CHAPTER 1
Skepticism: The Big Picture
Sextus gives an overview of skepticism in the opening of book I of Outlines of Pyrrhonism: except for one minor omission (in section [7]), I include the whole of this.
On the Most Basic Difference among Philosophies
[1] Suppose youâre investigating some topic: chances are, the result is that either (a) you make a discovery, or (b) you deny making a discovery and admit the matter is not to be grasped*, or (c) you keep on investigating. [2] So equally, when it comes to the things investigated in philosophy, some people have claimed to have discovered the truth, some have declared that it is not possible for this to be grasped, and some are still investigating. [3] It is those strictly called dogmatists* who think they have discovered itâpeople like Aristotle* and Epicurus* and the Stoics* and some others; itâs Clitomachus* and Carneades* and other Academics* who have declared they are dealing with things not to be grasped; and itâs the skeptics who are still investigating. [4] Hence it makes sense that the most basic philosophies are thought to be three: dogmatic*, Academic, and skeptical. About the other ones, it will be appropriate for others to speak; right now itâs about the skeptical approach that we are going to speak in outline, with the following prefaceâthat on none of the things to be discussed do we insist* that the matter is definitely as we say, but on each one we are reporting like a case study, according to how it now appears to us.
On the Accounts of Skepticism
[5] There is one account of the skeptical philosophy called âgeneral,â and another called âspecific.â The general one is where we expound the features of skepticism, telling how it is conceived, what are its starting points and its arguments, its criterion and its aim, what are the modes of suspension of judgment, how we employ the skeptical statements, and the distinction between skepticism and the philosophies closest to it; [6] the specific one is where we argue against each part of so-called philosophy. Well, letâs deal first with the general account, beginning our survey with the names of the skeptical approach.
On the Ways Skepticism Is Named
[7] The skeptical approach, then, is called investigative, from its activity involving investigation and inquiry, and suspensive from the reaction that comes about in the inquirer after the investigation ⌠and Pyrrhonian, from the fact that Pyrrho* appears to us to have gone in for skepticism in a more full-bodied and obvious way than those before him.
What Skepticism Is
[8] The skeptical ability is one that produces oppositions among things that appear and things that are thought in any way whatsoever, from which, because of the equal strength in the opposing objects and accounts, we come first to suspension of judgment, and after that to tranquility*.
[9] We call it an âabilityâ not in any elaborate sense, but simply in terms of being able; âthings that appearâ we are taking here as the things perceived with the senses, which is why we contrast with them the things that are thought. âIn any way whatsoeverâ can be connected with the ability (meaning that weâre taking the word âabilityâ in a simple way, as we said), or with âproducing oppositions among things that appear and things that are thoughtâ; since we oppose these in a variety of waysâopposing things that appear to things that appear, or things thought to things thought, or interchanging them, so that all the oppositions are includedâwe say âin any way whatsoever.â Or âin any way whatsoeverâ goes with âthings that appear and things thought,â meaning that we are not investigating how the things that appear do appear, or the things that are thought are thoughtâweâre taking these in a simple way. [10] We speak of âopposingâ accounts not necessarily in the sense of an assertion and a negation, but simply in place of âconflicting.â âEqual strengthâ refers to an equality in terms of trustworthiness or its absence, so that none of the conflicting accounts is ahead of any other as more trustworthy. Suspension of judgment is when thought comes to a stop; because of this we neither deny nor put forward anything. Tranquility is a trouble-free condition, or calmness, of the soul. How tranquility comes in alongside suspension of judgment we will suggest in our remarks on the aim.1
About the Skeptic
[11] The Pyrrhonian philosopher was in effect already explained in the conception of the skeptical approach; itâs the person who has a piece of this âability.â
About the Starting Points of Skepticism
[12] The starting point that causes skepticism, we say, is the hope of getting tranquility. Highly gifted people, being bothered by the inconsistency in things, and at a loss as to which of them they should give more of their assent to, went for investigating what is true in things and what is false, on the assumption that by determining these things they would achieve tranquility. But the starting point of the skeptical setup is, above all, every argumentâs having an equal argument lying in opposition to it; for from this we seem to end up not having doctrines*.
