Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles

for Oil, Gas, Chemical and Related Facilities

Dennis P. Nolan

• Publisher: William Andrew
• Year: 2010
• eBook ISBN: 9781437778588
• Edition: 2
• Topic: Technology & Engineering
• Subtopic: Chemical & Biochemical Engineering
• Index: Technology & Engineering

Handbook of Fire and Explosion Protection Engineering Principles: for Oil, Gas, Chemical and Related Facilities is a general engineering handbook that provides an overview for understanding problems of fire and explosion at oil, gas, and chemical facilities. This handbook offers information about current safety management practices and technical engineering improvements. It also provides practical knowledge about the effects of hydrocarbon fires and explosions and their prevention, mitigation principals, and methodologies. This handbook offers an overview of oil and gas facilities, and it presents insights into the philosophy of protection principles. Properties of hydrocarbons, as well as the characteristics of its releases, fires and explosions, are also provided in this handbook. The book includes chapters about fire- and explosion-resistant systems, fire- and gas-detection systems, alarm systems, and methods of fire suppression. The handbook ends with a discussion about human factors and ergonomic considerations, including human attitude, field devices, noise control, panic, and security. People involved with fire and explosion prevention, such as engineers and designers, will find this book invaluable.- A unique practical guide to preventing fires and explosions at oil and gas facilities, based on the author's extensive experience in the industry- An essential reference tool for engineers, designers and others facing fire protection issues- Based on the latest NFPA standards and interpretations

1. Introduction

1.1Fire, Explosions, and Environmental Pollution

Fire, explosions and environmental pollution are the most serious “unpredictable” issues affecting life and business losses in the hydrocarbon and chemical industries today. The issues have existed since the inception of industrial-scale petroleum and chemical operations during the middle of the last century. They continue to occur with ever-increasing financial impacts and highly visible news reports. Management involvement in the prevention of these incidents is vital if they are to be avoided. Although from some perspectives, “accidents” are thought of as non-preventable, in fact all accidents, or more correctly “incidents”, are preventable.

Research and historical analyses have shown that main cause of incidents or failures can be categorized into the four following basic areas:

• Ignorance, for example:

• Assumption of responsibility by management without an adequate understanding of risks;

• Supervision or maintenance occurs by personnel without the necessary understanding;

• Incomplete design, construction or inspection occurs;

• There is a lack of sufficient preliminary information;

• Failure to employ individuals to provide guidance in safety with competent loss prevention knowledge or experience;

• The most prudent and current safety management techniques (or concerns) are not known or applied; or advised to senior staff.

• Economic considerations, such as:

• Operation, maintenance or loss prevention costs are reduced to a less than adequate level;

• Initial engineering and construction costs for safety measures appear uneconomical.

• Oversight and negligence, with examples such as:

• Contractual personnel or company supervisors knowingly assume high risks;

• Failure to conduct comprehensive and timely safety reviews or audits of safety management systems and facilities;

• Unethical or unprofessional behavior occurs;

• Inadequate coordination or involvement of technical, operational or loss prevention personnel, in engineering designs or management of change reviews;

• Otherwise competent professional engineers and designers commit errors.

• Unusual occurrences:

• Natural disasters such as earthquakes, floods, weather extremes, etc., that are out of the normal design range planned for the installation;

• Political upheaval and/or terrorist activities;

• Labor unrest, vandalism, sabotage.

As can be seen, the real cause of most incidents is what is considered human error. The insurance industry has estimated that 80 percent of incidents are directly related to, or attributed to, the individuals involved. Most individuals have good intentions to perform a function properly, but it should be remembered that where shortcuts, easier methods or considerable (short term) economic gain opportunities present themselves, human vulnerability usually succumbs to the temptation. Therefore it is prudent in any organization, especially where high risk facilities are operated, to have a system in place to conduct considerable independent checks, inspections and safety audits of the operation, maintenance, design and construction of the installation.

This book is all about the engineering principles and philosophies to identify and prevent incidents associated with hydrocarbon and chemical facilities. All engineering activities are human endeavors and thus they are subject to errors. Fully approved facility designs and later changes can introduce an aspect from which something can go wrong. Some of these human errors are insignificant and may never be uncovered. However, others may lead to catastrophic incidents. Recent incidents have shown that many “fully engineered” and operational process plants can experience total destruction. Initial conceptual designs and operational philosophies have to address the possibilities of a major incident occurring and provide measures to prevent or mitigate such events.

1.2Historical Background

The first commercially successful oil well in the US was drilled in August 1859 in Titusville (Oil Creek), Pennsylvania by Colonel Edwin Drake (1819-1880). Colonel Drake's famous first oil well caught fire and some damage was sustained to the structure shortly after its operation. Later in 1861, another oil well at Oil Creek, close to Drake's well, caught fire and grew into a local conflagration that burned for three days, causing 19 fatalities. One of the earliest oil refiners in the area, Acme Oil Company, suffered a major fire loss in 1880, from which it never recovered.

