Justifying War

Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry

Richard Norton-Taylor

• Publisher: Oberon Books
• Year: 2015
• Print ISBN: 9781840024173
• eBook ISBN: 9781783192892
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Literature
• Subtopic: British Drama
• Index: Literature

"It usually begins as a play put on at a theatre in North London, and then transfers to I think the BBC, maybe in this case to ITV, I do not know. But the participants and witnesses are played by actors; and there is nothing one can do to stop this. Indeed, it shows, perhaps, the appetite, legitimate appetite of the public, for information beyond the press, beyond the bare written words of what happened." (The Hutton Inquiry, 1/8/03, from Geoffrey Robertson QC's application for the proceedings to be televised)
Although primarily focusing on Dr Kelly's death, the Hutton Inquiry has revealed much of the inner workings of Downing Street, the MoD and the BBC. Witnesses have been challenged and questioned on the compilation of the dossier on weapons of mass destruction, the releasing of Dr Kelly's name into the public domain, and the Government's case for war in Iraq.
Justifying War - Scenes from the Hutton Inquiry opened at the Tricycle Theatre, London on 30th October 2003.

Producer’s Note

Lord Hutton’s Inquiry into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr David Kelly sat for 25 days and heard from 75 witnesses. These edited transcripts are taken from the evidence of 12 witnesses in the first part of the Inquiry.

The evidence is presented chronologically, with the exception of that of Dr Jones. He gave his evidence two days after Mrs Kelly. It is presented here before her evidence. Of the witnesses we have chosen, all but five (W atts, Blitz, Mackinlay, Mrs Kelly and Dr Jones) were recalled for cross-examination in part 2 of the Inquiry.

The main purpose of the second part was to allow the earlier evidence to be tested in cross-examination by opposing counsel representing the Government – both ministers and officials – Dr Kelly’s family, and the BBC and to be questioned further by counsel for the Inquiry itself.

Lord Hutton is expected to present his report to the Government in the New Year.

The text in square brackets indicates an addition [made for
clarification purposes] to the original hearing script.

The following text was correct at the time of going to press.

USHER: Ladies and gentleman, could you please switch off your mobile phones.

Silence. All rise.

Opening Statement by Lord Hutton,
1st August 2003

HUTTON: This Inquiry relates to a very tragic death. Therefore, ladies and gentlemen, I think it would be fitting if we stood for a minute’s silence in memory of Dr Kelly. My terms of reference are these: ‘Urgently to conduct an investigation into the circumstances surrounding the death of Dr Kelly.’ First of all, my primary task is to investigate the circumstances surrounding the death and that will involve a detailed and careful examination of the relevant facts. Secondly, my terms of reference require me to conduct the investigation urgently, and that means I must proceed with expedition. Thirdly, I must ensure that the procedures at the Inquiry are fair to those who give evidence. It is also important that I should emphasise that this is an Inquiry to be conducted by me – it is not a trial conducted between interested parties who have conflicting cases to advance. I do not sit to decide between conflicting cases – I sit to investigate the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly’s death.

Patrick Lamb, 11th August 2003

DINGEMANS: While we are waiting we might as well get have DOS 1/55. Mr Lamb, could you tell his Lordship your full name?

LAMB: My full name is Patrick Lamb.

DINGEMANS: And what is your current occupation?

LAMB: I am presently the deputy head of the Counter Proliferation Department in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. I worked very closely with David Kelly.

DINGEMANS: Can I deal with the dossier. Now I think you have disclosed that Dr Kelly was involved in April 2002 in the first draft.

LAMB: Correct.

DINGEMANS: Was he involved in the May additions?

LAMB: Yes, he was. At all times we would show the text to David and we would very much rely on his expertise and knowledge, as the source and person who could verify the accuracy of what we were producing.

DINGEMANS: That was because of his involvement in the UNSCOM inspections?

LAMB: Very much so. He obviously had direct involvement. Often, I can recall, if I had to make a choice between a textual choice and Dr Kelly, I would often back Dr Kelly ahead of the textual source

DINGEMANS: But it appears that David Kelly had further involvement, is that right?

LAMB: He had further involvement through me, which is that after the decision by the Prime Minister on 3rd September that there would be a public dossier there was obviously a revision of the constituent parts. Our relationship with Dr Kelly was a very easy one, a very relaxed one; and when he came into the department we would, as a matter of course show him drafts if drafts were available and we would discuss them with him. This was, as I say, on an informal basis.

DINGEMANS: Looking at the contents page [of the dossier], those bits of the chapter that you, in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, would have discussed, if I can use that term, I hope fairly, with Dr Kelly would be part 2, History of UN Weapons Inspection and chapter 3, The Current Position; is that right?

LAMB: That would be correct. I would add, however, there is also part 3, Iraq Under Saddam Hussein, which became known, informally at least, to those of us involved in the Cabinet Office meetings, as the human rights element of the dossier. There we would have discussed that also with Dr Kelly.

HUTTON: Can I just ask you Mr Lamb on part 2 of the September dossier Dr Kelly would have commented on that, he did not actually write it, he commented on it, but he actually wrote, did he, the first draft of the box on page 38?

LAMB: He would have written what eventually became the first draft in the box on page 38. He also contributed in particular on pages 11 and 12 that relate to the chemical weapons and biological weapons agents developed by Iraq, their lethality and so on; and obviously he acted as technical adviser in that respect.

