Nuclear Safeguards, Security, and Nonproliferation

Achieving Security with Technology and Policy

James Doyle

• Publisher: Butterworth-Heinemann
• Year: 2019
• eBook ISBN: 9780128032725
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Engineering General
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Nuclear Safeguards, Security and Nonproliferation: Achieving Security with Technology and Policy, Second Edition is a comprehensive reference covering the cutting-edge technologies used to trace, track and safeguard nuclear material. Sections cover security, the illicit trafficking of nuclear materials, improvised nuclear devices, and how to prevent nuclear terrorism. International case studies of security at nuclear facilities and illegal nuclear trade activities provide specific examples of the complex issues surrounding the technology and policy for nuclear material protection, control and accountability. New case studies include analyses of nuclear programs of important countries, such as North Korea, Iran, and Kazakhstan, among others.This is a thoroughly updated, must-have volume for private and public organizations involved in driving national security, domestic and international policy issues relating to nuclear material security, non-proliferation, and nuclear transparency.- Covers the continuing efforts to reduce the size of nuclear arsenals- Highlights the challenges of verifying nuclear weapons reduction- Summarizes issues from the 2015 Nonproliferation Treaty Review Conference- Illuminates the evolving status of nonproliferation and safeguards in Iran and DPRK

Part 1

Nuclear Arms Reductions: The Status of Global Efforts

Outline

1. Chapter 1. Global Nuclear Arsenals, 1990–2018
2. Chapter 2. The Humanitarian Initiative and the Nuclear Weapons Ban Treaty
3. Chapter 3. Regional Initiatives Toward a Nuclear Weapons Free World: The Case of Nuclear Weapons Free Zones
4. Chapter 4. Essential Capabilities for Nuclear Security: A National Program for Nonproliferation and Verification Technology Development
5. Chapter 5. Case Study: The Iran Nuclear Deal
6. Chapter 6. Confronting a Nuclear North Korea

Chapter 1

Global Nuclear Arsenals, 1990–2018

Hans M. Kristensen Nuclear Information Project, Federation of Information Project, Washington, DC, United States

Abstract

This chapter assesses the global status of nuclear arsenals by summarizing the current capabilities, strategies, and force structure plans of all states possessing nuclear weapons. Several trends are evident. The four main nuclear competitors of the Cold War—Britain, France, Russia, and the United States—have greatly reduced the size of their Cold War nuclear arsenals over the past three decades. However, the pace of these reductions has slowed and, in some cases, concluded. These nations, along with the five others possessing nuclear weapons (China, India, Pakistan, Israel, and North Korea), are all modernizing their forces and intend to maintain them for the next 30–40 years, if not through the end of the century. They are placing increasing emphasis on the role that nuclear weapons play in their national strategies and adding new types of weapons to their arsenals. Most disconcertingly, they are discussing the role of nuclear weapons in a way that appears to borrow from the Cold War playbook that increases reliance on tactical and low-yield nuclear weapons in limited regional scenarios, a move that increases the chance of nuclear war.

Keywords

Cold War; Intercontinental ballistic missile; Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty; Nuclear Posture Review; Non-strategic nuclear weapons; Nuclear weapon states; Sea-launched cruise missilex

Chapter Outline

1. Introduction
2. Global Status of Nuclear Forces
   1. United States
   2. Russian Federation
   3. China
   4. France
   5. Britain
   6. India
   7. Pakistan
   8. Israel
   9. North Korea
   10. NATO
3. Nuclear Plans and Operations
4. Conclusions

Introduction

Nearly three decades after the Cold War ended, the world’s nine nuclear-armed states are busy modernizing their nuclear arsenals to last through most of this century and reaffirming the importance of nuclear weapons in their defense strategies.

The four main nuclear competitors of the Cold War—Britain, France, Russia, and the United States—have made enormous progress in reducing the size of their Cold War nuclear arsenals over the past three decades. Yet the progress and hopes and aspirations in the 1990s about deep cuts and nuclear disarmament are a far cry from the conditions in 2018.

