China's Foreign Policy in the Arab World, 1955-75

Three case studies

Hashim S.H. Behbehani

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN:
  9781138925489
• eBook ISBN:
  9781000156164
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Economic Theory
• Index: Economics

China's foreign policy in the Arab world is important because it reflects China's general foreign policy. In this study, first published in 1981, the author draws upon a wealth of previously unpublished and inaccessible material to analyse Chinese attitudes in three cases: the two Arab liberation movements, the Palestine Resistance Movement and the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Oman, and the established and independent State of Kuwait. Since the Arab liberation movements played a significant political role within their fields of operation, it was necessary for China to decide whether these movements did actually fit in with Chinese foreign policy objectives. Dr Behbehani's analysis of these two case studies provides the basis for a discussion of whether China's motives in supporting the liberation movements are theoretical or purely practical. China's support for Kuwait's political internal continuity is related to the stability of the whole Gulf region. The author analyses Chinese support for Kuwait and the surrounding conservative states on two main bases, political and economic, in the form of trade. It is through these channels, particularly the economic one, that China has sought to establish itself in the Gulf and the Arabian peninsula.

Chapter 1

China and the Arab world

China’s foreign policy towards the Arab world is here dealt with in three separate, distinct, but complementary phases (1955–66; 1967–70; 1970–5). The first deals with issues of foreign policy which emerged after independence in 1949 until the early 1960s, although by 1959 Chinese leaders had set a course for a foreign policy independent of that of the USSR, whose role and prestige in the communist bloc had previously dominated all communist bloc foreign policies. Immediately after the establishment of the People’s Republic of China (PRC), the new regime was confronted with one of the most serious military operations in the history of the emerging state. The Korean War, in 1950, though it was by no means wanted by China, actually enhanced the People’s Republic’s prestige in the world as a whole, and particularly within the communist bloc. Security in Manchuria, as its most important heavy industrial area, was essential to China. Since North Korea had a common border with Manchuria, it was important that the North Korean regime be sympathetic to, and preferably under the influence of, the Chinese regime. Thus China had to face directly the most formidable nation in the world, and its troops found themselves in direct confrontation with American forces on the battlefield. China’s ability to withstand American might was very important to the survival of the regime. Moreover, it is important to remember that although the USSR supplied a limited quantity of arms to its allies, the Soviet role in the conflict was only secondary. This confirmed China’s fears concerning the limited extent to which the Soviet leadership was willing to intervene actively on the side of its communist allies.

After the stalemate in Korea, and once China’s borders were secure in that area, attention was diverted to Indo-China, where France was facing insurmountable difficulties, particularly in Vietnam. The Geneva Peace Conference from 27 April to 15 June 1954¹ had originally been convened to discuss the unification of Korea; but it failed to accomplish this task and, taking place shortly after the Viet Minh victory at Dien Bien Phu, only succeeded in temporarily halting the war in Indo-China. Shortly after this, China once again got involved in a problem which was considered central to its basic foreign policy objectives: in September 1954, it shelled Quemoy, an island off the coast of China held by the Republic of China (Taiwan). Though China failed to liberate Taiwan, this had apparently not been its immediate objective. Rather, the whole affair had been aimed at following a ‘tit for tat’ policy against ‘US imperialism’, and brought about two developments. On the one hand, Taiwan signed a Mutual Defence Treaty with the USA, thus adding a new element to the USA’s intensification of the cold war policy of ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Dedication
• Table of Contents
• Illustrations
• Abbreviations
• Note on transliteration and sources
• 1 China and the Arab world
• 2 Sino-Palestinian relations 1955–66
• 3 The 1967 June War and its aftermath: developments in the Palestine Resistance Movement
• 4 Black September and its aftermath
• 5 Turning point in Sino-Palestinian relations
• 6 Brief history of the Liberation Movement in Oman
• 7 China’s attitudes to, involvement in, and withdrawal from, the Omani War, 1955–75
• 8 China and Kuwait
• Conclusion
• Appendix 1 Fatah military study on China
• Appendix 2 Arab Labour Party of Oman’s study on the historical development of Oman
• Appendix 3 PFLOAG: internal directives
• Appendix 4 Minutes of talks
• Appendix 5 Sino-Arab delegation exchanges, 1956–75
• Appendix 6 Sino-Arab trade, cultural, and friendship treaties and agreements 1955–75
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index