American Policy Toward Israel

The Power and Limits of Beliefs

Michael Thomas

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781135983444
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Storia
• Subtopic: Storia militare e marittima

This book explains the institutionalization of nearly unconditional American support of Israel during the Reagan administration, and its persistence in the first Bush administration in terms of the competition of belief systems in American society and politics.

Michael Thomas explains policy changes over time and provides insights into what circumstances might lead to lasting changes in policy. The volume identifies the important domestic, social, religious and political elements that have vied for primacy on policy towards Israel, and using case studies, such as the 1981 AWACS sale and the 1991 loan guarantees, argues that policy debates have been struggles to embed and enforce beliefs about Israel and about Arabs. It also establishes a framework for better understanding the influences and constraints on American policy towards Israel. An epilogue applies the lessons learned to the current Bush administration.

American Policy toward Israel will be of interest to students of US foreign policy, Middle Eastern politics and international relations.

1 Explaining the extra-special relationship

The battle of beliefs

The relationship between the United States and Israel is in many ways unlike any other bilateral relationship of the United States. That much is agreed by all knowledgeable observers. Americans and their officials also agree that the United States has undertaken, and will always honor, an obligation to insure the continued existence and security of the State of Israel. As to nearly any other statement about the relationship, disagreements are numerous and often rancorous.

When you listen to participants in the policy process, you are always struck by the wide divergence in relevant beliefs, and the intensity of advocates’ efforts to establish their beliefs as predominant. To understand the policies as well as the rancor, it is necessary to identify the beliefs of important participants in the policy-making process, and to study how the competition among those beliefs is conducted. Most important are beliefs, both moral and strategic, about the identity and role of Israel. Also relevant are beliefs about Arabs and Palestinians, Islam and terrorism and (during the Cold War) Soviet communism.

Advocates seek to establish their beliefs as predominant in part by identifying them with prevailing American cultural, normative and ideological preferences. Salient pro-Israel conceptualizations have been: Israel as religious or eschatological imperative; moral obligee; Western democratic cultural sibling; and finally as strategic asset in American efforts to contain Soviet communism and Islamist terrorism. Most Americans understand Israel to be the land of their Bible and the country in the Middle East most like the United States in important ways: democratic, open and populated by fiercely independent and courageous people. That vision of Israel, and empathy with its founding after the Holocaust, have formed the basis of broad popular support. Those Jews and Christians for whom Israel fulfills an eschatological role argue there is a religious duty to support those who seek to reconstitute the land God gave Abraham. Others, including but not limited to Jews whose self-identification is tied up with Israel, argue that Israel is America’s cultural sibling and moral obligee, and that it must always be favored over its neighbors as the region’s only Western-style democracy. Many, including those for whom the principal reason for support is really religion or affinity, make a strategic case for maintaining Israel as a regional hegemon. On the other side are realists and others not driven by religion or affinity, who deny some or all of the proffered justifications and argue that policies uniquely and overwhelmingly favoring Israel have been not just wrong, but destructive of American interests.

Personal belief systems also explain divergent characterizations of the process by which policy toward Israel has come to be what it is. Realists and other critics of American policy, frustrated by the perceived irrationality of their opponents, sometimes claim that a small, mostly Jewish, pro-Israel lobby has American policy in a “stranglehold,” and has caused the United States to abandon its own national interests in favor of Israel’s interests by means of political leverage, intimidation and control of public discourse. This implied accusation of dual loyalty or worse is sometimes made explicitly. Those who support ever-stronger ties argue that such ties not only facilitate a rational pursuit of American national security interests but also affirm American political and moral values. They tend to view the critics as blind to America’s true interests, or even as anti-Semitic. Each of these positions, and their many permutations and combinations, reflect sets of beliefs about Israel, about Arabs and Palestinians, and ultimately about what America is or should be.

