The Fukushima and Tohoku Disaster

A Review of the Five-Year Reconstruction Efforts

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• Publisher: Butterworth-Heinemann
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780128140789
• eBook ISBN: 9780128129654
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Environmental Science
• Index: Biological Sciences

The Fukushima and Tohoku Disaster: A Review of the Five-Year Reconstruction Efforts covers the outcome of the response, five years later, to the disasters associated with the Great East Japan earthquake on March 11, 2011. The 3.11 disaster, as it is referred to in Japan, was a complex accident, the likes of which humans had never faced before. This book evaluates the actions taken during and after the earthquake, tsunami, and nuclear accident, for which the Japanese government and people were not prepared. The book also provides recommendations for preparing and responding to disasters for those working and living in disaster-prone areas, making it a vital resource for disaster managers and government agencies.- Includes guidelines for governments, communities and businesses in areas where similar complex disasters are likely to occur- Provides information, propositions, suggestions and advice from the people that were involved in making suggestions to the Japanese government- Features case studies (both pre- and post-disaster) of three simultaneous disasters: the Great East Japan earthquake, the resulting tsunami, and the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant disaster

Chapter 1

The Great East Japan Earthquake: Catastrophic

Abstract

This introductory chapter gives an overview and background of the work by 18 authors compiled in this book. The unprecedented natural disaster was huge and further complicated by a nuclear accident. The author, with his experience after other earlier mega-earthquakes in Japan, served on committees set by the Japanese government immediately after the Great East Japan Earthquake. Actions during the disaster and throughout the 5 years that followed still have not put an end to the suffering, and the author points to the “system of problems” at all levels of society. The author's voice urges not only Japan to prepare for the next disaster, but he also sees the problem as part of global environmental changes. Japan is threatened by the next mega-earthquake and the author's view shows how we should steer our efforts toward maintaining a resilient society.

Keywords

Earthquake; Tsunami; Policies; Preparation; Response; Community; Government; Reconstruction; Global warming; Resilience

Chapter Outline

1.1 Trouble With Policies in Recovery and Reconstruction

1.1.1 Problems in Response at the Local Community Level

1.1.2 Problems in Response at the Prefecture Level

1.1.3 Problems in Response by the Central Government

1.1.4 Causes of Delays in Incomplete Recovery and Reconstruction Projects

1.2 Quick Overview of the 3.11 Tsunami Generation Mechanism

1.3 Tsunami Preparation Before and After the 3.11 Disaster

1.3.1 Tsunami Evacuation Warnings and Advices

1.3.2 Tsunami Levee Design Before the Quake

1.3.3 Level-1 (L1) Tsunami and Level-2 (L2) Tsunami

1.3.4 Problems With Constructing Tsunami Levees

1.4 Troubles in the Efforts Toward Revitalizing Local Communities

1.4.1 Lack of Coordination From the Start

1.4.2 A Case Study of Rikuzen-Takata Pine Field

1.4.3 House Rebuilding Out-of-Sync

1.5 Promoting Disaster Reduction Policies

1.5.1 Newly Developed Disaster Reduction Policies

1.5.2 “The Worst Disaster Scenario” and “Disaster Prevention and Reduction in the Mainstream”

1.5.3 Disasters at Their New Stage

1.6 Disaster Resilience and National Resilience

1.6.1 Pictures of New Disasters to Plan Against With National Grand Design 2050 and National Spatial Planning

1.6.2 Disaster Resilience

References

I was assigned to be a member of two important committees set by the Japanese government immediately following the Great East Japan Earthquake. One was “The Reconstruction Design Council in response to the Great East Japan Earthquake” and the other, “Committee for Technical Investigation on Countermeasures for Earthquakes and Tsunamis Based on the Lessons Learned from the 2011 off the Pacific coast of Tohoku Earthquake.” Upon finishing the tasks of these committees, I then served as a committee member of the “Committee for Policy Planning on Disaster Management of the Central Disaster Management Council,” and then for the “Disaster Management Implementation Committee.” Through this service, I carefully looked after the reconstruction and recovery after the earthquake and tsunami disaster. My work was based on the experience and knowledge gained from the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake and the 2004 Niigata Prefecture Chuetsu Earthquake. We strongly hope that we will reach our common goal of “Build back better than before,” first accepted as the Hyogo Framework for Action during the Second United Nations (UN) World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction in 2005 and practically adopted in the Third Sendai Framework Action (SFA) in 2015.

