1 Chinese culture and the âgreat revival of the Chinese nationâ
From Silk Road to Belt and Road
Introduction
In 2017 at the 18th Party Congress the CPC enshrined the latest rendition of Chinese Marxist ideology in the party constitution. With full acknowledgement to Chinaâs new paramount leader, the amendment enshrines as part of the guiding ideology âXi Jinping Thought for the New Era of Socialism with Special Chinese Characteristicsâ (Xi Jinping xinshidai Zhongguo tese shehuizhuyi sixiang). Xi Jinping Thought is now placed alongside that of Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping, thus elevating Xi Jinpingâs ideological contributions to a status far above that of his predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. Since Xi Jinping came to power in 2012/2013 China has indeed entered a âNew Eraâ, one shaped and informed by a myriad of global, regional and domestic forces, trends, and events. Key aspirational aspects of this body of thought, such as the âChina Dreamâ, have already been discussed in the prologue. This chapter extends the analysis to examine other aspects of the âNew Eraâ and in particular those that relate to the primary concerns of this book, namely, mobility narratives, route heritage and the place of culture, cultural heritage, and government in the CPCâs ambition to realise the âgreat revival of the Chinese nationâ (Zhonghua minzu weida fuxing).
In summary, the primary aim of this chapter is to introduce and contextualise the key themes of mobility, culture, and government in contemporary China and, at the same time, provide an overview of the conceptual and theoretical approach that will be used in the following chapters to explore this mix of thought and practice in relation to the âAncient Tea Horse Roadâ of Southwest China.
The chapter is divided into the following four sections:
Section one: Belt and Road as mobility narrative
The first section examines the place of Belt and Road in the context of Chinaâs rise as a 21st-century superpower. Belt and Road is understood in this instance as a mobility narrative, that is, as a complex discourse of regional and global connectivity with China as the centre. This ambitious strategy marks a shift in the party and governmentâs primary focus on the domestic economy and affairs to one which takes into significant consideration the use of Chinaâs accumulated capital and resources to construct a China-centred global network. I examine how the Silk Road(s) as route heritage have been revitalised in this scheme of things to construct a mobility narrative that presents Belt and Road as a win-win situation and a salient example of âletting the past serve the presentâ, a theme that has particular pertinence to the study of the tea-horse road.
Section two: the place of âcultureâ in Chinaâs rise
The second section reviews the place of âcultureâ in Chinaâs rise. âCultureâ in this context is both an object of official ideology through the ongoing promotion and transformation of cultural nationalism and, at the same time, has become the object of market forces with both official and unofficial dimensions. I consider Chinaâs remarkable transformation over the last several decades as a form of âcreative destructionâ, that is, whilst much culture may have been destroyed in the process something ânewâ that resembles the âoldâ is emerging from the rubble. In terms of physical construction, I consider it as a form of âterraformingâ by which I mean the reshaping of physical, social, and cultural contexts to suit the interests of development of a âsocialist market economyâ. In terms of representation these elements are a simulacrum in which the whole is greater than the parts. In short, forces in China are creating a new nationscape in which a reinvented and repackaged cultural heritage is playing a prominent role. The overall effect is to create a new ârealityâ in which the Chinese citizen-subject inhabits a space in the âpresentâ upon which is overlaid a vision of the âpastâ.
Section three: the challenge of defining âcultureâ
The third section continues with the theme of âcultureâ by examining different approaches to this complex category and highlighting some key themes that are of importance to this book. After examining some of the most influential approaches I present the strategy to be adopted here by combining aspects of cultural studies with that of governmentality in which I take culture to be an artefact of government and key organisational category of discourse. The last part of this section introduces Laurajane Smithâs (2006) notion of an âauthorised heritage discourseâ (AHD) which will be deployed at key moments of explication in the chapters to follow. Smithâs work is particularly valuable insofar as it reminds us of the importance of the âmore-than-representationalâ elements of heritage discourse and practice.
Section four: the socialist market economy and the cultural turn
In turn the fourth and final section places the anticipated discussion of the tea-horse road in the following chapters within its historical context of the post-1978 reform era and in particular within the conceptual and policy creation of the âsocialist market economyâ and the âcultural turnâ of the early 1990s. Here I outline the significance of the âsocialist market economyâ as providing the conceptual and policy foundations for the rapid development of new cultural industries, including tourism. The section concludes by outlining some of the key features of cultural policy in Xi Jinpingâs New Era, namely, advocating âcultural confidenceâ (wenhua zixin), âbringing cultural artefacts to lifeâ (rang wenwu huoqilai) and the policy of âamalgamating culture and tourismâ (wenlĂź ronghe).
Section one: Belt and Road as mobility narrative
In 2013 President Xi Jinping launched an ambitious global initiative under the title of âThe Silk Road Economic Belt and the 21st-century Maritime Silk Roadâ. The official abbreviation in Chinese is yidai yilu which the authorities render in English as the Belt and Road Initiative. Here both âbeltâ (dai) and âroadâ (lu) respectively refer to âregionsâ and âroutesâ and together connote a strong sense of mutual connectivity and mobility. Note also that in Chinese both âbeltâ and âroadâ can be taken as plural, and hence Belt and Road refers to a network of roads and regions.1 Belt and Road is thus a mobility narrative that seeks to conceptualise and act upon greater connectivity within China and beyond. Since 2013 Belt and Road has become a major focus of the Chinese governmentâs global economic strategy and diplomatic agenda. In this regard Belt and Road now stands alongside the China Dream as one of the key ideological and policy agendas of Xi Jinpingâs term of office and the direction he and his colleagues are aspiring to direct China towards, now encapsulated in the aforementioned Xi Jinping Thought, the grand goals of the âgreat revival of the Chinese nationâ and making China a âmodern civilisational powerâ (xiandai wenming daguo). A major difference being that whereas the China Dream is primarily directed at a domestic audience, Belt and Road, by contrast, purposely includes a foreign interlocutor. Furthermore, where the China Dream is more of a general exhortation for the citizen-subjects2 of the nation-state to ascribe to a renewed cultural nationalism without particular and detailed policy proposals (these come through initiatives tailored at provincial, municipal, and county levels of government), Belt and Road includes a concrete policy agenda and is backed by the coffers of the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and Silk Road Fund (both founded by the Chinese government) to the tune of billions of US dollars.