Most analysts of international relations use rationalist models, in which actors’ interests, preferences and causal beliefs are given and ideas are relegated to minor roles. However, one’s beliefs shape how he defines goals and understands cause and effect. They provide filters and blinders as he seeks and considers evidence. They provide default positions when strategic analysis yields only ambiguous answers. And by defining policies over time and becoming embedded in political institutions, beliefs can shape policy long after the evidence originally relied upon is obsolete or discredited (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 3). Beliefs can be “world views” (fundamental normative, cosmological, ontological and ethical beliefs), “principled” beliefs about justice or causal beliefs.¹

American policy makers often “default” to policies based upon cultural ideology, a “structure of meaning” that defines the American collectivity, its morality, and its friends and enemies (Mansour 1994: 261). When in doubt, “political actors follow the strategy most in conformity with their identity and ideology.” Such a strategy can be stable in the absence of substantial material interests (ibid.: 276–7).² When in most cases a policy of strong and unconditioned support does not appear to damage U.S. interests, the policy maker is reassured that optimism and following his “conscience” are warranted.

Beliefs held strongly by leaders tend to stifle debate and chill the production of variant approaches to policy; as such ideas become embedded as “conventional wisdom,” the quality and variety of policy papers declines, and career decisions are affected. Beliefs become “institutional roadmaps.” Even

if individual officials can identify viable policy options based upon different beliefs, they are often not given a full hearing because to do so would force rethinking basic assumptions about values or causation. An example is the relatively insignificant impact of the regional specialists (“Arabists”) of the State Department in the years under study.³

Ideas or ideology have other functions in policy-making: mobilizing support; structuring information; obscuring alternative facts and policy options; and creating momentum or inertia, among others. Whatever the origin of ideas or their continuing connection to interests, they persist in influence when they become embedded in institutions and in the terms of policy debate, particularly when they have affected institutional design. Political institutions – agency organization and staffing, laws, rules, norms, operating procedures, and budgets – mediate between ideas and policy outcomes (Goldstein and Keohane 1993: 20–1). As ideas become predominant and embedded institutionally, they change political institutions so that policy makers thereafter have a different set of enabling and constraining structures within which to work.⁴ Changes in policy – here, we posit a “ratcheting” of support for Israel – must take into account, not just external events and the contemporaneous preferences of the president and other participants in the process, but also the institutional changes that have been produced in part by the cementing of ideas central to prior policy decisions.⁵

This book will seek to explain the elements and dynamics of the “special relationship” and how it has shaped and constrained American policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. To do so, it will focus on groups holding different sets of beliefs about Israel and Palestinians, and their efforts to establish their beliefs as predominant and thereby limit and define policy options. In each administration, the president and the key advisers on whom he relies bring their beliefs and leadership skills to a contest in congressional and electoral politics with groups possessing their own skills and sets of beliefs. We will look in depth at the administrations of presidents Ronald Reagan and George H. W. Bush, 1981–1993. During Reagan’s two terms, proponents of ever-deeper ties and nearly unconditional support of Israeli policies, led by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), had a receptive audience, and succeeded in embedding their beliefs in policy and institutions to an unprecedented degree. During “Bush I,” it became evident that this process of ratcheting support had limits, and was conditional on developments in the region and the degree to which the president and his chief advisers shared their predecessors’ deep emotional affinity toward Israel. Drawing on the lessons learned in the two administrations, we will summarize the important determinants of American policy toward Israel and the Palestinians. In an epilogue, we will examine how the elements described and analyzed in earlier administrations have changed during the administration of George W. Bush, and how the dynamics of change played out through 2006. We will find that some advocates, and some sets of beliefs, grew in influence, and some receded at least temporarily.

How special is it?

Generally, those who speak of a “special relationship” between the United States and Israel are referring to the cultural, religious, moral, historical and emotional ties between the peoples of the two nations. It is a phrase often used to refer to one set of explanations for favorable American policies toward Israel, in contradistinction to strategic arguments for cooperation and support. Often, arguments for support of Israel cast in terms of affinities and moral or religious obligations are more effective with target audiences than arguments based on Israel’s asserted strategic value. However, the resulting policies are not limited to moral or emotional support or guarantees of Israel’s security, but involve very real economic, military and political assistance, often of Israeli governments which then pursue policies not favored, or even actively opposed, by the United States. Some of that support can be quantified, and compared with how the United States treats other states, including strategic and ideological allies.

