Japan, Race and Equality

The Racial Equality Proposal of 1919

Naoko Shimazu

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2002
• eBook ISBN: 9781134693030
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Ethnic Studies
• Index: Social Sciences

This study explores the Japanese motivations in raising the proposal for racial equality at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. This is the first comprehensive analysis of an historically significant event which has not been given adequate scholarly attention in the past. The story which unfolds underlines the complexity of politics and diplomacy surrounding the racial equality proposal and analyses the effect of the failure of the proposal on Japan's politics in the 1920s and 1930s.

1 Negotiating racial equality at the peace conference

The purpose of this chapter is to ‘set the scene’ for the analysis of the racial equality proposal of 1919, by providing a narrative account of the negotiations at the Paris Peace Conference. As it makes no claim to be a general study, this chapter will focus exclusively on the negotiations for the racial equality proposal which took place in the League of Nations Commission.

The League of Nations Commission was established by the Preliminary Peace Conference at the plenary session of 25 January 1919 in order to draft the covenant of the League of Nations.¹ The racial equality negotiation covers the period from late January to late April 1919, when the Japanese government made two unsuccessful attempts in the League of Nations Commission to have a racial equality amendment accepted as an insertion into the covenant of the League. Broadly, the negotiation went through three phases: the first phase from late January to 13 February, when the first attempt to include racial equality as part of Article 21 failed; the second phase from 14 February to 11 April, when the proposal was defeated for the second time; and the final phase from 12 April to 28 April when the Japanese delegate made a final speech on the proposal in the plenary session of the conference. The account of the negotiations shows that it was a complex process which involved the reconciliation of many layers of conflicting perceptions, both externally between the three states and internally within each delegation. Moreover, it reveals that the ‘racial equality’ proposal evolved substantively in the course of two months from one redolent of ‘immigration’ to one that was truly abstract.

THE PROTAGONISTS

Before unravelling the diplomatic drama over the racial equality negotiations, let us briefly introduce the members and peace policies of the principal three delegations – the British Empire, the United States and Japan – which were at the heart of the racial equality controversy at the Paris Peace Conference.

The British Empire delegation was composed of five plenipotentiaries: David Lloyd George (Prime Minister), Arthur Balfour (Foreign Secretary), Andrew Bonar Law (Lord Privy Seal and Leader of the House of Commons), George Barnes (Minister without portfolio), and one representative in rotation from the British Dominions² and India whose representation was as follows: i) Canada: Robert Borden (Prime Minister), G.E. Foster (Minister of Finance), A.L. Sifton (Minister of Customs), C.J. Doherty (Minister of Justice); ii) Australia: William Morris Hughes (Prime Minister) and Joseph Cook (Minister of the Navy); iii) South Africa: Louis Botha (Prime Minister) and Jan Smuts (Minister for Defence); iv) New Zealand: William Massey (Prime Minister); v) India: Maharaja of Bikaner and Lord Sinha (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for India). The principal players in the racial equality negotiations were Foreign Secretary Balfour, Lord Robert Cecil and General Smuts (the latter two being appointed as British representatives of the League of Nations Commission), Australian Premier Billy Hughes and, to a limited extent, Canadian Premier Robert Borden. The British Dominions played a highly prominent part in the racial equality debate, which belied the otherwise more secondary positions they occupied within the delegation. On the whole, they remained marginal and uninterested in the wider spectrum of issues which concerned the British government at Paris.³ Moreover, Prime Minister Lloyd George controlled much of the decision making.⁴ He had a strong distrust of professional diplomats and preferred to consult his close circle of advisers and friends known as the ‘Garden Suburb’.⁵ The Foreign Office was only saved from obscurity because of Balfour, who managed to maintain a good personal channel of communications with the prime minister.⁶

In terms of war aims, Britain’s initial objective on entering the war in August 1914 was the restoration of Belgian neutrality and this remained its core war aim for two and a half years.⁷ This motivational objective incorporated other causes such as the protection of France against aggression, the destruction of ‘Prussian’ military domination, and the defence of the rights of small nations.⁸ Apart from the core interest in maintaining the independence, integrity and unity of the British Empire, the British position at the peace conference was based on three things: first, to guarantee security for France; second, to settle territorial concessions; and third, to support the Wilsonian League of Nations. The first two factors were intrinsically important for Britain, while the support for the League was a necessary concession to America’s role in the war and in the peace.

