1.1. Introduction
Political turmoil and armed conflict have engulfed many parts of the Arab region for several years now, claiming hundreds of thousands of lives, destroying capital assets worth hundreds of billions and turning millions of its inhabitants into refugees. The human and economic costs of the conflict are still on the rise with no end yet in sight.
Analysis of the immediate causes of the conflict tends to blame a wide range of factors. Some even invoke complex conspiracies by outside powers, eager to loot the regionās wealth and spread their hegemony. However, although plots and conspiracies may have been the bread and butter of human history, what is glaringly obvious is a total lack of immunity possessed by large segments of Arab societies against them, whether imaginary or real. Devoid of such immunityānormally engendered by good governance, solid educational systems, plentiful employment opportunities, leading to uniform distribution of incomes and wealthāeven worse fates are possible.
In effect, disasters that unfolded in many Arab countries are firmly rooted in persistent failure to acquire, adapt, and implement knowledge for inclusive and sustainable socioeconomic development. On the other hand, acquiring, adapting, and implementing such knowledge would have to rest squarely on the above pillars; namely good governance, quality education as well as transparent economic and social transactions.1 In order to escape this chicken-and-egg conundrum, it is essential to encourage evolutionary processes in politics, economics as well as in scientific and technological knowledge that subvert vicious cycles, installing more benign ones in their place. For example, governance, both good and bad, requires that modern telecommunication capabilities are acquired and disseminated. Once available, such capabilities may be used to enhance the quality of education as well as access useful information on assembling and delivery of a variety of goods and services, driving a multitude of innovative enterprises while at the same time enhancing peopleās abilities to share crucial everyday information and organize to counter bad governance.
It is also likely that events of the current decade might convince policy makers to adopt alternative courses, opening wider possibilities for access to and implementation of knowledge, particularly knowledge linked to science, technology, and innovation (STI) capabilities in a manner that benefits all segments of society.
The current race by several Arab countries to set up their own knowledge economies is at least partly in response to some such notions. However, given goodwill and best intentions all round, trajectories toward establishing truly functional knowledge economies and societies are complicated by the fact that rentier practices have taken a firm hold during decades of misrule, inherited feudal values, and distorted legal and regulatory frameworks, thus engendering corruption and cronyism and negatively impacting publicāprivate collaboration. Additionally, crucial coordination between concerned national STI institutions, which are at any rate ill-equipped, inadequately funded, and often mismanaged, with the aim of tackling essential development problems is absent or at best incidental.
1.2. A Historical Perspective
Since their independence from colonial rule, toward the middle of the 20th century, development efforts in the Arab countries have mostly been directed toward institution and infrastructure building. Attempts were made as early as the 1950s to establish science councils. Scientific research centers came into being in many countries in the 1970s. Some of the countries even established ministries of state for technology, as well as ministries for telecommunications and technology. Higher commissions for scientific research were set up by several Arab countries under the auspices of the Council of Ministers. Many of these initiatives certainly did make their mark on the national STI landscape; however, for the most part, changes they were able to bring about were mostly cosmetic and palliative, rather than fundamental.
Reviews of scientific research and technological development activity undertaken in some of the worst hit Arab countries compared with other countries in the region and around the globe indicate meager progress over the past years for which statistics are available, even prior to the onset of hostilities they witnessed several years later. With regard to innovation and innovative activities undertaken for the benefit of enterprise and job creation, several reports issued by international bodies, notably, the World Economic Forum, also indicate that countries such as Syria, Iraq, Libya, and Yemen have, for a number of years, occupied a less than satisfactory position even in comparison with other developing countries.
This situation may not be entirely blamed on the lack of willāby concerned government institutions as well as the STI communityāto develop and implement viable STI initiatives. Indeed, as the following chapters will indicate, several attempts were made at relevant institution building by all Arab countries, particularly during the latter three decades of the past century and toward the beginning of the present century. Thus, many Arab countries, including Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, Jordan, Tunisia as well as Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, among the Arab Gulf countries, established research and development facilities in the 1970s. This led to research output, at least some of which eventually translated into significant gains for national development. An example of such developments is provided by the near self-sufficiency in agricultural produce achieved by Syria during much of the 1980s and 1990s. Success attained by this country owed a great deal to endogenous agricultural scientific research and technological development aided by international and regional research centers,2 as well as the creation of agricultural research stations by concerned government authorities. Nevertheless, several factors3 conspired to limit and redirect research and development efforts in this country toward less, even nonproductive domains. At any rate, national institutions involved in scientific, technological, and innovation activities suffered the same if not a higher degree of undue political intervention and corruption that many other institutions in the country had to cope with, thereby curtailing their independence and abilities to contribute to national development.
1.3. Toward a Better Future for Science, Technology, and Innovation in the Arab Countries
Capabilities in STI have assumed critical importance for all aspects of socioeconomic activity in the developed as well as developing countries. The Arab countries are no exception. As indicated later, particularly in Chapters 2 and 3, building knowledge economies aided by a host of advanced technologies appears to be a prime preoccupation for many in the Arab world. In this regard, and in order that future efforts lead to optimal outcomes, it is essential to consider the following points:
- ⢠Was STI capacity building progressing satisfactorily prior to the onset of the current turmoil?
- ⢠How might STI capacity building proceed in the shadow of rentier practices, attendant corruption and cronyism, widespread unemployment, and poverty?
- ⢠What kind of innovation systems and policies are needed in the immediate and near futures?
- ⢠Who else, beside governments, might facilitate STI capacity building?
Subsequent paragraphs in this chapter provide introductory comments while detailed consideration of the above questions is taken up in ensuing chapters.
1.3.1. STI Capacity Building Was Already Suffering Before the Current Turmoil
It is essential to note at the very outset that the roots to current problems in the region, with their heavy impact on STI capacity building, date back decades if not centuries earlier, imprinted by a series of historical events and deeply embedded in cultural systems that enshrine rentier practices. See Frame 1.1.
Even before the Arab uprisings, which resulted in stagnation on many fronts including innovation in many aspects of socioeconomic life, it was patently evident that innovative potential inherent in these countries and their populations was far from being fully realized. Thus, in comparison with several other developing countries around the wor...