China on the Move

Migration, the State, and the Household

C. Cindy Fan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134088652
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Histoire
• Subtopic: Histoire de la Chine

China on the Move offers a new and more thorough explanation of migration, which integrates knowledge from geography, population studies, sociology and politics; to help us understand the processes of social, political, and economic change associated with powerful migration streams so essential to Chinese development.

Using a large body of research, clear and attractive illustrations (maps, tables, and charts) of findings based on census, survey and field data, and selected qualitative material such as migrants' narratives, this book provides an updated, systematic, empirically rich, multifaceted and lively analysis of migration in China.

1
Migration, the state, and the household

Introduction

The rapid surge of migration has been one of the most profound changes in China since it embarked on economic reforms in the late 1970s. Official estimates of the floating population – people not living in places where they are registered – are in the range of 150 million, accounting for about 12 percent of China’s population (National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) 2006). Some sources estimate that the number of migrant workers in Chinese cities is as high as 200 million, rivaling the total volume of international migrants worldwide (e.g. China Daily 2006).¹ The sheer size of migrant flows has profoundly affected China’s development. Rural–urban migration, in particular, has been the main source of urban growth and is rapidly reshaping the economic, demographic, and social landscapes of the Chinese city and countryside. Parallel to, and as a result of, rural–urban migration, China’s level of urbanization increased from 21 percent in 1982 to 43 percent in 2006 and is expected to exceed 50 percent by 2015 (Chan and Hu 2003; Duan 2003; Guangming ribao 2006; Lu and Wang 2006; Zhou and Ma 2003; 2005; see also Chapter 2).²

Research on migration in China, not surprisingly, has proliferated and has produced an impressive body of findings. Numerous studies have explored in depth the hukou (household registration) system and how it has given rise to two circuits of migration, one consisting of privileged migrants sponsored by the government and the other consisting of peasant migrants relying on their own resources (e.g. Chan and Zhang 1999; Chan et al. 1999; Cheng and Selden 1994; Fan 2002a; 2002b; Goldstein and Goldstein 1991; Gu 1992; Li 1995; Mallee 1996; Smart and Smart 2001; Wang 1997; Wang et al. 2002; Wu and Treiman 2004; Yang 1993). Related to this general theme is research on peasant migrants’ inferior political, social, and labor market positions (e.g. Chan 1996; Fan 2001; 2002a; Jiao 2002; Smith 2000; Solinger 1995; 1999a; 1999b; Wang et al. 2002; Zhou 1992). Second, researchers have documented the patterns of migration, including spatial and regional patterns, migrants’ characteristics, and different types of migration (e.g. Fan 1999; 2005a; Li 2004; Liang and White 1997; Liang and Ma 2004; Ma 1996; Scharping 1997). Third, some studies have focused on the determinants of migration and migration experiences, including economic opportunities, regional disparity, rural development, and network (e.g. Fan 1996; 2005b; Hare 1999a; Li 1997; Liang 1999; Rozelle et al. 1999; Shen 1999; West and Zhao 2000; Zhou 2002). Finally, the incorporation of migrants into the urban economy and society, including their occupations, housing, communities, fertility behavior and health, and the role of return migrants in the countryside, are increasingly popular research themes (e.g. Gaetano and Jacka 2004; Huang 2001; Jacka 2006; Li and Siu 2002; Logan 2002; Ma 2001; 2002; Ma and Xiang 1998; Murphy 2002; Pun 2005; Shen 2002; Smith 1996; Stinner et al. 1993; Taubmann 1997; Wu 2002; 2004; Yang 2006; Yang et al. 2007; Zhang 2001). Building on this fruitful body of work, this book seeks to highlight the roles of the state and the household for interpreting migration in China. I argue that the surge of migration and its changes must be understood in relation to how the state and the household have repositioned themselves during economic and social restructuring. In this chapter, I shall briefly establish the link between the state and the migrant labor regime and the role of gender in peasant household strategies. This is followed by an outline and critique of the hukou and permanent migrant paradigms. After a description of the data used in the analysis, I give a brief overview of individual chapters.

