We recall from chapter 1 that Islamophobia is not limited to negative opinions about Muslims or Islam. Islamophobia refers to attitudes and actions, to what people feel toward Muslims and how those feelings are translated into discriminatory, exclusionary, and violent practices targeting Muslims and those perceived as Muslim.
Much of the book has surveyed Western fears and anxieties toward Muslims. We have explored the historical, political, economic, social, and religious roots of anti-Muslim prejudice, focusing on how theologians, philosophers, colonizers, politicians, scholars, authors, native informants, journalists, and filmmakers have constructed Muslims as the violent, backward, misogynist, and uncivilized “other.”
We now turn our attention to the consequences and casualties of Islamophobia—the discrimination, exclusion, and violence experienced by Muslims as a result of decades and indeed centuries of animosity. We discussed some of these consequences for Muslims outside the West already in chapter 4—for example, the death toll and destruction resulting from the War on Terror in Afghanistan and Iraq. In this chapter, I survey the impact of Islamophobia on Muslims living in the West, noting the restrictions on civil liberties and the harsh treatment Muslims have received at the hands of governments, law enforcement officials, and non-Muslim citizens. Facing detentions and deportations, hate crimes and headscarf bans, Muslims have emerged as the most overtly targeted and besieged minority religious community in the post-9/11 West.
Surveillance and Profiling
While antiterrorism laws existed long before 9/11, the 9/11 attacks generated an unprecedented wave of new legislation and counterterrorism measures that greatly expanded the power of Western governments and law enforcement agencies to identify and eliminate the “internal threat” posed by suspected domestic terrorists. In 2001, the US attorney general John Ashcroft tapped into this fear to defend the use of extraordinary measures to battle this enemy: “The attacks of September 11 were acts of terrorism against America orchestrated and carried out by individuals living within our borders. Today’s terrorists enjoy the benefits of our free society even as they commit themselves to our destruction. They live in our communities—plotting, planning and waiting to kill Americans again.” Given the religious identities of the 9/11 perpetrators, it is clear that the “they” to whom Ashcroft refers are the Muslims in our midst. Ashcroft implies that measures must be taken to ensure that Muslims do not exploit “the benefits of our free society” to attack the United States again.
Initial US Counterterrorism Measures after 9/11
The most prominent measure adopted in the United States after 9/11 to battle domestic terrorism was the USA PATRIOT Act.The USA PATRIOT Act (2001) was enacted by the US Congress soon after 9/11. The act expanded the government’s power to conduct surveillance programs and to detain immigrants suspected of supporting terrorism. Passed overwhelmingly by Congress in October 2001 and renewed or extended several times since then, the act expanded the US government’s power to wiretap and conduct surveillance without prior cause, to access private records without oversight, and to detain indefinitely immigrants suspected of supporting terrorism, among other provisions. It accompanied additional measures that enabled the government to freeze the financial assets of any individual or organization alleged to have terrorist ties and to restrict nonimmigrant visas for individuals coming from countries believed to sponsor terrorism.
Much of this legislation paved the way for surveillance programs, racial and religious profiling, detentions, deportations, and renditions carried out by agents of the US government and directed overwhelmingly at Muslims and Arabs. It also reflected the continuation of a historical trend whereby those deemed to be representative of current “foreign enemies” are singled out as threats to national security. During World War II, for example, over one hundred thousand people of Japanese descent in the United States, many of whom were citizens, were placed in internment camps following Japan’s bombing of Pearl Harbor. The Japanese at home came to symbolize the Japanese enemy abroad. In much the same way, Muslims residing in the United States after 9/11 came to function as stand-ins for the Muslim enemy in the global War on Terror. Domestic counterterrorism measures targeting Arabs and Muslims thereby became linked with efforts to shore up public support for US military and political intervention in the Muslim-majority regions.
One of the most extensive counterterrorism measures after 9/11 was the religious and racial profiling of Arabs and Muslims via the National Security Entry-Exit Registration System (NSEERS). Introduced in 2002, the program required men from twenty-three Muslim-majority countries, as well as from North Korea, to register with the US government. The men were interviewed, fingerprinted, and photographed by federal officials. According to data provided by the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), in the first year of NSEERS, close to one hundred thousand individuals were registered at their US port of entry, while just over eighty-three thousand people already residing in the United States were registered. While the DHS initially indicated that targeting men from these nationalities was necessary for national security, in 2011 the department reversed course and suspended the program, noting that collecting such data “no longer provides any increase in security.” A grand total of zero terrorism convictions resulted from the program.
Countering Violent Extremism
By 2005, the Bush administration’s decapitation strategy—the focus on capturing, torturing, and killing of al-Qaeda leaders in order to destroy the organization and bring an end to the War on Terror—was faltering. Efforts to institute regime change in Afghanistan and Iraq also gave the US government little to show for its military invasion, as violence and turmoil persisted in both countries. All of this led the administration to rethink its counterterrorism strategy and to consider the larger factors driving terrorism.
The administration began to shift its focus toward what one senior official referred to as a “strategy against violent extremism.” The idea was to recalibrate counterterrorism policies to focus more on the process that led individuals to support violent extremism, a process labeled in some European circles as “radicalization.” In fact, the United States looked to Europe, particularly the Netherlands and Britain, for inspiration as it developed these preventative measures. The programs and strategies that emerged ultimately became known as Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).
While CVE as a concept emerged in the Bush administration, it was the Obama administration that prioritized CVE in terms of human and financial resources. The Obama administration’s initial CVE focus was international. It operated under the leadership of the State Department’s Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism. The US government poured money into programs that empowered Muslim women, developed partnerships between law enforcement and Muslim community leaders, provided a larger platform for Muslims advocating for nonviolence, and analyzed local factors driving violent extremism.
In 2011, the Obama administration produced its first comprehensive strategy for domestic CVE. The strategy promoted increased efforts by the FBI and local law enforcement to engage “at risk” communities, including Muslims, to educate them about risk factors that lead to radicalization and violence. In 2014, the US government launched CVE pilot initiatives in three cities: Boston, Minneapolis, and Los Angeles. Overseen by the Department of Justice (DOJ), these initiatives sought to bring religious and community leaders together with teachers, social workers, health professionals, and law enforcement representatives in order to deter individuals from joining “violent extremist” organizations. Financial support for domestic CVE increased around this time, and by 2016, over $100 million in federal funding was available to develop these and other initiatives.
The Obama administration insisted CVE was not discriminatory and that the US government was interested in deterring all forms of violent extremism. In practice, CVE initiatives disproportionately targeted Muslim communities. Muslim civil liberties organizations, including the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR), pointed out that the very premise of CVE was flawed in light of the fact that Muslims were singled out for concern even though the majority of terrorist attacks in the United States are perpetrated by non-Muslims. These initiatives also encouraged teachers and those who provide social and health services to conduct informal surveillance on Muslim students or patients, an activity that fell outside their job description and that violated the trust needed for these professional relationships to work. Without a doubt, CVE in the Obama era had a persistent “public relations” problem within man...