Chapter 1
The Value of Style
‘In this day’s silly Sunday Times,’ says Samuel Butler,‘there is an article on Mrs. Browning’s letters which begins with some remarks about style. “It is recorded,” says the writer, “of Plato, that in a rough draft of one of his Dialogues, found after his death, the first paragraph was written in seventy different forms. Wordsworth spared no pains to sharpen and polish to the utmost the gifts with which nature had endowed him; and Cardinal Newman, one of the greatest masters of English style, has related in an amusing essay the pains he took to acquire his style.”
‘I never knew a writer yet who took the smallest pains with his style and was at the same time readable. Plato’s having had seventy shies at one sentence is quite enough to explain to me why I hate him.’
Few of us are as bold and blunt as Butler (who took an impish delight in pulling the legs or noses of the conventional); and yet when I read examination answers, or Ph.D. dissertations, or some things that are published in books and periodicals even by professional critics of literature, I sometimes wonder if a good many of us, although we give years of our lives to English, do not practise what Butler preached, a good deal more thoroughly than Butler himself. For, in practice, Butler took pains to write well, vividly, amusingly; and even in theory, as we shall see, Butler proceeded to eat a good deal of what he had said in disparagement of style. For he was really rebelling, not against style, but against what he considered preciousness in style. And in art it seems to me true enough that the ‘precious’ is worthless.
In fact, Butler’s quarrel, like so many quarrels, remains largely verbal. He is here using ‘style’ to mean a deliberately cultivated, individual, peculiar style of one’s own – something that he associated with pretentious aesthetes. In this sense, Hazlitt too denied having a style. And, again, Southey wrote, ‘Of what is called style, not a thought enters my head at any time’ – his only endeavour was, he said, ‘to write plain English, and to put my thoughts in language which every one can understand’. Yet this has not prevented critics from praising both Hazlitt and Southey for their ‘style’. And rightly. Why should we thus narrow a useful word to mean merely a special manner of writing that approaches mannerism – as in Lamb or De Quincey, Pater or Doughty? It robs us of a general term we need.
Often, indeed, I suspect that those who decry ‘style’ are impelled by that humble-seeming pride which is too proud to make pretensions, and therefore belittles what it disdains to pretend to. Sometimes, too, men have been influenced by an odd belief in the virtue of generality and impersonality. ‘A marked manner,’ says Horace Walpole, denouncing the style of the hated Johnson, ‘when it runs through all the compositions of any master, is a defect in itself, and indicates a deviation from nature. … It is true that the greatest masters of composition are so far imperfect, as that they always leave some marks by which we may discover their hand. He approaches the nearest to universality whose works make it difficult for our quickness and sagacity to observe certain characteristic touches which ascertain the specific author.’
Fortunately no one practised this less than Walpole himself, in his letters. But we are not at the moment concerned whether this bleak Act of Uniformity is wise or not (though it seems to me no wiser than its opposite extreme, the rage at all costs for originality). The point is that those who dislike any personal mannerism would do better to call it that; and not to confuse matters by calling it, without qualification, ‘style’.
What, in fact, is ‘style’? A dead metaphor. It meant originally ‘a writing-implement’– a pointed object, of bone or metal, for inscribing wax. But already in Classical Latin the word stĭlus was extended to mean, first, a man’s ‘way of writing’; then, more generally, his ‘way of expressing himself’, in speech as well as in writing. In modern English, ‘style’ has acquired further senses. As in French, it has been narrowed to signify ‘a good way of expressing oneself’ – ‘his writing lacked style’; and it has been extended to other arts than literature, even to the art of living – ‘her behaviour showed always a certain style’. But the two main meanings which concern us here, are (1) ‘a way of writing’; (2) ‘a good way of writing’.
Our subject, then, is simply the effective use of language, especially in prose, whether to make statements or to rouse emotions. It involves, first of all, the power to put facts with clarity and brevity; but facts are usually none the worse for being put also with as much grace and interest as the subject permits. For grace or interest, indeed, if the subject is purely practical, like conics or conchology, there may not be much room; though even cookery books have been salted with occasional irony; and even mathematicians have indulged in jests, as of going to Heaven in a perpendicular straight line. But, further, men need also to express and convey their emotions (even animals do); and to kindle emotions in others. Without emotion, no art of literature; nor any other art.
You may of course answer, like Butler: ‘But this is all affectation – fiddling with phrases and trifling with cadences! Give me simple English and common sense.’ And yet, just as ‘common sense’ is far from common, simple English can prove in practice far from simple to attain. Further, this difficulty has more serious consequences, both public and private, than is sometimes realized. Our verbal communications remain often badly ambiguous; and, in another sense than the Apostle intended, ‘evil communications corrupt good manners’.
For two thousand years Christendom has been rent with controversy because men could not agree about the meaning of passages in Holy Writ; both Old and New Testaments have been more disputed than any human will. The gardens and porticoes of philosophy are hung with philosophers entangled in their own verbal cobwebs. Statesmen meet at Yalta or Potsdam to make agreements, about the meaning of which they then proceed to disagree. Employers and workers reach settlements that lead only to fresh unsettlement, because they misunderstand the understandings they themselves have made. Sharp legal minds spend their lives drafting documents in a verbose jargon of their own which shall be knave-proof and fool-proof; but it is seldom that other legal minds as sharp cannot find in those documents, if they try, some fruitful points for litigation. Even in war, where clarity may be a matter of life or death for thousands, disasters occur through orders misunderstood. Some adore ambiguities in poetry; in prose they can be a constant curse.
For example it seems that, within a few hours in the Crimea, first of all Lord Cardigan’s misinterpreting of Lord Lucan’s orders wasted the victory of the Heavy Brigade, and then Lord Lucan’s misinterpreting of Lord Raglan’s orders caused the suicide of the Light Brigade. It is said that Sir Roger Casement was hanged on a comma in a statute of Edward III. And Professor Ifor Evans has adduced the strange case of Caleb Diplock who bequeathed half a million for ‘charitable or benevolent objects’. Clear enough, one would have thought – though needlessly verbose. But the law regularly sacrifices brevity to make sure of clarity – and too often loses both. In this case legal lynxes discerned that ‘benevolent’ objects are not necessarily ‘charitable’. The suit was carried from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeal, f...