1 âGlobalizationâ, institutions and welfare regimes
This book takes as axiomatic the fact that welfare states in the âmature democraciesâ are changing. According to many observers, âglobalizationâ is somehow responsible for the development of different social policy alternatives in contemporary welfare systems and it is primarily this issue that will be considered in detail throughout this volume. However, the apparently simple relationship between âglobalizationâ and welfare regime change is of course nothing of the sort. For one thing, the nature and extent of global challenges are hotly contested and it is not clear that the â primarily economic â pressures involved have had the impact on welfare policies that globalization enthusiasts claim. Certainly, the argument here does not hold that welfare systems in the OECD are embarked upon an inexorable ârace to the bottomâ in which rampant globalization forces once-autonomous nation-states to outdo one another in their efforts to cut social spending, maintain low interest and tax rates, and thus remain economically attractive for inward investment â a sort of economic beauty contest in which multinational corporations sit as judge and jury. Arguments of this nature will be examined in the course of this volume but, on the whole, they will be rejected in favour of an analysis that presents a more complex and mixed picture of the fortunes of contemporary welfare regimes.
Such an analysis certainly recognizes that globalization has influenced welfare policies in different welfare systems â indeed a key argument of this book is that âneoliberal driftâ is an important phenomenon from which few regimes are entirely immune. The difficulty, though, is how best to understand the pressures and counter-pressures to which national governments are increasingly subject while bearing in mind that their welfare systems, which have become deeply embedded over time, are unlikely simply to âcollapseâ in the face of new challenges. As an initially schematic starting-point, two significant dimensions of discussion need some elaboration before being explored more fully in Chapters Two and Three. First, the economic dimension is important in its own right and âglobalizationâ, however contentious the term appears to be, is an immensely significant issue. Some observers, for example (see Giddens, 1990, 2000), argue that the increasing power of global capital constitutes by far the most serious difficulty for national governments struggling to manage welfare systems in increasingly open economies. Others appear equally convinced that the pressures confronting contemporary welfare systems are more attributable to endogenous economic difficulties, particularly the domestic roots of deindustrialization and the turn towards the service economy. An alternative perspective would play down the causal significance of economic factors to suggest that institutional infrastructures can prevent, or at least mitigate, pressures in ways that preserve the core characteristics of national welfare systems as these developed over the second half of the last century. Whether or not these âinstitutionalistâ arguments are accepted, they have come to influence perceptions of contemporary welfare state politics in some quarters in recent years, acting as a significant counterpoint to those who believe that economic pressures â âglobalâ or âdomesticâ â can directly account for welfare regime change.
But to conceive change in terms of these stark binaries is itself problematic as the discussion below suggests. If these key perspectives broadly frame the main concerns examined in this book, it is important to understand not only how they might âconditionâ one another â the interrelationship between economic and institutional factors being of central significance â but also how this âeconomic-institutional nexusâ organizes other factors which also play a major role. Here shifting demographic patterns are amongst the most important new challenges facing national welfare systems, the contention being that these do not somehow lie outside the nexus but are very much a part of it â as the discussion of the changes currently being made to pensions systems demonstrates (see Chapters Six and Seven).
In essence, the argument here is that national welfare systems are changing as new economic pressures interact with existing institutional arrangements â political, social and cultural â in ways that render the latter less stable. This embryonic instability means that welfare systems are becoming more vulnerable to other challenges that confront them â less able, for example, to rely on the âtraditionalâ policy solutions and institutional configurations that characterized welfare politics throughout the postwar period. Clearly the nature of change will depend on the particular welfare system in question â and a short discussion about the nature of âwelfare regimesâ will be conducted below. Before getting to this, however, a brief assessment of the key themes of âinstitutionalismâ and âglobalizationâ is required.