HUTTON: Yes; but when you say ‘contributed’, do you mean that he made comments on a draft that you or someone else had written or that he wrote it himself?

LAMB: With respect to Iraq’s biological weapons programme, he wrote that himself.

HUTTON: I see, yes. Thank you very much.

DINGEMANS: Is that all that you can help with on the drafting of the dossier, from your point of view?

LAMB: I believe that it is, sir, yes. We worked extremely well in a very happy manner in many respects. It was not a labour of love, it was something we thought was extremely important, continue to believe to be extremely important. I am only very saddened that that happy atmosphere has the shadow of Dr Kelly’s death hanging over it.

Andrew Gilligan, 12th August 2003

DINGEMANS: Can you tell his Lordship your full name?

GILLIGAN: Yes, it is Andrew Paul Gilligan. I am the defence and diplomatic correspondent of the Today Programme on Radio 4.

DINGEMANS: Can you tell us when you first met Dr Kelly?

GILLIGAN: Yes, it was in the early months of 2001. I cannot tell you exactly when because I have lost my appointments diary for that year but it was probably in January or February. I was going to Iraq and I wanted to speak to him to discuss, you know, Iraqi related issues with him.

DINGEMANS: How had you come on his name?

GILLIGAN: He had been initially recommended to me by a colleague at the BBC, and I had then found his details in fact in our central contacts database. There is a sort of potted biography of him and it starts by saying: ‘If David Kelly were a tax inspector he would recoup Britain’s entire national debt.’

DINGEMANS: Did he describe his role in the dossier?

GILLIGAN: He did in outline terms. I said something like: what was your involvement? He said it was to advise on all claims relating to his expertise in the dossier.

DINGEMANS: And what did you understand his expertise to be?

GILLIGAN: Chemical and biological weapons. He had spent a great deal of time in Iraq. He was pretty close to the subject.

DINGEMANS: What view did he convey to you of the Iraqi regime?

GILLIGAN: He was extremely suspicious of them; and I mean he had been involved in many confrontations with them when he was an UNSCOM inspector.

DINGEMANS: Who was responsible for the meeting on 22nd May? Did you contact him or did he contact you?

GILLIGAN: No, I contacted him.

DINGEMANS: Can I take you to diary entry BBC/7/55? You have written 4 o’clock. Did you actually meet at 4 o’clock or could it have been afterwards?

GILLIGAN: I was slightly, you know, maybe 10 or 15 minutes late. He was waiting when I got there.

DINGEMANS: I think you have seen his evidence where he said the meeting was at 5. Does that accord with your recollection?

GILLIGAN: No, I think it was at 4. It was certainly fixed for 4 and then I went on to something else; and I am pretty sure, you know, it would not have started later than about 4.10 or 4.15. I have a drinks receipt, I bought drinks for us.

DINGEMANS: We will come to that. Can we turn to BBC/ 7/56. You did not have something to eat [at] this time?

GILLIGAN: I do not think so. We might have had some sandwiches or more drinks but that is the only thing I can find.

DINGEMANS: That shows a bottle of Coke and a bottle of Appletize. Can you help me with the time on that?

GILLIGAN: That says 4.15, 16.15. That is the time I went to the bar to buy the drinks.

DINGEMANS: You still have this receipt because I imagine you put this through the BBC accounts, do you?

GILLIGAN: Yes, I need to claim it back for expenses.

DINGEMANS: The notes you made on 22nd May 2003, were those made with a pen and pencil or with some other means?

GILLIGAN: They were made on my personal organiser.

DINGEMANS: Can we turn to BBC/7/57? This is the printout from your personal organiser?

GILLIGAN: Yes.

DINGEMANS: Yes, just reading the note through, if that is alright.

GILLIGAN: ‘Transformed week before publication to make it sexier. The classic was the 45 minutes. Most things in dossier were double source but that was single source. Most people in intelligence weren’t happy with it because it didn’t reflect the considered view they were putting forward. ‘Campbell: real information but unreliable, included against our wishes. Not in original draft – dull, he asked if anything else could go in. ‘It was small…’, this is the programme, I think. ‘It was small because you could not conceal a large programme.’ I cannot read it, the type is a bit faint.

HUTTON: It looks like ‘thin’. Is it ‘I think’?

GILLIGAN: ’I think it is 30 per cent likely that Iraq had an active chemical warfare programme?

HUTTON: Is it ‘chemical warfare’ or ‘chemical weapons’?

GILLIGAN: Either really. We started by talking about other things and then we got on to the dossier; and I said: What happened to it? When we last met you were saying it was not very exciting. He said: ‘It was transformed in the week before publication’. I said: To make it sexier? And he said: Yes, to make it sexier. Then I said: What do you mean? Can you give me some examples? And he said the classic – he did not use the word example, he said the classic was the 45 minutes, the statement that WMD could be ready in 45 minutes.

DINGEMANS: Then there is the entry which is just a single word, ‘Campbell’. Was there any question that gave rise to that entry?

GILLIGAN: Yes, it was something like: how did this transformation happen?

DINGEMANS: Right.

GILLIGAN: And then the answer w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright
• Contents
• Characters
• Original Production
• Producer’s Note
• For Further Reading