Governing Singapore

Democracy and national development

Raj Vasil

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781865082110
• eBook ISBN: 9781000319415
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Economic Policy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Singapore has its critics, but the city-state has achieved remarkable successes as a result of the voluntary trade-off of certain political rights for economic and social progress. In Governing Singapore, Raj Vasil supports this national bargain. He argues that in Asian new states like Singapore, economic and social under-development, as well as ethnic diversity and divisions make it impossible for Western liberal democracy to function effectively as an instrument of popular rule. The problems of under-development faced by Asian new states since decolonisation and independence continue to prove that democracy alone is not enough - national development and the need to adapt democracy to economic and social realities are equally important.Through reconciling democracy with national development, Singapore has transformed from a poor, backward Third World island into a prosperous and dynamic First World nation. Today Singapore is far better prepared for greater democratisation and increased popular participation.

PART 1
LEE KUAN YEW’S SINGAPORE

1
THE PEOPLE’S ACTION PARTY: THE NATIONAL PARTY

The People’s Action Party (PAP), which has ruled Singapore without interruption since 1959, has determined the entire nature and course of politics and the direction of socio-economic change in the country. It views itself and is seen by many Singaporeans as the unchallenged national party. In 1983, the party’s Central Executive Committee asserted that ‘if there were no PAP there would be no Singapore as we know it today’.¹ It is significant that the PAP was able to achieve this special status despite the fact that at the time of decolonisation in late 1963 it did not necessarily enjoy the support of a majority of Singaporeans. By the time of independence, the Indian National Congress, Pakistan Muslim League and Burmese Anti-Fascist People’s Freedom League were the acknowledged embodiments of the national movements of their respective countries; some of their leaders were legends among their peoples and they enjoyed wide popular support and respect. They and their political organisations were in a much better position than the PAP and its leaders to mobilise their respective peoples in the tasks of national development. When democratic processes, including elections, were introduced after decolonisation, they could take for granted that their people would entrust power in their hands. Furthermore, in most cases they did not have to face an effective opposition to them.

The PAP and its leaders were not in that happy position at the time of decolonisation and independence. Perhaps it was this uncertainty and the strong challenge to its position as Singapore’s political ruler that made PAP’s leaders work harder to maintain their unity and integrity and produce significant economic and social progress. At the time of decolonisation, the PAP was not only not recognised as the embodiment of Singapore nationalism but it had to fight for its very survival against the pro-communist Barisan Sosialis. It had no well-organised grass-roots organisation and it attracted only limited popular support. It had no charismatic leaders such as Nehru or Nu, who could be relied upon to deliver popular backing for the party. These make the achievements of the PAP that much more significant.

I

The PAP, a coalition of English-educated social democrats and Chinese-educated pro-communists, was formed as a mass-based, left-wing nationalist organisation to mobilise the masses against British colonial rule. However, by the time of decolonisation in late 1963, the party had been totally transformed. Its democratic socialist leaders had assumed full control following the exit from the party of its large, popularly based pro-communist group (which soon reappeared on the political scene as the Barisan Sosialis). It had achieved a convincing victory in the September 1963 general elections over the Barisan Sosialis. With the virtually unchallenged hold on power it had achieved, the party became totally overshadowed by the government it formed and it soon almost entirely lost its independent existence and organisation. Since then the party has never been able to exist as a distinctive entity with an identity of its own, its governments having entirely controlled and dominated the party. This has made the PAP unique among political parties.

Although it is activated at the time of elections, it performs no crucial functions. Its role as a mobiliser of mass support for the government is substantially exercised by government-controlled institutions. It acts only in a limited way as the eyes and ears of the government. It has little appeal of its own and has substantially depended on its governments’ performance and the personality of its founding father, Lee Kuan Yew, for popular backing and electoral support. It has no officials and leaders outside the parliamentary-ministerial wing.

From a party that was formed as a small left-wing organisation with extremely limited popular support, it has over the years been turned into a national movement. The PAP now views itself as the sole custodian of the Singapore nation, its integrity and prosperity, and is accepted as such by many Singaporeans. It is to its credit that it has built up this position on the basis of its performance and not by manipulating and exploiting ethnic divisions as has happened elsewhere in Asia.

