Microbial Forensics

Bruce Budowle, Steven E. Schutzer, Roger G. Breeze

• Publisher: Academic Press
• Year: 2005
• eBook ISBN: 9780080454887
• Topic: Biological Sciences
• Subtopic: Microbiology
• Index: Biological Sciences

Microbial Forensics describes the new and growing field of Microbial Forensics- the science that will help bring to justice criminals and terrorists who use biological material to cause harm. This book describes the foundation of the field of microbial forensics and will serve as a basic primer to initiate those scientists and officials that have an interest in the topic. It covers a variety of areas from forensic science, to microbiology, to epidemiology, to bioinformatics, and to legal issues.* Provides the real science beyond that displayed on TV and in the movies * Covers not only microbes but also the biology, chemistry, physics & computer science that is used for identification.* Of relevance Internationally to military, intelligence, law enforcement, agricultural, legal and environmental fields

CHAPTER 1

Microbial Forensics

BRUCE BUDOWLE and MARK R. WILSON, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Laboratory Division, Quantico, Virginia, USA

JAMES P. BURANS, National Bioforensic Analysis Center, Department of Homeland Security, Frederick, Maryland, USA

ROGER G. BREEZE, Centaur Science Group, Washington, DC, USA

RANAJIT CHAKRABORTY, Center for Genome Information, University of Cincinnati College of Medicine, Cincinnati, Ohio, USA

Publisher Summary

This chapter reflects the threat of existence and potential usage of bioweapons elaborating upon the history, programs, epidemiology, tools, bioinformatics and genetics of microbial forensics. Science plays an important role in criminal investigation, and microbial forensic science continues to assist in solving crimes by characterizing physical evidence found at a crime scene. Advances in technology will develop better treatments and therapies for many microbial diseases that affect humans, animals, and plants. However, technology can be misused to challenge the national and international security by using pathogens or toxins as weapons. In forensics, the crime scene is recognized and secured to preserve the quality of the evidence. Vigilance is necessary to detect the use of bioweapons. The chapter also stresses on educational efforts as a key to disease surveillance and appropriate public response to a disease outbreak, whether it is intentional or natural. By developing a robust microbial forensics field supported by the Bio forensic Analysis Center (BFAC), a developed knowledge base, integration of government; academic; and private sector institutions, and the standing working group— Scientific Working Group on Microbial Genetics and Forensics (SWGMGF), the global society can overcome the challenge of bioterrorism.

INTRODUCTION

Officials, victims, and family and friends of victims of crime often want to identify the perpetrator of the crime and to exclude those who could not have committed the crime. Science can assist in that endeavor by characterizing physical evidence found at the crime scene. The fields of human DNA analysis, hair morphology comparisons, handwriting, fingerprint identification, drug analysis, ballistics, tool marks, and others are well established in forensic science.

In the 21st century, the ability to manipulate and disseminate pathogens has increased to a point where there are grave concerns about potential use of microbiological organisms and their toxins to attack and cause serious harm to humans, animals, and plants. These new scenarios of threat and crime can also be addressed using forensic science practices for identifying perpetrators of crimes and to protect the innocent. The field of microbial forensics, with the goal of attribution, has begun to crystallize, and much effort nationally and internationally is being dedicated to develop and form this field into a mature science. This introductory chapter describes the efforts and needs of the microbial forensics field. First, the threat is defined. Then, historical examples of bioweapons use are provided not only to familiarize readers with the potential use, but to show that such weapons do exist and have been used. As some readers may not be familiar with forensic science, a general description of the basics of forensic science practices are provided in a following section. Subsequently, the microbial forensic field is defined, and the efforts and needs of the field are discussed. Lastly, education efforts are stressed as a key to disease surveillance and appropriate public response to a disease outbreak, whether it is intentional or natural.

