The Boston Celtics of the National Basketball Association won NBA titles in 1959â66, 8 years in a row. They also won the title in 1968 and 1969. They were led by their 6â˛9âł Center, Bill Russell, a man considered the greatest defensive player in his or any time. But he hardly ever shot the ball more than 10 or 12 ft from the basket; he wasnât a good shooter. And, he wasnât very good at âfree throwsâ 15 ft from the basket. Most tall players of his day werenât good at either of those skills. The Celticsâ starting line-up was Russell, 6â˛9âł, K.C. Jones, point guard, 6â˛1âł, Sam Jones, shooting guard, 6â˛4âł, Tom Sanders, power forward, 6â˛6âł, and Tom Heinsohn, shooting forward, 6â˛6âł. Average height 6â˛5âł. Consider the current Golden State Warriors. They have won NBA championship is 2015, 2017 and 2018. Their starting line-up averages almost 6â˛7 1/2âł. Their 6â˛11âł center, and their 6â˛9âł shooting forward both shoot well from 25Ⲡto 30Ⲡfrom the basket. With the possible exception of their power forward, the other four starters all shoot âlights outâ from 25 to 30 ft. They are good âfree throwâ shooters.
Current NBA players are taller, in better physical condition, they jump higher, they run faster, and they âfly through the air with the greatest of ease,â spin around 360 degrees while in the air and jam the ball into the basket. There are 6â˛10âł point guards in todayâs NBA. Watch some NBA games from the late 1950s and the 1960s and if think that you are watching a high school basketball game then it would be understandable. The game is that different in 2019 from âback-in-the-day.â But regardless of how different it looks, the Celtics then, and the Golden State Warriors today are playing the same game: basketball. The Celtics were the best in their day: 10 championships in 11 years. Today, they probably would not make the playoffs.
Even when things look different, there are similarities among them. Basketball is basketball. And, behavioral economics is behavioral economics. The 1950s and 1960s version, âoldâ behavioral economics, may look different from the 1974â2019 version, ânewâ behavioral economics, just as the 1965 Celtics look different from the 2019 Golden State Warriors. But along with the rather obvious differences there are similarities. This book is about some of the obvious differences and some of the important similarities. Maybe more than this, this book will try to get more well-deserved recognition for those who came before the truly momentous years in the history of (behavioral) economics: 1974 and 1979.
I What this book is about and what it is not about
This book is about the pre-Kahneman and Tversky behavioral economists, and the relationship between their behavioral economics and that of the behavioral economics beginning with Kahneman and Tversky. These two groups are the âoldâ and ânewâ behavioral economics, respectively. Or, if you prefer, the first generation behavioral economics and the generations which came after. The âoldâ group includes Herbert Simon, George Katona, Harvey Leibenstein, who I refer to as the âbig 3â of the âoldâ group. It also includes Boulding, March, Cyert, Scitovsky, Shackle, Nelson, Winter, Duesenberry, Rheinhard Selten, and an early 20th century French Judge and sociologist Gabriel Tarde. Tarde is a forerunner of behavioral economics because he wrote about behavioral economics in the early years of the 20th century. The others are first gen behavioral economics because they started writing about it in the 1940s.
Paul Samuelson in 1949 wrote about the âsophisticated-anthropomorphic sin.â This âsinâ is not realizing that the content of those who came before is equivalent to those who came later because the earlier group does not use the same terminology or symbols as the later group. Equivalent is too strong a word in this case. But what I will try to show in this book is that the ideas and topics written about by the âoldâ group was also in the writings of the new behavioral economists, in substance if not in style.
One of the most important aspects, if not the most important aspect of their common interest/substance was to show that homo economicus was, to use a term used by Richard Thaler, a unicorn. So long as homo economicus, the unicorn, was the model human, behavioral economics would not exist. Homo economicus is a fully rational maximizer. His behavior is based on certain rules, similar with the way gravity âbehavesâ according to certain rules. He canât act in any other way because he does not have free will. Homo economicus is, therefore, a robot, a machine which acts according to the âsoftwareâ programs placed in its âhardware.â Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler wrote about the gap between full rationality and human rationality, but Katona, Simon, and Leibenstein wrote about this gap as much as 30 years before Kahneman, Tversky, and Thaler. The other first gens also wrote about this gap.
Below is a quote from each of Katona, Simon, and Leibenstein. The quotes indicate their research agenda. The quotes do not sound similar with the ânewâ behavioral economists. They do sound more the way economists wrote in the 1950s and 1960s.
Unlike pure theorists, we shall not assume at the outset that rational behavior exists or that rational behavior constitutes the topic of economic analysis. We shall study economic behavior as we find it
Katona (1951, p. 16).
âŚreplace the global rationality of economic man with a kind of rational behavior that is compatible with the access of information and the computational capacities that are actually possessed by organisms, including man, in the kinds of environments in which such organisms exist
Simon (1955, p. 99).
