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INTRODUCTION
A twofold task
Since the 1980s, the study of Daoist philosophy has faced new challenges and criticisms especially from Derridean thinkers and scholars who are under Derridean influence. Despite sporadic efforts to point out the analogy between Derrida's “trace” or “differance” and Zhuangzi's “dao” (in contrast to frequent discussions of deconstruction in Buddhism), and despite praise of the Zhuangzi as the ultimate text of the 1980s,1 Daoism has been accused of logocentrism. Robert Magliola, among others, has asserted that to identify or even find analogous the classical Daoist and Derridean thought would be dishonest. Daoism, according to him, “in its characteristic form from the beginning down to contemporary times has been logocentric.”2
Chan Buddhism has encountered a similar problem. Hitherto most discourses on Buddhist deconstruction have not significantly referred to Chan Buddhism, but rather to Nāgārjuna, Prāsangika, and Chinese Mādhyamika. Although a few scholars have suggested that Chan put into practice Mādhyamika Buddhist deconstruction,3 the mainstream of Chan Buddhist tradition has been conspicuously censured for logocentrism one way or another. For example, Bernard Faure unhesitatingly located the mainstream of Chan Buddhism within logocentrism. He particularly singled out the Chan master Linji, considering him “clearly logocentric,” and emphasized the connection of Linji's thought with Zhuangzi's in that regard.4
My work will, to some extent, address the issue of whether Zhuangzi and Linji are logocentric or not. However, my concern here is not merely with this specific question. The whole situation, as demonstrated by these two cases, has raised a more fundamental and more general task for contemporary Chinese thinkers and scholars of Chinese philosophy, especially of Daoism and Chan Buddhism. This task is twofold.
First, how to recontextualize and reinterpret Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought in terms of the postmodern condition? Given that there is no pure objectivity or full presence of an original movement of thought but only a web of textuality weaving human understanding and making impossible any escape from the alternation of context, every interpretation is a recontextualization. No interpretation can take place outside a context, but context is always on the move. The changeability and inexhaustibility of context are determined by the flux and contingency of human existence as being-in-the-world. In this view, living traditions are always in the process of reinterpretation and revitalization.
One of the major factors that makes our present context of interpreting Daoism and Chan different from that in the 1960s or 1970s is obviously the so-called postmodern condition, or what I term postmodern discourse, a large range of phenomena that recently has dominated the Western intellectual arena. This includes poststructuralism, postmodernism, neopragmatism, and so on, as well as those who respond to the ideas propounded by these currents and therefore contribute to this discourse.5 No matter how divergent these currents are, they provide some similar vocabularies, metaphors, beliefs, or attitudes, indicating a departure from modern philosophy or the discourse of Enlightenment, and even from the entire tradition of Western metaphysics. Since the interpretation of Daoism and Chan in the West has largely become an inseparable part of the Western linguistic game, I doubt that it can ever escape every current context. Even in the East, the introduction of postmodern discourse, among other things, has increasingly constituted a new element in the context for reinterpretation of traditions. At any rate, Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought must meet the challenges of poststructuralist, postmodernist or neopragmatist views as well as the criticisms from thinkers or scholars who are under the impact of these views, in order to revitalize themselves. In other words, the postmodern condition demands that we use new vocabularies to retell old stories.
Second, how can Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought participate in postmodern discourse? It is hard to imagine that Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought could take part in postmodern discourse without recontextualization and reinterpretation. On the other hand, the revitalization of Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought could perhaps be advanced through participation in postmodern discourse. These two sides of the task are thus dialectically interrelated. Without taking up the first, the second would have no basis; in undertaking the second, the first would eventually be fulfilled. This relationship also answers the question of whether Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought should or could participate in postmodern discourse. As suggested above, the context of reinterpretation of Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought has been increasingly global. In fact, a presentation of Daoist and Chan Buddhist thought in a Western language such as English cannot avoid using Western contemporary terms, ideas and concepts. Furthermore, the possibility of Daoist and Chan Buddhist participation in postmodern discourse is based on the following observations:
(1) Postmodern discourse creates new opportunities for a rediscovery of Daoist and Chan Buddhist traditions by renewing Western interest in the flux and contingency of the world and human existence, in multiperspectivism, in non-dualistic approaches, in dialectic negation and other linguistic strategies, in the paradoxical and ironic, etc., all of which have long been the foci of these two Eastern traditions. However, only when the West has begun to shift its focus, yield to new directions and adopt new vocabularies, can it acquire paradigms for understanding these Eastern traditions anew.