Israel has been the largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid in the period since World War II; it was the largest recipient for the years 1976–2004, when Iraq began to account for more aid.⁶ Total economic and military aid, including loans and grants, amounted to over $146 billion (in constant 2004 dollars) in the period 1946 through 2004. Most of that aid was given after 1970, and all loan programs were converted to grant programs in 1981 (Economic Support Funds, or ESF) and 1985 (Foreign Military Financing, or FMF). At Israel’s request, ESF funds are being phased out by 2008, partially offset by increased FMF funds; however, the FY2007 budget request for aid to Israel totals $2.59 billion, about 30 million more than FY2006.⁷ Unlike other aid recipients, whose funds are parceled out over the fiscal year and allocated to audited programs, Israel by law receives its aid money within 30 days of the start of the fiscal year, and ESF funds are unallocated and essentially unaudited. Also unlike other recipients, Israel can use approximately one-quarter of its FMF funds to purchase from Israeli, rather than American, manufacturers.⁸ FMF constitutes approximately 23 percent of the Israeli defense budget.

These direct aid figures measure only a part of the total economic benefit of the relationship. Israel is one of three countries (the others being Canada and Mexico) that benefit from laws permitting tax deductions for contributions to foreign charities. Such contributions are thought to exceed $1 billion per year; some go to settler organizations and others who could not under United States law be the beneficiaries of ESF or other aid funds. In 1985, the two countries signed a Free Trade Agreement that resulted in the elimination of all customs duties between the countries and a 200 percent increase in Israeli exports to the United States.⁹

The military support given by the United States, including FMF, is intended to allow Israel to maintain a “Qualitative Military Edge” (QME) over all neighboring militaries.¹⁰ In April 1988, Israel was declared a “major non-NATO ally” of the United States, which gave Israel preferential treatment as a bidder on U.S. defense contracts and allowed it to acquire surplus American equipment at reduced or no cost. Israel participates in several Mediterranean-based NATO programs. It also participates in major United States research and development programs: Israel is developing the Arrow antiballistic missile for the Strategic Defense Initiative at a cost to the United States of over $1 billion, and participating in development of the F- 35 Joint Strike Force fighter aircraft. Under Memoranda of Understanding from 1981 and 1983, Israel and the United States coordinate strategic planning and war-fighting capabilities in biannual meetings of a Joint Political and Military Group. Joint military exercises and U.S. stockpiling of materiel in Israel began in 1984. Since 2001, annual multi-agency meetings have addressed long-term strategic issues.

These programs are visible signs of a much more dramatic truth: over the years since 1970, and particularly since 1981, Israel has increasingly been able to depend upon the United States in maintaining an unassailable security position. The Israel Defense Forces have married their logistics, planning and technology development to those of the American Defense Department, and achieved interoperability not matched by any other ally of the United States. A policy of mutual assistance has become embedded in habits of thinking, institutional design, programs, staffing and budgets. Israel’s potential adversaries have either been brought on side, as with Egypt and Jordan, or have long come to understand that even without commitment of American troops, Israel cannot be defeated militarily.

Similarly, the United States has given Israeli governments political support unlike that afforded any other ally. Some has come in the form of added money: when Israel spun into deep recession in the 1980s, the United States converted all aid to grants and added $1.5 billion in one-time aid; when Israel kept out of Desert Storm as requested in 1991, it received $650 million and Patriot missiles; faced with an influx of Soviet immigrants in 1992, Israel received $10 billion in housing loan guarantees; in the aftermath of the 2003 Iraq invasion Israel received $9 billion in loan guarantees and $1 billion in added FMF grants; and even as Israel’s implementation of the Wye Agreement stalled in 1999, President Clinton insisted on $1.2 billion in added grants. Beginning with Kissinger’s shuttle diplomacy in 1973 and accelerating after the Camp David accords under President Carter, the costs of implementing agreements favored by the United States have been underwritten in large part by the United States.

