A Guide to Hazard Identification Methods

Frank Crawley

• Publisher: Elsevier
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9780128195437
• eBook ISBN: 9780128223093
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Chemical & Biochemical Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

A Guide to Hazard Identification Methods, Second Edition provides a description and examples of the most common techniques leading to a safer and more reliable chemical process industry. This new edition revises previous sections with up-to-date, linked sources. Furthermore, new elements include a more detailed account of purpose, Black Swan events, human factors, auditing and QA, more examples and a discussion of major incidents, HAZID and task analysis. - Outlines HAZOP - a tried and tested technique - Discusses HAZID - a newer technique which has not been adequately described elsewhere - Includes eight new techniques not in first edition - Illustrates each tool with practical examples - Shows how many techniques are used under the larger umbrella of hazard identification

1

Regulatory framework

Synopsis

This chapter is an attempt to introduce the regulatory framework in both United Kingdom and European Union as a means to illustrating the detail that is required to satisfy the Regulations.

Keywords

Regulatory framework; Chemical Industry; Society; Regulations; European Union system; Safety Acts

Chapter outline

• 1.1 Overview
• 1.2 Background
  • Background in United Kingdom
  • Evolution European Union
• 1.3 Features of Seveso III Directive
  • Land-use planning
  • Other areas
• Appendix
• References

1.1 Overview

Society is subject to rules and there is no difference for industry. This chapter gives a brief review of the rules or Regulations by which the Chemical Industry must operate and links these into the various chapters within this Monograph. It concentrates on the United Kingdom, working within the European Union system.

There are many accounts covering the rules of different non-European Union different Nations or States. These must be understood fully and followed. Therefore, each nation or state within a nation must use the rules appropriate to that nation or state.

1.2 Background

The development of chemical and petrochemical manufacturing in the post Second World War era has led to a global expansion of production and storage facilities. For example, the size of olefin plants between 1948 and 1968 was doubling every 7 or 8 years, while the site footprint had hardly changed. New processes such as the direct oxidation of ethylene with pure oxygen were developed and many novel processes, particularly in the pharmaceutical industry, were brought on-line. These facilities introduced new hazards into communities and neighbourhoods which required regulation.

In general the historic legal framework was reactive, not anticipative, although newer frameworks have tended to be more anticipative.

The first ‘Safety Acts’ go back over 150 years with the regulation of chemical process safety becoming more established since the 1970s. Various reasons exist for the promulgation of the different regulations with one of the main initiators of new regulations or changes in existing regulations being the occurrence of major accidents with serious consequences either for the safety of employees, the neighbourhood or the environment.

Within United Kingdom there are some differences of approach to regulation within the component countries of the United Kingdom as a result of ancient Acts passed many years ago [1, 2, 3, 4]. Thus in the United Kingdom there is Environmental Agency, whilst in Scotland there is the Scottish Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA).

It is self-evident that the regulations require to be policed requiring a Regulator or Competent Authority with means of enforcement supplied by overarching Acts.

Background in United Kingdom

The regulation of major accident hazards within the United Kingdom has its roots within the report of the Robens’ Committee in 1972 [5]. This identified that ‘major hazards’ associated with technology present a particular problem, and recommended comprehensive provisions to deal with toxic, explosive and flammable substances be adopted. To this end the creation of a major hazards branch within the new inspectorate (i.e. Health and Safety Executive) was recommended, as was the establishment of a Standing Advisory Committee on Major Hazards (ACMH). The ACMH being given the remit to identify types of installations which have the potential to pose a major hazard and to advice on measures of control. One of the recommendations of ACMH (ACMH III) was ‘Land Use Planning’. However before the resulting regulation from the Robens’ Report, the Health and Safety at Work Act [6] could take effect, one of the worst accidents in British chemical processing history, the explosion and fire at Flixborough, occurred on 1 June 1974.

The sequence of major Regulations within the United Kingdom under HASWA has been:

• • 1978 The publication of the Hazardous Installations (Notification and Survey Regulations) [7] as a consultative document in line with the Health and Safety Commission's duty to consult under the terms of the HASAW Act.
• • 1983 Notification of Installations Handling Hazardous Substances (NIHSS) Regulations 1982 [8].
• • 1984 RIDDOR Regulations (Reporting of Injuries, Deaths and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations).
• • 1984 Control of Industrial Major Accident Hazards (CIMAH) Regulations (1984) [9] implementing EEC Directive 82/501/EEC.

