Maritime Security in Southeast Asia

Kwa Chong Guan, John Skogan, Kwa Kwa Chong Guan, John Skogan

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2007
• ISBN:
  9781134123445
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politique et relations internationales
• Subtopic: Sécurité nationale

This book confronts both the maritime security challenges and responses. In Southeast Asia, maritime security has, over the last twenty years, taken on a much greater importance, due to the Law of the Sea convention, which has resulted in a 200 nautical mile Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs).

As well as traditional security threats to maritime security, there has also emerged a range of non-traditional threat, such as those emanating from piracy and international terrorism that spill over into the maritime domain. Events such as September 11th, and the designation of Southeast Asia as a 'second front' in the war against terrorism, have resulted in the growing realization that multilateral security cooperation is required in order to better manage emerging security threats.

Expert contributors to this book identify the nature of the maritime security problem and critically evaluate the various responses with an eye to improving the management of prevailing and emerging security threats. This book will be an invaluable resource to academics, policy analysts, legislators and students interested in security issues in Southeast Asia.

PART I
Introduction

1 Southeast Asian SLOCs and security options

Anders C. Sjaastad

The importance of the Southeast Asian sea lanes of communications (SLOCs) to the economies of both established and emerging Asian powers is beyond question and thus of utmost significance for the overall global economy. Moreover, the attention devoted to safeguarding the innocent passage of commercial shipping through the Southeast Asian straits is only going to increase as countries such as China, India and Japan are scrambling to secure deliveries of energy and raw materials to fuel their booming economies. For instance, China recently surpassed Japan to become the number one ‘user’ nation of transports through the Malacca Strait. Thus, the safety and security of the SLOCs are already hot topics in Asian- Pacific affairs and both littoral states and user countries pursue policies they claim are designed to achieve those goals. The purpose of this introductory chapter is to explore and analyse the nature of the security challenges facing Southeast Asia and then discuss the various security options, be they national, bilateral or multilateral, and to what extent they are available.

All parties – whether littoral states, user countries or other interested actors will unanimously favour steps and arrangements that will safeguard innocent passage of commercial shipping through Southeast Asian waters – at least in theory. However, when it comes to drawing up and agreeing upon ways and means to achieve these aims, things become difficult. It is when nations agree on proper arrangements, share the responsibility and even establish institutions that interests diverge and even become conflicting. This is partly because of differing national priorities, but is also a result of mistrust, lack of confidence and hidden agendas. For some of the littoral states who can still remember their colonial past, the principle of sovereignty is sacrosanct and any arrangement or action that could be seen to undermine it is taboo. And seen with Southeast Asian eyes, it appears that the United States’ first priority nowadays is to fight international terrorism regardless of other threats or considerations. Countries such as Indonesia and Malaysia may certainly share some of the American worries, but without regarding fighting terrorism to be an all-consuming business.

There is a natural tendency for Western observers, including this one, to look for Atlantic/European solutions to Asian security challenges – partly because these institutions are familiar, but also because they have proved largely successful in the Atlantic/European theatre. However, there is an understandable reluctance amongst Asians to emulate European behaviour and institutions not least for historical and ideological reasons.

Another frequent Asian objection to adopting Western organizations is that most of them are relics from the Cold War era and consequently irrelevant to present- day Asia. The counter-argument that most of these institutions still serve the old continent well is not enough to erase the bleaker aspects of the European legacy.

The security challenges

In most of Asia, unlike in Europe, traditional military threats prevail and the use of military power to pursue political aims is still regarded as a state option. In addition, new unconventional and asymmetrical threats have become prominent, widespread and imminent. In Europe, the armed forces are reduced in numbers and military expenditure is cut while the remaining forces are restructured to face asymmetrical threats in the European theatre as well as being capable of being deployed to fulfill ‘out-of-area’ missions. But unlike in the world overall, parts of Asia have seen military expenditure and the armed forces substantially increase. This is to a large extent explained by the multifaceted threats many Asian nations potentially face. But it is also partially due to the lack of cooperation between the armed forces of Asian countries. In Southeast Asia, this is largely the case whether one speaks of cooperation on a bilateral or multilateral level, a result of the limitations that the principle of sovereignty places on the ‘newly’ independent countries.