(2) Daoist and Chan Buddhist traditions do have something to say, to offer. They have a long history and a rich legacy of dealing with issues postmodern thinkers have just begun to tackle. Therefore, they can make unique contributions to postmodern discourse by addressing those issues from Daoist and Chan Buddhist perspectives.
My entire project thus echoes the call of this twofold task. Whether or not my treatise accomplishes the task will be left to reader's judgment.
Three related areas and a focus on the use of language
This book is a philosophical investigation of linguistic strategies in Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism, specifically an investigation of the otherness of language use in these two traditions. However, the investigation is conducted in three areas or under three categories: deconstructive strategy, liminology of language, and indirect communication. Different linguistic strategies or different uses of language in philosophical and religious discourse have drawn contemporary Western thinkers’ close attention and have entailed a variety of new discussions. Among various conceptions, deconstructive strategy, liminology of language, and indirect communication have become three important categories for the study of linguistic strategies. The exploration of these three areas has not only opened language possibilities for philosophical and religious discourse, but has also helped to change the way of Western thinking. However, although the probe of linguistic strategies in Western traditions has been favored recently, very little has been done to investigate Eastern traditions in these three areas. The distinctiveness of language use in the traditions of Daoism and Chan Buddhism has been generally acknowledged by Western scholars, but it has not been closely examined in terms of the best contemporary theory and insight.
My investigation might be the first systematic attempt to take a close look at the linguistic strategies of Daoist Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism and related issues. The work is divided into three parts, each of which investigates one of these three areas. Each part has a similar structure: the opening chapter discusses the definition of the category that is to be used in the ensuing chapters to investigate the Zhuangzi and Chan. A second and third chapter pursue its relevant investigation in the Zhuangzi and Chan. In addition to this main body of work, the book also includes an introductory chapter and concluding chapter for the whole investigation.
The first part investigates deconstructive strategies in the Zhuangzi and Chan Buddhism. The central point of this investigation indicates how the use of deconstruction as a linguistic strategy is demanded by soteriological/practical concerns and how its purpose or goal is beyond linguistic or textual spheres, a characteristic that we do not see in Derridean deconstruction. In chapter 2, based on an analysis of the Derridean and other Western philosophers’ discussion on deconstruction, I define deconstruction as a contextual strategy or a situational operation of overturning oppositional hierarchies with the characteristic of self-subverting. I argue that this definition can be used to start the examination of deconstructive strategy in the Zhuangzi and Chan without falling prey to generalization. While deconstructive strategy in the Zhuangzi and Chan bears a family resemblance to Derridean deconstruction, it is a deconstruction in the other context, or is the topology and alterity of deconstruction. Examining the otherness of deconstruction in the Zhuangzi and Chan helps to explore deconstruction from these other perspectives and to reflect upon Derridean deconstruction and contemporary Western philosophy. For example, the Zhuangzi and Chan can shed light on the issue of the relationship between philosophy and non-philosophy, between a philosophical theme and a deconstructive strategy, an issue that contemporary Western philosophers are still debating. It also helps to rediscover and reinterpret the Zhuangzi and Chan.
In the preliminary remarks of chapter 3, I indicate that my investigation differs from the works of some other scholars in that mine is not another comparison between Derrida and Zhuangzi, not confined to Zhuangzi's undoing of conceptual–linguistic hierarchies. Nor does it focus merely on Zhuangzi's deconstruction of Confucianism and Moism. To show the distinctiveness of Zhuangzi's deconstruction and the inner connection between his undertaking and his strategy, I first investigate Zhuangzi's philosophy of change involving three areas: infinite transformations of things, things transforming of themselves, and the dynamic interrelationship of things. The philosophy and its soteriological motif – accommodating one's mind to infinite changes of things – underlies his use of deconstructive strategy, and his strategy serves this theme in an illuminating way. In examining Zhuangzi's deconstruction of self, I reveal that Zhuangzi's teaching of “no-self” overturns the closure of self, but at the same time eludes falling into its opposite – non-self – while resting in the third category – “forgetting self.” Finally, I explore how Zhuangzi performs a deconstructive operation on the primitive Daoist notion of dao as one or as nonbeing.
