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The Organisation Todt in Hitlerâs empire
On the road to war, Hitler entrusted Fritz Todt and Albert Speer with two tasks at the core of his future empire: the dictator chose Todt to mastermind the construction of the Third Reichâs motorway network, destined to radiate out into conquered territory, and instructed Speer to begin rebuilding Berlin as an imperial capital, to be renamed âGermaniaâ.1 Hitler put Todt in charge of building the Autobahnen in 1933, just months after he became chancellor. He then appointed Speer to realise his vision for Germania on 30 January 1937, the fourth anniversary of his accession to power. In both instances he chose men who would go on to serve in succession as his armaments ministers and leaders of what became known as the Organisation Todt (OT). This labour force grew out of Todtâs motorway-building concern, and Hitler publicly named it for the first time in 1938. This was while its engineers were building the Westwall, known as the Siegfried Line to Germanyâs wartime foes, just over a year before the Second World War started with the Wehrmachtâs invasion of Poland.
The projects to create the motorways and Germania reflected Hitlerâs megalomania and craving for all things gargantuan. They also demonstrated his reliance on the workforce of engineers and construction specialists created by Todt, which began on the motorways, largely transferred to the Westwall and then absorbed the builders of Germania during the war.2 From an improvised group of around 350,000 German workers in the run-up to the twentieth centuryâs bloodiest conflict, the Organisation Todt metamorphosed in wartime into a 1.5-million-strong agency mostly composed of foreign slave labourers,3 including Jews and Slavs vilified under the Nazi racist code. Germans made up less than a quarter of the force. As Hitlerâs imperial designs grew following initial military successes, so did the OTâs geographical reach. By 1940 the OT had started motorway networks to link Klagenfurt to Trondheim and Calais to Warsaw, with a route later planned as far as Moscow. Development of the railways was to include the introduction of double-decker trains travelling at up to 200 kilometres per hour, taking 600 passengers per carriage from Munich to Rostov-on-Don. Hitler instructed Munich rail authorities to make the necessary changes to the main station, whose hall was to have required the largest steelframe structure in the world. As for the city of Germania, Hitlerâs obsession with buildings which would outdo rival colonial powers was its hallmark. A triumphal arch would dwarf its Parisian counterpart, and the main northâsouth and eastâwest roads were to have been more than 100 metres wide. A massive domed hall next to the FĂŒhrerâs palace would accommodate 180,000 people, while a neighbouring square was designed for events attended by a million.4 On seeing a model of the planned city, Propaganda Minister Joseph Goebbels commented admiringly: âIncomparably monumental. The FĂŒhrer is raising a memorial to himself in stone.â5
The imperial capital of Germania was the biggest of five âleader citiesâ (FĂŒhrerstĂ€dte) to be redeveloped at great cost under plans reaching into peacetime after an imagined Nazi final victory. The other cities in this elite group were Nuremberg, Hamburg, Munich and Linz, earmarked for the grandest rebuilding under plans which, to a lesser extent, included almost all of Germanyâs major cities. The Baltic seaside spa of Prora, on the island of RĂŒgen, was to have become the worldâs largest resort, with 75 kilometres of beach and facilities for 14 million German holidaymakers a year. Although German military setbacks from late 1941 onwards meant most of these long-term schemes were never realised, they covered not just the core of the Reich but the occupied territories of Europe. The Norwegian city of Trondheim was to have been turned into a settlement for more than a quarter of a million Germans, protected by a naval base which Hitler claimed would have made Singapore look like âmere childâs playâ. In Eastern Europe the dictator instructed that new German urban developments should be modelled on the Fatherlandâs medieval towns, such as Regensburg or Heidelberg. They would have been ringed at a distance of 30â40 kilometres by model settlements built for the German rural population, with imposing public buildings and fast road links.6
The significance of the OTâs involvement in this chilling imperial vision, under which the lives of the local East European population counted for virtually nothing, was twofold: building was Hitlerâs passion, and this was the area where the OT excelled. Hitlerâs imperial goals were central to the operations of the Organisation Todt, which was deployed almost exclusively in Nazi-occupied territory for most of the war and relied heavily on slave labour. In choosing Todt and Speer to construct the Third Reichâs highways and the colossal buildings of metropolitan Berlin, even before he appointed them as successive armaments ministers, Hitler entrusted these two men with components of his imperial design that he especially prized. What he required were edifices and feats of technology designed to proclaim German power and his own to the world.