Apart from traditional conflicts rooted in unsettled or disputed borders, or stemming from historical animosity, the most likely serious security challenges to Southeast Asian countries are derived from the complex territorial disputes in the potentially resource rich waters of the South China and East China Seas. China claims virtually the whole of the South China Sea including all islands, islets and rocks as its exclusive economic zone (EEZ) based on a so-called ‘historical’ right. This ‘imperialistic’ claim would imply that China demands areas even within, for instance, Malaysia’s territorial waters off Borneo. Beijing’s position, however, hardly holds up in any international court and China, being a party to the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), is bound by its principles. Whilst China is still pushing its claim, it is a handy tool to involve the various countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), rather than entertaining much hope of getting its demand accepted. However, ASEAN itself is ridden with controversies when it comes to the South China Sea since many of its members have conflicting territorial claims and more distant members are reluctant to get involved. In early 2005, for instance, there was a naval stand-off between Indonesia and Malaysia over the disputed area of Ambalat in the Sulawesi Sea. This delicate situation is reinforced by China’s ‘divide and rule’ strategy with regard to the South China Sea. Beijing has succeeded in engaging separately two of the ‘frontline’ states, namely the Philippines and Vietnam, and has entered into bilateral agreements with them concerning the South China Sea issues. This has, not surprisingly, created increased suspicion inside the organization and the ensuing lack of trust has been carried over when facing other challenges such as terrorism and piracy. As a net result this has limited the possible use of ASEAN as a more potent security instrument.

What has been achieved, however, within the auspices of ASEAN is an agreed code of conduct when it comes to behaviour and confidence building measures in the South China Sea. However, as a testimony to the delicacy of even agreeing upon such a set of behavioural rules, several of the claimant states did not want a legally binding ‘code of conduct’ – all they could accept was a declaration guiding the intended conduct in the South China Sea. That being said, the declaration has worked well, disciplined the various states’ behaviour and the incidents have been kept low-key and restrained. Nevertheless, the claimant countries have from time to time taken small and ‘innocent’ steps hoping to improve their own position without trying to rock the overall status quo situation.

All potential security challenges and conflicts in Southeast Asia can, in principle, be handled through a pragmatic approach apart from the territorial disputes, whether they exist on land or at sea. None of the countries, big or small, are likely to compromise their claims in the South China Sea in the foreseeable future. Thus, rather than compromising on the one hand or resorting to military means on the other, the parties have put the conflicts aside for future deliberations. However, that is what makes the South China Sea issues so difficult and always potentially dangerous for Asian security.

The piracy threat to the SLOCs is disputed amongst the Southeast Asian countries themselves. Since 9/11 some countries, the US prominent among them, have been looking for any connection between piracy and international terrorism. The Southeast Asian countries would argue that so far there is no proven link in the Southeast Asian waters, but that they will be looking for any evidence since combating international terrorism is a common obligation for any civilized country, something the Bali terrorist acts have demonstrated. However, when the challenge is isolated to combating piracy, different perspectives and interests rule, and the various possible security options are controversial.

Even the term ‘piracy’ is debated when it comes to the illegal activities that occur in various Southeast Asian straits, with the Malacca Strait prominent among them. Indonesia and Malaysia will argue that according to the definition of piracy in UNCLOS, there is no piracy taking place in the Malacca Strait, only armed robbery. Piracy is by definition an activity that takes place solely on the high seas, not in the territorial waters of some littoral state.¹ Since the southern part of the Malacca Strait is so narrow (20 nautical miles), there are no international waters between the territorial borders of Indonesia and Malaysia. In fact, that makes these two countries the main littoral states of the Malacca Strait, while Singapore mainly borders the Singapore Strait. While all three countries are equally interested in safeguarding commercial shipping through the Malacca Strait, the difference in geographical location makes Singapore more relaxed when it comes to involving user states in the patrolling and policing of traffic. In this connection, one is always reminded that Indonesia and Malaysia fought vigorously in UNCLOS, and succeeded, to avoid the Malacca Strait and other straits from being defined as international straits. Thus, these straits permit innocent passage but the jurisdiction rests with the littoral states within their territorial borders of 12 nautical miles.