THE THREAT

Terrorism can be defined as an attack or threat of an attack on the innocent to create fear, intimidate, inflict harm, and/or affect economic well-being. These acts have often been politically motivated, but may not always be so. To create terror, perpetrators of bioterrorism use pathogens or toxins as weapons. A number of bacteria, viruses, and fungi pose serious health risks to humans, animals, and plants, and the use of them as bioweapons can have serious consequences on human health, economic development, social stability, and political activities of nations worldwide. Moreover, technology has developed to such a point that there is a greater potential and increased likelihood that biological weapons will be accessible to individuals or small groups of individuals instead of just state organized institutions. Sophisticated high technology, such as that used for nuclear weapon development, is not needed to produce large quantities of weaponizable pathogens, and large quantities of bioweapons can be easily produced. Dissemination of pathogenic agents has been considered difficult in the past and put a limitation on their use, but some approaches can be relatively simple, such as may be needed to infect large herds of livestock. To add to the motivation of use is the low cost of producing and using pathogenic agents in criminal acts. It has been estimated that the cost to inflict civilian casualties is about $2000 per km² for conventional weapons and about $800 per km² for nuclear weapons; for biological weapons the cost is only about $1 per km².^1,2 Thus, bioterrorism will be one of the major threat challenges of the 21st century. Indeed, the anthrax letter bioterrorism attack of 2001 brought to the forefront the need to consider strengthening homeland security and enhance our forensic capabilities for attribution and deterrence.

In addition to bioterrorism, pathogens and/or toxins may be used in biocrimes. These acts may be considered the same as traditional crimes which usually are directed towards harming individuals except that the weapon is biological in nature, instead of guns, knives, and traditional chemical poisons such as cyanide. However, the use of a bioweapon in a criminal case should be taken as seriously as that of a bioterrorist attack.

HISTORY

The use of pathogenic agents as weapons has been documented for more than two millennia. The ancient Romans carried out biological warfare by putting carrion into the wells of their enemies to poison the water supply. Such crude biowarfare tactics continued well into the 20th century.^3,4 During the 14th-century siege of Kaffa (now Feodossia, Ukraine), the attacking Tartar soldiers experienced an epidemic of bubonic plague. The Tartars capitalized on the devastating disease and used the bodies of plague victims as weapons. They catapulted their own soldiers’ diseased bodies into the walled city of Kaffa in an attempt to inflict harm on their enemy and likely contributed to the European plague epidemic during the Middle Ages.^5–7 Smallpox and measles contained within blankets and clothing were used by the Conquistadors and British as biological weapons against Native Americans. It is believed that such tactics influenced the outcome of the French and Indian Wars.^5,7 Plague was used as a weapon by the Japanese during World War II. Laboratory-raised fleas were allowed to feed on plague-infected rats. The fleas were then disseminated from airplanes over China.^7,8 In 1993, the Aum Shinrikyo Cult (known for its sarin nerve gas attack in a Tokyo subway) attempted to spread anthrax in Tokyo from the rooftop of an eight-story building owned by the Cult. The purported attack did not cause any illness from the anthrax agent, because the strain Sterne (a vaccine strain) was used. It is believed that the Aum Shinrikyo Cult also dispersed botulinum toxin, Q fever, and spores from a poisonous mushroom, but all attacks failed.^9–11 In 1984, cult followers of Baghwan Sri Rajneesh attempted to affect the outcome of a local election in Dalles, Oregon. They attempted to incapacitate the population and prevent them from voting by successfully contaminating salad bars in 10 restaurants with Salmonella typhimurium; 751 people developed food poisoning. A Salmonella typhimurium strain found in a laboratory at the commune of the religious cult was indistinguishable from the strain from the outbreak.¹² In 1996 in Dallas, Texas, there was a documented case of intentional Shigellosis contamination. Twelve people of the laboratory staff of St. Paul Medical Center hospital developed severe, acute diarrheal illness. Shigella dysenteriae type 2 was isolated from stool samples of some of the sick workers. All outbreak patients reported eating muffins or doughnuts in a break room. Shigella dysenteriae type 2, recovered from the patients, from an uneaten muffin, and from the medical laboratory’s stock strain were indistinguishable by pulsed-field gel electrophoresis. A criminal investigation ensued focusing on a laboratory technician who was subsequently convicted on five felony assaults and falsifying laboratory documents.^10,13

