Rising Islamic Conservatism in Indonesia

Islamic Groups and Identity Politics

Leonard C. Sebastian, Syafiq Hasyim, Alexander R. Arifianto, Leonard C. Sebastian, Syafiq Hasyim, Alexander R. Arifianto

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781000205381
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Social Sciences
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Social Sciences

This edited volume argues that the rise of Islamic conservatism poses challenges to Indonesia's continued existence as a secular state, with far-reaching implications for the social, cultural and political fortunes of the country. It contributes a model of analysis in the field of Indonesian and Islamic studies on the logic of Islamic conservative activism in Indonesia. This volume presents informative case studies of discourses and expressions of Islamic conservatism expressed by leading mainstream and upcoming Indonesian Islamic groups and interpret them in a nuanced perspective. All volume contributors are Indonesian-based Islamic Studies scholars with in-depth expertise on the Islamic groups they have studied closely for years, if not decades.

This book is an up-to-date study addressing contemporary Indonesian politics that should be read by Islamic Studies, Indonesian Studies, and more broadly Southeast Asian Studies specialists. It is also a useful reference for those studying Religion and Politics, and Comparative Politics.

1 Introduction

Rising Islamic conservatism in Indonesia: Islamic groups and identity politics

L.C. Sebastian, S. Hasyim, A.R. Arifianto

Introduction

The role of Islam in both state and society has been a central tension in the understanding of the foundations of the Indonesian nation since it achieved independence in 1945. Sukarno, Indonesia’s founding father, had famously developed the Pancasila (literal meaning, “Five Principles”), a set of broad principles flexible enough to accommodate the archipelago’s cultural and religious diversity while serving as a source of unity. Enshrined in the Preamble of the 1945 Constitution, the first tenet of Pancasila – the “Belief in Almighty God” – remains controversial right up to today. This was because the first principle’s original formulation, namely the “Belief in Almighty God with the obligation to carry out Islamic shari’ah for its adherents”, had underscored the aspirations of Islamists throughout Indonesian history who sought to establish a state based on Islamic law.

Although nationalist considerations had thus far prevailed, particularly the nightmarish scenario of the disintegration and breakup of a country with substantial non-Muslim minorities if an Islamic state was to be formed, contestation over the nature of the Indonesian state remains current. The present configuration of the Indonesian state is one that is neither secular nor Islamic. Rather, Indonesia is a “religious” state. It is a religious state insofar as it positions “Almighty God” as the first tenet of Pancasila, guarantees the freedom of worship for its six official religions, and encourages religious piety while blasphemy is punishable by law. Just as President Obama had a custom of ending speeches with the phrase “God Bless America”, Indonesian politicians tend to begin speeches with Arabic phrases such as Assalamualaikum, meaning peace upon you, and invoke the name of God (Insya Allah, meaning “God willing”) as they express optimism for the success of a new policy initiative. Not too long ago, referring to the lack of coronavirus cases in Indonesia, the remarks of Indonesia’s health minister were picked up by the international media. A caption on a South China Morning Post article read: “Indonesia’s health minister says prayer has kept coronavirus away” (Cochrane 2020).

While such remarks may seem laughable from a Western standpoint, they reflect the day-to-day operations of a country that has in some ways remained socially conservative even as it has a young population very much in tune with modern developments. Of late, Islamisation of the Middle Eastern variant had deepened this conservative outlook. The growth in Islamic conservatism has manifested itself in concrete, visible consequences in a democratic system. Indonesian politicians increasingly utilise religious rhetoric, while political campaigns in some regions have become a test to prove which candidate is “more Islamic”. In the 2019 presidential election, incumbent president Joko Widodo “Jokowi” decided to name conservative cleric Ma’ruf Amin as his running mate because of the need to shore up his Islamic credentials. Being perceived as insufficiently pious can be a serious handicap in contemporary Indonesian politics, especially as Islamic organisations possess one of the most reliable voter turn-out machines in the country.

This edited volume argues that the rise of Islamic conservatism poses significant challenges to Indonesia’s continued existence as a multi-religious state, with far-reaching implications for the social, cultural and political fortunes of the country. As long-time Indonesian watchers, we are concerned that Islamic conservatism is pushing the country away from an inclusive orientation toward an exclusionary one. Religious intolerance is on the rise as demonstrated in multiple cases of protest against church construction in Islamic neighbourhoods, the abuse of blasphemy laws to punish minority groups, the retreat of middle-class Muslims into Islamic residential housing in exclusive gated compounds, and vigilante-style persecution (such as threats, verbal harassment and physical intimidation). The slightest criticism against Islam is already impossible in Indonesia. Human Rights Watch website reported in 2018 that Fiera Lovita, a doctor in West Sumatera, fled with her family to Jakarta after she was threatened and insulted by members of the Islamic Defenders Front for criticising its leader (Harsono 2018). In North Sumatera, a Buddhist woman’s complaint to her neighbour in 2018 that the local mosque’s call to prayer was too loud led to an angry mob burning down 14 Buddhist temples and her imprisonment on blasphemy charges.