In the light of the above, the Japanese proposal certainly was not a high priority for Britain. Basically, it would not have made much difference for Britain whether the Japanese proposal was adopted or not, as it was neither complementary nor contrary to core British interests. However, the interpretation of immigration attached to the proposal by the British government meant that the Dominions took over the negotiation to protect their vested interests. This became a considerable source of tension within the delegation.

The American Delegation to Negotiate Peace (the official title of the American delegation) was composed of five plenipotentiaries: President Woodrow Wilson, Colonel Edward House (special advisor to the president), Secretary of State Robert Lansing, General Tasker Bliss and Henry White (a Republican retired diplomat). President Wilson was by then so revered internationally that his arrival in war-torn Europe was hailed as the coming of the saviour. However, there was much controversy surrounding Wilson’s unilateral decision to attend the peace conference because both Lansing and House believed that it would weaken his international stature as the prophet of peace.⁹ Moreover, Wilson’s autocratic method of decision making at Paris made the presence of the other peace commissioners redundant.¹⁰ Hence the American delegation, though huge and well-manned, was internally very divided.

The United States’ peace policy thus became the implementation of the Fourteen Points, first enunciated by Wilson in January 1918.¹¹ The two most important points made in the Fourteen Points were the implementation of the principle of self-determination in resolving territorial settlements in Europe, and the creation of a League of Nations which would ensure a just and equitable postwar international order. The strength of Wilson’s moral position derived from the fact that the United States did not have vested interests in territorial possessions in the way that the other great powers had. The American role as victor was more as an arbiter of ‘the conflicting interests of the different powers’.¹² In practical terms, the priority of the United States became the creation of the League of Nations, the embodiment of all the democratic ideals, which Wilson personally took over by being chairman of the League of Nations Commission with House as the other American representative.¹³

Finally, the Japanese plenipotentiaries to the conference consisted of Saionji Kimmochi, the delegation head, Makino Nobuaki as the de facto chief, Chinda Sutemi (ambassador in London), Matsui Keishirō (ambassador in Paris), and Ijūin Hikokichi (ambassador in Rome), with a grand total of sixty-four members. Saionji was the symbolic leader whose actual role at Paris was very limited due to ill health, but was nonetheless important as ‘the Patrician Liberal’ who strongly believed that Japan could not survive in isolation from the West.¹⁴ Prime Minister Hara’s selection of the plenipotentiaries reflected the pro-Western attitude of the new government, as most had some sort of connection with the Foreign Ministry.¹⁵ Hara’s views were strongly shared by Makino, who was effectively in charge of the delegation. Neither Hara nor Foreign Minister Uchida, who would have been the natural choice, felt it politically expedient to leave the newly elected government.¹⁶ This undermined Japan’s bargaining position at Paris, especially when lined up against the formidable ‘Big Four’ of Wilson, Clemenceau, Lloyd George and Orlando.¹⁷

As the Japanese peace policy at the Paris Conference will be discussed in detail in Chapter 2, it suffices here to say that it consisted of three demands. The first two demands, territorial in nature, were claims to the former German colonies and associated rights to the Shantung Peninsula in China and the Pacific islands north of the equator. The last demand, the central concern of this study, was the demand for a racial equality clause to be inserted into the covenant of the League of Nations.