The State of Pennsylvania passed the first anti-pollution laws for the petroleum industry in 1863. These laws were enacted to prevent the release of oil into waterways next to oil production areas. At another famous and important early US oil field named Spindletop, located in Beaumont, Texas, one individual smoking a cigarette set off the first of several catastrophic fires that raged for a week, only three years after the discovery of the reservoir in 1901. Major fires occurred at Spindletop almost every year during its initial production. Considerable evidence is available that hydrocarbon fires were a fairly common sight at early oil fields. These fires manifested themselves as either from man-made, natural disasters, or from deliberate and extensive use of the then-“unmarketable” reservoir gas. Hydrocarbon fires were accepted as part of the perils of early industry and generally little effort was made to stem their existence.

Since the inception of the petroleum industry, the level of incidents for fires, explosions and environmental pollution that has precipitated from it, has generally paralleled its growth. As the industry has grown, so too has the magnitude of the incidents. The production, distribution, refining, and retailing of petroleum, taken as a whole, represents the world's largest industry in terms of dollar value. Relatively recent major high profile incidents such as Flixborough (1974), Seveso (1976), Bhopal (1984), Shell Norco (1988), Piper Alpha (1988), Exxon Valdez (1989), Phillips Pasadena (1989), BP Texas City (2005), Buncefield, UK (2005), Puerto Rico (2009), Deepwater Horizon/BP (2010) have all amply demonstrated the loss of life, property damage, extreme financial costs, environmental impact and the impact to an organization's reputation that these incidents can produce.

After the catastrophic fire that burned ancient Rome in 64 AD, the emperor Nero rebuilt the city with fire precaution measures that included wide public avenues to prevent fire spread, limitations in building heights to prevent burning embers drifting far distances, provision of fireproof construction to reduce probabilities of major fire events, and improvements to the city water supplies to aid fire fighting efforts. Thus it is evident that the basis of fire prevention requirements such as limiting fuel supplies, removing the available ignition sources (wide avenues and building height limitations) and providing fire control and suppression (water supplies) have essentially been known since civilization began.

Amazingly to us today, Heron of Alexandria, the technical writer of antiquity (circa 100 AD) describes in his journals a two cylinder pumping mechanism with a dirigible nozzle for fire fighting. It is very similar to the remains of a Roman water supply pumping mechanism on display in the British Museum in London. Devices akin to these were also used in the eighteenth and ninetieth century in Europe and America to provide fire fighting water to villages and cities. There is considerable evidence that society has generally tried to prevent or mitigate the effects of fires, admittedly usually only after a major mishap has occurred.

The hydrocarbon and chemical industries have traditionally been reluctant to immediately invest capital where direct return on the investment to the company is not obvious and apparent. Additionally, fire losses in the petroleum and chemical industries were relatively small up to the 1950s. This was due to the small size of the facilities and the relatively low value of oil, gas, and chemicals to the volume of production. Until 1950, a fire or explosion loss of more than $5 million dollars had not occurred in the refining industry in the US. Also in this period, the capital-intensive offshore oil exploration and production industry was only just beginning. The use of gas was also limited early in the 1900s, as its value was also very low. Typically production gas was immediately flared (i.e., disposed of by being burnt off) or the well was capped and considered an uneconomical reservoir. Since gas development was limited, large vapor cloud explosions were relatively rare and catastrophic destruction from petroleum incidents was unheard of. The outlays for petroleum industry safety features were traditionally only the absolute minimum required by governmental regulations. The development of loss prevention philosophies and practices were not effectively developed within the industry until the major catastrophic and financially significant incidents of the 1980s and 1990s.

In the beginnings of the petroleum industry, usually very limited safety features for fire or explosion protection were provided, as was evident by the many early blowouts and fires. The industry became known as a “risky” operation or venture, not only for economic returns, but also for safety (loss of life and property destruction) and environmental impacts, although this was not well understood at the time.

The expansion of industrial facilities after the Second World War, construction of large integrated petroleum and petrochemical complexes, increased development and use of gas deposits, coupled with the rise of oil and gas prices of the 1970s, have led to the sky-rocketing of the value of petroleum products and facilities. It also meant that the industry was awakened to the possibility of large financial losses if a major incident occurred. In fact, fire losses greater than $50 million dollars were first reported during the years 1974 and 1977 (i.e., Flixborough in the United Kingdom, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia). In 1992, the cost just to replace the Piper Alpha platform and resume production was reportedly over $1 billion dollars. In 2005 the Buncefield incident cost was over $1 221 000 000 dollars (£750 million UK pounds reported in insurance claims). In some instances legal settlements have been financially catastrophic, e.g., the Exxon Valdez oil spill legal fines and penalty was $5 billion dollars. In 2009, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) proposed its largest-ever fine of $87 million dollars against BP for a lack of compliance with safety regulations and agreed-upon improvements at the Texas City refinery, after the explosion of 2005. It has already paid out more than $2 billion dollars to settle lawsuits from the incident.

