Contemporary Belarus

Between Democracy and Dictatorship

Elena Korosteleva, Colin Lawson, Rosalind Marsh, Elena Korosteleva, Colin Lawson, Rosalind Marsh

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Print ISBN:
  9780700716135
• eBook ISBN:
  9781135789473
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Asian History
• Index: History

Belarus is unique among the states of the former Soviet bloc, in that after a decade of transition', the country remains stalled' and backward-oriented. Political and economic changes are characterised by half-measures, and recently a new suppression of dissent has been introduced; the country balances between the prospect of democracy and a retreat to authoritarianism. These developments contrast starkly with the many democratic changes in neighbouring states and suggest a possible alternative path for future development in Eastern Europe. This book provides a thorough overview of current developments in Belarus. It looks at historical, political, economic and social changes, and at international relations, especially relations with Russia and the European Union, considering all these factors both in their domestic and international contexts and defines the type of democracy, if any, which exists in Belarus, exploring the prospects for further democratisation.

1 Introduction

Paradoxes of democratisation in post-communist Belarus

Elena A. Korosteleva, Colin W. Lawson and Rosalind J. Marsh

Until very recently, Belarus has received relatively little attention from western scholars and policy-makers. However, the political and economic development of Belarus since the fall of communism is eminently worthy of further investigation. First, Belarus, situated in the centre of the European continent, bordered by Russia, Ukraine, Lithuania, Latvia and Poland, occupies an important geostrategic position, and as the European Union and NATO enlarge, it could have a vital influence on the stability of Europe. Second, Belarus deserves to be better known to the world community because by the beginning of the twenty-first century it appears to be in full retreat from democracy and ruled by an increasingly repressive leadership. Since the rise to power of President Lukashenka in 1994, the country’s constitution has been arbitrarily changed; elections have not been free and fair; parliament and the independent media have been suppressed; opposition leaders have unaccountably disappeared, been arrested or exiled; the authorities have increasingly relied on the security services (the KGB has not even been renamed); and there have been constant violations of human and civil rights. Third, post-communist Belarus provides an interesting case study because of its singular path of political and economic transition. Unlike many other post-communist states, it has defied all expectations and failed to move either in the direction of nationalism or towards democracy and a free market. This book aims to suggest, on the basis of an analysis of the hybrid post-communist regime in Belarus, that such contradictory developments need to be taken into account by general theorists of transition and the process of democratisation. Further, it will pose the question: is Belarus, after the fall of Milosˇevichin Serbia, the last dictatorship in Europe? Or have the preconditions for a democracy already been laid?

Several valuable studies of the history and politics of Belarus have appeared in English since the mid and late 1990s, including some by contributors to the present volume.¹ David R. Marples has analysed Belarus’s political development up to 1996–7, arguing that Belarus is largely ‘a denationalized nation’ – nationalism and anti-Russian feeling did not provide a new ideology or organising principle able to fill the vacuum left by the collapse of the USSR, as it did in Ukraine, the Baltic States and many other states of the CIS.² Kathleen Mihalisko has explored Belarus’s exceptional development in the context of other post-communist transitions, emphasising factors that inherently favour and oppose democratic progress.³ Garnett and Legvold have focused on Belarus’s international situation, analysing its crucial importance for European security,⁴ and White and Rose have produced a useful comparative survey of public opinion in Belarus, Russia and Ukraine in the year 2000.⁵ The aim of the present volume is to update previous research, evaluating recent trends and the prospects for democratisation at the beginning of the twenty-first century.

It was in order to satisfy the perceived need to increase public and scholarly knowledge about Belarus that the first conference on post-communist Belarus in the UK was held at the University of Bath in February 2000. This book is based on revised and updated versions of papers given at the conference. The introduction will discuss the current political and economic situation in Belarus up to 2001, situating its development in the context of other ‘third-wave’ transitions, particularly in the states of the former USSR, before proceeding to summarise the main arguments of the book.

Third wave transitions⁶

The last decades of the twentieth century have witnessed the birth of many new regimes. Most countries in Latin America and almost all states in Central and Eastern Europe have begun remarkable transformations from semi-closed economies towards a free market; and from dictatorial-style regimes towards liberal democratic polities. Many political scholars emphasise the sui generis nature of the new regimes, primarily associated with (i) the high complexity of the transitional tasks⁷ and (ii) the incomplete and non-progressive institutionalisation of the system. Scholars agree that many new regimes fit the minimal criteria of a polyarchy,⁸ having adopted the practice of elections and certain democratic liberties. Nevertheless, inwardly they have appeared to demonstrate a different mode of development. Third-wave democracies are often cited as ‘democracies by default’, ‘semi-democracies’ or even ‘façadede mocracies’.⁹ This essentially implies little system change, populist politics, the lowering of public expectations of what could be achieved through political action, and consequently, low-level participation and delegated leadership in an ‘alegal’environment, that is to say, a system that is not protected by its own constitution. Regimes of this type are, paradoxically, sustainable, and characterised by various degrees of non-institutionalisation, under-representation and non-intensive political competition. This suggests that a continuing enquiry into theories of transition and the process of democratisation should be undertaken.