Institutions, âglobalizationâ and retrenchment politics
As March and Olsen (1998: 948) state, institutionalization refers to processes that involve âthe development of practices and rules in the context of using them [that have] earned a variety of labels ⌠which refer to the development of codes of meaning, ways of reasoning, and accounts in the context of acting on themâ. So far as welfare is concerned, the main contention behind the institutionalist position is that the embedded organizational structures on which particular policies rest, together with the assumptions and expectations about the nature of âwelfareâ that develop over time among interested parties, conspire to make radical reform difficult. Paul Pierson (1996: 152) notes, for instance, that ârelatively stable, routinized arrangements structure political behaviorâ. Depending to a degree on regime type, those who are critical of the extensive state-based welfare systems which developed among the advanced democracies, mainly in the postwar period, can find it difficult to formulate policy alternatives acceptable to a range of interests which have come to depend â socially, economically, culturally â on specific forms of welfare provision. There are a number of reasons why this may be the case, the precise argument varying according to different interpretations of the institutionalist position. Rational choice institutionalists, for instance, contend that âactors follow a logic of expected consequences within institutional constraintsâ (Beyeler 2003: 154), the suggestion being that change will only occur âbecause of shifts in the actorsâ opportunity structureâ. In short, the core focus is on âhow individuals build and modify their institutions to achieve their interestsâ (Campbell, 2004: 15). A second, more âsociologicalâ variant of institutionalist thinking argues that social actors âbehave according to a logic of appropriateness within their institutionally defined rolesâ (Beyeler, 2003: 154). Behaviour here is less ârationalâ and more likely to be generated through the sense of identity that institutions can create in both individual and collective actors. Importantly, according to Beyeler (2003: 157), in the sociological institutionalist view âthe autonomy of actors is based on rather than restricted by institutionsâ with the result that âinstitutions are changed if the underlying values are eroding and identities with the previous institution get weakerâ.
These differing approaches are best understood as ideal types within the institutionalist paradigm. In effect they form the two ends of a continuum of potential behavioural responses to pressures for change with the pure ârational actorâ model at one end and the more sociological, identity-driven model of institutional attachment and belonging at the other. Significantly for the discussion here, Beyeler (2003: 158) notes that the further that strict rationality arguments are relaxed the easier it becomes to understand that âpolicy-making can clearly not be conceived as a simple functional reaction to changes in the environmentâ. Struggles and power conflicts will emerge in key areas of institutional change with different actors adopting different positions and strategies depending on their particular interests and location within the prevailing institutional structure â that is to say, their âlocationâ within the sets of ârules, norms, institutions and identities that drive human actionâ (see March and Olsen, 1998: 958) in particular ways and specific contexts.
That individuals act in a more complex and bounded manner than would be dictated by pure ârationalâ self-interest opens up important dimensions of debate about the nature of path-dependent change and institutional stickiness. These include the need to consider both the âformalâ and âinformalâ factors that may conspire to reduce the potential for radical change while permitting âadjustmentsâ to existing policies and practices. At the formal level of the nation state, for example, âveto pointsâ may be expressly written into constitutional design in order to guard against the prospect of damaging changes driven through by unrepresentative or overpowerful interests. Reinforced majorities may be required for major reforms, while in consociational systems minorities have a constitutional right to block certain types of reform proposal. In federal and/or bicameral political systems there are formal mechanisms for controlling over-enthusiastic governmental executives either through countervailing power from devolved legislatures or the capacity of second, or upper, assemblies to block or delay proposed legislation. Constitutional arrangements such as these can become an entrenched part of political culture and national identity with the result that they are likely to prove âstickyâ when confronted by pressures for change. Less formally â and irrespective of constitutional considerations â the âembeddednessâ of policies within both the state and civil society can be highly significant, with âpolicy legaciesâ or âfeedbackâ exercising powerful sway over attempts to change existing forms of provision, delivery mechanisms and, indeed, the historically induced, cultural assumptions that citizens themselves hold about the role and purposes of (in this case) welfare. The âincreasing returnsâ generated as a result mean that decisions taken at earlier points of policy history can become self-reinforcing or âpath-dependentâ. In this way, as Pierson (2000a: 491 original emphasis) notes, âit is not just that institutional arrangements make reversal of course difficult. Individual and organizational adaptations to previous arrangements may also make reversal unattractiveâ. Core elements of welfare systems offer particularly clear examples of the issues at stake here. Pierson (1998: 552) notes that âhuge segments of the electorates of advanced industrial societies rely on the welfare state for a large share of their incomeâ and, further, that âdeeply institutionalized programs like health care and pensions [mean that] social actors are likely to place high value on predictability and continuity in policyâ (Pierson, 1998: 555). In consequence, it is hardly surprising if proposals for social reform are often closely contested by different interests and that political outcomes tend to favour evolutionary adjustment and the status quo (Ingram and Clay, 2000) over radical change where assumptions about the nature and role of central services â and the identities that are therefore bound into them â encounter external challenges. In this way, such external pressures are socially, politically and culturally âmediatedâ, the argument being that the relationship between these pressures and the attempts by governments and other actors to manage them will be both complex and non-linear.
