British Politics

The Basics

Bill Jones

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• ISBN:
  9780429576591
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Politics
• Index: Politics & International Relations

Fully updated and expanded, the second edition of this still compact text on British politics expertly analyses the major changes in British political life, placing them revealingly within the context of the evolution of British society from absolute monarchy to representative democracy.

The author considers each of the major components of British politics in digestible chapters, such as the Monarchy and the House of Lords, the Commons, voting behaviour, parties and pressure groups, the prime minister and cabinet, devolution, local government, and foreign policy. The book includes two new chapters on the EU referendum and Brexit, and the extraordinary December 2019 election, as well as coverage of events such as the coronavirus pandemic, and the respective travails of the increasingly split two major political parties.

This readable and comprehensive introduction will be of key interest to A-level students, undergraduates and those new to the study of British politics.

PART I

INTRODUCTION

1

British politics in flux

What’s interesting is we’ve moved more to a politics of identity than a politics of the economy.

(George Osborne’s bemused yet accurate reflection in the wake of the Referendum result (Independent, 17 December 2016))

Since the first edition of this book was published in 2016, British politics has experienced so much political turbulence that many of its perceived constants have fragmented or even disappeared to be replaced by new features. My final chapter in the first edition charted the negative trends which had been apparent for some years: declining turnout; increasing lack of trust in politicians and our institutions; the repercussions of the worldwide economic meltdown 2008–09; and the unexpected 2015 Tory election victory.

Since then we’ve had the pivotal Referendum result on 23 June 2016; the shock general election which so weakened Theresa May in June 2017; and finally the historic 2019 election which routed Corbyn’s Labour Party and returned Boris Johnson with a substantial majority and the prospect of five, possibly ten years in power. Andy Beckett writes of US and UK politics during these years being characterised by:

Hung parliaments; rightwing populists in power; physical attacks on politicians; Russian influence on western elections; elderly leftists galvanising young Britons and Americans; rich, rightwing leaders in both countries captivating working-class voters – scenarios close to unimaginable a decade ago have become familiar, almost expected.

Not since the 1970s had there been a decade containing ‘two general elections, a referendum about Europe, fears for the environment, a rising threat of political violence and a pervasive sense of foreboding’ (Beckett, 2019).

Then, just as the intractable divisions created by Brexit seemed less intense after Britain left the European Union (EU) at the end of January 2020, along came the coronavirus, which, ironically perhaps, succeeded in finally uniting the whole country in its attempts to resist and overcome the pandemic. This opening chapter seeks to update and delve a little deeper into these extraordinary crises and upheavals plus give consideration to their possible causes and implications.

MPs’ expenses claims – a watershed moment?

In May 2008 the High Court ruled in favour of a Freedom of Information request into expense claims by UK members of parliament. The Daily Telegraph acquired access to all the details of expenses claims and, correctly judging this was a potentially sensational story, carefully issued it in discrete sections, revealing the extraordinary claims being made. The most lucrative ‘scam’ utilised was ‘flipping’ homes. Members of Parliament (MPs) were allowed to claim expenses on the second home they needed for their work in the London-based legislature. By re-nominating second homes they were able claim expenses, including mortgage payments and in several cases able to sell their homes, buy another and do the same thing once again. This enabled some MPs to manipulate their expense accounts to acquire considerable wealth: something unlikely to impress voters.

Other expenses included payment for everyday expenses – improvements, cleaning, making numerous claims below the £250 limit requiring receipts; and up to £400 a month for food. The public, hearing how their elected MPs could get them, the tax payers, to pay for things ordinary people had to fund themselves, were generally outraged. Both big parties offered examples of egregious claims – Labour’s Elliot Morley MP received a 16 month prison sentence for claiming for mortgage payments after the debt had been paid off!

In retrospect the public did not factor in the many calls for increases in MPs’ pay which had been turned down but offset by increases in expenses. Many MPs felt such claims were justified given their relatively low salaries compared with comparable UK professional occupations and other legislatures worldwide. Moreover, most MPs criticised had in reality acted within the limits of expenses rules. However, the regime, once exposed, appeared outrageously inappropriate and unfair to a public which had recently experienced a world financial meltdown and a resultant recession. Some politicians interviewed in the Emily Maitlis BBC programme (24 March 2019) on the scandal suggested the already thin degree of trust between government and people had catalysed the process which ultimately erupted in the June 2016 referendum vote. Maybe the decade of turbulence and crises began with this major loss of faith in our political class (see Beckett, 2019)?

