Japan's Relations With China

Facing a Rising Power

Peng Er Lam, Peng Er Lam

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2006
• ISBN:
  9781134193721
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: International Relations
• Index: Politics & International Relations

The essays in this collection examine Sino-Japanese political relations given the phenomenon of 'a rising China and a stagnating Japan'. Questioning whether their relationship is one of cooperation or conflict, the book reviews China and Japan's bilateral ties to see whether they have deepened and broadened despite differences in outlook, national interest and political systems.

Adding a new perspective to the Sino-Japanese political relations discussion, the book looks beyond the interactions of central governments to examine the role of NGOs, local governments and sub-regional linkages. The contributors adopt a range of analytical approaches and explore case studies including the Taiwan issue, Japanese Official Development Policy towards China and joint fishery management in the East China Sea. With perspectives from the US, Russia and Malaysia, the book yields new insights into this complex and multifaceted relationship and is a welcome addition to the current literature.

1 The shifting nature of Japan–China relations after the Cold War*

Kokubun Ryōsei

Introduction: the widening gap in Japan–China relations

Recently, the issue of “China’s rising” versus “Japan’s downfall” has been the topic of discussion. While China continues to grow, Japan is still struggling to slough off the recession after the collapse of the “bubble economy,” and more than ten years have passed since then. The contrast between the two great nations must be striking for the world observing East Asia.

However, one should not compare both countries simplistically. Japan has already realized a matured economy and an affluent society; China is still a developing economy and yet to realize an affluent society. China is twenty-six times larger in geographic area and has ten times more inhabitants than Japan; however, China’s economy is only about one third of Japan’s GDP. In terms of per capita income, China still has a long way to go before it can even come close to Japan.

Nevertheless, Japan will be facing new economic difficulties as a whole that cannot be avoided due to its low birth rate and rapid aging and the fact that Japanese corporations are moving their manufacturing plants overseas. On the other hand, China—although forced to deal with domestic economic disparities—is expected to maintain its pace of economic growth in the long-run especially in the coastal areas. If China continues to grow, the balance of power and influence of Japan and China in East Asia will eventually change in a dramatic fashion. China’s domestic economic problems are piling up and are not easily overcome. However, China cannot reverse itself from its path of market economy and capitalistic economy and has no choice but to follow its course of growth. In other words, the direction of China is very clear and decisive.

Probably because of the changes in the composition of the overall relationship and because of the sense of rivalry, both countries have developed a poor image of each other and frictions have been created. According to the public opinion survey carried out in 1980 by the Japanese government, 78.6 per cent of Japanese felt “friendly” toward China and only 14.7 per cent did not. China’s image among Japanese changed immediately after the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989. Those feeling “friendly” dropped to 51.6 per cent and “not friendly” went up to 43.1 per cent and in the 1990’s due to the Taiwan Strait crisis and the rise of China Threat Theory, the feeling of “not friendly” exceeded that of “friendly.” A similar survey in 2004 shows 37.6 per cent feeling “friendly” and 58.2 per cent “not friendly.”¹ According to the survey conducted on the image of Japan among Chinese in 2004 by the Institute of Japanese Studies, Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, 6.3 per cent of Chinese felt “friendly” toward Japanese and 53.6 per cent “unfriendly.” Moreover, the top three Chinese images of Japan were, “cherry blossoms,” “Japanese military invasion” and “Mount Fuji.” It has been sixty years since the end of the war; however, it seems their idea of Japan has remained fixed.²

Japan–China relations have experienced some friction, particularly as of the latter half of the 1990’s. Starting around 1995, the year that marked the fiftieth anniversary of the end of the war, the Chinese Communist Party, in an attempt to cope with the weakening power of the central government, decentralization and political corruption launched repeated patriotic campaigns. The Communist regime highlighted its allegedly leading role in the anti-Japanese war in the nation’s history curriculum to underpin its legitimacy and rise to power. The direct election of the President of Taiwan in 1996, held as the result of democratization, led to China’s military exercises and missile tests targeting waters near Taiwan. Thus, China itself provided the necessary elements leading to the emergence of the China Threat Theory in Japan. In 1998, President of State Jiang Zemin visited Japan. He was infuriated because Japan did not include an “apology” for Japan’s past invasion in the joint communiqué and referred to the issue of historical problems persistently, which offended and repulsed many Japanese.