The Chinese state

Most mainstream migration theories do not emphasize the role of the state in internal migration. The neoclassical view emphasizes human capital and regional income differences as determinants of migration (Schultz 1961; Sjaastad 1962; Todaro 1969). The behavioral approach highlights psychological factors that constrain rational decision-making (Wolpert 1965). Network theory stresses the role of social networks and shared community origin in shaping the process and pattern of migration (Goodman 1981; Massey 1990). The labor market segmentation theory describes how migrants in cities are channeled into a secondary or informal sector (Harris and Todaro 1970; McGee 1982; Piore 1979). The household strategies perspective considers migration as part of the household’s organization of resources (Mincer 1978; Katz and Stark 1986). Demographic explanations of migration focus on life-course triggers and household aging that create the need to move (Brown and Moore 1970; Clark et al. 1984). Compared to the above perspectives, those focusing on international migration, not surprisingly, are much more concerned with policy, legislation, and related institutional factors (Calavita 1992; Farer 1995; Massey and Espinosa 1997; Waldinger 1992; Wright and Ellis 1997; 2000).

In social sciences, the neoclassical and neoliberal positions that prioritize market over institutions are increasingly being challenged. Skocpol (1985), for example, calls for “bringing the state back in” to a central place in explanations of social change and politics. Amin (1999), Jessop (1999), and Peck (1994) are among those advocating an institutional approach in economic geography. Much of the debate about an institutional approach, including the role of the state, however, has taken place with reference to North American and Western European contexts. The disconnect of the debate from transitional and formerly socialist economies is especially troubling because it is in these very economies that the state’s role is most pronounced and has had the most profound changes. Russia and China share some similarities in the persistence of policies and institutions that aim at regulating migration and labor market processes. In Russia, Soviet-period institutions continue to control access to social services and benefits (Buckley 1995; Mitchneck and Plane 1995a; see also Chapter 3). Similarly, in China, peasant migrants’ incorporation into the urban labor market is heavily monitored by the state. In both countries, internal migration is not free but accrues costs such as fines and refusal of social services, and labor markets have emerged only recently.

For almost three decades, China has undertaken a transition from the former socialist model into a “socialist market economy.” Despite the adoption of market logic, the state continues to see itself as the ultimate planner that guides and regulates the economy. In that light, the “socialist” in socialist market economy refers less to political ideology but more to the domination of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) and the very planning function of the state. Here, the state is broadly defined and includes not only the central government but also local governments and agencies and institutions authorized for planning purposes. Though the state does not necessarily have a unified and consistent approach all the time, its shift toward a developmentalist agenda is undeniable. This shift has greatly influenced how the state redefines its position, how it has engendered a migrant labor regime, its relations with peasants, and gender roles and relations – all central for understanding migration and in particular rural–urban migration in China.

The developmentalist state

Since the late 1970s, the Chinese state has taken on a developmentalist role. Losing faith in the Maoist model of central planning and collectivization and realizing that China’s economic development was lagging considerably behind that of Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) (South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Singapore) and Western capitalist economies, Deng Xiaoping and his associates were determined to adopt measures that boost economic growth. Deng set the tone for economic reforms by the famous quote “It doesn’t matter if the cat is white or black so long as it can catch mice,” which epitomizes the shift in focus from political ideology to pragmatism, expertise, and performance. Policies that would have been unacceptable during Maoist times, such as marketization, decollectivization and fiscal decentralization, have become appealing because of their promise to bring about economic growth.

The mandate of rapid economic growth has also legitimized a strategy of export-oriented industrialization, pursued through an open-door policy, export-processing and special economic zones, and incentives for foreign investors. Chinese scholars accept this strategy as applications of the “grand international cycle” theory, which in essence describes capital’s global search for new, cheap sites of investment (Cheng 1994). Past policies that emphasized agriculture have virtually been abandoned and replaced by a new focus on modernization via industries and services (Lo 1994; Yang and Guo 1996). Clearly, the new development strategy was inspired by the success of NIEs, but it was also made possible by the abundance of rural labor. In short, adoption of export-oriented, labor-intensive industrialization demands a labor regime different from that of the Maoist period, one that depends heavily on migrant workers.