According to the available statistics, the number of acts of piracy in the Southeast Asian waters is not great² and does in reality encompass many different types of illegal activities as pointed out in the chapter by Catherine Zara Raymond. Although piracy in these waters has been a traditional trade for many centuries, the level increased after the Asian financial crisis of 1997–98 and despite variations, was a significant phenomenon until the tsunami struck in December 2004. The sharp drop in reported incidents suggested that the Aceh Province housed many pirates, with a number of them killed, and their boats destroyed, by the tsunami. After a lull of five months following the tsunami, the pirate activities started to increase again.

It is a statistical fact that more acts of piracy take place on the Indonesian side of the Malacca Strait than on the Malaysian side. Indonesia is of course a vast littoral country and the authority of Jakarta is not greatly observed in the more remote parts of the country. Poverty is widespread, and the Asian financial crisis and the tsunami hit Indonesia very hard and dramatically worsened the situation for many already living close to subsistence level. Piracy is also bred by inefficient law enforcement capability in Indonesia, which is plagued by corrupt officials with a lack of resources at their disposal. Furthermore, there exist criminal syndicates who organize piracy from land and, for instance, recruit daytime fishermen to become pirates at night, executing various missions. Thus, piracy in these waters is to a significant extent an expression of the social and economic conditions existing on land. Poverty is consequently a recruitment factor.

Security options

Security in Southeast Asia is commonly regarded to be firstly domestic, secondly bilateral/trilateral and only thirdly multilateral. In addition, security problems are frequently believed to be created by major powers infringing upon the sovereignty of the littoral states, particularly in connection with the security of the SLOCs. Thus, some Southeast Asian countries invoke as an absolute principle that no security cooperation should limit national sovereignty. Equally absolute is a second principle banning any outside interference in domestic affairs and in this connection ‘interference’ is defined comprehensively. Although these principles may sound familiar, reasonable and subscribed to by many newly independent countries, in Southeast Asia they are applied more vigorously than in most other places. Thus, unlike in Europe where there is frequently a trade-off between sovereignty and cooperation in order to enhance common security, these attitudes will severely limit many potentially viable multilateral security options and will even infringe upon the use of bilateral arrangements in Southeast Asia.

National security options

The ability to pursue a successful national security policy differs significantly among the Southeast Asian countries. Malaysia has lately devoted significant resources to build up a national capacity to police and patrol the Malacca Strait. These efforts include spending a considerable amount of money to establish a monitoring system covering the Malacca Strait and the launch of a new maritime agency to boost security in Malaysia’s territorial waters, enforce maritime laws and conduct search and rescue operations.³ This coast guard, which became operational in November 2005, has the necessary assets available and in place for that to happen. But Malaysia is still willing to accept financial contributions from ‘user’ countries to cover both financial investments and operational costs of monitoring activities and surveillance of the straits. So far Japan has been the only user country to contribute financially to the Malacca Strait surveillance both through its shipowners’ association and via other channels.