Whether the Skeptic Has Doctrines
[13] We say that the skeptic does not have doctrines not in that more everyday sense of âdoctrineâ in which some say that a doctrine is when you agree to something2âfor the skeptic assents to the reactions that are forced on him by appearance* (for example, when being warmed or cooled, he would not say âI think Iâm not being warmed or cooledâ); we say that he does not have doctrines in the sense in which some say that a doctrine is the assent to some unclear matter investigated by the sciencesâfor the Pyrrhonist does not assent to anything unclear. [14] He doesnât have doctrines even in uttering the skeptical phrases about unclear thingsâfor example, âNo moreâ3 or âI determine nothing,â or any of the others about which weâll speak later. For someone with a doctrine puts forward as a reality the matter on which they are said to have a doctrine, but the skeptic does not put forward these phrases as definite realities; he supposes that, just as the phrase âeverything is falseâ says that it is itself false along with the others, and likewise ânothing is true,â so too âno more [this way than that]â says that, along with the others, it is itself âno moreâ the case [than its opposite], and for this reason brackets* itself together with the others. We say the same about the other skeptical phrases too. [15] But if the dogmatist puts forward as a reality the thing on which he has a doctrine, while the skeptic utters his own phrases in such a way that they are potentially bracketed by themselves, he cannot be said to have doctrines in uttering them. But the most important thing is that in uttering these phrases he says what appears to himself, and announces without opinions* the way he himself is affected, making no firm statements* about the objects actually out there.
Whether the Skeptic Has a School of Thought
[16] We go a similar way on the question whether the skeptic has a school of thought. If one says that a school is an attachment to many doctrines that are consistent with one another and with apparent* things, and by âdoctrineâ one means assent to an unclear matter, we will say that he does not have a school. [17] But if one says that a school is an approach that follows a certain rationale in line with what appears, where that rationale indicates how it is possible to seem to live properly (âproperlyâ being understood not only in terms of virtue but in a more straightforward way) and extends to the ability to suspend judgment, we say that he does have a school; for we do follow a certain rationale that, in line with what appears, marks out a life for us that fits with ancestral customs and the laws and the culture and our own reactions.
Whether the Skeptic Does Natural Science
[18] We say similar things on the question whether the skeptic should do natural science. If the point is to make declarations with strong confidence about any of the things on which doctrines are held in natural science, we do not do natural science. But if the point is to be able to oppose to every argument an equal argument, and to achieve tranquility, we do engage in natural science. This is also how we cover the logical and the ethical parts of so-called philosophy.
Whether the Skeptics Do Away with Apparent Things
[19] Those who say that the skeptics do away with apparent things seem to me not to be listening to what we say. We donât overturn the things that lead us, owing to a passive appearance and whether we like it or not, to assentâas we said before;4 and these are the apparent things. When we investigate whether the actual object is such as it appears, we allow that it appears, and our investigation is not about the apparent thing but about whatâs said about the apparent thing; and thatâs different from investigating the apparent thing itself. [20] For example, honey appears to us to sweeten; we agree to this, for as a matter of sense-perception, we are sweetened. But whether it is indeed sweet as far as argument is concerned,5 we investigateâwhich is not the apparent thing but something said about the apparent thing. And even if we do go ahead and raise arguments against apparent things, we put these forward not with the aim of doing away with the apparent things, but for a show of the dogmatistsâ rashness; for if argument is so tricky that it just about snatches apparent things from under our eyes, how can we not be suspicious of it on unclear matters, and hence avoid following it and acting rashly?
On the Criterion of Skepticism
[21] That we pay attention to apparent things is clear from what we say about the criterion of the skeptical approach. A criterion is spoken of in two ways: thereâs the kind that is used for the purpose of trust on a matter of reality or unrealityâand weâll talk about this in the accoun...