America, War and Power

Defining the State, 1775-2005

Lawrence Sondhaus, A. James Fuller, Lawrence Sondhaus, A. James Fuller

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781135981693
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Written by leading historians and political scientists, this collection of essays offers a broad and comprehensive coverage of the role of war in American history.

Addressing the role of the armed force, and attitudes towards it, in shaping and defining the United States, the first four chapters reflect the perspectives of historians on this central question, from the time of the American Revolution to the US wars in Vietnam and Iraq. Chapters five and six offer the views of political scientists on the topic, one in light of the global systems theory, the other from the perspective of domestic opinion and governance. The concluding essay is written by historians Fred Anderson and Andrew Cayton, whose co-authored book The Dominion of War: Empire and Liberty in North America, 1500-2000 provided the common reading for the symposium which produced these essays.

America, War and Power will be of much interest to students and scholars of US military history, US politics and military history and strategy in general.

1 Defining a New Empire

The New Power Takes Shape, 1775–1815

Jeremy Black

Editor’s introduction

Taking an outsider’s view, the author focuses on the context of international competition in which the United States formed. Challenging the traditional exceptionalist view, he argues that the first decades of the new republic were marked by war. To the degree that they helped to define the perspectives of the Federalists and the Democratic-Republicans, debates over military power were central to the politics of the early republic.

America was a state born in war, and its early decades as an independent state involved the assertion of power through force, against both foreign and domestic challenges. Indeed, exigencies and debates focused on force, and how best to secure, sustain and use it, were crucial in the political and governmental history of these decades. This subject is generally neglected these days because of a preference, in accounts of the American Revolution and subsequent years, for social themes, especially topical ones of gender and race. Furthermore, among political historians, and, here again, there is no American exceptionalism, there has traditionally been a degree of reluctance in coming to terms with the formative context of international competition and military need. In seeking as a foreigner to discuss the subject, there is a danger that the opposite approach is taken, with an excessive focus on this context, at the expense, in particular, of the role of domestic political debate, in not only framing but also determining the understanding of this context, and therefore in providing the essential narrative. Yet, there is first-rate American work on the topic,¹ and this chapter is intended as a contribution to be read alongside this literature.

If contexts are the order at the outset, then the interpretative context also requires understanding. Here the key problem is posed by American exceptionalism, an approach that both discourages American scholars from looking for parallels that might add comparative insights, and foreign scholars from doing the same. The key context for this period is that, between 1776 and 1815, America was not alone in having to define itself as a new state in an acutely threatening international order, for this was also true of a host of states and would-be-states across the Western world; while all existing states, in responding to challenges, did likewise, albeit within far more established political patterns. The usual comparison for the American Revolution is with the French Revolution that began in 1789, but that, in fact, was only one among a number of European revolutionary or radical movements, and, in several countries in the 1780s, shortlived radical governments were established. These included Geneva, the United Provinces (modern Netherlands) and the Austrian Netherlands (modern Belgium), in all of which the new order was suppressed by counter-revolutionary force. The destruction of Polish independence early the following decade can also be located in this context, as the reform movement that had drawn up a new constitution in 1791 was a particular issue for Catherine the Great of Russia. Furthermore, as another comparative element, the range of territories affected by secessionist movements in the European colonial world also included Ireland (against British rule in 1798) and Haiti (against the French).

It was also necessary for colonial authorities to respond to the de facto independence thrust upon them by the overthrow of metropoles by French forces during the French Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1792–1815). This was a problem throughout the Spanish empire, as the Bourbon dynasty there was overthrown by Napoleon in 1808 and replaced by his own brother, Joseph, and also, to a lesser extent, in its Portuguese counterpart. The extent to which these colonial authorities had to devise diplomatic and military policies has been underrated, because new states were not created until after the Napoleonic Wars, but independence was not the necessary precondition for these policies.

As yet, there is not the basis for a systematic comparative study of this issue, while a chapter-length is insufficient for this purpose. Nevertheless, across the Western world, a sense of incipience accompanied by urgency was general, and the issues were similar. In particular, as with all revolutionary periods, irrespective of the goals of policy, there was the question of how best to control military forces. This involved both the specific issue of loyalty, with the political consequences that might arise, and the more general one of long-term political and social impact. The issue of loyalty was most acute if the new political system was felt to be under threat. That led, for example, to the killing of French Revolutionary generals for being unsuccessful, as Theobald Dillon was in 1792, and Adam Philippe de Custine in 1793, because a lack of success was held to betoken an absence of zeal, if not worse. Such an approach would have played havoc with American commanders in 1775–83 and 1812–15: Philip Schuyler, Benjamin Lincoln and Horatio Gates would have been prominent victims, and George Washington could have been executed for failing to save New York City in 1776 and Philadelphia in 1777, or for not crushing Sir Henry Clinton at Monmouth Court House in 1778.