Post-Soviet states, of which Belarus is one, have appeared to embark on a more complex transition to a democratic polity than any others in the European region. Historically, these countries were strongholds of socialism, and simultaneously, the initiators of transition. Culturally and structurally, they suffered most from inherited legacies and unresolved conflicts. Their present development has led to economic stagnation and impending system collapse, as well as the lingering threat of ‘red’ (or ‘red–brown’) dictatorship, mass alienated politics, extreme social divisions, and growing international isolation. The latter is particularly alarming for the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The dual enlargement of the European Union and NATO eastwards, as well as the incorporation of more successful Central and East European countries (CEECs) into a global capitalist market, means that the states of the former Soviet Union feel increasingly isolated from the ‘new’ Europe. This isolation is not only geographical, but also isolation outside a newly built political and economic ‘Schengen Wall’. This sense of exclusion, especially among the borderland countries like Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova, has begun to be manifested in an emerging conflict of identities – such as a pro-European versus a pro-Slavic Russian identity – and in an understanding of the limited opportunities that might be available to the ruling elite in this structurally constrained environment.¹⁰ The situation has been aggravated by Russia strengthening its control over the borderland countries, primarily through demanding repayment of debts and limiting energy supplies to the dependent CIS states.

Belarus is a good candidate for analysis because it is an exemplar of the difficulties associated with third-wave transition and the CIS in particular. Its transition to democracy has been slow and disruptive. In 2001, Belarus was in its eleventh year of ‘transition’ from the old to the new regime, and, nevertheless, its democratic progress remains unsound, economic restructuring has not been initiated, parties remain weak and powerless, and the prospect of dictatorship is looming. Indeed, contemporary Belarus has arrived at a crossroads of transition: what lies ahead is either an irrevocable path to democracy or a slide backwards to dictatorship.

An overview of Belarus

The Republic of Belarus formally declared independence from the former Soviet system on 25 August 1991 and became – for only the second time in its history (a short-lived National Republic having been established in 1918) – an independent sovereign state. However, its path to democracy appears to be a long and unsuccessful detour. Its first parliamentary elections in March–April 1990 resulted in a short-term success for the democrats, who established the first ‘Democratic Club’ with nearly one-third of its deputies gaining seats in parliament. However, the communist majority prevailed and continued a course of counter-reform similar to that of the pre-perestroika period. In 1992 the nationalists initiated a call for new parliamentary elections which was widely supported by the electorate, but contemptuously ignored by the old-fashioned parliament. The latter was replaced only in 1995 by a new multi-party legislature after the first relatively competitive elections. However, while changing its external appearance, parliament internally remained unchanged. There was still a relative majority of non-partisan (48 per cent) and Left-oriented deputies (22 per cent communists and 17 per cent agrarians), and very few others. Its democratic tenure was brief and in most respects ended with the introduction of the presidency in 1994. The first President of the Republic of Belarus, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, dissolved the parliament in 1996, following an alteration to the 1994 constitution. Nevertheless, parliament continued to meet and was still recognised by all major international authorities on the basis of the 1994 constitution. President Lukashenka’ sterm of office should have expired in July 1999; however, he did not accept this, and accordingly altered the constitution by referendum, allowing himself two more years in power. Consequently, parliamentary elections took place in autumn 2000, but none of the existing opposition parties expressed a desire to participate in them, and thus did not attempt to negotiate with the authorities through democratic means. At present the country is living through the aftermath of the 2001 presidential election, during which it proved difficult, if not impossible, for the opposition to challenge President Lukashenka, who remains the only credible leader in the contemporary Belarusian political arena.

