Divine and Human Providence

Philosophical, Psychological and Theological Approaches

Ignacio Silva, Simon Kopf, Ignacio Silva, Simon Kopf

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9781000227321
• Edition: 1
• Topic: Teologia e religione
• Subtopic: Religione e scienza

This volume offers an original perspective on divine providence by examining philosophical, psychological, and theological perspectives on human providence as exhibited in virtuous human behaviours. Divine providence is one of the most pressing issues in analytic theology and philosophy of religion today, especially in view of scientific evidence for a natural world full of indeterminacies and contingencies. Therefore, we need new ways to understand and explain the relations of divine providence and creaturely action.

The volume is structured dynamically, going from chapters on human providence to those on divine providence, and back. Drawing on insights from virtue ethics, psychology and cognitive science, the philosophy of providence in the face of contingent events, and the theology of grace, each chapter contributes to an original overall perspective: that human providential action is a resource suited specifically to personal action and hence related to the purported providential action of a personal God.

By putting forward a fresh take on divine providence, this book enters new territory on an age-old issue. It will therefore be of great interest to scholars of theology and philosophy.

1 Prudence and human providence

Love and wisdom

Craig A. Boyd

Introduction

In J.R.R. Tolkien’s monumental work, The Lord of the Rings,¹ some characters are specially designated ‘The Wise.’ These individuals include Elrond – an immortal Elf – and Gandalf the Grey – one of the wizards sent to Middle-earth to help humans, elves, and hobbits against the powers of evil. Gandalf’s peculiar virtue consists of a constellation of features including prudence, humility, wisdom, an over-arching orientation to the good, and care for even the most vulnerable creatures. These qualities help him to see into various relationships and the potential outcomes of complicated situations for the purpose of facilitating his providential care for others.

At one point, early on in the narrative, Frodo – the Hobbit tasked with destroying the Ring of Power – expresses his frustration at his uncle Bilbo’s failure to kill the wicked creature Gollum who had tried to kill Bilbo. Frodo exclaims, “at any rate, he is as bad as an Orc, and just an enemy. He deserves death.” Gandalf responds by saying, “deserves it! I daresay he does. Many that live deserve death. And some that die deserve life. Can you give it to them? Then do not be too eager to deal out death in judgment. For even the very wise cannot see all ends.”² Gandalf’s caution in killing – and his warning about desiring the death of another creature – reflects his own love of the good and his care for others. It also tacitly serves as an indication of Gandalf’s own approach to shaping the course of future events – i.e., human providence. As a person with limited knowledge of what may or may not happen, Gandalf is keenly aware of his own limitations and thinks that willing the good for another (or at least not willing the evil) is a wise course of action. He also notes, however, that even wise people do not ‘see all.’ This is obviously a reflection on the contingency of mortal affairs and the limitations of human knowledge. The virtue concerned with these things is, according to the virtue ethics exemplified by Thomas Aquinas, prudence. On his view, prudence is tied etymologically with providentia – or porro videns – ‘to look ahead.’ He says, “prudens dicitur quasi porro videns; perspicax enim est, et incertorum casus” – “the prudent person is said to be able to look ahead because he can foresee uncertainties.”³ And this is what prudence does; it looks ahead, it anticipates what might happen. In most discussions of prudence, the emphasis is on ‘the looking ahead’ and the process of deliberation, and not as much on the reason for the action. Yet, without a sufficiently good end intended, what the agent does cannot be understood as prudent. Prudence requires both knowledge of the real and desire for the good. In this respect, providence functions as the particular instantiation of the prudent person. It is, in a sense, ‘prudence in action.’

In this chapter I consider how human providence has a distinctly moral feature that extends beyond the merely calculative aspect of the clever to the genuinely loving care that the good person offers others. The person who possesses human providence not only ‘looks ahead’: she also has an appropriately well-ordered desire for the good. More specifically, human providence is a kind of deliberate care for the vulnerable. I begin with a brief treatment of Aquinas’ views on prudence and then move on to how his ideas can be incorporated into a more complete account of human providence that attends specifically to care for the vulnerable. Aquinas’ account of prudence serves as a general framework for what prudence is and how it functions. But I also employ Alasdair MacIntyre’s understanding of practical rationality and its concern with who we are as vulnerable (that is, dependent) rational animals.⁴ Throughout the chapter I employ Tolkien’s Gandalf as an exemplar of human prudence⁵ and providential care for the vulnerable.⁶