There is also an ongoing struggle to delineate the boundaries of religion and to exclude those who do not conform to the religious identity that has already been set down. For instance, Muslims from the dominant Sunni sect are increasingly persecuting minority Muslim groups such as Ahmadis and Shiites, who are seen as heretical. The state has been largely silent. Such developments have begun to encroach on the formal rights of citizens to run for political office, with conservative Islamic groups arguing that non-Muslims cannot run for elected office because it would be improper for a non-Muslim to govern a Muslim-majority society.

It is worthwhile to pay close attention to the Islamic organisations that are at the epicentre of Indonesia’s conservative turn, including the Indonesian Ulama Council (Majelis Ulama Indonesia), NU Garis Lurus, the Indonesian Mujahidin Council (MMI), Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia, Gerakan Nasional Pengawal Fatwa-Ulama and others. Islamic political parties such as Partai Keadilan Sejahtera (PKS, the Prosperous Justice Party), and the prominent role they played in the conservative turn are equally important. We examine this ecosystem of Islamic organisations in greater detail in the respective chapters.

This volume discusses Islamic conservatism in terms of its intersection with identity politics and the way in which religious identity has been leveraged by conservative Islamic groups to attack their enemies and influence the direction of state policy. Often, this is done in the open through the use of democratic means, such as the right to freely associate and demonstrate. The most obvious example is the mobilisation effort – known as Aksi Bela Islam (ABI, Defending Islam Movement) – led by a coalition of conservative groups to turn out hundreds of thousands of Muslim supporters in demonstrations against Ahok in the run-up to the 2017 Jakarta election. This event will be discussed at length in the book.

This volume is also expected to contribute a model of analysis in the field of Indonesian and Islamic studies on the logic of Islamic conservative activism, which so far has only been understood on a superficial level by many scholars – for instance by those who portray them merely as tools used in an oligarchic power struggle in Indonesian politics, with no power or agency to shape their own destiny (e.g. Hadiz 2016). Scholars have failed to adequately take into account the ideological motivations of Islamist activists and organisations and their agency in bargaining and negotiating with national and regional-level political actors to ensure their agenda is being adapted (e.g. regional Shari’ah regulations, prohibition against Ahmadi and Shi’a minorities, etc.). This volume presents several case studies that highlight these factors in a fair and balanced perspective.

Another goal of this work is to broaden the concept of Islamic conservatism. Often, this is held to be synonymous with “political Islam” – attempts by hard-line groups to impose some form of Islamic law on the state or to convert the state into an explicitly Islamic organ. While some conservative Islamic groups do hold that as their primary goal, it is a narrow reading of Islamic conservatism. The contributors in this volume explore the interaction between the Indonesian state and Islamic conservatism in a more nuanced manner, giving due weight to the fact that Indonesia is a socially conservative, Muslim-majority country. Therefore, the relationship between conservative Islam and the state is more complex than simply an attempt by radical groups to take over the government and convert it into an Islamic state – conservative Islamic groups often do represent opinions or positions that are broadly popular in Indonesian society. The contributions in this volume will help to give this complex dynamic the detail and nuance it deserves.

One of the novel contributions of this volume is that it provides an on-the-ground perspective on these issues from people who live it every day. The contributors are Islamic scholars from Indonesia, most of whom have first-hand experience studying these organisations in great depth. To our knowledge, with exception of van Bruinessen (2013b), there is no existing English-language work about Islamic conservatism in Indonesia featuring analysis entirely sourced from local Indonesian experts. The authors engage with mainstream Islamic organisations such as MUI and Muhammadiyah, but also with lesser-known actors such as NU Garis Lurus (NUGL). The scholarship is based on insights and expertise obtained via extensive fieldwork, often using first-hand interviews with leaders and activists from these organisations, including groups such as FPI, HTI and MMI that are understudied in mainstream scholarship due to their secrecy, their distrust of outside observers and, more generally, the lack of access.

This edited volume looks at Islamic conservatism as a combination of normative and practical issues derived from Islamic texts that promote literal and exclusive compliance towards Shari’ah (Islamic moral ethics, and the adaptation of a more literal understanding of Islam within Indonesia’s political and legal structure). The opposite concept of Islamic conservatism is Islamic modernism or liberalism, which promotes a contextual and inclusive interpretation of Islam (Kurzman 2002).