Often U.S. support comes in the form of political protection against the rest of the international community. The United States has vetoed 39 United Nations Security Council Resolutions criticizing or making demands upon Israel, out of a total of 181 resolutions vetoed by all permanent members of the Security Council in the period 1946 to May 2006.¹¹ Many other resolutions were withdrawn because of the certainty of a veto by the United States. President George W. Bush supported Israel’s refusal to allow

a U.N. investigation of Israel’s 2002 incursion into Ramallah in spite of Israel’s earlier consent to the investigation and Bush’s own criticism of the operation. Because of the relationship between the U.S. and Israel, no peace process is possible without the participation of the American administration. Since with few exceptions American presidents have allowed the Israeli government to determine whether the security situation permitted concessions on land or the conditions of the occupation, Israel’s position on when to engage in negotiations and how to structure negotiations is immeasurably strengthened.

Just as the justifications for this unique level of bilateral support are seen as admirable or malign, depending upon the beliefs of the observer, so are policy results. As noted, there is near universal public support for policies that are seen to guarantee Israel’s continued existence and security, and security includes some level of economic security. Further, there is no question that during the Cold War, Israel provided valuable services in providing intelligence, developing and demonstrating war-fighting techniques with American arms against Soviet systems, and more generally devaluing alliances with the Soviet Union. Even during the Cold War period, however, realist critics argued that the empowering of Israel encouraged a dangerous and costly impunity when Israel did not in fact share American policy interests or goals. Its military was superior to those of Soviet client states which were Israel’s adversaries, but not very useful against overt Soviet use of force, and not capable of being integrated into regional efforts involving Arab states.¹² Richard Nixon was greatly impressed by Israel’s value in discouraging a Soviet-backed Syria in 1970; but Henry Kissinger had all he could do to prevent Israel’s destruction of the Egyptian army in the desert in 1973, and a damaging Arab oil embargo followed that war. Ronald Reagan had mixed feelings about Israel’s pre-emptive destruction of the Iraqi nuclear facilities at Osirak, but was chagrined to be pulled involuntarily into strategic, domestic and moral dilemmas by Ariel Sharon’s war of choice in Lebanon. Israel pursued its own interests, first and foremost security as defined by Israelis. As it did so, it repeatedly raised questions about whether American empowerment of and identification with Israel created a powerful and reliable ally, or a free agent that was a principal cause of Middle East crises that damaged relations with Arab states and Muslim populations, and that fueled resentment boiling over into terrorism.

After 1989, any strategic advantage Israel provided against Soviet ambitions was gone, and the 1991 Gulf War demonstrated that Israel’s relationships with the United States and with its neighbors could impede or complicate American policy goals, even goals shared by Israel. However, Israel’s domestic advocates argued that Israel’s role in American policy – as a democratic example in a region of autocracy and theocracy, and as a uniquely effective ally against rogue states, terrorism and weapons proliferation – was more important than ever. Those who had been skeptical of Israel’s value in the Cold War were at least as skeptical that Israel presented

Explaining the extra-special relationship 7 solutions to these issues rather than being a cause of them. After the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, these arguments became central to American foreign policy, and once again those favoring support of Israel and of Israel’s policy choices broadly prevailed.

A little realism about the national interest

All policy makers claim to act in the national interest, and much of the debate concerning America’s relationship with Israel has been cast in terms of American national security interests. Hans Morgenthau joined his famous dictum that the central goal of every state’s foreign policy is to achieve “the national interest in terms of power” with his assurance that the true statesman would know the security needs of the country, and thus the national interest.¹³ Morgenthau’s complaint was that there had been few such statesmen after the first century of American nationhood (Morgenthau 1951). Kenneth Thompson, E. H. Carr and Kenneth Waltz also demonstrated the dangers of inattention to vital security interests defined in terms of power in the international system. However, when national survival is not at stake, the struggle among executive, legislative and interest group actors sharing power over decision making is likely to dominate foreign policy formulation (Milner 1997: 4, 14).

Like the “general welfare” and the “public interest,” the national interest is typically defined either so broadly in terms of core values as to be useless in rigorous policy analysis (e.g. survival and security of the state, sovereignty, economic subsistence) or so specifically in terms of policy “subgoals” a...