1.1 Trouble With Policies in Recovery and Reconstruction

1.1.1 Problems in Response at the Local Community Level

Let's first list the clear reasons for the problems:

(1) Belief and confirmation bias: Everyone believed that if there was an earthquake, it had to be offshore of Miyagi Prefecture. The prediction back then called for 99% occurrence there within the next 30 years, and this was believed to be the next big one to hit Japan in future. The Japan Meteorological Agency was no different and its tsunami forecast had not calculated an earthquake of magnitude 8 or larger off the shore of Sanriku. The administration and local residents all shared the same belief.
Miyagi Prefecture had the highest rate of earthquake insurance coverage, in excess of 1230 billion yen. The coverage was about 16 times that of the amount, roughly 78 billion, for the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake. Due to this good coverage, rebuilding of homes was not a major social issue. Rather, new problems surfaced for relocating houses to higher-level areas.

(2) Illusion that countermeasures were sufficient: Tsunami hazard maps had been prepared with almost all local administration offices in preparation for Miyagi Prefecture offshore earthquakes. Communities of Iwate Prefecture had seawater gates and walls against hypothetical 1933 Showa Sanriku offshore earthquakes and tsunamis, and with the assumption that no tsunami would go over these walls, had no tsunami hazard maps. Tsunami evacuation drills were held, but the number of local residents participating in them kept dropping every year. The administration had some fear that the lack of preparedness within the residents could lead to serious damages. The number of residents in the submerged area during the Great East Japan Earthquake was about 510,000 and the death toll reached about 4.2% of that. On the other hand, the Taro area of Miyako City was protected by a seawater wall 10 m high, and the death rate there was also about the same, 4%. The percentage of residents that did not run for safety was the same everywhere.

(3) Unexpected damage to the communities: No one thought the community administration buildings would collapse and be underwater, killing mayors and administrative workers. The local disaster prevention plans had no conditions of such damage to administrative bodies except perhaps some damage to the buildings. This lack of preparation caused delays in the rescue activities, with no proper damage information sent out after the disaster struck.

(4) Neglecting the power of tsunami: A tsunami is one of the most dangerous natural disasters and it was not well understood that fleeing from it is the only way of surviving. The last damaging tsunami dates back to that caused by the Great Chilean Earthquake in 1960. Along the coastline of Sanriku, resonation amplified the tsunami size when it reached the end of the Ofunato Bay, causing concentrated damage there. Over the 50 years since the disaster, the threat had faded from people's memories.

(5) Misunderstanding past experience: On February 27, 2010, a year before the Great East Japan Earthquake, when a magnitude 8.8 quake shook Chile, the Japan Meteorological Agency announced a large tsunami warning along the coast of Iwate and Miyagi. The actual tsunami heights observed, however, reached less than 1 m at most observation spots and the warning ended up appearing to be “crying wolf.” The Japan Meteorological Agency never explained its false alarms and the residents gradually lost faith in its alerts. Moreover, with 5–6 m high walls right in front of their eyes, the residents had the misconception that the walls would protect them from tsunamis, which could reach only 3–6 m: another misjudgment. Their past experience directed the residents into underestimating the size of tsunamis that could hit the area.

(6) Difficulty in taking actions without proper information: With total lack of disaster information, the communities that suffered damage set up their disaster response headquarters, but had no idea where to start the discussion. In the era of Internet and cellular phones, there was a misconception that they would operate even during times of disaster, and the administration had not made any a priori evaluation of how to estimate the degree of damage and what to report to the prefecture and central government.