Migrant labor regime

The state’s approach toward labor, during the Maoist period, was one based on centralized allocation. Through “unified state assignment,” state agencies allocated jobs to school graduates and transferred workers from one job to another. This approach entailed low job mobility and controlled labor migration. In this connection, the People’s Republic of China’s (PRC) version of the hukou system was implemented in the late 1950s (see Chapter 3). Under this system, urbanites were entitled to work and access to subsidized food, housing, education, and other social services. Open markets for food, housing and jobs were virtually non-existent, and almost all necessities in urban areas were controlled by the state. Without urban hukou and accompanying benefits, it was next to impossible for peasants to survive in cities. Thus, peasants were bound to the countryside and rural–urban migration was minimal.

While the hukou system was an instrument of migration control (e.g. Yu 2002:15–21), it has also been seen as a tool for implementing the Maoist state’s development philosophy. Specifically, the state blocked flows of resources, including labor, from rural to urban areas in order to extract value from agriculture for subsidizing industry – especially heavy industry – as it pursued a Soviet-style development model. By binding a large labor force to the countryside, this strategy ensured a supply of low-priced agricultural goods to achieve “industrialization on the cheap” (Chan and Zhang 1999; Cheng and Selden 1994; Tang et al. 1993). The premise of this political-economic argument is that the state erected barriers between the city and the countryside in order to advance a specific model of development (see also Chapter 3).

A similar logic is useful for understanding the hukou system and its changes during the post-Mao period. Far from being dismantled, urban–rural barriers have been used by the developmentalist state to achieve new economic goals. By maintaining an institutional and social order in which peasants are inferior to urbanites, and by permitting peasants to work in urban areas as “temporary” migrants – migrants that are denied urban hukou and entitlements – the state has created a migrant labor regime that enables labor-intensive industrialization and urban development (see Chapter 3). In this way, the state makes available a large supply of rural labor to advance its developmentalist strategy at low cost and at the same time ensures that most peasant migrants will eventually return to the countryside without burdening the state.

These peasant migrants are attractive to global investors. Peasants’ institutional and social inferiority, as well as severe labor surplus in the countryside, are the key to explaining their pursuit of urban jobs despite the low pay. Without social insurance and labor rights infrastructure, the migrant labor regime is a safe haven for urban and industrial employers that thrive on cost-minimization and exploitation (see Chapter 6).

On the surface, the migrant labor regime in China is not too different from the labor market in many developing countries, where a cheap and unskilled labor force fosters labor-intensive industrialization. The labor market segmentation theory, in particular, explains the channeling of migrants into the secondary, informal sector in cities. This theory, however, assumes homogeneity among migrants and does not highlight the role of the state (Breman 1976). What makes China stand out is the central role of the state in channeling and constraining peasant migrants to specific sectors and jobs – construction, garment factories, domestic work, and other jobs shunned by urbanites – through control instruments in connection with the hukou system. Temporary migrants in Chinese cities are not spillovers from the primary sector; rather, they are blocked by state institutions from entering the primary sector. The migrant labor regime is, in essence, the product of a system that defines opportunities by hukou status and locality and that fosters a deep divide between rural and urban Chinese. Despite hukou reforms that have taken place since the late 1980s (see Chapter 3), the vast majority of peasant migrants continue to be in inferior institutional, economic and social positions compared to urban residents.

The migrant labor regime is also gendered. Similar to many other parts of the world, the availability of young, single women workers in China has attracted investment from multinational corporations (e.g. Chant and Radcliffe 1992; Cheng and Hsiung 1992). Factories target young, single migrant women because they are construed as having good attention to detail, able to handle delicate work, and easy to control (e.g. Lee 1995), while male migrants are channeled to heavy work such as construction. Thus, migrant work is highly segregated by gender (Fan 2003; Yang and Guo 1996). In the migrant labor regime, new forms of labor disciplining that a...