Rationality

Constraints and Contexts

Tzu-Wei Hung, Timothy Joseph Lane

• Publisher: Academic Press
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780128046005
• eBook ISBN: 9780128046234
• Topic: Psychologie
• Subtopic: Neurosciences cognitives et neuropsychologie

Rationality: Contexts and Constraints is an interdisciplinary reappraisal of the nature of rationality. In method, it is pluralistic, drawing upon the analytic approaches of philosophy, linguistics, neuroscience, and more. These methods guide exploration of the intersection between traditional scholarship and cutting-edge philosophical or scientific research. In this way, the book contributes to development of a suitably revised, comprehensive understanding of rationality, one that befits the 21st century, one that is adequately informed by recent investigations of science, pathology, non-human thought, emotion, and even enigmatic Chinese texts that might previously have seemed to be expressions of irrationalism. - Addresses recent challenges and Identifies a direction for future research on rationality - Investigates the relationship between rationality and mental disorders, such as delusion and depression - Assesses reasoning in artificial intelligence and nonhuman animals - Reflects on ancient Chinese Philosophy and possible cultural differences in human psychology - Employs philosophical reflection, along with linguistic, probabilistic, and logical techniques

III

Pathology

Introduction

Chapter 5: Delusion and the Norms of Rationality

Chapter 6: Outline of a Theory of Delusion: Irrationality and Pathological Belief

Chapter 7: Is Depressive Rumination Rational?

Introduction

Those among us who work with psychiatric patients on a regular basis are often struck by certain aspects of their thought that suggest they do care about and are sensitive to evidence. A colleague of one of the editors has a young male patient who suffers from schizophrenic delusions, delusions that include belief that he is the son of the Japanese emperor. Upon being asked how he knows he is the emperor’s son, he replies that every morning he appears in the entranceway of a local Japanese department store where he is loudly greeted by a large group of people who are bowing toward him and speaking Japanese. Of course he neglects to offer that, as is the custom of Japanese department stores, they bow to and loudly greet all new customers at the start of each day. In this section our authors explore three themes, two related to delusions and one to ruminations: whether delusional thought results from a failure of systems designed for belief fixation, whether certain delusions serve as evidence that some beliefs are modular, and whether depressive ruminations are in some respects rational.

In “Flying Solo: Delusions, Rationality and Doxastic Solipsism” (Chapter 5), Tim Bayne observes that delusions are typically regarded as failures of rationality. According to this epistemic view, what distinguishes delusional from nondelusional thought is the degree to which persons depart from the norms of good reasoning. Bayne examines a number of objections to this epistemic conception and explores an alternative that centers on the notion of proper function. According to the proper function view, delusions occur when the systems responsible for belief fixation fail to function in the ways for which they were designed.

In “Rationality and Delusion,” (Chapter 6), Ian Gold observes that some evolutionary psychiatrists suggest persecutory delusions are an effect of social threats in the evolutionary past. Gold explores this proposal in the context of a general approach to delusions and develops a model of persecution that attempts to explain how delusions develop and why they are retained in the face of conflicting evidence. He suggests that one consequence of this model is that some beliefs, at least some pathological beliefs, are modular.

In “Is Depressive Rumination Rational?” (Chapter 7), Timothy Lane and Georg Northoff assess the relationship between depressive rumination and rationality. They observe that while most mental disorders affect only a small segment of the population, depression is unique in that it is both prevalent and costly. This has led some researchers to propose evolutionary explanations that treat depression as an adaptation. Lane and Northoff consider and reject one such explanation, namely, the “analytical rumination hypothesis” (ARH), which postulates that depression’s crucial adaptive trait is rumination—negative, intrusive thoughts. According to ARH, depressive ruminations are not indications of a disorder; rather, they are a rational trade-off because they help solve dilemmas, albeit at the cost of inducing anhedonia. Lane and Northoff argue that ARH is unlikely to be true. In developing their critique of ARH, they appeal to recent imaging studies of depression that show resting state hyperactivity in anterior midline regions of the brain correlates with abnormal levels of self-focus. It seems that on the personal level, patients are trapped within themselves, isolated from the external world; ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• List of Contributors
• Preface
• I: Introduction
• II: Science
• III: Pathology
• IV: Irrationality
• V: Nonhuman
• VI: Communication and emotion
• Index