THE FORMATION

The PAP was formed on 21 November 1954 at the Victoria Memorial Hall in Singapore, the culmination of a series of meetings and discussions among a disparate group of leaders. Some of the prominent convenors of the inaugural meeting were Toh Chin Chye, Lee Kuan Yew, S. Rajaratnam, C.V. Devan Nair, Ismail Rahim, P. Govindaswamy, Lee Gek Seng, Fong Swee Suan and Chan Chiaw Thor. The founding leadership represented three distinct groups: the social democrats, consisting mostly of English-educated professionals; leaders of public service unions; and pro-communists, representing unions in the private sector and Chinese school teachers.

Even though the initiative to form the PAP had been taken by the English-educated professionals—Toh Chin Chye, Lee Kuan Yew and S. Rajaratnam—they brought with them little mass support. The limited popular support that they did enjoy was restricted to the public service unions that had been attracted by Lee Kuan Yew through his legal work for those unions, and S. Rajaratnam through his personal contacts with many of their leaders. The pro-communists were the chief source of the mass backing for the party especially among the Chinese, who constituted a dominant majority in Singapore.

The British did not consider the party a serious threat at the time, believing that the pro-communists and the social democrats were more likely to dissipate their energies fighting each other than their British overlords. The Straits Times, a mouthpiece of the British establishment in Singapore, reported the formation of the party with all possible disdain, although the reporter obviously did not realise that he was writing about a political movement that would soon establish its dominant hold on Singapore politics and eventually act as the instrument of the total transformation of Singapore.

The paramount immediate objective of the PAP was to secure the end of colonialism in Malaya and Singapore. It was opposed to the idea of trying to ‘improve’ colonialism, then fashionable among the existing, mostly right-wing, political organisations in Singapore. One major fear, in the words of S. Rajaratnam, was that ‘if a genuine left-wing party was not launched before the Rendel Constitution came into effect, then the way would be open for the consolidation of British power through local right-wing groups.’² Lee Kuan Yew presented the key objectives of the PAP:

1. To end colonialism and establish an independent national state of Malaya comprising the territories now known as the Federation of Malaya and the Colony of Singapore.
2. To create a democratic unitary government of Malaya based on universal suffrage of all those who are born in Malaya or who adopt Malayan nationality.
3. To abolish the unjust inequalities of wealth and opportunity inherent in the present system.
4. To establish an economic order which will give to all citizens the right to work and the full economic returns for their labor and skill.
5. To ensure a decent living and social security to all those who through sickness, infirmity or old age, can no longer work.
6. To infuse into the people of Malaya a spirit of national unity, self-respect and self-reliance, and to inspire them with a sense of endeavour in the creation of a prosperous, stable and just society.³

Priorities were quite obvious. First, the PAP sought to achieve an end to colonial rule; it represented the sole basis for cooperation between the social democrats and the pro-communists. Second, it wished to secure Singapore’s merger with Malaya. And third, within a united Malaya and Singapore it expected to build ‘a more equal and a more just society, where educational, employment, social and economic opportunities are more equitably distributed.’⁴

Despite their pre-eminent leadership position in the party the social democrats could not afford to adopt policies and programs that were entirely unacceptable to the pro-communists, and with this in mind the PAP adopted a clear left-wing stance to attract support from the Chinese masses, who constituted a large majority. It demanded repeal of the widely hated Emergency Regulations. It emphasised its multi-ethnic character and commitments, seeking official status for Chinese and Tamil languages along with English and Malay. It asked for equal citizenship rights regardless of race, religion or language. These measures were especially geared to attract non-Malays, who had been treated as aliens throughout their sojourn in the country.

The party’s immediate purpose was to establish itself as the chief representative of the Singapore ‘nation’, for which it had to be a mass-based organisation. Its activities were geared to building and mobilising popular support against colonial rule. It promoted and led mass political action and agitation with the purpose of strengthening its base among workers. Several of its leaders had close links with unions: Lee Kuan Yew was a legal adviser to several unions of public employees, while Lim Chin Siong and Fong Swee Suan, the two leading pro-communists, respectively led the powerful and mostly Chinese Factory and Shop Workers Union and Hock Lee Bus Workers Union. The PAP was largely a party of unionised workers that had grown up in unions.

