkic republics in Central Asia, creating an enthusiasm for a leadership role for Turkey in the region. This enthusiasm for “Turkey’s tutelary role in Central Asia was in part a reaction to what was perceived as rejection by the West.”¹⁷ As Samuel Huntington puts it:

Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer. The end of the Soviet Union gives Turkey the opportunity to become the leader of a revived Turkic civilization involving seven countries from the borders of Greece to those of China.¹⁸

As a result, the debate revolved around national identity, the definition of national interest, and the kind of political, economic, and social systems that Turkey should adopt. In the course of these debates, basic decisions regarding Turkey’s foreign policy (defense and national security) became inextricably intertwined with the national identity of Turkey. According to the Kemalist elite, Turkey should stay with the West and try to gain recognition as a European state. For Islamists, Turkey cannot be a part of Europe because it belongs to a different civilization. Instead, Turkey should ally with other Muslim countries in the Middle East. Nationalists, on the other hand, argue that Turkey, without a radical departure from its West-oriented foreign policy, should pay more attention to the Turkic republics and play a leadership role in the region.

Realists might argue that Turkey’s identification with the West was motivated purely by Turkey’s security and economic interests. Turkey’s membership in the NATO alliance and political commitment to the West, for example, might have been aimed solely against the Soviet threat that emerged after the second war. There are at least two objections to this argument, however. First, while Turkey’s ties with the West were based on concrete security interests, they also manifested a will to become part of the West. Joining NATO, as one scholar expressed, “filled Turkish hearts with pride and exaltation. They were no longer ‘outsiders.’ They were at last part of the West.”¹⁹

Second, the direction of Turkish foreign policy was drawn during the time of Ataturk when he wanted Turkey to reach the level of contemporary civilization, which only meant European civilization. During this time, there was no Soviet threat to be balanced against. Furthermore, Turkey received financial and emotional help from the Soviet Union during the Independence War. The Soviet threat emerged after Turkey began to ally itself fully with the West. Turkey farther deepened its relations with the West even when there was no serious threat from the Soviet Union after the 1950s. As a middle power with a unique geographical position, Turkey could have played off the superpowers against each other to maximize its gains during the Cold War. As explained in chapter IV, especially after the Cuban missile crisis, the Soviets were doing everything possible to earn Turkey’s neutrality in the Cold War. However, Turkish political leaders bluntly stated that neutrality was not an option and Turkey would continue to fully ally with the West. Turkey’s identification with the West persisted even when it did not get any support from its allies on the Cyprus issue, which was—and still is—a major concern of Turkish foreign policy.

Turkey’s somewhat chaotic relations with its Middle Eastern neighbors can also be explained by reference to its identity. Even though the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War gave many opportunities to Turkey to formulate more flexible regional policies, Turkey continued its full identification with the West. For example, a realist would expect that Turkey would try to get support from its neighbors, especially from Iraq and Iran, for its long-lasting Kurdish problem since they also have a substantial Kurdish population. However, Turkey’s fear that Iran and other radical Islamic countries may contribute to the spread of Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey drove Turkish political leaders to distance themselves from these countries. Turkey’s active participation in the Gulf War also further harmed its relations with Iraq, which reversed its policy on the Kurdish issue and supported the outlawed Kurdish Workers Party’s (PKK) activities in Turkey. Turkey’s policy in the Gulf War also required Turkey to cut off its trade with Iraq—one of Turkey’s biggest trading partners in the region—costing billions of dollars in damage. Moreover, Turkey’s military agreements with Israel concluded in 1997 sent shock waves throughout the Middle East and became a major problem in Turkey’s relations with the regional countries.

This book argues that an adequate account of Turkish foreign policy requires an analysis of Turkey’s identity since it is closely linked to the formulation of foreign policy. As the above examples show, even though Turkey had ample opportunities during and after the Cold War to formulate its foreign policy to maximize its material gains, it chose to stay with the West, sometimes at its own cost. Furthermore, as I argue throughout, even when Turkish decision makers thought that only the identification with the West could maximize Turkey’s gains, their definition of those material gains was based on Turkey’s identity.

A.
REVIEW OF CHAPTERS

The main focus of this book will be Turkey’s foreign policy during and after the cold war period. However, in order to see the effects of identity on the formulation of Turkey’s foreign policy preferences during this time frame, the analysis should be supported by a historical analysis of how that identity was constructed in the first place and how it defined Turkey’s preferences and interests. Chapter 2 reviews realist and constructivists arguments and gives a critique of both. Chapter 3 is an analysis of the impact of the West during the Ottoman Empire and the construction of official Turkish identity in the years following the Independence War in 1920. It argues that since Turkish politics was dominated by Mustafa Kemal Ataturk—the founder of the modern Turkish Republic—I look at his definition of western identity and his ideas on both western and eastern civilizations. The chapter also includes the elements and institutionalization of Turkey’s west...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1: Introduction
• Chapter 2: Literature Review
• Chapter 3: Modernization and the Construction of Turkey’s Official Identity
• Chapter 4: Turkey and the West
• Chapter 5: Identity Crisis and Turkey’s Search for Alternatives
• Chapter 6: Turkey and the Muslim Middle East
• Chapter 7: Turkey and Israel: The “Outsiders” in the Middle East
• Chapter 8: Conclusion
• Notes
• Bibliography