Various issues and problems followed including the case of the Japanese history textbook that contained a description stating that Japan’s past invasion was justified; Lee Teng-hui’s visit to Japan; and protectionist measures adopted against inexpensive scallions, shiitake mushrooms and tatami mats flowing in from China. And one more issue which persists even now as a main obstacle to Japan–China relations was Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to the Yasukuni Shrine. Since the last years of Jiang Zemin’s leadership, China has emphasized positive Japan–China relations, working toward the “future.” The attitude of China became more evident under the new leadership of Hu Jintao. Notwithstanding the fact that China is doing its best not to raise historical issues, China’s current inclination is to base the relationship on “history as paragon” and Japan is suffering somewhat from “apology fatigue”.

What led into this vicious cycle? The image of “Rising China, Sinking Japan” and its impact on the psychology of many Japanese towards China may be a contributory cause. We certainly cannot deny such aspects. However, to understand contemporary Japan–China relations, we need to study the underlying factors from a viewpoint of shifting historical relationships.

These changes in the framework of relations, in this case, represent an on-going transformation process from the stable relations that were established after the normalization of diplomatic relations in 1972, moving through the late 1980s to the 1990s, and after the end of the Cold War. This chapter reviews the transformation of Japan–China relations as of the “1972 frame-work” from four angles: 1) structural changes in the international order and China; 2) deepening interdependence; 3) generational changes and 4) Taiwan’s transformation. For convenience sake, reference is made to “after the end of the Cold War” in this chapter. However, this study does not attempt to explain everything based on the international factors alone, but rather tries to explain these changes by weighing in other domestic factors that are closely related.

Structural changes in the international order and China

The post-1972 framework of Japan–China relations was first stipulated within the conventions of international relations. Japan would not have been able to normalize diplomatic relations with China without the consent of the United States. At the same time, this normalization would not have been possible unless China likewise accepted the US-Japan Security Treaty. The rapprochement between the United States and China in 1971–72 led essentially to the fulfillment of these conditions. The US-China détente process was aimed at serving as a counterbalance against the Soviet Union, the mutual “hypothetical enemy” and it changed the structural order of the Cold War in Asia that used to be based on the confrontation between the United States and China.

The United States approved Japan’s attempt to normalize diplomatic relations with China, and China recognized the existence of the US-Japan Security Treaty, which China judged to be effective as an anti-Soviet strategy. In February 1973, immediately after the normalization, Mao Zedong told Dr Kissinger, President Nixon’s principal aide, “We also believe that rather than Japan having closer relations with the Soviet Union, we would rather that they would improve their relations with you. That would be better.”³ The other factor that has been pointed out frequently in how China came to approve the US-Japan Security Treaty is that China is said to have theorized that such treaty would be effective as a brake against Japan becoming a major militarized nation (the theory called “capping”).

Thus, the US, China and Japan all came under the same umbrella for the purpose of countering the Soviet Union and, essentially formed a strategic partnership. This is why the three-way relationship between Japan, the United States and China remained stable until the breakup of the Soviet Union at the end of the Cold War. Regarding Japan’s inclusion in the US-China containment of the Soviet Union as of 1972, Japan’s degree of awareness relative to the strategic implications of this process is unclear and needs to be studied. In the process of negotiating and concluding the Japan–China Peace and Friendship Treaty during the latter part of the 1970s, the issue of inserting the “anti-hegemony” clause, which meant anti-Soviet for China, caused controversy, although it had already been inserted in the Japan–China Joint Communiqué of 1972 at China’s request.

Under the post-1972 framework, China’s modernization was considered mutually beneficial for both Japan and China. However, under Mao’s leadership, China continued political struggles symbolized by the Cultural Revolution and economic development was not a priority. As a result, China was left out of the international competitive market. Starting in the early 1970s, China gradually made a comeback into international society under the leadership of Zhou Enlai; and during Deng Xiaoping’s era that started after 1978, China with its “Reform and Open Policy” actively sought contacts and work with the international community. Both Japan and the United States applauded China’s attitude and full-heartedly backed China to join the international community.

