CHAPTER 1: The Value of Style
âIN THIS DAYâs silly Sunday Times,â says Samuel Butler, âthere is an article on Mrs. Browningâs letters which begins with some remarks about style. âIt is recorded,â says the writer, âof Plato, that in a rough draft of one of his Dialogues, found after his death, the first paragraph was written in seventy different forms. Wordsworth spared no pains to sharpen and polish to the utmost the gifts with which nature had endowed him; and Cardinal Newman, one of the greatest masters of English style, has related in an amusing essay the pains he took to acquire his style.â
âI never knew a writer yet who took the smallest pains with his style and was at the same time readable. Platoâs having had seventy shies at one sentence is quite enough to explain to me why I hate him.â
Few of us are as bold and blunt as Butler (who took an impish delight in pulling the legs or noses of the conventional); and yet when I read examination answers, or Ph.D. dissertations, or some things that are published in books and periodicals even by professional critics of literature, I sometimes wonder if a good many of us, although we give years of our lives to English, do not practise what Butler preached, a good deal more thoroughly than Butler himself. For, in practice, Butler took pains to write well, vividly, amusingly; and even in theory, as we shall see, Butler proceeded to eat a good deal of what he had said in disparagement of style. For he was really rebelling, not against style, but against what he considered preciousness in style. And in art it seems to me true enough that the âpreciousâ is worthless.
In fact, Butlerâs quarrel, like so many quarrels, remains largely verbal. He is here using âstyleâ to mean a deliberately cultivated, individual, peculiar style of oneâs own â something that he associated with pretentious aesthetes. In this sense, Hazlitt too denied having a style. And, again, Southey wrote, âOf what is called style, not a thought enters my head at any timeâ â his only endeavour was, he said, âto write plain English, and to put my thoughts in language which every one can understandâ. Yet this has not prevented critics from praising both Hazlitt and Southey for their âstyleâ. And rightly. Why should we thus narrow a useful word to mean merely a special manner of writing that approaches mannerism â as in Lamb or De Quincey, Pater or Doughty? It robs us of a general term we need.
Often, indeed, I suspect that those who decry âstyleâ are impelled by that humble-seeming pride which is too proud to make pretensions, and therefore belittles what it disdains to pretend to. Sometimes, too, men have been influenced by an odd belief in the virtue of generality and impersonality. âA marked manner,â says Horace Walpole, denouncing the style of the hated Johnson, âwhen it runs through all the compositions of any master, is a defect in itself, and indicates a deviation from nature. ⊠It is true that the greatest masters of composition are so far imperfect, as that they always leave some marks by which we may discover their hand. He approaches the nearest to universality whose works make it difficult for our quickness and sagacity to observe certain characteristic touches which ascertain the specific author.â
Fortunately no one practised this less than Walpole himself, in his letters. But we are not at the moment concerned whether this bleak Act of Uniformity is wise or not (though it seems to me no wiser than its opposite extreme, the rage at all costs for originality). The point is that those who dislike any personal mannerism would do better to call it that; and not to confuse matters by calling it, without qualification, âstyleâ.
What, in fact, is âstyleâ? A dead metaphor. It meant originally âa writing-implementâ â a pointed object, of bone or metal, for inscribing wax. But already in Classical Latin the word stÄlus was extended to mean, first, a manâs âway of writingâ; then, more generally, his âway of expressing himselfâ, in speech as well as in writing. In modern English, âstyleâ has acquired further senses. As in French, it has been narrowed to signify âa good way of expressing oneselfâ â âhis writing lacked styleâ; and it has been extended to other arts than literature, even to the art of living â âher behaviour showed always a certain styleâ. But the two main meanings which concern us here, are (1) âa way of writingâ; (2) âa good way of writingâ.
Our subject, then, is simply the effective use of language, especially in prose, whether to make statements or to rouse emotions. It involves, first of all, the power to put facts with clarity and brevity; but facts are usually none the worse for being put also with as much grace and interest as the subject permits. For grace or interest, indeed, if the subject is purely practical, like conics or conchology, there may not be much room; though even cookery books have been salted with occasional irony; and even mathematicians have indulged in jests, as of going to Heaven in a perpendicular straight line. But, further, men need also to express and convey their emotions (even animals do); and to kindle emotions in others. Without emotion, no art of literature; nor any other art.
You may of course answer, like Butler: âBut this is all affectation â fiddling with phrases and trifling with cadences! Give me simple English and common sense.â And yet, just as âcommon senseâ is far from common, simple English can prove in practice far from simple to attain. Further, this difficulty has more serious consequences, both public and private, than is sometimes realized. Our verbal communications remain often badly ambiguous; and, in another sense than the Apostle intended, âevil communications corrupt good mannersâ.
For two thousand years Christendom has been rent with controversy because men could not agree about the meaning of passages in Holy Writ; both Old and New Testaments have been more disputed than any human will. The gardens and porticoes of philosophy are hung with philosophers entangled in their own verbal cobwebs. Statesmen meet at Yalta or Potsdam to make agreements, about the meaning of which they then proceed to disagree. Employers and workers reach settlements that lead only to fresh unsettlement, because they misunderstand the understandings they themselves have made. Sharp legal minds spend their lives drafting documents in a verbose jargon of their own which shall be knave-proof and fool-proof; but it is seldom that other legal minds as sharp cannot find in those documents, if they try, some fruitful points for litigation. Even in war, where clarity may be a matter of life or death for thousands, disasters occur through orders misunderstood. Some adore ambiguities in poetry; in prose they can be a constant curse.
