The first volume of the Theo-Logic is Balthasarâs attempt at a constructive reinterpretation of truth that integrates scholastic concern over the nature of objective Being with the concern for the subjectivity of the knowing process, that was so prevalent in the philosophical circles of Balthasarâs day. Balthasar frames this integration as reconciling philosophical realism and idealism. Balthasarâs Theo-Logic pick this up from Hegelâs account of logic as an âenquiry into the real as found in knowing.â But Balthasar goes beyond Hegelâs logic by crafting theo-logic, in which his philosophical investigation into the nature of Being in the first volume opens up to theological completion in the later two volumes. In Theo-Logic 1, Balthasar only begins to unify realism and idealism. Such philosophical union must await its theological accomplishment in the dramatic person of Christ.
The present chapter accomplishes three things. First, I unpack Balthasarâs understanding of truth as the meeting point of metaphysics and epistemology. As a property of Being truth is a metaphysical category; but as something known, truth is also an epistemological concept. Truth belongs to both. Truth limited to epistemology results in titanic Idealism. But truth confined to metaphysics results in arid neo-scholasticism. To isolate truth to either one or the other is to mistake the nature of truth as a knowable property of Being.
Second, I argue that Balthasar interprets Being and knowledge as loveâas the rhythm of gratuitous, free giving and receiving between subject and object. In his Theo-Logic, Balthasar does not supplant the rationalism of Thomas Aquinas by replacing it with fideism or affectivism; instead, he demonstrates the mutuality of knowledge and love. Knowledge comes not solely through an act of cognition; understanding is an act of the whole self in the expressive, creative, and receptive act of the loving intellect.
Third, I end the chapter by highlighting the way Balthasar frames the truth of God as both the beginning and the end (principium et finis) of the truth of the world. This helps us reconcile the natural world as open to divine. Balthasarâs way of parising this relationship between created and divine truth resonates with his Ignatian metaphysics outlined in chapter one. Indeed, the conclusion to Theo-Logic 1 lays the philosophical groundwork for finding God in all things, even in the structure of human understanding.
Truth as Metaphysical and Epistemological
Father Aidan Nichols often refers to the Theo-Logic as the âontological trilogyâ in which Balthasar considers the question of Being in itself. While it is not incorrect to identify metaphysical questions as one of the driving forces in the Theo-Logic, Balthasar is not only doing metaphysics. He is not asking the question of Being qua Being only, but also asking about how humanity can venture to speak truthfully of Being. The volumes of Theo-Logic are metaphysical explorations, yes, but they are also explorations of expression: of how Being expresses itself, how we come to know Being, and how we can express Being in finite language.
Recalling our earlier statement that the Theo-Logic brings together realism and idealism, we can understand the series as a direct response to (Hegelian) Idealism, as an account of reality as it is made known to us. Like Hegelâs own logic, Balthasarâs Theo-Logic takes up the challenge of truth when âthing becomes think.â
We must accept from the beginning that Balthasar is not skeptical about the human ability to know the truth of Being. He is optimistic that when humans know truth, they know the truth of Being itself. Such optimism is rooted in the nature of truth. But we should not confuse his optimism as a claim for the possibility of absolute knowledge. Balthasar wants to hold together knowledge and mystery. Because truth is a property of knowledge, we can really know. But knowledge is not necessarily co-extensive with comprehension. Because truth is also a property of all of Being, what is disclosed to our understanding exceeds our comprehension. Balthasar elevates truthâs mystery, rather than overcoming it. What holds knowledge and mystery together, for Balthasar, is love. Theo-Logic 1 supplants Idealismâs drive for absolute knowing with love that wills the perpetual mystery of truth.
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Before going any further, we should offer a word of caution. Balthasarâs epistemology has been criticized in some quarters for failing to be sufficiently philosophical. Victoria Harrison, for example, though she sees a great deal of potential in Balthasarâs thought for developing a distinctly religious epistemology, notes that the Theo-Logic fails to develop a constructive, systematic rationality as a supplement to Balthasarâs critique of Kantianism. But developing a theory of rationality is not Balthasarâs task in the Theo-Logic. He sets out, rather, to develop a principle for understanding the ontological reality of Being when it is interpreted as love. Whatever system of rationality that we might derive from the Theo-Logic is incidental. Balthasarâs purpose is to inquire into the nature of truth itself.
Instead of a systematic rationality, Balthasar articulates an ontological and epistemic disposition of Being and of knowledge. This disposition is marked by receptivity. Balthasar identifies what he calls a dialogical rhythm in Being and knowledge. It is a back-and-forth rhythm of gift and receptivity, which Balthasar says is the rhythm of love. In this rhythm, Being freely gives from its objective depths. The subject receives it with fidelity and charity.
It is worth noting that Balthasar describes this epistemological disposition that corresponds to this rhythm as âadorationâ [Anbetung]. This is clearly the language of spirituality and devotion, but Balthasar uses it to describe knowledge as an epistemic disposition of openness to Beingâs revelation through the subjectâs receptivity and creative participation. We can see even here at the outset of his philosophical study of truth that Balthasar is laying the groundwork for his portrayal of the saints as the ones who most perfectly realize the epistemic attitude of true knowledge.
Truth as a Transcendental Property of Being
Balthasarâs Theo-Logic begins with the unequivocal assertion that truthâs proper object is Being. Theo-Logic 1 resists the narrow subject-oriented epistemology of post-Kantian Idealism. Balthasar also distances himself from the legacy of the transcendental Thomists like Joseph MarĂ©chal and Karl Rahner, opting instead to construe truth as a transcendental property of Being rather than as constructive power of human mind and will. Human knowing, Balthasar insists, is always responsive. Knowledge responds to the disclosure of the mystery of Being. The Theo-Logic reframes epistemological questions in such a way that truth refers first to the making known of Being (disclosure, revelation) and then, subsequentlyâresponsivelyâknowledge of Being (trustworthy understanding). To do this, he relies on a traditional participatory understanding of truth (Aquinasâ Disputations on Truth is never far from his mind), developed through a phenomenological method. Balthasar considers the nature of truth through the way it appears in the world. Epistemology, as Balthasar conceives it, is never simply about the structures of the human act of knowing; it is also concerned with the knowledge of Being. From the very beginning, then, Balthasar insists on the connection between ontology and epistemology, Being and knowing.
âConsciousnessâ and Being
This ontological framing of truth has significant consequences for the entirety of the Theo-Logic and for Balthasarâs theology of the saints. As an ontological reality, truth is the expression (logos) of Being. The idea of the expressivity of Being (the âself-speaking of Beingâ) is important for both the intelligibility of the world and Balthasarâs later christological interpretation of truth. There, following Bonaventure, Balthasar defines the Logos as the âexpressionâ of the Father. What the saints know when they know Christ is the expression of the Father, the source and the goal of all Being. But we are getting ahead of ourselves.
Balthasar conceives truth as considering the appearance of Being in concrete forms in the world of phenomena that we inhabit. This immediately raises the issue of the relation between appearance and reality. For Balthasar, there cannot be a one-to-one correspondence between the two, but neither are the two only nominally related. He asserts that in human consciousness (BewuĂtsein), Being invades concrete appearances.
Balthasarâs study of truth begins with a phenomenology of consciousness itself. He argues that the phenomenon of consciousness demonstrates the ontological nature of knowledge. He makes much of the word for âconsciousnessâ: BewuĂtsein. Balthasar interprets consciousness as meaning both âbeing consciousâ (act) and âbeing consciousâ or âconscious beingâ (Be...