Chapter 4 is a systematic examination and constructive interpretation of Chan Buddhist thought concerning its attitude towards the notion of Buddha nature and its deconstructive strategy. Scholars of Buddhism have long debated over the issue of Buddha nature. Recently, it is again a central issue in the debate between Japanese scholars of Critical Buddhism and other Buddhist scholars. This chapter delves into the inner struggle between the reification and deconstruction of Buddha nature in Chan Buddhist thought as a critical response to the recent critique of Chan Buddhism. The chapter has three parts, the first of which analyzes how the notion of Buddha nature evolved in the Indian tradition of tathāgatagarbha thought, identifies reifying and deconstructive tendencies within that tradition, and reveals how further deconstruction is called for. It is a basic situation Chan Buddhists must face. Part two examines the deconstruction of Buddha nature in The Platform Sūtra. The target of Huineng's deconstructive operation is Shenxiu's reification of “the pure mind.” Special attention is given to the inner connection between Huineng's strategy and his soteriological theme – free flowing together with all thoughts and things. His notion of no-thought thus opposes both the absence of thought and the attachment to thought. The pragmatic/functional context of the Chinese term zixing (self nature) is also clarified to dismiss any misunderstanding. Part three probes deconstruction in the school of Hongzhou Chan, a main target of which is Shenhui's reifying tendency. The Hongzhou notion of renyun (following along with the movement of all things and circumstances) is particularly examined in relation to its strategy, including the use of both kataphatic and apophatic language.
The second part of the book investigates liminology of language in the Zhuangzi and Chan. Liminology is a new category which has recently appeared in Western philosophical discourse. My book is the first work that investigates the Daoist and Chan Buddhist liminology of language. In chapter 5, I utilize David Wood's coinage liminology to develop a new study of the limits of language and the strategies of dealing with them. In terms of the discussions of contemporary thinkers on these points, I formulate three major aspects of a liminology of language. (1) Radical problematization of the limit or boundary of language. (2) Insight into the mutual connection and transition between two sides of the boundary of language, between speaking and non-speaking, etc. (3) Play at the limit or boundary of language. These three aspects are three levels within the liminology of language. The first, the experientio-analytic level, can lead to a metaphysical or trans-metaphysical view of the limit of language. The second level reflects a completely trans-metaphysical wisdom, while the third is practical. The core of this liminology of language is to de-absolutize the limit of language, keeping it in a relational perspective and exploring novel linguistic strategies to negotiate the limit. All three aspects are useful in understanding, reinterpreting or rediscovering the Zhuangzi and Chan concerning their attitude towards the limit of language and their linguistic strategies.
Chapter 6 takes a liminological approach to Zhuangzi's view of language and his strategy of “speaking non-speaking.” The contradiction between Zhuangzi's seemingly negative attitude towards language and his productive use of language is an age-old puzzle. Modern scholars either repeat this puzzle or completely neglect it. My liminological approach attempts to solve this problem by first analyzing all Zhuangzi's claims about the inadequacy of language. A careful reading and contextual analysis of these claims breaks the myth of Zhuangzi's complete negation of language. What appears as a negative attitude towards language is always related to his rejection of a conventional way of using language, which could be called descriptive, entitative, or metaphysical. Zhuangzi instead always calls for a different use of language. His notion of “speaking non-speaking” shows his profound understanding of the mutual connection and transition between speaking and non-speaking. Zhuangzi is a master of crossing the boundaries of language, a master of play at the limits of language, who is quite consistent. “Speaking non-speaking” thus promotes a marginal speech rather than retreating into a silence.
In chapter 7, I point out that the Chan Buddhist claims of the inadequacy of language have their root in Indian Mahāyāna Buddhism. However, a close examination of the context of Indian Mahāyāna Buddhist claims shows that they actually point to the inadequacy of referential, or cognitive language in religious/soteriological practice. My analysis reveals that the radical Chan emphasis on non-reliance on words aims particularly at freeing Buddhists from the restriction of the referential, entitative, or cognitive use of language. But Chan Buddhists also make very clear the necessity or inevitability of using language. The issue for them is not the abandonment of language but how to use it differently. Since the Chan masters penetrate into the non-dualistic relation between speech and silence, they demonstrate their profound understanding of the interplay between them. As a result, they are more flexible, more skillful in using and creating unconventional language that overcomes the limitation of conventional language and best serves their soteriological practice. Their strong objection to reliance on words and their creative use of words are simply two sides of one coin. The chapter translates and presents many textual materials from Chan recorded sayings to Western readers for the first time, concerning the Chan Buddhist notion of relativizing the limits of language and other important views. These materials and/or notions have long been neglected by modern scholars both in the West and in the East.
The third part of this book investigates pragmatics of indirect communication in the Zhuangzi and Chan. Chapter 8, on one hand, surveys contemporary Western philosophers’ inquiries into the indirect feature of communication and, on the other, re-examines Kierkegaard's theory of indirect communication. Both inquiries deviate from the classical notion of communication as a direct conveyance of information or knowledge. They allow the repositioning of indirect communication within philosophical discourse, freeing it from the oppressive hierarchy of direct/indirect communication while paying more attention to various indirect strategies of communication. Based on this survey, indirect communication i...