Iran's Persian Gulf Policy

From Khomeini to Khatami

Dr Christin Marschall

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2003
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• eBook ISBN:
  9781134429905
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

This book examines the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran towards the states of the Persian Gulf from 1979 to 1998. It covers perceptions Iranians and Arabs have of each other, Islamic revolutionary ideology, the Iran/Iraq war, the Gulf crisis, the election of President Khatami and finally the role of external powers, such as the United States. The author argues that over the twenty-year period, the policy has moved from being ideological to pragmatic; and that by tracing its history, we can better anticipate its future relationship.

1

FOUNDATIONS OF IRAN’S PERSIAN GULF POLICY

The Persian Gulf policy of the Islamic Republic of Iran has to be seen in the light of its historical and geopolitical context. Since the revolution in 1979, and the war with Iraq, policy towards the Arab states has evolved from a policy mainly driven by revolutionary Islamic ideology, to one predominantly influenced by national interest, economic and strategic considerations. In the 1990s, with the important exception of the former dependence on the United States, the Iranian policy towards the Gulf states seemed to be in many ways a direct continuation of Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi’s policies of the 1970s.

Underlying ideological and geopolitical concerns, nationalism and the perceptions Persians and Arabs have of themselves and of each other have to be borne in mind as a behavioural determinant for the process of policy making. Persians base their role in the Persian Gulf on their long history as a powerful nation state, which they trace back over 2,500 years to Achaemenid times. The Arabs, on the other hand, are more directly concerned with threat perceptions emanating from the period of the Shah and the fear of the export of revolution.

This chapter will explain the historical background which influences the relationship. It will then examine the foreign policy of the Islamic Republic and its ideological, strategic and domestic determinants. Iran’s Persian Gulf policy is a product of these two aspects as well as of external factors, such as the military presence of the United States in the region which will be dealt with in later chapters.

Iran’s history in the Persian Gulf

Mutual perceptions

A main feature in Arab perceptions of their Iranian neighbour has been deep distrust and fear. Apart from the sectarian and ethnic divides of Sunni–Shi‛a and Arab–Persian, this is based on concrete fears small countries often have of a large neighbour. It is founded on their view of Iranian expansionism leading back to the time of the Shah as well as dislike of Shi‛a Islam and the threat of an export of the Islamic revolution which could result in the overthrow of their regimes.

Tehran’s foreign policy makers on the other hand have been aware of but widely disregarded the Arabs’ fears. It was only in the mid-1990s that Iranian politicians and analysts came to realise that the prevailing distrust had to be overcome. This may be due to Iran’s view of the world which, according to Graham Fuller, is ‘intensely Irano-centric’. The country’s vast geography and ancient glorious history to some extent delimit its political thinking.¹ Iranians derive a sense of pride and glory from the knowledge of their past which they trace back to the sixth century BC, when Cyrus the Great founded the Achaemenid Empire. With this knowledge comes a sense of cultural superiority towards their neighbours. In addition, as explained by Mahmood Sariolghalam, Associate Professor at the School of Economics and Political Science, National University of Iran: ‘The Iranian people have a philosophical way of looking at things. They think Iran is a superpower. They think in terms of thousands of years.’²

As for the Iranian perception of the importance of geopolitics for Iran’s regional role, Davoud Bavand, Professor of International Law at Imam Sadeq University, explained:

It is Iran’s natural mission to have the dominant position in the Persian Gulf. Besides its long history and the importance of political and military power during the Shah’s era, Iran is a big country with a large population and a major coastal power. Its shores span half the Persian Gulf [c. 1,050 miles], Iran has numerous islands, and is an exclusive economic zone.³

The ‘Persian’ Gulf

The importance of the Persian Gulf was particularly apparent in the dispute about the term ‘Persian’ Gulf. The Arabs decided to call the Gulf ‘Arab’ or ‘Arabian’ during the height of Arab nationalism in the 1950s and 1960s. Ever since, the term has been a reason for serious disagreement and a widened ‘gulf’ between the two peoples. As expressed by an Arab newspaper:

There is a big Gulf, but the biggest gulf that separates us from the Iranians is that they insist and will remain calling it Persian, and that it is our victory that the seven Arab Gulf states and the other fourteen Arab states call it Arab.⁴

Iran under the Shah as well as under the Islamic Republic has taken deep dislike toward this renaming of the historic term recognised by the United Nations.⁵ Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, the President of the Islamic Republic, described the feeling in Iran:

It is not at all wise for a group of countries to gather and then decide on their own to change the name of what has been historically known as the Persian Gulf to the ‘Arabian Gulf.’ What purpose does it serve, when your honorable neighbor is offended or a sense of insecurity is created in the region?⁶

Iran’s claim to the name of the Gulf is an ancient one and has been explained numerous times by contemporary Iranian historians.⁷ They assert that the Persian Gulf was called the Persian Sea 2,500 years ago, when Darius, the Achaemenid king, called it ‘a sea which comes out of Persia – draya tya hacha Parsa aity’.⁸

The Persian historical memory and national consciousness make it irrelevant to what extent Iran in its past was a seafaring nation or maritime power. The national myth and the conviction that this Gulf is a Persian lake in which the Persians have always played a leading role as well as the awareness of the long coastal line and large population have been important factors in Iran’s foreign policy since the time of the Shah.