The term conservative is not a permanent categorisation, however. As a label, the term conservative can apply to many different Muslims organisations that seek to exclude others, monopolise the truth and judge the beliefs of other groups. Today, such Islamic organisations are labelled conservative, but this label is not static. This means that Islamic conservatism is not sunnatullah, not given, but is part of an evolving process between religion, society, politics and the state.

Prior to the presence of MMI, FPI and FUI, the label conservative was often given to Nahdlatul Ulama (NU) due to the organisation’s exclusive understanding of Islam (madhabism) and its political support for the conservative regime of Sukarno (Geertz 1976; Noer 1973). Now, Nahdlatul Ulama is considered more moderate, while the label conservative is applied to Islamic organisations like MMI, FPI, FUI, HTI and others. From this we can see that the term conservatism is a fluid one and its meaning and application can change over time and in response to evolving cultural or political circumstances. One of the overarching goals of this edited volume is to situate the contemporary conservative turn in Indonesian Islam within the broader political and social currents that are driving it, and to underline the fact that this is a dynamic and not a static process. To that end, the following section will analyse the concept of “conservatism” in Indonesia from a historical perspective, especially how it has changed over time and in response to democratic reforms.

Conservatism in the Indonesian context

Conservatism was not a mainstay of political or religious discourse in Indonesia in its early years as a developing nation-state. This is because in the first half of the 20th century, as Indonesian intellectuals were struggling to create an independent nation-state and define a post-colonial trajectory, there was no clearly defined liberal vs conservative divide – the tension was mostly between those advocating socialism, nationalism or a stronger role for Islamic identity and the extent to which these strains would be embodied in the apparatus of the state. Following independence, Indonesia’s founding fathers were mainly concerned with whether to adopt a theocratic or nationalist-secular state. There were proponents on both sides, and ultimately the ideology of Pancasila was reached as a form of compromise (Darmaputera 1988; Intan 2006; Ramage 2005). The Pancasila acknowledged the supremacy of God, but also that Indonesia was a unitary state committed to social justice, and a state that recognised the legitimacy of non-Islamic religions.

The term conservatism began to enter scholarly debate during Suharto’s authoritarian New Order, with Peter Christian Hauswedell’s (1973) article in Indonesia titled “Sukarno: Radical or Conservative, Indonesian Politics 1965–64”. Hauswedell applied concepts of radical and conservative leadership to Indonesia and argued that Sukarno was a radical leader. In looking back on Indonesia’s 20th-century political trajectory, Bourchier & Hadiz (2003) would elaborate on this idea of political conservatism as being in opposition to progressive ideals. To them, the goal of conservative politics was to accumulate power, while the progressive stance was to use power and authority for the benefit of the people.

The concept of religious conservatism evolved along a separate path. It first came to prominence in The Religion of Java, where Clifford Geertz (1976) used the term conservative to differentiate between the characteristics of Nahdlatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah. The word kolot was equated to conservatism and described the ideological and theological practices of Nahdlatul Ulama. The term moderen, in direct contrast to kolot, was used to describe Muhammadiyah. Geertz identified five main areas that differentiated kolot from moderen to underscore the differences between the two organisations.

First, kolot meant a belief in God determining your path in life, while moderen emphasised self-determination. Second, the kolot group believed in the all-encompassing role of religion in social life, while moderen drew clear distinctions between religious and secular affairs. Third, the kolot group was more tole...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of illustrations
• List of contributors
• Acknowledgements
• Abbreviations
• 1 Introduction: Rising Islamic conservatism in Indonesia: Islamic groups and identity politics
• 2 Muslim identity and deprivation: socio-psychological sources of support for Islamist radical groups in Indonesia
• 3 Islamic orthodoxy at the regional level in Indonesia
• 4 Examining the growth of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia: thecase of West Java
• 5 Resisting conservatism: Muhammadiyah’s experience through its social activities
• 6 Challenging moderate Islam in Indonesia: NU Garis Lurus and its construction of the “authentic” NU online
• 7 MUI and its discursive relevance for “Aksi Bela Islam”: agrowing trend of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia
• 8 The rise and fall of “transnational” Islam in Indonesia: the future of Hizbut Tahrir Indonesia (HTI)
• 9 Why do Islamist movements: die? Majelis Mujahidin Indonesia and its decline
• 10 The PKS and Tarbiyah movement: its agenda and future in Indonesia
• 11 Indonesian hybrid Salafism: Wahdah Islamiyah’s rise, ideology and Utopia
• 12 Creating entrepreneurial and pious Muslim subjectivity in globalised Indonesia
• 13 Epilogue: Conservative Islam and the dilemma of Indonesian democracy
• Index