The few examples described above focus mostly on those agents that could cause harm to human targets (see CDC list).⁵ However, disruption of food sources and great economic upheaval could arise by targeting agriculture. U.S. commercial animal agriculture revolves around three commodities: cattle, swine, and poultry (i.e., chickens and turkeys). Sheep, goats, ducks, and other species may be considered commercially insignificant, but an attack on these could hurt smaller economic sectors and affect public confidence. While horses are not considered to be a domestic livestock industry by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), they do fulfill personal and recreational needs. Deer, elk, bison, and other wildlife species are also not considered domestic livestock but could become reservoirs for pathogens, and attacks on wildlife could affect the ecosystem. Fish and shellfish, which form a notable industry, are often not thought of as targets, but could be targets for an attack.

International lists of livestock diseases that pose the greatest threats are maintained by the International Organization of Epizootics (OIE).¹⁴ There are about 15 diseases on the OIE List A and a much larger number in List B. Blue-tongue, Newcastle disease, and vesicular stomatitis, which are on List A, occur naturally in the U.S. Terrorists and criminals have easier access to these and other animal pathogens, because they occur naturally. Some animal diseases are caused by zoonotic pathogens (i.e., causing disease in animals and humans). These include: Rift Valley Fever (Bunyaviridae), Glanders (Burkholderia mallei), and Q fever (Coxiella burnetii). Pathogens that reside in a broad range of host species can be more difficult to eradicate and enable access from a variety of reservoirs.

Livestock are highly vulnerable. One need only consider the most recent outbreak of Foot and Mouth disease in England to appreciate the impact of just a natural outbreak. The same or greater effect can be imagined with the use of a livestock-directed bioweapon. Animal pathogens are often highly contagious and can be dispersed without advanced technology; in addition, disease can spread rapidly, animal to animal. In the U.S., disease spread can be exacerbated because livestock are often transported in large numbers throughout the U.S.¹⁵ Historically, attacks have occurred against livestock. For example, during World War I, Glanders (Burkholderia mallei) was used by the Germans to infect Allied horses and mules. In fact, a laboratory was established in Chevy Chase, Maryland in 1916 to culture Glanders (and anthrax) and the live organisms were then provided to German agents to infect U.S. draft animals. They successfully infected a number of animals in the U.S., as well as in Europe.^7,10,16 The former Soviet Union also used Glanders in the early 1980s during its war in Afghanistan.^17,18 In 1952, the Mau Mau poisoned and killed some cattle at a British mission station in Kenya usin...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• CONTRIBUTORS
• FOREWORD
• PREFACE
• ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
• Chapter 1: Microbial Forensics
• Chapter 2: Infectious Diseases: Not Just a Health Matter Anymore
• Chapter 3: The Fundamentals of Human Virology
• Chapter 4: Keeping Track of Viruses
• Chapter 5: Bacterial Pathogens
• Chapter 6: Biology and Detection of Fungal Pathogens of Humans and Plants
• Chapter 7: Forensic Aspects of Biologic Toxins
• Chapter 8: Epidemiologic Investigation for Public Health, Biodefense, and Forensic Microbiology
• Chapter 9: Molecular Epidemiology and Forensics of RNA Viruses
• Chapter 10: Investigation of Suspicious Disease Outbreaks
• Chapter 11: Forensic Handling of Biological Threat Samples in the Lab
• Chapter 12: Forensic Genetic Analysis of Microorganisms: Overview of Some Important Technical Concepts and Selected Genetic Typing Methods
• Chapter 13: Non-DNA Methods for Biological Signatures
• Chapter 14: Microbial Forensics Host Factors
• Chapter 15: Bioinformatics Methods for Microbial Detection and Forensic Diagnostic Design
• Chapter 16: Population Genetics of Bacteria in a Forensic Context
• Chapter 17: Quality Management in Microbial Forensics Laboratories
• Chapter 18: Admissibility Standards for Scientific Evidence
• Appendix