Global Engineering Ethics

Heinz Luegenbiehl, Rockwell Clancy

• Publisher: Butterworth-Heinemann
• Year: 2017
• Print ISBN: 9780128112182
• eBook ISBN: 9780128112199
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Engineering General
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Global Engineering Ethics introduces the fundamentals of ethics in a context specific to engineering without privileging any one national or cultural conception of ethics. Numerous case studies from around the world help the reader to see clearly the relevance of design, safety, and professionalism to engineers. Engineering increasingly takes place in global contexts, with industrial and research teams operating across national and cultural borders. This adds a layer of complexity to already challenging ethical issues. This book is essential reading for anyone wanting to understand or communicate the ethics of engineering, including students, academics, and researchers, and is indispensable for those involved in international and cross-cultural environments. - Takes a global-values approach to engineering ethics rather than prioritizing any one national or regional culture - Uses engineering case studies to explain ethical issues and principles in relatable, practical contexts - Approaches engineering from a business perspective, emphasizing the extent to which engineering occurs in terms of profit-driven markets, addressing potential conflicts that arise as a result - Provides extensive guidance on how to carry out ethical analysis by using case studies, to practice addressing and thinking through issues before confronting them in the world

Chapter 1

Introduction: Engineering Ethics from a Global Perspective

Abstract

This chapter introduces the book's themes and contents, related to global engineering ethics. It begins with a case study of the Überlingen midair collision, highlighting the manner in which automated and manual systems, human error, and global contexts contributed to this tragedy. The chapter goes on to explain recent changes in engineering work and educational environments, and their effects on engineering ethics. It lists initial assumptions for a global approach to engineering ethics, and the rest of the chapter explains the nature and relevance of these assumptions to considerations of ethical issues within engineering. These include the nature of ethics, its importance for engineers, global perspectives on engineering, problems with ethical theories, role responsibilities of engineers, and considerations of case studies. The chapter ends with a case study concerning the ITER project and fusion power, highlighting how cleaner energy and interdisciplinary, international collaborations can contribute to better futures.

Keywords

Global engineering ethics; Überlingen midair collision; Ethical theory; Role responsibilities; Case-study procedure; ITER project; International collaboration; Fusion power; Clean energy; Sustainable development

Chapter Objectives

Having read this chapter and answered the associated questions, readers should be able to

● describe recent changes that have taken place in the field of engineering, and why this necessitates approaching engineering ethics from a different perspective;

● articulate not only the nature of ethics in general but also why it should be of particular concern to engineers;

● explain the problem of theory and interconnected roles that reason, engineers' role responsibilities, and case studies play in approaching engineering ethics from a global perspective.

Case Study One—The Überlingen Midair Collision: Systems Conflicts and Global Contexts

At approximately 9:35 p.m. on Jul. 1, 2002, two planes collided midair near Überlingen, Germany, killing all 71 persons on both planes. A number of human-controlled and human-automated technological systems were in place to avoid such an incident ever occurring. This collision was, thus, the result of a confluence of circumstances and conditions that illustrate the increasingly complex and global contexts of technology in modern life. Examining this case helps to introduce readers to this context and its associated problems.

The Überlingen collision occurred between a Tupolev 154 passenger plane traveling from Moscow, Russia, to Barcelona, Spain (henceforth 154), and a Boeing 757 cargo plane traveling from Bergamo, Italy, to Brussels, Belgium (henceforth 757). The pilots of both planes were well-trained, seasoned flyers. The pilots of 154 to Barcelona were Russian, and the pilots of 757 to Brussels were British and Canadian. Their nationalities are important, as we will see shortly, since training and cultural differences contributed to the collision.

757 and 154 began communicating with Swiss air traffic controller Peter Nielsen, of the Zurich area control center at 9:21 p.m. and 9:30 p.m., respectively. Nielsen told 757 to climb to flight level 360, which it did, and, shortly after, 154 entered Zurich airspace at that same flight level. The pilots of 757 failed to report to Nielsen that they had ascended to flight level 360. When 154 entered Zurich airspace, Nielsen told the pilots to change their radio frequency to avoid interference, since 154 was initially using the same radio frequency as 757. Nielsen was unaware that the two planes were at the same flight level, and his attention was diverted for two main reasons.

First, although two air traffic controllers were working that night, one was on break at the time, leaving Nielsen by himself. Nielsen was thus in charge of two navigation stations—one for high altitudes on which 154 and 757 appeared and one for Friedrichshafen and St. Gallen-Altenrhein airports—with their own radios and screens; the screens were located a meter apart from one another, forcing Nielsen's attention to be divided between them. After instructing the pilots of 154 to change their radio frequency, Nielsen turned his attention to the Friedrichshafen and St. Gallen-Altenrhein airports screen, directing an Airbus approaching German airspace.