Historically, Belarus possessed the structural foundation on which democracy could have been built, but this appeared to be insufficient for national consolidation. This foundation included a relatively stable economy,¹¹ significant intellectual capital, existing political divisions, an emerging opposition, and eager voters. However, structural and institutional factors¹² – as well as the decisive intervention of the ‘elite factor’ – have delayed democratisation. Notably, political parties – the basis of a strong democratic system – have failed twice to gain office and to sustain the momentum for change: first, in the 1995 parliament and second, as a result of their failure to win votes and seats in the 2000 parliamentary elections. Petty disputes, lack of co-operation and arguments between and within the parties led to a pessimistic prognosis about their future potential. Because of their continuing inability to win seats in parliament, parties have become increasingly disregarded by the electors, who would rather enjoy short-term benefits from the state than believe in parties’ long-term promises. The populist President Aliaksandr Lukashenka, with his appointed loyal administration and system of clienteles, continues to control the ‘representative’ institutions of parliament, as well as the Constitutional Court, the mass media and the state bureaucracy. Paradoxically, the regime in Belarus remains sustainable, as in many other post-Soviet democracies, with the power balance heavily weighted towards the presidency and away from the legislature.

Paradoxes of contemporary policy-making in Belarus

Belarus displays a good example of a façade regime in which democratic ‘scaffolding’ conceals a dictatorial style of polity building. For example, outwardly Belarus seems to be a stable economy characterised by optimistic transition indexes¹³ and economic growth. Inwardly, however, it presents a case of impending economic and political crises with no policy for reform. Externally, Belarus ‘fits’ the criteria of a developing polyarchy, as it has an institutionalised practice of elections and has nominally guaranteed constitutional liberties to its citizenry. Internally, the legal and bureaucratic systems fail to protect and promote individual human rights, and there are many informal mechanisms that allow the government to manipulate public opinion to its own advantage. Finally, there is an impression of an active political society. This is associated with a stable number of national political parties with crystallised ideological profiles, a multiplicity of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and the consolidation of trade unions. However, this does not necessarily lead to the conclusion that they all possess equal opportunities to gain access to the decision-making arena. Since the alteration of the 1994 constitution this has been the sole prerogative of the incumbent President and his government, and subsequently Belarus has been ruled under a system of super-presidentialism.¹⁴

The economy

Owing to its geopolitical location and economic position, Belarus has been faced with a more complex transition than that of Central and East European countries (CEECs). On the one hand, Belarus has always been dependent on Russia’s natural resources, and hence, its foreign policymaking. On the other hand, with its orientation to the East, and the involvement of CEECs in a transnational framework of co-operation,¹⁵ the position of Belarus and many other CIS countries in the international arena is rapidly attaining the position of a self-contained regime situated beyond Europe’s new ‘Iron Curtain’.¹⁶ As Light notes, ‘There is an increasing belief in the outsider states that being “between” is not just a physical reality, but implies having to choose between Russia and the West.’¹⁷ A feeling of exclusion has also been reinforced by the gradual economic progress of the CEECs, in contrast to the performance of the CIS states which have been lagging far behind in their development, despite the shared legacies of the Soviet past.

Belarus can be formally described as a regime moving towards ‘democracy’ as a state counterposedto its totalitarian past. Nevertheless, it still preserves many features of the command economy with central planning and limited privatisation. As Stephen White notes, the ‘move to democracy’ in Belarus, as in the case of many other CIS states, is a term which has to be carefully applied within the area: despite their façadefeatures, some countries ‘fall short of democratic practice’ and ‘go beyond a competitive struggle for the popular vote’.¹⁸

Belarus, like many other CIS regimes, has not yet seriously considered the wholesale restructuring of its economic system. The relatively enthusiastic initiation of reforms at the outset of transition seems to have stalled towards the end of the decade, and after the 1998 financial crisis in Russia, Belarus went into continuing recession. The average index of transitional progress in the new European democracies varies from 2.3 in the CIS, 2.7 in the Balkan countries, 3.2 in the Baltic countries, to the highest 3.5 score in East Central Europe on a 0–5 scale, with 4.3 being the highest score achieved by any one country.¹⁹ However, as some scholars note, the averaging of disparate data that produces these scores is probably flattering to the CIS states.²⁰

Belarus demonstrates a certain level of economic development.²¹ The republic has been classif...

Table of contents

• Cover Page
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Tables
• Notes on contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Note on translation and transliteration
• 1 Introduction
• 2 History and politics in post-Soviet Belarus
• 3 Explaining post-communist authoritarianism in Belarus
• 4 Difficulties of elite formation in Belarus after 1991
• 5 Party system development in post-communist Belarus
• 6 Electoral politics of Belarus compared
• 7 President and opposition
• 8 Belarus
• 9 Path-dependence and the economy of Belarus
• 10 Economic policy in Belarus from official and oppositional perspectives
• 11 Russia and Belarus
• 12 Belarus’s external relations
• 13 Belarus’s relations with the European Union
• Afterword