Alongside ensuring effectiveness, a failure to control the military was clearly a serious problem for new governments and states. Napoleon’s coup in 1799 revealed this in France, while successive caudillos were to make it apparent in Spanish America, and the civil sphere in Haiti suffered greatly from the same problem. The US was far from removed from this process. Brigadier General James Wilkinson, Governor of the Louisiana Territory, was heavily involved with the plans associated with Vice President Aaron Burr in 1804–6, which included the secession of New York and New England (1804),² and, with subsequently, the “Spanish Conspiracy,” which appears to have included plans for a Western secession. Wilkinson hoped to seize Santa Fé from the Spaniards for his own ends. Indeed, Wilkinson’s self-serving treason was not dependent on Burr, nor restricted to his schemes. Furthermore, they nearly put paid to the career of the best American general prior to the Civil War for, in 1810, Winfield Scott was court martialled and suspended for a year for criticizing Wilkinson’s involvement.³ At the same time, successive versions of the Mississippi Question reflected the volatility of loyalties in the hinterland.

Alongside the fear of military force subverting the republic, of a Benedict Arnold, Oliver Cromwell or Napoleon Bonaparte, or their equivalent, indeed, in religious terms, of an ungodly “Man of Blood” acting as an un-Christian tyrant, there was also a profound anxiety about the problems for American public life that would come from the military, irrespective of the intentions of its commanders. In part, this stemmed from the origins of the American state (the federal entity as well as the individual states), both as a product of British political culture and as a reaction against the supposed authoritarian practices of the metropole, not least in its use of military force, in its expectations of financial support for the military, and in its readiness to rely on military governance.

The political culture was that of opposition to a standing army. This was the product of a seventeenth-century English tradition, directed against Stuart and Cromwellian autocracy, that had been revivified in the “Commonwealth” and country-party critique of supposed “Old Corps” Whig governmental practices and intentions during the reigns of George I (1714–27) and George II (1727–60). From the imperial perspective, this might appear surprising, as British regulars had played a key role in the conquest of French Canada in 1758–60, thus ending the challenge to British North America’s most vulnerable borders. However, the British military had won few plaudits from the colonists, being widely seen, particularly by self-conscious local politicians, as autocratic in intention and manner. Some British officers indeed loathed the American troops and thought them incompetent, a judgment that the French and Indian War did not bear out, but one that reflected not so much a hostile response to an American proto-nationalism, as the view that many regulars held of militia and, indeed, of civil society.⁴ Under George III, American hostility to the British military had risen when it had been associated, first as cause and, subsequently, as support, for an unpopular process of taxation; and this was to be accentuated by the experience of war and occupation.⁵

This was not the best background for any attempt to create a standing force to fight for American independence. This problem was exacerbated by the extent to which assumptions and practices about military goals and activity were colony-based and militia-orientated.⁶ The US therefore represented an accentuation of the commonplace reluctance to see regular forces as anything other than supporters of centralization and arbitrary government. In forming this attitude, the acceptance of the theory of natural rights or natural law in the Declaration of Independence questioned the legitimacy of all authority, especially central authority, and the discrediting of executive power was also important.

Yet, more than a militia would be required to fight the British regulars. This was urgent from the outset, both because the British had a substantial force in Boston, and as a result of the great vulnerability of America, its lack of a battle fleet. Whatever the strength of individual American warships, as seen in 1812 when three British frigates were captured, and whatever the potential of American privateers, the Americans lacked a fleet able to block the use of the Atlantic by the British, both as a means of communication, partly solving logistical issues, and as the basis for a strategic dimension. In the nineteenth century, this was to lead to a heavy emphasis in the US on coastal fortifications in doctrine, force structure, and expenditure, a policy clearly directed against Britain, the leading naval power, but this was not a viable solution during the War of Independence. The relevant forts were lacking at the strategic level, and, operationally, garrisons in positions such as Fort Washington and Ticonderoga were unable to prevent British advances, as the campaigns of 1776 and 1777, respectively, demonstrated. Instead, by fixing garrisons, forts were actually a source of vulnerability, which the fall of Fort Washington in 1776 demonstrated. Similarly, the forts that blocked the river approaches to Philadelphia were captured in 1777.

On June 14, 1775, Congress decided to raise the Continental Army and, the following day, appointed George Washington commander of “all the Continental forces, raised, or to be raised, for the defense of American liberty.” Understandably, he was unwilling to see militiamen as a substitute for Continentals. However, the powerful American ideological–political preference for militia over a trained army continued throughout the war. Creating numerous problems for Washington, this made it difficult to complete the Continental regiments.

It is possible either to emphasize the extent to which a new army was forged, serving as the basis for a new consciousness, or, alternatively, to stress deficiencies. The degree to which the army represented a new political identity and social practice certainly helped to sustain its cohesion, and even the continuation of the Revolutionary cause when the war went badly, as in the winter of 1777–8, when the army camped at Valley Forge. The formation of the army indeed was a political act: the army, a force that would not dissolve at the end of the year, even if individual terms of service came to an end, symbolized the united nature of the struggle by the Thirteen Colonies, and was a vital move in the effort to win foreign recognition and support.