Turbulence begins: the scottish referendum

The delegation of domestic powers to Scotland during the early years of Blair’s 1997 government was designed to satisfy desires for regional autonomy but its success seemed merely to encourage nationalist (Scottish Nationalist Party, SNP) sentiment north of the border. The referendum held in the autumn of 2014, would, in the words of SNP leader Alex Salmond, decide the issue of independence ‘for a generation’. The campaign, however, unleashed a bolt of nationalist political energy which anticipated events to come over the next three turbulent years. The SNP went on to lose the vote 55.3% to 44.7% but its acquired energy gathered strength for the party all over Scotland at all levels right up to the 2017 election and later the one in December 2019.

General election, 2015

After the five years of Tory–Lib Dem Coalition government, opinion polls, which had reflected early big Labour leads, settled on predicting another hung parliament with Ed Miliband probably emerging as prime minister (PM). Professor John Curtice’s BBC Exit Poll defied the pre-election polls and the results trickling in soon proved there would be no dead heat, so widely predicted it had almost been accepted in advance as a fact, but a small overall majority for David Cameron. For him this was a huge, unexpected victory. Maybe his offer of an EU membership referendum was responsible for his surprise victory?

When Miliband resigned, more signs of ‘turbulence’ appeared. Jeremy Corbyn, a veteran ‘hard-left’ Labour MP had scrabbled to accumulate the requisite 35 MP nominations, required by the rules, to stand in the leadership contest. So confident were the majority of ‘moderate’ MPs that he was bound to lose, some helped nominate the Islington MP on the democratic principle that his wing of the party should anyway be represented. Corbyn’s rousing unreconstructed socialism, surprisingly to many, struck a resonant note with older former Labour members who had left in disgust at Tony Blair’s New Labour and younger cohorts of young voters, now convinced the ‘centrist’ approach had failed and who yearned for a message of hope. As for David Cameron, his confidence could not have been higher at this time. He shared with an ecstatic 2015 party conference the following thoughts: “I really believe we’re on the brink of something special … We can make this era – these 2010s – a defining decade for our country … one which people will look back on and say: ‘That’s the time when the tide turned.’ ” (Beckett, 2019).

EU referendum, 23 June 2016

The 1975 in–out Referendum on UK membership of the then EEC, far from resolving attitudes towards the transnational body, merely stored up future discontents manifested in the run-up to the 1992 EU Maastricht Treaty which greatly extended its powers. The growth of the United Kingdom Independence Party’s (UKIP) ‘People’s Army’, led by the ebullient former City trader, Nigel Farage, had alerted Conservatives to the strong possibility that their Euro-sceptic voters might favour UKIP and thus deny them power in future elections. To prevent this, Cameron – against the advice of some of his closest advisers including George Osborne – offered that in–out referendum in his manifesto in 2013. Many thought he had done so in the expectation that the Liberal Democrats (Lib Dems), in another coalition, would prevent it ever happening. His victory, ironically, robbed him of such a veto but his Old Etonian confidence led him to believe that, as in the Scottish 2014 vote, his leadership of the Remain cause would reinforce the status quo.

The campaign became bitter as both sides used exaggeration and outright lies in their efforts to win the vote. Remain claimed, via a Treasury study, that leaving would cost each family an annual £4,300. Leave hired a bus emblazoned with the claim that membership of the EU cost the country £350 million a week. The figure was dismantled in the media and shown to be little more than half this sum but Leave denied its falsity and the bus continued to tour the country. Leave’s campaign strategist, Dominic Cummings, later claimed that without this exaggerated statistical ploy the campaign would not have been won. Leave advocates, like Liam Fox, reassured voters that leaving would be straightforward: the ‘easiest deal in human history’. Around the halfway mark Remain seemed to be winning the argument and Leave switched its emphasis squarely on to immigration. A poster showing crowds of immigrants queuing up for entry was likened to Goebbels’ 1930s propaganda and Leave claimed Remain would allow up to 70 million Turks into the country via the EU even though that country was not, and is unlikely to ever become, an EU member. On 24 June 2016 the result again over turned most of the poll predictions: Leave 51.9%, Remain 48.1%.