However, the Soviet Union, the common target that brought the United States, China and Japan together in a three-way relationship, ceased to exist at the end of the Cold War. As a result, the three nations lost the glue that held them together. Following the Tiannamen Square incident and the end of the Cold War, the United States and China clashed frequently on issues relating to human rights and Taiwan. Moreover certain American opinion shapers began highlighting the so-called China Threat Theory. Meanwhile, repeated US diplomatic pressures against China lead to an increasing discontent in China against the United States that reached its peak when NATO forces bombed the Chinese Embassy in Yugoslavia “by mistake” in May 1999. In the 1980s, the United States had supplied China with weapons, provided military collaboration for the sake of countering the Soviet Union and hardly questioned China’s nuclear testing or defense spending. Japan assumed the same basic stance.

In the 1990s, in seeking to expand Japan’s role in the world including security issues, a re-definition of the US-Japan Security Treaty was in progress between Japan and the United States. Since the US-Japan Security Treaty initially came into existence due to the Soviet Union, the disappearance of the Soviet Union made it necessary to give the treaty a new meaning in order to continue as an alliance. This new meaning was provided by the US-Japan Security Joint Statement issued after the Hashimoto-Clinton talks in April 1996 and the new guideline-related bills passed by the Japanese Diet in May 1999. To counter the missile development by the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (North Korea), Japan started to show its interest in the joint development of TMD (Theater Missile Defense) with the US.⁴

China was offended by these developments, because it viewed the re-definition of the US-Japan Security Treaty to be a part of anti-China encirclement after the disappearance of the Soviet Union. It seems the timing was bad. The process of re-defining the Security Treaty went on for some time following the end of the Cold War; however, it was played up because of the summit talks that coincided with the March 1996 election of the President of Taiwan and Chinese naval exercises designed to coerce the Taiwanese. For China, it appeared to be strategic joint effort of Japan and the US which was aimed at seeking for more active commitment to the Taiwan issues. China has not discarded its suspicion that, using North Korea as an excuse, the TMD is to be eventually used against China.

Speaking of China’s modernization, the attitudes of Japan and the United States are unchanged, i.e. both encourage China to further its reform and open policy and support its effort to enter into the international economic system. The basic stance remains the same even with change of administration from Clinton to Bush. Concerning China’s entry into the WTO, various complicated issues were debated for many years; however, Japan approved it in July 1999 and the United States in November 1999, and China joined the WTO in December 2001.

With the advent of the Bush Administration, the US-China relationship became strained. Under the Clinton Administration, China was a “strategic partner”; however, the Bush Administration started to describe China as a “competitive rival.” On top of this, at the beginning of the Bush Administration, a US Navy EP-3 maritime patrol aircraft and a Chinese fighter aircraft collided in mid-air. Immediately after the incident was settled, the 11 September 2001 terrorist attack occurred and the United States became absorbed with going after the Al Queda terrorist group and with issues in Central Asia and the Middle East. In the interest of anti-terrorist measures, the United States and China seem to be strengthening cooperative relationships.

Beijing basically sided with Washington during the US invasion of Afghanistan and also refrained from criticizing the United States even though Paris and Berlin were critical of Washington. Cognizant of its important relations with Washington and amidst US concerns about North Korean nuclear proliferation, Beijing criticized Pyongyang and even offered to mediate and bring its North Korean ally to the table of the six-party talks. Similarly, China has maintained a low key approach toward Japan. While Japan-bashing has not stopped on the Internet and in the tabloids sold on the street, the stance of the Chinese government has been reserved, not questioning the historical issues, refraining from attacking the Yasukuni Shrine issue as well as the dispatch of the Japanese defence force to Iraq. The US-Japan alliance may be a reason for their reserved attitude.

China’s composed attitude should be welcomed. Time will tell whether the change in China’s attitude is real or merely tactical. As far as the US-China relationship is concerned, China and the United States are cooperating in anti-terrorist measures. It is definitely based on strategic considerations and not because both countries built their relationships based on mutual trust. The United States must be extremely interested in the future of China as a power, in the long-run. Their political regimes and sense of values are distinctly different and it is inconceivable for these two great nations to build a long-term friendship easily.

