Adam Eitel
Thomas Aquinas wrote on conventional topics in conventional genres in medieval faculties of theology. Well over half of his corpus comprises commentaries on Scripture, a commentary on Peter Lombardâs Sentences, and two pedagogically motivated revisions of its topics known as the Summa Against the Gentiles and the Summa of Theology (hereafter Summa). Much else in his corpus consists in disputed questions on theological topics, sermons and liturgical works, and commentaries on books by Boethius and Dionysius. Thomas also exposited many of the Aristotelian texts that were available in the thirteenth-century Latin West. Can he for that reason be called a âphilosopherâ? Modern answers to this question too often forget that philosophus was a pejorative term in thirteenth-century Parisian schools. Its connotation can be surmised, if only in part, from Thomas himself. Take the case of the Commentary on the Gospel of John, where Thomas adverts to the danger of philosophical teaching: âthe wisdom of no philosopher has been so great that it could keep human beings from error; the philosophers have rather led many into error.â And again, in the Commentary on 1 Corinthians, he identifies âphilosophersâ with the âthe rulers of this world, insofar as they fancy themselves as rulers of men in teaching. Of these,â he continues, âit says in Isaiah 19, âThe princes of Zoan are utterly foolish; the wise counselors of Pharaoh give stupid counsel.â From these rulers all human philosophy has come.â It should not surprise that Thomas refused to call himself or any other Christian a âphilosopher.â Why, then, are contemporary readers so tempted by the prospect of finding a philosophy âinâ the Summa?
One reason follows from the originating circumstances of modern Thomism. At least since Pope Leo XIIIâs encyclical Aeterni Patris, the Summa has been looked to as a tool for re-securing authority. Leo traced the churchâs loss of political and social power to a congeries of sixteenth-century philosophical errors. He contended that those errors could only be undone by a new philosophyâone that could be separated, albeit subordinated, to ecclesial teaching. Here lies the aegis of âThomistic philosophy.â
Of course, there is a more obvious reason that Thomasâs readers ask about the place of philosophy in the Summa: Thomas alludes to, appropriates, and explicitly cites ancient philosophic authorities. Chief among them are Aristotelian authorities, but there are others, too: Plato, Cicero, ancient philosophical schools, and many others besides figure prominently in Thomasâs dialectical exegesis. But precisely how does he use philosophic authorities? The question cannot be answered until we have relearned to ask it well. In what follows, then, I am not so much looking for an answer but the proper form of a question. To this end I will explore Thomasâs conception of philosophy in the forms of Christian teaching he inherits. First, I turn to Thomasâs interpretation of just one of the Pauline epistles in which he finds ânearly the whole of theological teaching.â Specifically, I take up the epitome of Christian pedagogy that Thomas finds in Paulâs refusals of wisdom in 1 Corinthians 1â2. Then, second, I ask to what extent Thomas finds the same pedagogical principles at work in his ancient Christian authorities. In closing, I begin to show how his efforts to trace this Pauline pattern might illuminate his use of philosophy in the Summa.
Human Wisdom in the Commentary on 1 Corinthians
In his Commentary on 1 Corinthians, Thomas specifies Paulâs teaching with respect to its (1) author, (2) its âsubject matterâ (materia), and (3) its âmanner of teachingâ (modus docendi). Paulâs wisdom is âfrom God in a special wayâviz., by revelation.â Then, too, it is chiefly about God, since the principium of Paulâs subject matter is nothing but Christâthe very wisdom of God who died: âthe chief element in the teaching of the Christian faith is salvation effected by the cross of Christ; hence in 1 Cor. 2:2 Paul says, âFor I decided to know nothing among you except Jesus Christ and him crucified.ââ Finally, Paul exhorts the Corinthians to hold fast to the manner of teaching that comports with this cruciform teaching. Paulâs own âmanner of explanationâ (modum enarrandi) makes use of only those things that serve âthe demonstration of Christâs power.â
Thomas is especially struck by Paulâs pedagogyâhis manner of teachingânot least because he takes it to be the same pedagogy proposed by âthe first teachers of the faith.â Paulâs is an apostolic pedagogy. So it is not just one among several pedagogies available to the teacher of Christian wisdom. For Thomas, it is, rather, the pedagogy of Christian teaching. The limits and procedures of this apostolic pedagogy, Thomas thinks, can be inferred from Paulâs several refusals of wisdom. Paul refuses to teach âin eloquent wisdomâ (in sapientia verbi) and âin loftiness of speech or wisdomâ (in sublimitate sermonis aut sapientiae); he purges his teaching of âpersuasive words of human wisdomâ (verbis persuasibilibus humanae sapientiae) and of every sort of âwisdom of this ageâ (sapientia huius saeculi). So says Paul. But precisely what does he mean? What do his refusals exclude?
First, Paul refuses âelegant philosophical teachingsâ (ornatu philosophiae doctrinis) and the âteachings of philosophersâ (doctrinis philosophorum)âand not just the teachings of some philosophers, but rather of âall human philosophy.â Then, second, he rejects philosophic pedagogies or manners of teaching. Here we must be more specific. Philosophersâ âmanner of argumentâ (modum ratiocinandi) proceeds through âcertain subtle pathsâ; they moreover urge assent by âordering speech in order to persuade.â Paul, on the other hand, refuses all efforts to âproveâ (probare) his claims with âwords drawn from human wisdom.â Nor does he employ ârhetorical persuasionsâ (rhetoricis persuasionibus)âsay, âobscure discoursesâ (alti sermones) and âempty argumentsâ (vanis rationibus) that produce useless speech.
But what grounds Paulâs refusals? On what basis does he forswear philosophic manners of teaching? Thomas notes that Christ first chose men who lacked âcarnal and earthly wisdomâ (carnali sapientia et terrena)âignorant fisherman and peasants who could not have made use of philosophical teaching or rhetorical persuasion. Not so Paul. Here is a man of noble birth who was educated in âworldly wisdomâ (sapientia mundana). Here is a âgolden vesselâ spilling over with âbrilliant wisdomâ (fulgorem sapientiae). Thomas thus contends that Paulâs refusals cannot be motivated by uncritical adherence to custom. Rather, they must follow from Paulâs own considered judgmentâa judgment that Thomas finds expressed in nuce in Paulâs contention that to preach in eloquent wisdom would be to empty the cross of its power (1 Cor. 1:17). For Thomas, the point...