Iranian involvement in the Persian Gulf before the revolution

The Iranian belief that the Persian Gulf is a Persian lake, which means Iran is the main littoral power, stems from the time of Achaemenid hegemony over the Middle East. In the third century AD, according to the Iranian historic memory, the Sassanid king Ardeshir restored the Persian Gulf and its shores, which in the meantime had been raided by Arab tribes, to Iranian sovereignty. He also sent an army into Bahrain and left his son Shahpur I as regent.⁹ The Portuguese entered the Persian Gulf in 1507 and occupied many Persian islands and cities. Under Shah Abbas (1587–1629), the Portuguese were expelled and Bahrain, Bandar Abbas, Qishm and Hormuz restored to Persian sovereignty. Shah Abbas’ successors were unable to hold Persian power over the region. Bahrain and several Iranian islands were seized by the ruler of Oman. It was only under Nader Shah in 1736–1737, that Iran re-established control over Bahrain and the entire coast from Basra to Makran. Nader Shah designed the first Iranian navy. The plan, however, was abandoned when he was assassinated in 1747. Iran’s power yet again lessened, when British dominance in the Persian Gulf rose. In 1783, Iran lost Bahrain to the Utubi Arabs who occupied the island.

Around the same time, Wahhabi Arabs extended their control over the southern shore of the Gulf. The Wahhabis were challenged by the viceroy of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, who established control over the Najd (1835–1838) and occupied various Gulf ports. Further Egyptian designs were halted by the British who, in 1820, had signed the General Treaty of Peace with the Trucial Coast and Bahrain. By 1861, Bahrain was under British protection, and in 1892, Bahrain and the Trucial sheikhs were placed under the control of the British resident in Bushehr.¹⁰

In 1865, Nasser ud-Din Shah attempted to establish a navy. This was foiled by the British. Reza Shah reasserted Iran’s control over the Persian Gulf in the 1920s. He – unsuccessfully – protested against British sovereignty over Bahrain on historic grounds and challenged the Iraqi position over the Shatt al-Arab. He brought the oil-rich province of Khuzistan under the authority of the central government in Tehran, when the Arab chief Khaz‛al instigated a rebellion. The sheikh had ruled the province in near autonomy, despite the fact that, in 1847, the Ottomans had recognised Iranian sovereignty over Abadan, Muhammarah (Khorramshahr) and the Eastern banks of the Shatt al-Arab.

In the mid-1930s, Reza Shah, without success, laid claim over Abu Musa and the Tunb islands. These had been part of Persian territory in the nineteenth century, but were brought under British control in 1903 by hoisting Sharjah’s flag on them.¹¹ The Tunbs were later given to Ras al-Khaimah when it split off from Sharjah. Reza Shah also attempted to build up a navy, but this attempt came to an end with his forced abdication in 1941, when British and Russian forces occupied Iran.¹² His son, Muhammad Reza Shah, needed the next twenty years to consolidate his power domestically before he could turn his attention to the Persian Gulf.

Once Muhammad Reza Shah had consolidated his power inside Iran in the early 1960s, his objective became to rid the Persian Gulf of foreign interference and to establish an independent national policy (siyasat-i mustaqill-i milli). This aim is in a way similar to the ‘neither East nor West’ policy of the Islamic Republic, although the latter was much more combative and ideologically fiercely independent. The Shah’s idea was a normalisation of relations with the Soviet Union and the development of an equal partnership with the United States.

The Iraqi coup of 1958, led to common fears amongst Iran and the conservative Arab regimes of the Persian Gulf, which were enhanced by Iraq’s consequent rapprochement with the Soviet Union. Iran at that time began to befriend its neighbours. In 1961, it denounced Iraq’s claim over Kuwait, just as the Islamic Republic did thirty years later in 1990. It then tried to expand trade as its most important policy instrument. This included various trade promotion measures, such as the sponsorship of trade conferences with smaller Gulf states, exchange of merchants and visits of rulers and top officials.¹³ The Islamic Republic has been following the same policy after the Iran–Iraq war in order to establish better relations with the Gulf countries. Iran further settled continental shelf disputes with Kuwait in 1965, Saudi Arabia in 1968 and Qatar in 1969.¹⁴ Iran’s great concern was Arab nationalism which not only led to the renaming of the Gulf to ‘Arabian’, but in 1964, a conference of Arab jurists declared Khuzistan as an ‘integral part of the Arab Homeland’.¹⁵ The main threat emanated from Egypt, which played on the Gulf’s anti-Iranian sentiment. In 1964–1965, Egypt wrongly charged that Iran had occupied the island of Abu Musa, and told Arab rulers in the Persian Gulf that Iran wished to colonise the sheikhdoms.¹⁶ After Muhammad Ali, this was a renewed Egyptian attempt at taking influence in the Persian Gulf, a behaviour which became apparent again during the Gulf Crisis in 1990–1991.