(7) Tsunami damage to the designated shelters of schools and community halls was unexpected: The people did not understand that going to the designated shelters was insufficient and that they had to climb to higher locations. As people age, they tend to be self-centered and base their decisions on experience only. The elderly population in the areas did not consider walking long distances to escape the possible disaster.

(8) The affected prefectures ignored collaboration with the communities during the disaster: The Basic Act for Disaster Countermeasures assigns responsibility for residential aid to local communities, and if the local communities fail, to the prefecture. The affected prefectures, however, made no cooperative efforts to help the communities. The lack of collaboration was the same as during the 2003 Sanriku Minami Earthquake, the 2005 Miyagi Earthquake, and the Iwate-Miyagi Nairiku Earthquake in 2008. Rather the local Diet members would run to the local area that elected them with the arrangement of The Cabinet Office, and the local communities had no expectations regarding the prefectures, and the prefectures in turn had the same idea.

1.1.2 Problems in Response at the Prefecture Level

This set of problems was the biggest cause of the delay in reconstruction and recovery from the Great East Japan Earthquake.

(1) No collaboration with affected local communities: As I stated in item (8) in the previous section, the lack of collaboration was a crucial issue. The prefectures of Iwate, Miyagi, and Fukushima had no procedures or disaster prevention plans stating what countermeasures to take in the event of disasters and had no idea how to organize administrative actions. Especially in the early stage of the disaster, with the lack of disaster information, many of the prefectural government employees were seen leaving for home when the end-of-the-day bell rang. All three government capital hall buildings survived with only minor damage, causing misunderstandings among the employees about the severity of the damage. This fact shows that they learned nothing from the lessons of the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake.

(2) Administration offices without field experience: The prefectural civil engineering and land administration departments had daily discussions with local communities and communications with residents about land acquisition and civil planning. The administration and planning department workers, however, were constrained to their desks and had hardly any communication with local communities. The same lesson taken from the Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake, that “You can only expect to do what you do daily,” applies here.

(3) Huge disaster area: The number of communities covered by the Disaster Relief Act was up to 241. Faced with this huge number, authorities in the prefecture were lost as to how to proceed with the recovery and reconstruction. They did not even think about dispatching prefectural officials to areas that had not made reports to the prefecture. Th...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• Chapter authors
• Preface
• Chapter 1: The Great East Japan Earthquake: Catastrophic
• Chapter 2: The Great East Japan Earthquake: Current Status and Problems of Recovery
• Chapter 3: Current Status of Rebuilding Houses and Reconstructing Local Regions After the Great East Japan Earthquake
• Chapter 4: Problems With Lifeline Recovery and Public Transportation
• Chapter 5: Supporting Health of the Great East Japan Earthquake Evacuees
• Chapter 6: Seismological Research and Earthquake Risk Assessment After the Great East Japan Earthquake
• Chapter 7: Concerns and New Measures for Tsunami Disaster Mitigation in Preparation for the Next Major Earthquake
• Chapter 8: Liquefaction With the Great East Japan Earthquake
• Chapter 9: Legal System for Supporting Disaster Victims
• Chapter 10: The Great East Japan Earthquake and Insurance
• Chapter 11: Problems With “Disaster Relief Volunteers”
• Chapter 12: How the Great East Japan Earthquake Affected Corporate Risk Management
• Chapter 13: Problems and Future of Post 3.11 Disaster Journalism
• Chapter 14: Nuclear Plant Disaster and Safety
• Chapter 15: Socioeconomic Issues, Reluctance in Buying Produce and Dealing With Highly Radioactive Waste
• Chapter 16: The Government and TEPCO Problems in Communicating Information With the Public During the Fukushima-1 NPP Accident
• Chapter 17: The Great East Japan Earthquake and Nuclear Power Safety Regulation
• Index