Analysis of the vote revealed that the older the voters the more likely they were to vote Leave – 60% of those 65+; 73% of 18–24 year olds voted Remain, also 66% of the 25–34 cohort. What type of people voted? A total of 57% of graduates voted Remain – 64% of postgraduates plus more than four in five of those in full-time education. Of those who left at school-leaving age, a large majority voted Leave. Predictably Conservatives voted 42–68 for Leave, Labour 63–37 for Remain, UKIP 4–96 for Leave, Lib Dem 64–36 Remain and Greens 75–25 Remain.

Cameron resigns

Despite having said he’d stay on as PM even if he lost the vote, his decision to go was probably wise as it would have been hard for a champion of Remain to lead the difficult process of implementing the nation’s verdict. Most commentators thought Boris Johnson might become PM with his close Leave campaign colleague, Michael Gove, as chancellor but on launch day the latter decided that after all, he did not think Boris was the man for the job, suggesting himself as a replacement. ‘He’s done the dirty on us mate’ was the grim reaction of Johnson’s Australian election strategist Lynton Crosby. Andrea Leadsom was left as the only Leave candidate. She sought to play up her status as a mother compared to the childless Theresa May but when this attracted adverse comment she withdrew, leaving May to accept what effectively became a coronation.

May in government: A ‘land grab’ for the centre ground?

In her acceptance speech on 13 July 2016 in front of Number 10, May was surprisingly ambitious. She talked about the people who had voted Leave through frustration and anger. She spoke about:

fighting against the burning injustice that, if you’re born poor, you will die on average 9 years earlier than others, if you’re black, you’re treated more harshly by the criminal justice system than if you’re white. If you’re a white, working-class boy, you’re less likely than anybody else in Britain to go to university. If you’re at a state school, you’re less likely to reach the top professions than if you’re educated privately. If you’re a woman, you will earn less than a man. If you suffer from mental health problems, there’s not enough help to hand. If you’re young, you’ll find it harder than ever before to own your own home. But the mission to make Britain a country that works for everyone means more than fighting these injustices.

This speech, which could just as easily have been written for a Labour PM, was a clear attempt to occupy the perceived holy grail in British politics – the ‘centre ground’ – where, it was widely believed, most elections are won or lost. Labour, it was argued, had failed to offer proper opposition to the government and was flailing in disarray under their new hard left leader, Jeremy Corbyn. It had in effect vacated the centre ground which was now up for grabs – hence May’s attempt at a ‘power grab’ on Labour territory. Early evidence, perhaps, of her desire to banish Labour to the periphery of UK politics.

The state-schooled May moved swiftly to place her stamp on the new government: George Osborne was summarily – some say ‘brutally’ – sacked as chancellor along with Michael Gove and most of Cameron’s other privately educated group of colleagues. Instead ministers were promoted with whom she had worked closely at the Home Office. She also startled the UK’s commentators by appointing the three leading Leave campaigners to senior cabinet posts in charge of the Brexit process: Boris Johnson as foreign secretary, David Davis as secretary for the ‘Department for Exiting the European Union’ (DxEU) and Liam Fox to International Trade (DIT). Finally, she moved into Downing Street as her joint chiefs of staff, her two Home Office aides, Nick Timothy and Fiona Hill. Both acted as effective but often feared, loathed and often scathingly rude aides, ruthlessly fighting for May’s interests throughout Whitehall.

‘Brexit means Brexit’

Ensconced in Number 10, May appeared rather opaque in her attitudes on Brexit, repeating the less than meaningful phrase ‘Brexit means Brexit’ time and again. In reality nobody knew what kind of severance from the EU the vote had implied and indeed vagueness over this question dogged the negotiations throughout this vexed Brexit dominated period. MPs were divided on both sides of the aisle. Some – Remainers and moderate ‘Leavers’ – preferred a ‘soft’ Brexit, as closely aligned as possible with the status quo. Others, including moderate...