In many ways the United Kingdom has led the European Union in Process Safety and uses a structure at four levels:

• The Act
• The Regulation—or Statutory Instrument (empowered by the Act)
• The Approved Code of Practice (what is expected)
• Guidance Notes

Evolution European Union

Following an accident at a chemical facility in Italy a cloud of ca. 10 tonnes of chemicals, including an estimated 1–2 kg TCDD (dioxane), was released over the neighbouring town, Seveso. The name of the town has been adopted for the major European Union regulations. Hence ‘Seveso Directive 1’ and two updates following further incidents. The concept of two tiers of application was kept in both Seveso II and the current Seveso III Directive.

Member States were required to ensure that the lower-tier establishments provide notification to the competent authorities, fulfil the general duty of safe operation to prevent major accidents and that the operator established a major accident prevention policy (MAPP). The MAPP was the basis for the management of safety at Seveso III establishments.

The dangerous substances in the Seveso II Directive were primarily covered in ten generic categories related to acute toxic, flammable, explosive or environmental hazard properties. In addition the Commission proposed a very much shorter list of named substances than included in the original Seveso Directive. These are generally substances, which have a very widespread use in large quantities, are substances of particular concern or are of particular economic importance where a very low threshold level would cause an extremely large number of sites to be covered by the Directive.

1.3 Features of Seveso III Directive

The Seveso III Directive [10] places requirements on the Member States of the European Union to set national regulations for operators and for the competent authorities which enforce the national legislation and implement the requirements of the Directive. The requirements may be described as follows:

Scope and definitions: Application of the Directive is to ‘establishments’ in which sufficient quantities of dangerous substances are present or may be present. This may involve adding the various components in a multiprocess site. Activities, which are excluded from the scope, are those covering military installations and facilities; hazards due to ionising radiation; the transportation of dangerous chemicals and their immediate activities, marshalling yards, docks, wharves; waste land fill sites (excluding tailings ponds and dams); mineral extraction activities; offshore mineral and hydrocarbon extraction.

General requirements: Operators are to be required to show that they have taken all measures necessary to prevent the occurrence of major accidents and to limit their effects to man and the environment. Further, an operator should be able to prove to the competent authorities, at any time, that these measures have been taken. (See Chapters 3–57, 15, 16, 17 and 19.)

Notification: Operators are to be required to notify the competent authorities of their existence, the hazardous substances involved, the activity, the person in charge of the establishment. This information is to be provided prior to commencing the activity and with any significant change, including closure of the establishment (see the ‘Safety Report’ later).

Major Accident Prevention Policy (MAPP): The operator is to be required to provide a written document setting out the policy for the prevention of major accidents and to ensure that it is properly implemented and guaranteed a high level of protection for man and the environment by appropriate means, structures and management systems. These means can be reviewed or examined by the methods outlined in Chapters 3–5 and in particular Task Analysis (Chapter 6). Audits (Chapter 17) then gives guidance on examination of these for weaknesses or systematic drift in standard.

Safety Management System (SMS): The operator is required to establish a Safety Management System in accordanc...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• Foreword
• Acknowledgements
• Acronyms and abbreviations
• 1: Regulatory framework
• 2: A guide to Hazard Identification Methods
• 3: Hazard Studies
• 4: Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)
• 5: HAZID
• 6: Task analysis
• 7: Layer of Protection Analysis (LOPA)
• 8: Relative ranking
• 9: The risk analysis screening tool (RAST)
• 10: Checklists
• 11: What if?
• 12: Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA) and failure modes, effects and criticality analysis (FMECA)
• 13: Fault tree analysis
• 14: Event tree analysis
• 15: Risk assessment
• 16: Vulnerability
• 17: Safety audits
• 18: Bow-tie diagrams
• 19: Process hazard review (PHR)
• Appendices
• Appendix A: An example of hazard studies during a modification used in a nonchemical environment
• Appendix B: Example of application of hazard identification techniques during the life cycle of a large continuous process
• Appendix C: Example of application of hazard identification techniques during the life cycle of a batch process
• Index