For example it seems that, within a few hours in the Crimea, first of all Lord Cardiganâs misinterpreting of Lord Lucanâs orders wasted the victory of the Heavy Brigade, and then Lord Lucanâs misinterpreting of Lord Raglanâs orders caused the suicide of the Light Brigade. It is said that Sir Roger Casement was hanged on a comma in a statute of Edward III. And Professor Ifor Evans has adduced the strange case of Caleb Diplock who bequeathed half a million for âcharitable or benevolent objectsâ. Clear enough, one would have thought â though needlessly verbose. But the law regularly sacrifices brevity to make sure of clarity â and too often loses both. In this case legal lynxes discerned that âbenevolentâ objects are not necessarily âcharitableâ. The suit was carried from the Court of First Instance to the Court of Appeal, from the Court of Appeal to the Lords; judges uttered seventy thousand words of collective wisdom; and poor Mr. Diplockâs will was pronounced invalid. Much virtue in an âorâ. Well did the Chinese say that when a piece of paper blows into a law-court, it may take a yoke of oxen to drag it out again.
But men not only underestimate the difficulty of language; they often underestimate also its appalling power. True, the literary (for very human reasons) are sometimes tempted, on the contrary, to exaggerate it. We may well smile at writers who too confidently claim that the pen is mightier than the sword. Fletcher of Saltounâs exaltation of the songs of a people as more important than its laws, Shelleyâs glorification of poets as the unacknowledged legislators of mankind, Tennysonâs poet whose word shakes the world, OâShaughnessyâs three men who trample down empires with the lilt of a new song â these, I feel, are somewhat too complacent half-truths. With all his powers of speech, Demosthenes could not save Greece; nor Cicero the Roman Republic; nor Milton the English Commonwealth. Yet it does seem rational to say that Voltaire and Burke became, in a sense, European powers; that Rousseauâs Contrat Social left a permanent mark on the history of Europe, and Paineâs Common Sense on that of America. This, if we brush away the blur of familiarity, remains astonishing enough. And these men, I think, won their triumphs not more (if so much) by force of thought than by force of style. Nor let us forget the influence of the English Bible.
How different, too, might have been the history of our own time if the written and spoken style of Adolf Hitler, detestable in itself, had been less potent to intoxicate the German people; or if the German people had had enough sense of style to reject that repellent claptrap; or again if Winston Churchill had not possessed a gift of phrase to voice and fortify the feelings of his countrymen in their darkest and their finest hour! Even the curious mind of Communism does not reject style as a bauble of the bourgeoisie. âIt is the businessâ, we have been told, âof the linguist and the critic to study the style of Stalin.â âLearn to write as Stalin writes.â In such fulsome hyperboles there is at least a sense of the importance of style; if little sense of any other kind.
Some years ago, indeed, a distinguished scientist, enraged by the airs of the literary, protested impatiently that in this, âthe hydro-electric ageâ, menâs worship of mere verbiage was out of date â for âthe spark-gap is mightier than the penâ. Seemingly it escaped him that the rhetoric of the FĂŒhrer had already reduced the scientists of the Third Reich into docile slaves, who demonstrated at his bidding the virtues of a non-existent Aryan race, or forged the weapons that were to force his infernal gospel on the world. Similarly in the Soviet Union we have seen biologists compelled to bow to âMarxismâ and to find once more, like Galileo, orthodoxy mightier than science.
And, again, Señor de Madariaga has quoted a pleasant item on Darwin from a catechism current in Francoâs Spain: âThis so-called scientist was born in Shrewsburg [sic], England. Endowed by God with a considerable gift of observation, but with very little intelligence. ⊠â
Our grandfathers hopefully chanted âGreat is the truth, and shall prevailâ; they knew little of propaganda. Mankind has not yet mastered language; often it has mastered them â scientists and all. Few of them realize this. And that only makes it worse.
True, it is not always by excellence of style that books exert this appalling power. It was not by beauty of language that the writings of Marx became a new gospel. Flaubert himself, that saint and martyr of style, felt driven to confess that the greatest writers were pre-occupied with greater things than perfect words. âCe qui distingue les grands gĂ©nies, câest la gĂ©nĂ©ralisation et la crĂ©ation. ⊠Est-ce quâon ne croit pas Ă lâexistence de Don Quichotte comme Ă celle de CĂ©sar? Shakespeare est quelque chose de formidable sous ce rapport. Ce nâĂ©tait pas un homme, mais un continent; il y avait des grands hommes en lui, des foules entiĂšres, des paysages. Ils nâont pas besoin de faire du style, ceux-lĂ ; ils sont forts en dĂ©pit de toutes les fautes et Ă cause dâelles. Mais nous, les petits, nous ne valons que par lâexĂ©cution achevĂ©e. Hugo, en ce siĂšcle, enfoncera tout le monde, quoiquâil soit plein de mauvaises choses; mais quel souffle! quel souffle! Je hasarde ici une proposition que je nâoserais dire nulle part: câest que les trĂšs grands hommes Ă©crivent souvent fort mal, et tant mieux pour eux. Ce nâest pas lĂ quâil faut chercher lâart de la forme, mais chez les seconds (Horace, la BruyĂšre).â
There...