Conducted at this level of generalization, it seems sensible to suggest that the inclusion of âcomplexityâ â to employ a useful shorthand â in the discussion appears to justify the institutionalist viewpoint over those who argue that global economic pressures can have a direct âhypodermicâ effect on national governments and their populations. However, there are a number of weaknesses associated with the institutionalist position that need to be taken into account which undermine its potential influence. It is clear from recent work by Campbell (2004) that institutionalists tend to operate with ill-defined notions of change and loose conceptions of âinstitutionsâ with the result that it is not always clear which types of change, levels of institutional analysis, time frames and so on are being examined. This lack of specificity obviously affects efforts to track and explain patterns of institutional change. Going further, Campbell (2004: 66) also points out that the processes or âmechanismsâ to which institutionalists refer when analysing the underlying reasons for the prevalence of incremental or evolutionary change are often poorly specified. âPath-dependenceâ tends to be intuitively associated with incremental shifts but, despite Piersonâs (2000b) efforts to furnish the idea with the additional notions of feedback mechanisms and increasing returns, Campbell believes these processes need to be better articulated.
These points are not trivial, for how core variables and processes are defined and understood influences and conditions perceptions of the consequences of change. For example, an analysis of the development of âprivatizationâ and devolution policies in the welfare arena across the majority of OECD countries could lead to different understandings of welfare state change depending on preconceptions about the role of the state, the history of welfare state development in particular countries and the responses of the institutional actors involved. The âtypicalâ institutionalist response would argue that privatization has become a particular technology of the state, which has been appropriated in ways that enable the latter to continue to play a central role in the development and delivery of social policies. In this way, Smith (2002: 82â3 my emphasis) can argue that although
government social policy increasingly relies upon a mixed public/private delivery system characterized by extensive contracting between government and nonprofit and for-profit service providers [and] tax credits for private organizations to pursue specific public policy goals ⌠and allowances and vouchers for housing, childcare and other services ⌠the rise of these new tools has offered government new opportunities to regulate private social and health organizations.
However, others could argue with equal justification that this shift towards a regulatory state constitutes more than merely an incremental adjustment of existing practices. On this view, the explanations associated with theories of evolutionary change â path-dependence, increasing returns, âlock-inâ effects and so on â cannot account alone for the emergence of new policies, or the reconfiguration of old ones, on the scale experienced in many of the mature democracies in recent years.
It may be that it is not possible to resolve differences of perception of this kind. Institutionalist conceptions of change and the pressures that drive it may simply be too elastic to permit anything more than a broad account of the possible forces at work and factors involved. To take one further example, it has been suggested by Rothstein (1998) that core institutional components of welfare are likely to persist, even as changes occur, owing to the influence of historically and culturally embedded assumptions (and it could be added âidentitiesâ) about the role of welfare in any particular polity. So Rothstein (1998: 214) can argue with reference to Sweden that citizensâ demands for âfreedom of choice and self-determination by no means spell the end of the universal welfare policyâ. This conviction is based on the view that âhow extensive the public commitment to the well-being of citizens should be is an altogether distinct question from whether or not the services following on this commitment should be produced by organizations which are publicly ownedâ (Rothstein, 1998: 215). The statement is significant because it appears to suggest that the institutional and cultural parameters of Swedish welfare universalism persist even as the stateâs role and indeed citizensâ behaviour, change. Of course, Rothstein may be correct to argue that there is a distinction between a public commitment to the universal welfare state and the delivery mechanisms required to sustain it. Even so, if the Swedish welfare regime does indeed remain formally attached to its universalist principles, could changing citizen perceptions together with the persistent policy changes of the kind implemented in recent years hollow out these principles in a way that ultimately forces a transformation of the role and purposes of welfare? If such a shift was to occur, how sure could institutionalists be of identifying the precise point at which the cumulative impact of change pushed institutionalized practices, norms and values beyond what could be anticipated from persistent incremental adjustment?