The dictator relied on Todt and Speer to fashion these symbols of imperial might, while hundreds of thousands of OT staff and foreign labourers built defence lines and transport links to defend conquered territories up to their furthest frontiers. For Hitler, the OT was an instrument of conquest and occupation. The bonds that developed between himself, Todt and Speer boosted the profile of the organisation, which became tightly woven into his dreams of empire, architecture and German technological prowess. To understand how the OT spread its network through German-occupied Europe and came to dominate all construction in the Reich in the final year of the war, the structure and aims of the organisation itself need to be investigated. Professional and academic qualifications of around 1,400 OT personnel are analysed in this chapter to assess the backgrounds of senior staff. Investigation of the remarkable expansion of the OT should start, though, with an assessment of the contribution of its two successive leaders. Hitler respected Todt, valuing his loyalty and competence; he delighted in discussing architecture with the much younger Speer, who was thirty-one when put in charge of rebuilding Berlin. Hitlerâs relationships with Todt and Speer are examined in turn, contrasting the two OT chiefsâ individual styles of leadership and gauging their separate efforts to realise Hitlerâs imperial ambitions.
The Organisation Todt under Todt
Todt and his large workforce had been constructing motorways for five years before Hitler named the âOrganisation Todtâ in public for the first time. The dictatorâs decision, proclaimed at the Nazi Partyâs Nuremberg rally in September 1938, represented an extraordinary honour for a man who had become one of his closest confidants.7 It recognised Hitlerâs favourite civil engineer in a way normally reserved for the FĂŒhrer alone. The leader of the Third Reich was the figurehead of the Hitler Jugend, but Fritz Todt became one of the few in the Nazi elite deemed worthy of having a national organisation bearing his name.8 This accolade reflected the strength of the bond between the two men, first forged during the building of the Autobahnen and the Westwall.
Hitlerâs impatience with the army led him to choose Todtâs labour force to complete the Westwall. Frustrated by the slow pace of army engineers, Hitler ordered Todt to take over building the fortifications facing Franceâs Maginot Line in May 1938. The dictator saw the Westwall as essential to secure Germanyâs western flank before his grab for Czechoslovakia, but concluded that the army was not up to the job.9 He derided army understanding of the required bunker strength and the power of modern weapons as âshockingâ. Hitler later declared that, if he had left it to the army alone, the Westwall would âstill not have been ready in ten yearsâ. It was thanks to the Organisation Todt, he said, that the whole project had got under way and progress had been made.10 The dictator foresaw two possible outcomes: Europe would either be under German leadership or fall victim to âBolshevismâ. He would rather not have to build the Westwall, but the more intensely the Third Reich looked to the East, the more it needed to guard itself against the West, where France, its First World War enemy, was viewed as the threat.
Like many OT operations, the Westwall was a massive undertaking, measuring about 600 kilometres in length and up to 50 kilometres in depth.11 Its construction required 350,000 OT workers, 90,000 of the armyâs fortification engineers and 100,000 from the Reich Labour Service (Reichsarbeitsdienst â RAD).12 Todt set up his headquarters in Wiesbaden for what became a roundthe-clock operation. He used his excellent contacts with industry to enlist the expertise and manpower of about 1,000 firms,13 as well as Nazi Party resources such as the National Socialist Motor Corps (Nationalsozialistisches Kraftfahrkorps â NSKK) to provide the fleets of trucks and other transport needed. It was this kind of improvisation and ingenuity that inspired Hitlerâs faith in Todt and his workforce.