It was not itself necessary to have such an army in order for individual colonies/states to assist each other militarily. Prior to the American Revolution, military units had been deployed outside the boundaries of individual colonies, against both Native American attacks and French and Spanish targets. Furthermore, during the Revolution, militia units under the control of state governments were sent to assist other states, as indeed they were sent to the Continental Army. However, by having such an army, military decisions were in large part taken out of the ambit of state government. Furthermore, individual military careers indicated the growing role of American, rather than state, considerations, and helped to make the new state a functioning reality capable of eliciting loyalty. For example, Benjamin Lincoln, in 1775 a councilor in the Upper Chamber of the new Massachusetts state government, and in 1776 a Major General in the Massachusetts force, was appointed to command the Massachusetts recruits levied to reinforce the Continental Army and, in 1778, was chosen to command the Southern Department. Politically, this helped to tie New England to the South, although his defense of Charleston in 1780 was a conspicuous failure. In 1781–3, however, Lincoln served as the First Secretary at War.

In theory, creating the Continental Army made the planning of strategy easier, freeing generals in some measure from the direction of state governments and allowing them to consider clashing demands for action and assistance. In practice, the creation of the army, although essential to the dissemination of a new notion of nationhood, did not free military operations from the views of state government, nor from the political disputes of the Continental Congress.

The complex relationships between force, nationhood and liberty were also seen in struggles over raising and supplying forces. Washington was obliged to deal with a form of government in which Congress could do little more than request men, funds and supplies from the states. The response varied considerably. Virginia was a state that provided much support for the Revolution, but, when, in April 1777, Congress recommended drafts from the militia to fill the Continental Army, Thomas Jefferson opposed them, arguing that they would be very unpopular. That November, the General Assembly to Virginia resolved that county lieutenants should collect clothing for the Continental troops raised in the county and send them to the army, but little was sent. In 1779, when a boat with 5,000 stand-of-arms imported for use by the Continental Congress arrived in Virginia, the arms were seized by the state government, leading to a serious dispute. There were riots against the draft in Virginia in 1780.

Virginia was not the only state to pose problems. South Carolina and Rhode Island did not introduce conscription, while, in the winter of 1777–8, General Anthony Wayne blamed what he saw as a lack of support from Pennsylvania on anti-military feeling in its government. Lincoln found the South Carolina militia unwilling to accept the command of Continental officers, while, in 1780, Horatio Gates, his successor as commander in the south, found his orders to the North Carolina militia countermanded by the state’s Board of War. Gates had to threaten the Board with dismissal, and pressure from the North Carolina legislature played a role in his removal from command. In New York state, in early 1781, several local committees stirred up opposition to the impressments of supplies by the army. The strong sense of state identity and interests restricted any attempt to lessen state power in favor of Congress. Generals such as Nathaniel Greene criticized politicians and civilians, reflecting a tension between the civilian political control that characterized the Revolution and the sense among generals that they could handle matters better.

The success of the Revolution did not end disputes over how best to organize the military; indeed, it encouraged them, as there was room for political debate without the exigencies of war lessening the range of options, while the degree of federal responsibility proved a particular issue of controversy. With both the military and foreign policy, the Americans avoided the fissiparous consequences of a federal system, by giving the key power to federal, not state, government. In 1778, Congress banned individual congressmen from talking to the Carlisle Commission, sent by the British government in an unsuccessful attempt to try to negotiate an end to the war. In part as a result of the Longchamps affair in 1784, in which a French diplomat was attacked, an ad hoc congressional court was given jurisdiction over international law, and the authority of the individual states was subordinated. However, the authority of the Supreme Court (established in 1789) in international cases, expressed in the Constitution in 1787, also drew on broader cases and considerations. Individual states lacked the right to negotiate “foreign” treaties or to make war, although their relations with Native Americans initially threatened to permit both. Thus, in the mid-1780s, Georgia raised state forces for duty against the Cherokee.

The nature and size of the national army was particularly controversial, Henry Knox, a keen Federalist, pressed hard for a stronger federal government and a national military establishment while heading the War Department in 1785–94. In 1783, he had aroused concern by founding the Society of Cincinnati as a body for officers from the War of Independence and their descendants. This was seen as a threat to the Confederation government. Knox faced opposition to a permanent force, as well as the financial weakness of the federal government.

On June 3, 1784, the day after decreeing that the last units of the Continental Army be disbanded, the Confederation Congress, nevertheless, voted to establish a 700-strong regiment of one-year volunteers in order to strengthen America’s presence in the Ohio Valley. In 1784–6, three treaties ceded much of southern and eastern Ohio to American settlement. This settlement was seen by most Americans as a rightful response to the God-given opportunities for expansion, and this expansion was itself seen as a recompense of their struggle for independence. In July 1787, Congress passed the Northwest Ordinance. This not only reasserted American sovereignty over the region, but also made it clear that this sovereignty was to be the prelude to settlement. The Ordinance provided for the establishment of new states there, and thus for an advancing frontier of settlement combined with a dynamic political structure. The Ordinance declared that Native rights would only be infringed “in just and lawful wars authorized by Congress,” and that Native lands would only be acquired with their consent. This was a policy that was to be widely honored in the breach, helping to lead to conflict.⁷

The absence, until the constitution was settled and established, of a well organized government or a system of direct taxation, was a fundamental limit to military capability. By the end of 1786, the regiment consisted of only 565 officers and ...