Second, the main telephone system used to communicate with nearby airports in Germany was—unbeknownst to Nielsen—down for maintenance, and the backup telephone system was not working as a result of software failure. Whereas Nielsen was not informed about the first, no one knew about the second. Again, after instructing the pilots of 154 to change their radio frequency, Nielsen was preoccupied with the phone system, attempting to communicate with air traffic controllers in Germany regarding the approaching Airbus. Additionally, although German air traffic controllers recognized the potential collision between 757 and 154, since both the main and backup phone systems were down, they were unable to communicate this information to Nielsen. Despite the failure of 757 to report its ascent, inattention and preoccupation by Nielsen, and failure of the main and backup phone systems, air travel and traffic control systems have built-in redundancies.

Despite the failures mentioned so far, there were two automated technologies in place that should have prevented the Überlingen collision: the short-term conflict alert (henceforth STCA) and the traffic collision and avoidance system (henceforth TCAS). The STCA is an automated alarm system that alerts controllers 2 min before any potential collision. Hence, 2 min before the Überlingen collision, this warning system should have alerted Nielsen that 757 and 154 were dangerously close. On the night of the collision, however, this system was down.

The TCAS is installed on planes, and it alerts pilots and provides instructions on how to avoid potential collisions. At 9:34:42 p.m., the TCAS alerted the pilots of 154 and 757 of the potential collision and then, at 9:34:56 p.m., directed the planes to ascend and descend, respectively. At this point, if the pilots of both planes had followed these instructions, then the tragedy could have been avoided. However, although the TCAS alerted the pilots of the danger and issued instructions on how to avoid a collision, this information was not relayed to the air traffic controller, Nielsen.

Hence, 7 s after the TCAS initially alerted the pilots of 154 and 757, Nielsen recognized the danger and directed 154 to descend to flight level 350. His instructions were the opposite of those the pilots of 154 received from the TCAS, a conflict between human instructions and an automated system. However, the Russian training of the 154 pilots had instructed them to follow the directions of air traffic controllers, and 154 descended accordingly. There were no mechanisms or safeguards in place if the pilots failed to comply with the TCAS instructions. It should also be noted that just over a minute (1:10) passed between the time the TCAS alerted the pilots to the potential collision and the time the collision occurred. Little time was thus available for either the pilots or Nielsen to gain their bearings.

The TCAS on 757 instructed the pilots to descend more, which they did and reported to Nielsen, although they received no response. With the TCAS on 154 continuing to instruct the pilots to climb, it wasn't until 9:35:27 p.m. that 154 stopped descending and started climbing. By this time, however, it was too late, and the two aircrafts collided at 9:35:32 p.m.¹

This case raises a number of interesting questions regarding the complex, global contexts of technology in modern life: which persons and systems contributed to the Überlingen collision? Where does primary responsibility lie? If not one person, then multiple persons? Are persons primarily to blame for this collision? If not, then where should blame be placed? What could have been done differently to avoid this collision, and what can be done to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future? Who's responsible for the ways modern technology is used? What role did the interaction between human beings and technology play in this collision, and what does this tell us about technical and organizational designs and their implementations? These are difficult questions, the answers to which are by no means entirely clear. For precisely those reasons, these are some of the issues considered going forward.

1.1 What’s Changed and Why it Matters: Initial Assumptions²

Traditional engineering practice has been relatively localized to specific cultural contexts. Therefore, ethics education for engineering students could legitimately be based on the background conditions existing in a particular society, and instructors could assume general familiarity with these among students. In the latter part of the 20th century and into the 21st century, however, this was no longer the case.

The previously existing conditions underwent significant changes, including the coming to dominance of multinational corporations, the location of plants by national corporations in other countries, the increasing international mobility of engineers, and the establishment of international supplier and customer systems. While some texts on engineering ethics ignored these developments, others have responded by adding one or more chapters regarding issues sometimes encountered by engineers dealing with foreign entities, such as questions of different ethical and religious systems and grease payments.³ Such responses, while legitimate first attempts to deal with the new international environment of engineering, do not address the need for a fundamental reconceptualization of how ethics should be conceived and taught, assuming it is no longer sufficient to look at international issues from within the framework of national perspectives.

This text seeks to rethink engineering ethics at a more fundamental level, using the global environment of engineering as the starting point rather than a mere addition. Toward this end, it is necessary that the particular national assumptions about the practice of engineering and theoretical foundations of ethics...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• Acknowledgments
• Chapter 1: Introduction: Engineering Ethics from a Global Perspective
• Chapter 2: Working With Cases: The Importance of Concrete Learning
• Chapter 3: Engineering Professionalism and Professional Organizations
• Chapter 4: Basic Ethical Principles for Global Engineering
• Chapter 5: The Prime Responsibility of Safety
• Chapter 6: The Global Business Environment: What Engineers Should Know
• Chapter 7: Cross-Cultural Issues: Their Importance to Global Engineering Ethics
• Chapter 8: Autonomy
• Chapter 9: Conflicting Duties and Dissent
• Chapter 10: Issues of Broader Concern for Engineers
• Chapter 11: The Rights of Engineers
• Appendix I: Global Engineering Ethics Principles Reviewed
• Appendix II: Steps in the Case-Study Procedure
• Appendix III: Guided Analysis: The Case of “Curious George”
• Index