Despite their common aim of securing an end to colonial rule, the party was clearly split between the social democrats and the pro-communists. An official history of the PAP said:

The dominant and recurring theme in the manifesto written 10 years ago is anti-colonialism. Everything else is overshadowed by it. It was the willing subordination of all other problems to the immediate task of combating colonialism which helped to conceal the reservation that some individuals had about the ultimate aims and objectives of the party.⁵

Despite the immediate compulsions to work together, each faction was extremely suspicious and kept a close watch on the activities of the other to ensure that it did not assume dominant control. Consequently, the full potential of popular support was not realised; no serious attempts were made to extend the membership as it was obvious to the social democrats, who then held formal ‘control’ of the party, that any large expansion of membership would only strengthen the position of the pro-communists and enable them to wrest control. In the beginning, a great deal of caution was exercised even with regard to establishing party branches; according to one estimate, in mid-1959 the party had a membership of no more than 5000.⁶ Membership requirements were difficult to enforce and invariably the more active and ardent pro-communists were able to recruit new members to swell the ranks of their supporters. As one study stated, ‘the head was in constant danger of being ingested by the body’.⁷

Further, the social democrats found it exceedingly difficult to attract members from groups that were most likely to support them: the English-educated among the dominant Chinese segment and among the Malay and Indian minorities. The PAP was branded by the colonial government as a radical organisation controlled by communists that generated such strong fears among these groups, especially of victimisation by employers, that not many of them were willing to join the party. Furthermore, as most party activists were Chinese-educated, the PAP’s activities at the branch level were largely Chinese-oriented and often conducted in Chinese dialects. These were mostly educational and cultural activities and tended to have little attraction for the Malays and the Indians.

Within a year of its formation the first national elections were held. The PAP, not wishing to dissipate its limited support and resources over a large number of constituencies, chose to field only four candidates: two social democrats and two pro-communists. Three party nominees, including Lee Kuan Yew, won. The only loser was pro-communist C.V. Devan Nair. By that time thanks to automatic registration the electorate had increased to around 300 000, from only 48 155 in 1951. The age of mass politics had arrived and the PAP, in order to be successful, had to gear itself to mass action. The future lay with political parties that represented certain policies and programs and were geared to the new politics.

The critical question that faced the social democrats with regard to the nature of party organisation after the election was: ‘What kind of mass organisation? Was it to be a mass organisation for revolutionary and violent seizure of power or was it to be a mass organisation for the democratic and non-violent seizure of power?’⁸ This was also a period of mounting competition between the two factions within the party. The pro-communists, who initially had accepted a role and influence largely behind the scenes and allowed the social democrats to be the visible leaders, now began to compete for leadership positions.

Despite an earlier understanding that the pro-communists would not occupy any official positions in the party’s Central Executive Committee (CEC), by mid-1956 at the second party conference they competed against the social democrats and won four of the twelve CEC seats. It was clear that the pro-communists, with their hold on the private sector unions and wide support among the Chinese masses, were mounting a challenge to the social democrats. However, before the social democrats could take action to organise themselves against a pro-communist take-over, the PAP was involved in the crucial City Council elections.

In 1957, the British introduced a fully elected 32-member City Council with an elected mayor. The PAP, still not fully confident about the extent of its popular support, put up only fourteen candidates. It presented a program concentrating on eradication of corruption, better management of services provided by the city, and reorganisation of the administration to make it people-oriented. The party performed better than expected, winning thirteen of the fourteen seats it had contested. Even though that did not constitute a majority on the council, the PAP was able to get one of its councillors, Ong Eng Guan, elected mayor because of serious disagreements among the other parties.

This later proved most crucial for the party’s development, giving the PAP its first opportunity to implement its policies and programs and demonstrate its dedication and effectiveness i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• Dedication Page
• Introduction
• Part 1 Lee Kuan Yew’s Singapore
• Part 2 Goh Chok Tong’s Singapore
• Conclusion: national development and democracy
• Endnotes
• Index