A major incident may also force a company to withdraw from that portion of the business sector because public indignation, prejudice or stigma towards the company strongly develops due to loss of life. The availability of 24-hour news transmissions through worldwide satellite networks, cell phone cameras and texting, or via the internet, emails, and blogs, guarantees that a significant incident in the petroleum or chemical industry will be known worldwide very shortly after it occurs, resulting in immediate public reaction and the prospect of lawsuits.

It is only in the last several decades that most industries have understood and acknowledged that fire and explosion protection measures may also be operational improvement measures, as well as a means of protecting a facility against destruction. An example of how the principle of good safety practice equates to good operating practice is the installation of emergency isolation valves at a facility inlet and outlet pipelines. In an emergency the valves serve to isolate fuel supplies to an incident and therefore limit damage. They could also serve as an additional isolation means to a facility for maintenance or operational activities when a major facility isolation requirement occurs (e.g., Testing and Inspection [T&Is], turnarounds, new process/project tie-ins, etc.). It can be qualitatively shown that it is only limitations in practical knowledge by those involved in facility construction, and cost implications, that have restricted practical applications of adequate fire protection measures throughout history.

Nowadays safety features should hopefully promulgate the design and arrangement of all petroleum and chemical facilities. In fact, in highly industrial societies, before construction of these facilities begin, proof must be given to the appropriate regulatory bodies that the facility has been adequately designed for safety. It is thus imperative that these measures are well defined early in the design concept, to avoid costly project change orders or later incident-remedial measures expenses required by regulatory bodies.

Industry experience has demonstrated that revising a project design in the conceptual and preliminary stages for safety and fire protection features is more cost effective than performing the reviews after the designs has been completed. The Cost Influence Curve for any project acknowledges that 75 percent of a project cost is defined in the first 25 percent of design. On average the first 15 percent of the overall project cost is usually spent on 90 percent of the engineering design. Retrofit or modification costs are estimated at ten times the cost after the plant is built and 100 times after an incident occurs. It is important to understand that fire protection safety principles and practices are also prudent business measures that contribute to the operational efficiencies of a facility. Where this is not realized by management, it contributes to the root cause(s) of eventually an incident occurring. Most of these measures are currently identified and evaluated through a systematic and thorough risk analysis.

1.3Legal Influences

Before 1900, the US industry and the federal governmen...

Table of contents

• Cover Image
• Table of Contents
• Front matter
• Dedication
• Copyright
• Preface
• About the Author
• 1. Introduction
• 2. Overview of Oil and Gas Facilities
• 3. Philosophy of Protection Principles
• 4. Physical Properties of Hydrocarbons
• 5. Characteristics of Hydrocarbon Releases, Fires, and Explosions
• 6. Historical Survey of Fire and Explosions in the Hydrocarbon Industries
• 7. Risk Analysis
• 8. Segregation, Separation, and Arrangement
• 9. Grading, Containment, and Drainage Systems
• 10. Process Controls
• 11. Emergency Shutdown
• 12. Depressurization, Blowdown, and Venting
• 13. Overpressure and Thermal Relief
• 14. Control of Ignition Sources
• 15. Elimination of Process Releases
• 16. Fire and Explosion-Resistant Systems
• 17. Fire and Gas Detection and Alarm Systems
• 18. Evacuation
• 19. Methods of Fire Suppression
• 20. Special Locations, Facilities, and Equipment
• 21. Human Factors and Ergonomic Considerations
• Appendix A. Testing Firewater Systems
• A.1. Testing of Firewater Pumping Systems
• A.2. Testing of Firewater Distribution Systems
• A.3. Testing of Sprinkler and Deluge Systems
• A.4. Testing of Foam Fire Suppression Systems
• A.5. Testing of Firewater Hose Reels and Monitors
• A.6. Fire Protection Hydrostatic Testing Requirements
• Appendix B. Testing Firewater Systems
• B.1. Fire Resistance Testing Standards
• B.2. Explosion and Fire Resistance Ratings
• B.3. National Electrical Manufacturers Association (NEMA) Classifications
• B.4. Hydraulic Data
• B.5. Selected Conversion Factors
• Acronym list
• Glossary
• Index