Prudence

It was Aristotle who famously listed the five intellectual virtues: wisdom, science, understanding, art, and prudence.⁷ An intellectual virtue was a good habit of thinking; and the intellectual habits of the speculative intellect were wisdom, understanding, and science. The intellectual virtues of the practical intellect were art and prudence. Central to his definitions of science, art, and prudence was the idea of right reason. Science was ‘right reasoning about things to be known’ (recta ratio scibilium). Art was ‘right reasoning about things to be made’ (recta ratio factibilium). And prudence was ‘right reasoning about things to be done’ (recta ratio agibilium). However, simply being able to ‘reason well,’ – in a generic sense of reasoning – does not mean that a person is able to ‘act well’ (in a moral sense). Something more is required. Like Aristotle, Aquinas says that a person might possess the intellectual virtues without possessing the moral virtues.⁸ This idea leads us to one of those intellectual virtues that persons must have not only in order to think well but also to act well. And this is the role of prudence, which is chief among the moral virtues.

The distinctions among science, art, and prudence are important. Science is right thinking about things that we do not (i.e., cannot) act upon. That is, science is about ‘inoperables.’ Art, in contrast, is right thinking about things that we make. It is a kind of right thinking that manifests itself in an external object of some kind. Prudence, finally, is about correct thinking concerning our actions. One way in which Aristotle considers virtue more generally, and prudence more specifically, is in terms of orthos logos.⁹ And Aquinas states explicitly that prudence is “right reasoning about things to be done.”¹⁰ The prudent person not only thinks well but also acts well. In fact, Thomas says that one need not possess the intellectual virtues (apart from prudence) in order to be good.¹¹ For example, wisdom is a good quality to possess, but it does not guarantee moral goodness. A person can have prudence without having wisdom. Conversely, a person can have wisdom without having prudence. It is better to have prudence than wisdom, but it is better – all things considered – to have both. And since prudence concerns human activity, its subject matter will vary considerably.

This variability is an important feature of right thinking about action. As Aristotle notes, the precision of any discipline or activity is determined by its subject matter.¹² And since human actions are widely variable, prudence must adapt to these conditions. Nevertheless, when we consider the nature of human action, we must consider two important factors: (1) the contingency of human actions, and (2) the necessary limitations on human knowledge.

The contingency of human actions includes a wide array of factors, namely times, places, methods, customs, and the activities of other agents. Unlike divine providence, Thomas notes that “human providence does not extend to necessary things.”¹³ The radical contingency of human affairs makes deliberation concerning how to proceed in any given situation difficult because other agents are also acting, and because other unforeseen factors can alter the outcome of any given course of action. Consider, for example, O. Henry’s short story, “The Gift of the Magi.” At Christmas time, a newly married couple considers what each one might buy for the other. The wife, who has beautiful long hair, decides to buy a chain for her husband’s pocket watch. So she cuts her long tresses and sells them in order to get money to purchase the chain. On his part, the husband has decided to sell his pocket watch in order to buy expensive combs for her beautiful long hair. Prudence can have a difficult time accounting for the variability of other agent’s activities.

Moreover, in addition to the contingency of human activity, a wise person will also acknowledge the limitations of knowledge. Aquinas wisely notes that

it is because human reason cannot grasp the infinity of individuals that our counsels are uncertain, as Wisdom says. Even so, human experience can resolve them into some definition according to what happens in the majority of cases, knowing which is enough for human prudence.¹⁴

The ‘majority of cases’ is an acknowledgement that, as Gandalf observes, “Even the very wise cannot see all ends.” There is a necessary epistemic humility in every act of human prudence, and this is simply because our knowledge is not complete. Charles W. Nelson notes Gandalf’s awareness of his limited knowledge and reach. He writes, “it is a recurring theme in Tolkien that his good characters possess the virtue of humility to such an extent that they are all cognizant of their abilities, but more importantly of their inabilities.”¹⁵ But even so, there is hope that reason can come to some understanding of what should be done most of the time, and this hope is derived from a variety of elements.

For Aquinas, reasoning rightly means that the prudent person needs to gather knowledge and use it well. We need a good memory of what has happened in the past. We need insight into moral first principles that guide us to a morally good end. We need docility so that we can learn from others and their insights. We must have acumen in order to judge quickly in sudden situations. A prudent person needs also to reason well and possess providence. And finally, we need circumspection and caution in acting. These eight qualities form the list of qualities or “component parts” of prudence.¹⁶ Among these elements ...