Pipeline Risk Management Manual

Ideas, Techniques, and Resources

W. Kent Muhlbauer

• Publisher: Gulf Professional Publishing
• Year: 2004
• Print ISBN: 9780750675796
• eBook ISBN: 9780080497709
• Edition: 3
• Topic: Tecnologia e ingegneria
• Subtopic: Scienze ambientali

Here's the ideal tool if you're looking for a flexible, straightforward analysis system for your everyday design and operations decisions. This new third edition includes sections on stations, geographical information systems, "absolute" versus "relative" risks, and the latest regulatory developments. From design to day-to-day operations and maintenance, this unique volume covers every facet of pipeline risk management, arguably the most important, definitely the most hotly debated, aspect of pipelining today.Now expanded and updated, this widely accepted standard reference guides you in managing the risks involved in pipeline operations. You'll also find ways to create a resource allocation model by linking risk with cost and customize the risk assessment technique to your specific requirements. The clear step-by-step instructions and more than 50 examples make it easy. This edition has been expanded to include offshore pipelines and distribution system pipelines as well as cross-country liquid and gas transmission pipelines.- The only comprehensive manual for pipeline risk management- Updated material on stations, geographical information systems, "absolute" versus "relative" risks, and the latest regulatory developments- Set the standards for global pipeline risk management

1 Risk: Theory and Application

Contents

I. The science and philosophy of risk

Embracing paranoia

The scientific method

Modeling

II. Basic concepts

Hazard

Risk

Failure

Probability

Frequency, statistics, and probability

Failure rates

Consequences

Risk assessment

Risk management

Experts

III. Uncertainty

IV. Risk process—the general steps

V. Data collection

What will the data represent?

How will the values be obtained?

What sources of variation exist?

Why are the data being collected?

VI. Conceptualizing a risk assessment approach

Checklist for design

General beliefs

Scope and limitations

Formal vs. informal risk management

Developing a risk assessment model

Risk assessment building blocks

VII. Risk assessment issues

Absolute vs. relative risks

Quantitative vs. qualitative models

Subjectivity vs. objectivity

Use of unquantifiable evidence

VIII. Choosing a risk assessment technique

Model performance tests

IX. Quality and risk management

X. Reliability

I The science and philosophy of risk

Embracing paranoia

One of Murphy’s¹ famous laws states that “left to themselves, things will always go from bad to worse.” This humorous prediction is, in a way, echoed in the second law of thermodynamics. That law deals with the concept of entropy. Stated simply, entropy is a measure of the disorder of a system. The thermodynamics law states that “entropy must always increase in the universe and in any hypothetical isolated system within it” [34]. Practical application of this law says that to offset the effects of entropy, energy must be injected into any system. Without adding energy, the system becomes increasingly disordered.

Although the law was intended to be a statement of a scientific property, it was seized upon by “philosophers” who defined system to mean a car, a house, economics, a civilization, or anything that became disordered. By this extrapolation, the law explains why a desk or a garage becomes increasingly cluttered until a cleanup (injection of energy) is initiated. Gases diffuse and mix in irreversible processes, unmaintained buildings eventually crumble, and engines (highly ordered systems) break down without the constant infusion of maintenance energy.

Here is another way of looking at the concept: “Mother Nature hates things she didn’t create.” Forces of nature seek to disorder man’s creations until the creation is reduced to the most basic components. Rust is an example—metal seeks to disorder itself by reverting to its original mineral components.

If we indulge ourselves with this line of reasoning, we may soon conclude that pipeline failures will always occur unless an appropriate type of energy is applied. Transport of products in a closed conduit, often under high pressure, is a highly ordered, highly structured undertaking. If nature indeed seeks increasing disorder, forces are continuously at work to disrupt this structured process. According to this way of thinking, a failed pipeline with all its product released into the atmosphere or into the ground or equipment and components decaying and reverting to their original premanufactured states represent the less ordered, more natural state of things.