When Hitler came to power, Todt was forty-two and possessed impeccable political credentials for becoming part of the regime. He had joined the Nazi Party as early as January 1923, gaining the very low membership number of 2465, and the SA in 1931. Like Hitler, he had served in the armed forces in the First World War, having been forced to interrupt his engineering studies to do so. He had joined the army in 1914 and transferred to the air force in 1916. He was wounded and received the Iron Cross. After the war he returned to college and gained his engineering diploma in Karlsruhe before eventually going on to obtain the higher qualification of doctor of engineering in Munich in 1931. On acquiring his initial qualification in Karlsruhe, Todt worked in industry, gathering experience which was to prove exceptionally useful in building up contacts with firms which would later be hired by the OT to carry out its gigantic construction and engineering projects. Some of Todtâs colleagues from his time with the Munich road-building firm Sager and Woerner from 1921 to 1933 held senior posts under him in the OT, including his deputy, Xaver Dorsch.14
It was while he was working for Sager and Woerner that Todt wrote to the NSDAP in Munich in response to an appeal in the partyâs publication, the Völkischer Beobachter, and offered his services as an engineer, suggesting ways to make technical and administrative savings in building the Reichâs highways.15 The partyâs favourable response brought an invitation for him to join the newly formed Kampfbund deutscher Architekten und Ingenieure (KDAI â Action Group of German Architects and Engineers) as head of its section for civil engineers. In December 1932 Todt wrote a forty-nine-page report entitled âRoad-building and Road Administrationâ, which set out for the party leadership what he viewed as a way to combat Germanyâs high unemployment and provide a motorway network with considerable military potential. He estimated that an army of 300,000 men could be transported during just two nights of driving on these highways from the east to the west of the Reich. Hitler was said to have been delighted when the report was presented to him, and Todtâs appointment as overseer of the construction of the Reichâs motorways followed soon after Hitlerâs appointment as chancellor.16
After Todt went on to oversee construction of the Westwall, he revealed a ruthless streak in his character when problems arose. Long shifts and hard labour, sometimes under fire after the war began, sparked protests among the workers and Todt, fearing delays, resorted to harsher methods to ensure the pace did not slacken.17 He acted swiftly to crush opposition among his workers (at that time predominantly German). The measures he took to punish OT Westwall workers guilty of mostly minor offences included detention and âre-educationâ in Hinzert camp, led from October 1939 by a future commandant of Buchenwald concentration camp, SS-SturmbannfĂŒhrer Hermann Pister. Since 1938 the OT had used police detention centres to incarcerate alleged offenders from the Autobahnen and Westwall workforces as a means of ensuring labourers quickly returned to work, typically after three weeks of âre-educationâ. When Pister started work with Todt as part of the SS security staff on Germanyâs western frontier, he was given OT funding to convert disused barrack camps into detention centres designed to reform any âwork-shyâ OT labourers on the Westwall and the motorways. The project was fully supported by the local Gestapo (Geheime Staatspolizei â Secret State Police). Hinzert and three other SS special detention units quickly came to resemble small-scale concentration camps, despite Todtâs express instruction that they should not do so. The head of the OT was nevertheless said by Pister to have been very satisfied with an increase in productivity among his labour gangs. When the OT shifted manpower into occupied France following the Wehrmachtâs May 1940 western offensive, the SS at first regarded Hinzert as having lost its reason for existence. On Himmlerâs order, however, it continued to operate and was brought under the SS Inspectorate of Concentration Camps (Inspektion der Konzentrationslager â IKL) in July 1940. Hinzert was deemed in its initial phase to have been so successful that it became a model for experiments with police detention centres elsewhere. The Gestapo, whose acts of terror against political opponents earned them a fearsome reputation, also detained tens of thousands of German and foreign workers for non-political, labour-related offences in around 200 âwork education campsâ (Arbeitserziehungslager â AEL) around the Reich.18
In a report covering his time in charge of Hinzert, Pister said the campâs average total of 600â700 prisoners could be put to work on the Westwall and other sites and their SS guards could ensure âmaximum work performanceâ, combining punishment with productive labour at the same time as relieving the load on the prison system. He bragged that initially reluctant firms had become eager to use his prisoners, whose productivity was twice or three times as high as that of other labourers.19 The concept of re-education or reform of offenders was much favoured by Pister. He believed that his German âboardersâ (Zöglinge) in the Hinzert special camp could be reintegrated into society and turned into useful members of the community. He relied on traditional techniques based on military-style camp life, strict discipline and extreme hard labour.20
Todt was proud of his organisationâs links with the SS and recommended Pister to Himmler, whose SS controlled the concentration camps, as a âgood leader of menâ. Todt was himself an SA-ObergruppenfĂŒhrer and committed National Socialist, having been a Hitler loyalist from the movementâs earliest days. In an exchange with Himmler in October 1941 about SS members working for the OT, he argued that about seventy such SS officers should keep the field-grey uniforms worn by the Waffen-SS, âfor I have always considered it right that it should be indicated by means of the uniform, also, that the OTâs leadership developed strongly from party structuresâ.21 The OT became a...