At the core of economics is the concept of efficiency. Microeconomic theory is concerned with allocative efficiency. Empirical evidence⌠suggests that⌠allocative efficiency is trivialâŚmicroeconomic theory focuses on allocative efficiency to the exclusion of other types of efficiencies that, in fact, are much more significant in many instances
Leibenstein (1966, p. 392).
The âoldâ group developed larger themes, they did not do experiments. The larger themes included the nature of human rationality and non-allocative efficiency. The new behavioral economists do experiments about the nature of human rationality, to name but one theme. Both the old and the new behavioral economists reject the characterization of human rationality being that of homo economicus. The styles of the âoldâ and the ânewâ differ from each other, but the substance, I assert, is very similar with respect to perhaps the most important topic in behavioral economics: the nature of human rationality.
This book is not a platform for whining. Whining is making a sad, often nasally sound, expressing discontent, disappointment or unhappiness. There will be no whining in this book. What would I whine about? First, an opinion piece published in the New York Times on February 11, 2001. The authors is Louis Uchitelle, the title, âSome Economists Call Behavior a Key.â The sentence which sent many behavioral economists of my age group, 55 in 2001, into a total tizzy was, âIn the histories of economics still to be written, the spring of 1994 will almost certainly be flagged as momentous. That is when⌠David Laibson⌠received his Ph.D. in economicsâ (Uchitelle, 2001). The tizzy followed a sense of being diminished, rejected, and ignored. Some number of these behavioral economists of my age never accepted the changing nature of behavioral economics, from the approach of Katona, Simon, and Leibenstein, and others, to that of Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, and others who came after them. The complaint was that behavioral economics seemed to have begun with a set of big ideas which ran contrary to neoclassical economics. It then shifted into a newer version of neoclassical economics which âcapturedâ every aspect of human nature and behavior which seemed contrary to neoclassical economics. Many members of the âold guard,â those around age 55 in 2001, were furious, saying, âYou canât turn neoclassical economics into behavioral economics by adding a parameter to your model.â
With hindsight, it was naĂŻve to think that as behavioral economics became more intriguing to economists that it would not be incorporated as much as possible into neoclassical economics. At the same time, the âoldâ groups, the first gen behavioral economicsâSimon, Katona, Leibenstein, Boulding, March, Cyert, Scitovsky, Shackle, Nelson, Winter, Duesenberry, Rheinhard Selten, Gabriel Tarde, and othersâhave to various degrees been discounted, under-appreciated, forgotten by the ânewâ behavioral economists. I am not going to whine about this. I am only going to try to explain why the âoldâ group laid some of the ground-work for the ânewâ group. And hence why they deserve a better treatment than they have received. Kahneman and Tversky, and Thaler all deserved the Nobel Prize, so did Herbert Simon and Reinhard Selten.
II Two beginnings, one door
Behavioral economics had two beginnings. The famous beginning, the truly revolutionary beginning, was in the years 1974 and 1979. The first year, 1974, was when Tversky and Kahneman published their article in Science, âJudgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases.â The second year, 1979, was when Kahneman and Tversky published their article in Econometrica, âProspect Theory: An Analysis of Decisions Under Risk.â Shortly after was the beginning of a long âtrainâ of important publications by Richard Thaler. The other beginning started in the 1940s with several publications by George Katona and Herbert Simon, followed in 1950 and then 1966 by Harvey Leibenstein. There was also Shackle beginning in the early 1940s, Duesenberry in 1949, March and Simon in 1958, Selten in the mid-1960s, and others. There can be two beginnings in behavioral economics because the first one, the one beginning in the 1940s, was been discounted. Some believe that there was only one beginning, but it is a major contention of this book that there were two.
As a way of thinking about the beginnings and the âoldâ and the ânewâ behavioral economics, I divide behavioral economists into three groups. The first gens consist of those who began writings before 1974 and include Katona, Simon, Leibenstein, and the other names already mentioned. The second group, includes Kahneman, Tversky, Thaler, and Akerlof. The third group, also part of the ânewâ behavioral economists consists of those who began publishing beginning around 1985 or later. This group is also a very illustrious group, including George Lowenstein, Andrei Shleifer, Colin Camerer, David Laibson, Mathew Rabin, Sendhil Mullainathan, and Raj Chetty. To illustrate what each group did in the history of behavioral economics, I use the metaphor of a door. The first gens built a door and on the front placed a sign, âBehavioral Economics. Enter Here.â The second group opened the door. The third group walked into the room. The first and second group had two and three Nobel Prize winners, respectively. Many would not be surprised if this third group has at least three winners. The topic of the two beginnings, and the door are part of Chapter 2.
Chapter 3 is about the âBig 3ââSimon, Katona, and Leibenstein. Simon, the polymath, Nobel Laureate, received his PhD in political science from the University of Chicago at age 27. Katona received his PhD in psychology at the University of Gottingen at age 20. He then studied with the founders of Gestalt psychology before moving to the United States, eventually to Ann Arbor, Michigan where he spent the remainder of his professional life at the University of Michigan. In 1951 his book, Psychological Analysis of Economic Behavior, was published. It was an early major statement about economics and psychology, a.k.a., behavioral economics. Rabin (2002) sa...