In 1968, the British announced their impending withdrawal East of Suez. In 1969, Iraq declared that the ‘Shatt al-Arab was an integral part of Iraqi territory’,¹⁷ and the regime which had taken power in Aden in 1967, announced its conversion to Marxism. Iran now sought closer links with the United States but without their direct interference in the region. In 1969, the Shah gave an interview to the New York Times in which he warned the Americans, who had a temporary base in Bahrain, not to replace the British as Bahrain’s protectors. He later disclosed to his Minister of Court, Alam: ‘the Americans should take careful note of our opposition to foreign intervention in the Gulf. America must be made to realize that we are an independent sovereign power and will make way for no one.’¹⁸

It was not America’s strategy to substitute the British. However, with the strategic importance of oil, the threat of Arab radicals and the Soviet navy appearing in the Indian Ocean and the Persian Gulf, they developed the Nixon Doctrine in 1969. It stated that Asian nations would have to accept greater responsibility for their own defence. The United States called for close ties with the countries in the Persian Gulf, in particular Iran, and with Saudi Arabia as a junior partner. This became later known as the ‘twin pillar’ policy. The Shah considered this as US acceptance of an existing regional reality,¹⁹ that is Iran’s leading role in securing the Persian Gulf. The Nixon Doctrine accommodated the Shah’s idea of independence, i.e. to protect the interests of the United States to keep the Soviets out of the Gulf, as long as he was the one to ensure this policy without direct US interference. In 1968, Prime Minister Hoveida had asserted:

As ‘the most powerful’ state in the entire Persian Gulf, ‘naturally’ Iran was greatly interested in the stability and security of the Gulf area, and to that end Iran was prepared to cooperate with any littoral state that desired cooperation. But it must be made clear, that this matter did not concern non-Persian Gulf powers … ‘There is no doubt’ that Iran could protect its own interests and ‘rights’ in the Persian Gulf with all its might and would not allow any outside power to interfere in the Persian Gulf.²⁰

The Shah and his government did not ignore the fact that Iran would be dependent on the United States as a supplier of military hardware and advisors, which would inevitably give them important influence in Iran’s affairs. However, the Shah knew that being the guardian of US interests, he would be rewarded with political and military support.

By 1967, Iran had four major objectives in the Persian Gulf. These were shared by the West. First, ‘to protect the safety of the Shah’s regime against internal subversion sponsored by radical Arab regimes or the Soviet Union’;²¹ second, to prevent radicalism dominating any other Gulf state; third, to protect Iranian oil resources and installations; and fourth, to preserve freedom of navigation. The last two points underlined the importance of the Persian Gulf as Iran’s economic lifeline. The export of oil had to be secured, since the Iranian economy mainly depended on this commodity since the 1960s. The acquisition of American military equipment would help to establish the necessary force, including a navy, to support these goals and to preserve Iran’s national security – the primary concern of the Shah’s foreign policy and any Iranian government.

The British withdrawal from the Persian Gulf in 1971 marked the actual beginning of Iranian power in the region. Iranian foreign policy concentrated on the Gulf and its security. Iran was worried that a hostile power could block the Straits of Hormuz, the main outlet for Iranian oil exports, and that another revolutionary regime could be set up in the south of the Persian Gulf.²² The Shah therefore reclaimed the three strategic islands of Abu Musa and the Tunbs in order to facilitate the defence of the Persian Gulf. He realised that he needed the co-operation of the Arab states, Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular, to maintain the security of the region. To gain their acquiescence in the islands question, he was willing to give up Iran’s claim over Bahrain.

On 4 January 1969, the Shah called for a United Nations administered plebiscite in Bahrain. On 30 April 1970, the Security Council endorsed the results of the referendum and declared that ‘the people of Bahrain wished to gain recognition of their identity in a fully independent and sovereign state’.²³ Iran accepted.

Iran, the British and the shei...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Dedication
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Note on transliteration
• Introduction
• 1 Foundations of Iran’s Persian Gulf policy
• 2 Impact of the Islamic revolution
• 3 The 1980s: impact of the Iran–Iraq war
• 4 The 1990s: Gulf Crisis, islands dispute and President Khatami
• 5 Regional security co-operation
• 6 External factors
• Conclusion
• Note on sources
• Interviews
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index