In view of these considerations, institutionalist arguments seem to be important for two reasons. First, they act as reminders of the complexities of embedded social, political and cultural arrangements in national welfare regimes, the existence of which reduce the likelihood of external pressures exerting a direct or linear transformative influence on national institutions. Second, however, because the institutionalist perspective is vulnerable to the criticism that it lacks conceptual rigour, it acts as reminder of the necessity not only to be as clear as possible about the definition of key concepts â âchangeâ, timescale and even the notion of âinstitutionâ itself â but also of the need to recognize that the identification of âcomplexityâ as a core issue is no substitute for the careful consideration of the mechanisms and processes which mediate external pressures. It would be dangerous to assume that, because the impact of external pressures may be nonlinear, they are somehow not important or do not exercise much influence over institutional change. And it is for this reason that it is important to conceptualize the relationship between exogenous pressures and welfare institutions (in the broadest sense) in terms of an economic-institutional nexus within which the balance of influence will shift according to regime type and depending on the mix of factors involved. While it may be correct, for instance, to argue that âglobalizationâ is unlikely to undermine existing arrangements entirely â and to produce statistical evidence to support such a conclusion (see Castles, 2001, 2004; Swank, 2002) â the manner in which global economic pressures (GEPs) impact on different welfare regime types will vary. For those better disposed towards the globalization thesis than institutionalists tend to be, the point is not always to endorse the thesis wholesale but to investigate the extent to which GEPs influence the institutional character of different regimes and vice versa as governments attempt to deal with both global pressures and a range of contingent factors, some of which will be âdomesticâ in origin. Within the global-institutional nexus, GEPs may corrode existing practices and identities in certain cases or reinforce particular tendencies and arrangements in others. Conversely these pressures themselves can be accommodated, increased or reduced depending on prevailing institutional arrangements and predispositions.
Certainly for Gilbert (2002) and others like Jessop (1994, 2002), welfare states have changed dramatically as part of a broader transformation of the state itself and GEPs are held to play a significant part in this process. Gilbert (2002: 15) suggests, for example, that âthe evidence indicates that a basic shift has occurred in the institutional framework for social protection ⌠most prominently in the United States and England, with other advanced industrialized nations moving steadily in the same directionâ. This shift takes the form of a move from the âwelfare stateâ of the postwar world to the âenabling stateâ of the late twentiethâearly twenty-first centuries and is being driven by a combination of factors, of which âthe globalization of the economyâ (Gilbert, 2002: 37) is amongst the most prominent.
Jessop regards the changing nature of welfare as part of a wider global transition from Fordist to post-Fordist modes of capitalist accumulation. In relation to welfare states, the move is conceptualized as a transition from the âKeynesian Welfare National Stateâ to the âSchumpeterian Competition Stateâ. The processes associated with this Schumpeterian turn are at their most visible in the âAtlantic economiesâ of the USA, the UK and (because they increasingly became part of this economic bloc owing to their relationship with the UK and military connections with the USA) Australia and New Zealand â although they are also beginning to emerge elsewhere. For the traditional welfare state, the hallmarks of change are the use of social policy to âenhance the flexibility of labour markets and to create flexible, enterprising workers [as well as to] put downward pressure on the social wageâ (Jessop, 2002: 168) in order that states remain competitive in the global marketplace. Importantly, however, Jessop does not argue that these changes in accumulation regimes fundamentally undermine all forms of domestic welfare provision. He acknowledges that dif...