These quasi-scientific theories actually provide a useful way of looking at portions of our world. If we adopt a somewhat paranoid view of forces continuously acting to disrupt our creations, we become more vigilant. We take actions to offset those forces. We inject energy into a system to counteract the effects of entropy. In pipelines, this energy takes the forms of maintenance, inspection, and patrolling; that is, protecting the pipeline from the forces seeking to tear it apart.

After years of experience in the pipeline industry, experts have established activities that are thought to directly offset specific threats to the pipeline. Such activities include patrolling, valve maintenance, corrosion control, and all of the other actions discussed in this text. Many of these activities have been mandated by governmental regulations, but usually only after their value has been established by industry practice. Where the activity has not proven to be effective in addressing a threat, it has eventually been changed or eliminated. This evaluation process is ongoing. When new technology or techniques emerge, they are incorporated into operations protocols. The pipeline activity list is therefore being continuously refined.

A basic premise of this book is that a risk assessment methodology should follow these same lines of reasoning. All activities that influence, favorably or unfavorably, the pipeline should be considered—even if comprehensive, historical data on the effectiveness of a particular activity are not yet available. Industry experience and operator intuition can and should be included in the risk assessment.

The scientific method

This text advocates the use of simplifications to better understand and manage the complex interactions of the many variables that make up pipeline risk. This approach may appear to some to be inconsistent with their notions about scientific process. Therefore, it may be useful to briefly review some pertinent concepts related to science, engineering, and even philosophy.

The results of a good risk assessment are in fact the advancement of a theory. The theory is a description of the expected behavior, in risk terms, of a pipeline system over some future period of time. Ideally, the theory is formulated from a risk assessment technique that conforms with appropriate scientific methodologies and has made appropriate use of information and logic to create a model that can reliably produce such theories. It is hoped that the theory is a fair representation of actual risks. To be judged a superior theory by the scientific community, it will use all available information in the most rigorous fashion and be consistent with all available evidence. To be judged a superior theory by most engineers, it will additionally have a level of rigor and sophistication commensurate with its predictive capability; that is, the cost of the assessment and its use will not exceed the benefits derived from its use. If the pipeline actually behaves as predicted, then everyone’s confidence in the theory will grow, although results consistent with the predictions will never “prove” the theory.

Much has been written about the generation and use of theories and the scientific method. One useful explanation of the scientific method is that it is the process by which scientists endeavor to construct a reliable and consistent representation of the world. In many common definitions, the methodology involves hypothesis generation and testing of that hypothesis:

1. Observe a phenomenon.

2. Hypothesize an explanation for the phenomenon.

3. Predict some measurable consequence that your hypothesis would have if it turned out to be true.

4. Test the predictions experimentally.

Much has also been written about the fallacy of believing that scientists use only a single method of discovery and that some special type of knowledge is thereby generated by this special method. For example, the classic methodology shown above would not help much with investigation of the nature of the cosmos. No single path to discovery exists in science, and no one clear-cut description can be given that accounts for all the ways in which scientifi...

Table of contents

• Cover image
• Title page
• Table of Contents
• Copyright
• Acknowledgments
• Preface
• Introduction
• Risk Assessment at a Glance
• Chapter 1: Risk: Theory and Application
• Chapter 2: Risk Assessment Process
• Chapter 3: Third-Party Damage Index
• Chapter 4: Corrosion Index
• Chapter 5: Design Index
• Chapter 6: Incorrect Operations Index
• Chapter 7: Leak Impact Factor
• Chapter 8: Data Management and Analyses
• Chapter 9: Additional Risk Modules
• Chapter 10: Service Interruption Risk
• Chapter 11: Distribution Systems
• Chapter 12: Offshore Pipeline Systems
• Chapter 13: Stations and Surface Facilities
• Chapter 14: Absolute Risk Estimates
• Chapter 15: Risk Management
• Typical Pipeline Products
• Leak Rate Determination
• Pipe Strength Determination
• Surge Pressure Calculations
• Sample Pipeline Risk Assessment Algorithms
• Receptor Risk Evaluation
• Examples of Common Pipeline Inspection and Survey Techniques
• Glossary
• References
• Index