Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare

Kenneth J. Arrow, A. Sen, Kotaro Suzumura

• Publisher: North Holland
• Year: 2010
• Print ISBN:
  9780444508942
• eBook ISBN:
  9780080929828
• Topic: Economics
• Subtopic: Decision Making
• Index: Economics

This second part of a two-volume set continues to describe economists' efforts to quantify the social decisions people necessarily make and the philosophies that those choices define. Contributors draw on lessons from philosophy, history, and other disciplines, but they ultimately use editor Kenneth Arrow's seminal work on social choice as a jumping-off point for discussing ways to incentivize, punish, and distribute goods. - Develops many subjects from Volume 1 (2002) while introducing new themes in welfare economics and social choice theory - Features four sections: Foundations, Developments of the Basic Arrovian Schemes, Fairness and Rights, and Voting and Manipulation - Appeals to readers who seek introductions to writings on human well-being and collective decision-making - Presents a spectrum of material, from initial insights and basic functions to important variations on basic schemes

Table of contents

• Cover
• Contents
• Edited by
• Copyright Page
• Preface
• List of Contributors
• Chapter Thirteen: Kenneth Arrow on Social Choice Theory
• Chapter Fourteen: The Informational Basis of Social Choiceprotect
• Chapter Fifteen: Competitive Market Mechanisms as Social Choice Procedures
• Chapter Sixteen: Functionings and Capabilities
• Chapter Seventeen: Arrovian Social Choice Theory on Economic Domains
• Chapter Eighteen: Topological Theories of Social Choice
• Chapter Nineteen: Nonbinary Social Choice
• Chapter Twenty: Social Choice with Fuzzy Preferences
• Chapter Twenty-One: Fair Allocation Rules
• Chapter Twenty-Two: Compensation and Responsibilityprotect
• Chapter Twenty-Three: Welfarism, Individual Rights, and Procedural Fairness
• Chapter Twenty-Four: Freedom, Opportunity, and Well-Being
• Chapter Twenty-Five: Strategyproof Social Choice
• Chapter Twenty-Six: Probabilistic and Spatial Models of Voting
• Chapter Twenty-Seven: Geometry of Voting
• Index