A SURPRISING TURN OF EVENTS AT PARIS

The negotiations for the racial equality proposal were prompted almost accidentally by an exchange which took place between the Japanese plenipotentiaries and President Wilson on 22 January 1919. Wilson was taken aback that the Japanese offered only measured support for the League at the plenary session. Essentially, the Japanese government had not realised until then that the acceptance of President Wilson’s Fourteen Points as a basis for armistice effectively meant the acceptance of the League of Nations.¹⁸ Quite unexpectedly, the Japanese had to focus right from the beginning on the League of Nations, which meant activating the following contingency plan:

Nevertheless, if a League of Nations is to be established, the Japanese Government cannot remain isolated outside the League and should there appear any tendency towards the establishment of a definite scheme [the League], the Delegates will so far as the circumstances allow make efforts to secure suitable guarantees against the disadvantages to Japan which would arise as aforesaid out of racial prejudice.¹⁹

Accordingly, Baron Makino Nobuaki²⁰ and Viscount Chinda Sutemi set about ‘translating’ with much haste the above clause in the peace policy, which became known as the racial equality proposal.

First of all, Makino and Chinda regarded the United States as the most likely opponent of the Japanese proposal because of the unresolved problem of anti-Japanese immigration.²¹ Despite their effort to see the Americans, it was not until the first meeting of the League of Nations Commission on 2 February that they were able to brief Colonel House, President Wilson’s special advisor, about their ‘general position regarding the abolition of racial discrimination’.²² As the racial equality proposal was not Wilson’s primary interest, Colonel House was entrusted with the negotiation. In negotiating with the Japanese, House’s talent as conciliator and mediator²³ was put to good use. His non-abrasive, indirect approach favourably impressed Baron Makino and Viscount Chinda.²⁴ The Japanese delegates approached him because he was considered by the Japanese government to be ‘pro-Japanese’ in sentiment, as reported by Ambassador Ishii in July 1918.²⁵ House, accordingly, made all the right noises for the Japanese:

I took occasion to tell them how much I deprecated race, religious, or other kinds of prejudices. It was not confined, however, to any one country or against any particular class of people; prejudice exists among the Western peoples against one another as well as against Eastern peoples. One can cite the contempt which so many Anglo-Saxons have for the Latins, and vice versa. This is one of the serious causes of international trouble, and should in some way be met.²⁶

Encouraged by House’s sympathetic attitude, Makino and Chinda submitted four different draft proposals to him between 5 and 12 February.²⁷ Having expressed interest in one of the proposals, House undertook to confer with Wilson who was consulted at least twice, on the 5th and 7th. Wilson subsequently agreed to present the preferred proposal²⁸ as his own amendment to the religious freedom article (Article 21). House noted that he had hoped to arrive at a formula which would not ‘weaken the American or British Dominions’ position and yet will satisfy the amour-propre of the Japanese’.²⁹ At this point in the negotiations, Wilson and House evidently perceived the Japanese proposal as a reasonable demand in line with the spirit of the covenant and not as a potential threat. Therefore, the first attempt by the Japanese to sound out the Americans had produced an unexpectedly encouraging response.

What is noteworthy about this stage in the negotiation was the extent to which House was involved in the day-to-day negotiation with the Japanese to come up with a satisfactory amendment. In the initial period, House was sympathetic to the Japanese proposal despite the fact that he perceived it essentially as one pertaining to the question of Japanese immigration.³⁰ Moreover, House must have suspected that the Japanese might raise the issue of immigration at the peace conference as he had instructed the Inquiry Commission, which was set up by him as a preparatory committee for the peace conference, to conduct a detailed study on Japanese immigration into the United States. The recommendations below made by the Inquiry Commission, perhaps not surprisingly, reflected closely House’s general attitude towards the Japanese on this question:

Although it is conceivable that Japan may not raise the question at the peace conference, yet it is likely that she will have something to say about it, and so...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Halftitle
• Title
• Copyright
• Dedication
• Contents
• Series editor’s preface
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• 1  Negotiating racial equality at the peace conference
• 2  Domestic politics and the League of Nations
• 3  Immigration and the ‘diplomacy of saving face’
• 4  Japan’s status as a great power
• 5  Australia overwhelms the British Empire delegation
• 6  The American opposition
• 7  Conclusions and reflections
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index