Thus, it is fair to state that Belt and Road is one of the most significant policy initiatives to emerge from China since the establishment of the PRC in 1949. It is a policy that will no doubt have a dramatic impact on the course of 21st-century history. Exactly how remains to be seen but we can gather some inklings from events in the contemporary moment. For starters, Belt and Road is one of the most important mobility narratives to emerge since World War II (WWII) and certainly the most important one to emerge from China in its entire history (the Silk Road, as shall be examined in more detail in Chapter 4, was for all intents and purposes a âforeign inventionâ of the 19th and 20th centuries). Hence, whilst many countries have signed up to Belt and Road,3 given that Chinaâs rise is shaking the foundations of the geopolitical status quo (that is, Western global order) and the enduring legacy of the mutual distrust of the Cold War persists, it comes as no surprise that the policy has garnered a great deal of attention in foreign media and government circles, ranging from lukewarm support to outright hostility. With regards to the latter, Belt and Road has been compared to a âTrojan Horseâ, a renewed âGreat Gameâ, âempire buildingâ, âneo-colonialismâ, a ânew geopolitical Cold Warâ, and a nefarious âMarshall Planâ.
In this book I consider Belt and Road as an ambitious global connectivity strategy, what Tim Winter (2019) describes as a form of âgeocultural powerâ, that takes Chinaâs domestic mobility narrative global. In the wake of the 2007/2008 Global Financial Crisis China shifted from being the leading global recipient of Foreign Direct Investment â a position that it had held for at least a decade â to one in which there was more Outward Foreign Direct Investment flowing out of China than going in. In short, in 2000 Chinaâs foreign investment in other countries was small by global standards, but by 2015 Chinese firms were investing across the globe to purchase assets that would provide growth, opportunity, learning, and security. This transition was directed and encouraged by government at all levels and encapsulated under the slogans of âgoing outâ (zouchuqu) and âmatching global standardsâ (yu guoji jiegui). In expanding on David Harveyâs (1985) notion of how capital seeks to overcome the challenges of domestic accumulation by shifting production abroad, we can consider Belt and Road as part of Chinaâs own âspatial fixâ, albeit it in a very early stage of development. During the first few decades of reform China became a desirable target location for foreign capital. Indeed, the demand for production facilities was so high and urgent that Chinese companies, for instance, purchased steel mills in their entirety from Western Europe and exported them holus bolus to China. Where previously the domestic Chinese economy rapidly expanded and became the âfactory of the worldâ, Chinese capital is now seeking its own âspatial fixâ. From the perspective of a calculating and self-reflexive state, this also includes the realisation of associated geopolitical and strategic interests. As Peter Cai (2017: 12) notes, Belt and Road is not so much about off-loading Chinese products, but more so its excess capacity. In this regard Chinese capital is following the pattern of previous nation-states that had sought to find their own âspatial fixesâ and resource security zones. The difference here is that those previous instances, whether Western or Asian (Japan and South Korea), were primarily capitalist nation-states wedded to a broadly defined liberal (or neoliberal) system. Chinese capital, by contrast, is formed under the conditions of the âsocialist market economyâ and is altogether quite a different set of circumstances and hence such a challenge for Western policy-makers and commentators to fathom.
Hence, in the present historical juncture it is Xi Jinpingâs Belt and Road that has become the official overarching narrative and policy framework for the mobility of Chinese capital along what it refers to as the âSilk Road(s)â. Thus, insofar as Belt and Road draws upon the most famous of ancient routes, it serves as an excellent example of the CPCâs efforts to âlet the past serve the presentâ (guweijinyong). At the same time, given that the Silk Road is itself a neologism created in the late 19th century and did not gain in popularity in the West until the 1930s, and then in China only decades later, it reminds us that âthe pastâ is only ever an object understood and mobilised by âthe presentâ. In drawing upon the fame of the Silk Road â in its now defined three major routes of north, south, and maritime â the Chinese authorities are seeking to extend the program of transport, connectivity, and mobility infrastructure construction that has unfolded across China to neighbouring regions and by extension to almost every corner of the globe. This is thus more than simply a matter of resurrecting or reconstructing the historical routes of the Silk Road, although the modern nation-states on the historical routes are obvious candidates for first consideration. Rather, Belt and Road uses the Silk Road as a geocultural metaphor for building the âSilk Road of the 21st Centuryâ. In noting that Chinese commentators on Belt and Road state that it is not meant to be taken literally, Sidaway and Woon (2017: 2) write:
In this sense, there is not always a singular belt or road that can be identified; rather, OBOR [One Belt One Road] serves as a cultural metaphor to characterize two projects with expansive geographical possibilities â one over land and the other over forging linkages in the maritime sphere â for the revitalization of global economic exchanges and interactions. Given such a formulation OBOR as an open and extensive venture that simultaneously appears on maps as a set of lines, there is a need to attend to how this initiative is taken up through a range of Chinese narratives.
Attending to examine how the âSilk Roadâ of Belt and Road, and by extension how other heritage routes such as the tea-horse road, are taken up through Chinese narratives is precisely the focus of this book. In ...