Indonesia on the other hand lacks resources to pay for any monitoring installations and would really need outside economic assistance. Only recently did Indonesia separate its police force from the military, a move that hopefully will lead to an increased law enforcement capacity since the Indonesian armed forces have never assigned any priority to fighting piracy in its waters. Japan has, in fact, financed a number of patrol boats to enable Indonesia to monitor the straits. Furthermore, Japan is also supposed to have helped Indonesia to acquire at least some surveillance capability. The Japanese efforts prove that Indonesia has difficulties in buying the necessary assets to police its territorial waters. Finally, Indonesian units have been training with the US Navy in conducting counterinsurgency and anti-piracy missions. However, defence ties between the two countries were largely severed in 1991, when Indonesian forces launched a bloody crackdown on pro-independence protesters in East Timor. In November 2005, the US resumed its military ties with Jakarta and is already providing defence equipment to Indonesia, largely to support maritime security.⁴

Bilateral security options

Asia is full of bilateral security treaties, arrangements and relationships, and it is frequently difficult to evaluate correctly the significance of some of them. However, the most important treaties definitely carry an Asian-wide importance, such as the bilateral and mutual security treaties between the US and Japan, the US and South Korea and the US and Taiwan, and these treaties constitute security frameworks that influence the actions and behaviour of other security players on the Asian scene. The real significance of the so-called China–Russian ‘strategic partnership’ is more difficult to assess beyond observing that when these major countries are bent on cooperating – at least within certain parameters – rather than outright competing for power and influence, this will have a stabilizing effect on the Asian security environment. In 2005 they even conducted a joint naval exercise, code-named Peace Mission 2005, which was the first one ever, and this may be an indication of an emerging condominium in parts of East Asia despite the inherent Russian suspicion of China’s future ambitions. The troubling China–Japan relationship is also worth mentioning. Their historically based antagonism compounded by present-day territorial disputes in the East China Sea, is bound to be a defining element in Asian affairs. But the most decisive factor for Asian security is the evolving US–China relationship, partly characterized by cooperation in important fields but also dominated by rivalry for power and influence.

How do the bilateral/trilateral agreements and relationships in Southeast Asia fit into this picture? In safeguarding the shipping activities in the Malacca Strait, one can speak of a loose trilateral cooperation. Malaysia and Indonesia have the closest relationship whereas Singapore, both in terms of geography and when it comes to shared interests, is a more distant partner. However, the limits to even the bilateral Malaysian–Indonesian cooperation are demonstrated when dealing with the sensitive topic of ‘hot pursuit’. ‘Hot pursuit’ would mean that one country’s law enforcement unit could follow a suspect across another state’s border and into its territorial waters, and if necessary, apply force. It is evident how useful such a mutual rule of engagement would be in fighting piracy, but it would also imply a concession in terms of sovereignty. Not surprisingly, once again the principle of unimpeded national sovereignty has won the day in Southeast Asia. All a legal follower can do is to ‘hand over’ the pursuit to the next country’s law enforcement agency, whether it is present or not. The consequence is of course a less efficient counter-piracy capability in the Malacca Strait and, to compensate at least partially for this inadequacy, there would have to be intimate mission coordination and shared real-time intelligence, of which none is available today.

Third party assistance in monitoring and patrolling the Malacca Strait, apart from financial contributions, has also been declined by the littoral states. India, for instance, requested some time ago to have merchant shipping escorted by some private security organization under the pretext of guarding them against pirates. The request was viewed by Malaysia as unacceptable and was turned down. The reason was simply that although foreign escorts might be seen only as a marginal infringement upon the sovereignty of the littoral states, it could turn into a serious violation once an incident involved an exchange of fire. Japan has also proposed to ‘assist’ in patrolling the Malacca Strait with its coast guard, especially after a Japanese-registered tugboat was hijacked by pirates in early 2005. In 1997, a prominent Japanese think-tank had toyed with the notion of ‘ocean peacekeeping’ as a mission for Japan. More recently, Japan had indicated that it was prepared to renew its commitment to patrol the Malacca Strait. Whenever there is talk about Japan acquiring a new mission, whether it is nonmilitary in the sense that it is the Japanese Coast Guard getting involved or it is the Japanese Navy extending its ‘defence parameter’, it is usually seen by its Asian neighbours as part of a grand strategy. This creates, for obvious historical and political reasons, a lot of sensitivity i...