Two factors have contributed to a greater diversity of views towards China among the Japanese and Americans in the post-Cold War era: the disappearance of a common Soviet threat and the rise of China. At the same time, up to now, bringing China into the international community was in the mutual interests of both Japan and the United States, which seemed to have been accomplished by having China admitted into the WTO. As China is expanding and establishing its position on the international economic and political scene, the focus of Japan and the United States shifted to the role of China in the international order in the future. In any case, the international order that supported the “1972 framework” has changed greatly and as yet a Japan–China relationship compatible to the changes has not been formed.

Deepening interdependence

After the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China in 1972, various practical agreements were reached between the two governments, namely, the Japan–China Trade Agreement (January 1974), the Japan–China Aviation Agreement (April 1974), the Japan–China Navigation Pact (November 1974) and the Japan–China Fishery Agreement (August 1975). Upon conclusion of these practical agreements, Japan and China began talks on the Peace and Friendship Treaty. It is a well-known fact that in the process, Japan and China argued over inserting an “anti-hegemony” clause, that might further anti-Soviet Union sentiment. After very complicated negotiations, the treaty was finally concluded in 1978. Up to this point, both governments took the initiative in Japan–China relations.

The private sector started to play an important role after the conclusion of the Japan–China Long-Term Trade Agreement (February 1978) that was signed shortly before the Peace and Friendship Treaty and which outlined the trade policy between Japan and China. In the short-run, this agreement was linked to the “Ten-Year Economic Plan” that started at about the same time. This plan failed because it was too ambitious, aiming for excessive increases in oil production, etc. In the long run, the full-scale turn toward China’s economic modernization symbolized by the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party Central Committee of the Chinese Community Party in December 1978 contributed to the agreement.

The agreement established the basic framework of subsequent Japan–China economic relations.⁵ China was to export raw materials such as oil and coal to Japan and Japan was to export advanced plant and technologies to China. This scheme fell through because of China’s stagnant oil production. However, as trade between Japan and China was aimed at bartering raw materials for advanced technologies, the typical pattern of economic relations between an advanced country and a developing country was established. In other words, the economic relationship was not horizontal but rather vertical.

A big change in Japan–China economic relations came about when Japanese companies started to consider going to mainland China in search of cheap labour after the yen became too strong as a result of the 1985 Plaza Accord. Japanese companies were still cautious in late 1980s but inroads into China accelerated in 1990s especially after the speeches in the southern inspection journey by Deng Xiaoping in which he dictated the reform and open policy and proposed the socialist market economy line.

Direct investments by Japanese companies, according to the statistics of China (by contract base), totaled only US$27 million reaching US$950 million over the five-year period from 1979 to 1983, but jumped from US$294 million to US$7.592 billion in 1995 alone. As for trade, imports by China exceeded those by Japan until 1987; however, as of 1988, the position was reversed and imports by Japan have continued to exceed Japanese exports to China to this day.⁶ This may be a result of China’s effort to gain competitive power through direct investments from overseas and to promote the export industry. In effect, Japan–China economic relations have gone from being vertical at the beginning to relatively horizontal with China’s economic growth in 1990’s. In other words, interdependence further deepened.

The situation seems to be accelerating since China’s entry into the WTO. This is related somewhat to Japan’s serious economic recession. To avoid high costs in Japan, manufacturers moved manufacturing facilities overseas, especially to China where labour costs are very low. The “hollowing out of industry” created in Japan became a serious issue; however, for manufacturers with some reservations, the Chinese market was the only way out. This is somewhat related to Japan’s serious economic recession. To avoid high costs in Japan, corporations moved manufacturing facilities abroad, especially to China where skilled labour costs are relatively very low. Japan’s economic recovery was evidenced in 2003. However, this recovery was not necessarily due to a successful “structural reform” but rather, in part, to special procurement demands from China. The trend is unmistakable. Economic dependency between Japan and China will deepen and broaden in the future.

This interdependence can be easily detected through people-to-people exchanges. In 1979 when the modernization process began, seven years after the normalization of diplomatic relat...