The pace of nuclear reduction has slowed; arms control has essentially stalled and become less restrictive and failed to achieve limits on many categories of nuclear weapons, and some agreements have been abandoned, while others are in jeopardy.

Moreover, Russia and NATO have descended into a new Cold War–like adversarial relationship dominated by bickering, embrace of “great power competition,” overt threats, revival of offensive military planning and operations, and violations or dismissal of arms control.

The adversarial relationship is boosting existing already substantial nuclear weapons modernization programs with plans to develop and deploy new and better nuclear weapons. For the first time in four decades, the United States is accusing Russia of increasing its nuclear arsenal, both in numbers and types of weapons. China has been increasing its arsenal for several years and appears intent on continuing to do so. Through their nuclear revival, the five original nuclear weapon states now appear to be going back on their obligations under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) to pursue negotiations to end the nuclear arms race and to nuclear disarmament.

The nuclear-armed states outside the NPT—India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan—are also modernizing their arsenals, with India and Pakistan working on significant expansions of their arsenals in a regional arms race, and North Korea has been rapidly improving its missile capabilities and nuclear warhead designs.

Once countries acquire nuclear weapons, they will sooner or later have to modernize them to ensure they continue to work. With each modernization cycle, new technologies can provide enhanced or new capabilities or even entirely new weapon types. During the Cold War, the modernization programs created bigger and bigger arsenals with nuclear weapons being incorporated into almost every major weapons category. Since the mid-1980s, the combined arsenal of Russia and the United States (as well as Britain and France) has been decreasing, but the pace of reductions has slowed and appears to be leveling out. Over the past couple of decades, moreover, the arsenals of China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have been increasing. All have been modernizing their arsenals, although in different ways, but the new adversarial relationship between NATO and Russia has significantly stimulated a revival of modernization plans, operations, and strategy.

Some have warned that Russia and the United States are now on the brink of a new “arms race.” ¹ Although an arms race similar to the one that characterized the Cold War—a race for who could build the most nuclear weapons—fortunately does not seem imminent, there are plenty of warning signs that a small Cold War has started, characterized by an intense technological and political competition. The combined effects of political disagreement and bickering, increased military posturing and Great Power competition, and more or less overt nuclear threats, combined with the extensive nuclear modernization programs, have the potential to halt nuclear reductions and even result in an increase of weapons types and numbers in the future.

Overall, the substantial and broad modernization programs effectively plan for the sustainment of large nuclear arsenals farther into the future than the nuclear era has lasted so far.

The nuclear-armed states and many of their allies frequently emphasize the importance of nuclear weapons to national and international security. That commitment is deepening. To maintain and demonstrate this role, nuclear weapon systems are periodically test launched, and nuclear exercises are frequently conducted to practice and refine offensive strike plans against potential adversaries. In recent years, Russia and the United States have both increased the profile and operational presence of their nuclear-capable forces.

Although a surprise nuclear first strike is viewed as highly unlikely, the United States, Russia, Britain, and France keep large numbers of nuclear warheads—possibly around 1800—on alert and capable of being launched on relatively short notice. Moreover, the nuclear doctrines of these nations include the possibility that they could use nuclear weapons first in a conflict. Maintaining nuclear forces on alert increases the risk of accidents and incidents and fuels adversarial and competitive policies and worst-case planning. Moreover, the highly alerted nuclear postures of the United States, Russia, Britain, and France may help motivate smaller nuclear-armed states such as China, India, and Pakistan to increase the readiness level of their nuclear forces as well, developments that could significantly worsen regional stability. ²

Missiles with the capability to deliver MIRV (multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles) were important and visible symbols of the Cold War. They were key to rapidly increasing the size of the arsenals, building first-strike capabilities, and to nuclear war-fighting strategies. The START II treaty in 1993 included an important ban on MIRV on intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) but was abandoned by the United States an...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• List of Contributors
• Introduction: Nuclear Security and Global Challenges
• Part 1. Nuclear Arms Reductions: The Status of Global Efforts
• Part 2. Technologies and Processes to Prevent Nuclear Proliferation and Strengthen Nuclear Materials Security
• Part 3. Preventing Nuclear Terrorism and Illicit Nuclear Trade
• Index