Money in Historical Perspective

Anna J. Schwartz

• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Year: 2009
• Print ISBN: 9780226742281
• eBook ISBN: 9780226742298
• Topic: Business
• Subtopic: Business General
• Index: Business

Modern monetary economics has been significantly influenced by the knowledge and insight brought to the field by the work of Anna J. Schwartz, an economist whose career has spanned almost half a century. Her contributions evidence a broad expertise in international history and policy, and an ability to apply the results of her careful historical research to current issues and debates. Money in Historical Perspective is a collection of sixteen of her papers selected by Michael D. Bordo and Milton Friedman. Grouped into three sections, the essays constitute a number of Dr. Schwartz's most cited articles on the subject of monetary economics, many of which are no longer readily accessible.

In the papers in part I, dating from 1947 to the present, Dr. Schwartz examines money and banking in the United States and the United Kingdom from a historical perspective. Her investigation of the historical evidence linking economic instability to erratic monetary behavior—this behavior itself a product of discretionary monetary policy—has led her to argue for the importance of stable money, and her writings on these issues over the last two decades form part II. The volume concludes with four recent articles on international monetary arrangements, including Dr. Schwartz's well-known work on the gold standard.

This volume of classic essays by Anna Schwartz will be a useful addition to the libraries of scholars and students for its exemplary historical research and commentary on monetary systems.

I

Money and Banking in Historical Perspective

1

The Beginning of Competitive Banking in Philadelphia, 1782–1809

Two capital banks operating in one city . . . might, perhaps, act in opposition to each other and, of course, destroy each other.—Pelatiah Webster (1786).

The founders of commercial banking in this country doubted seriously that several banks in one community could get along together, especially that the initial bank could survive if one more intruded upon its domain. They reasoned that each new bank would embarrass the established institutions by drawing on their specie reserves to build up its own. A corollary of this argument for monopolistic banking was that each newcomer must of necessity reduce the profits of the others.

But in Philadelphia, the home of the country’s first bank, it was demonstrated—as one rival after another opened its doors in the face of the opposition of older institutions—that competition did not impede their growth. Yet no sooner did a bank win friendly recognition from its elders than it fell prey to the same fear of newcomers. In New York and Baltimore (and possibly also in Boston),¹ as in Philadelphia, a new institution was looked upon as a threat to the security of intrenched banking interests. Only after considerable experience did the banks learn how to minimize the impact of the immediate repercussions of the establishment of another bank, and also how to conduct themselves in their relations with it. This experience, its effects lightened by an expanding demand for bank accommodations and fortuitous accretions to their specie holdings, made the banks generally realize that a competitor’s advent did not necessarily mean their eclipse.

1.1

In May 1781, when the Continental Congress approved the establishment of the Bank of North America, it recommended that, for the duration of the war, no other banking institution be chartered by any state. There was nothing, however, in the charter granted the Bank of North America in March 1782, to suggest that it had been accorded an exclusive right to banking in Pennsylvania either during or after the war. Yet, for a decade after the war ended, the bank was able to preserve its monopolistic position in both Philadelphia and the state.²

Early in 1784 the Bank of North America was faced with the prospect of a rival. The first two years of its existence had been extremely profitable; it paid 8-3/4 percent on its shares in 1782 and 14-1/2 percent in 1783.³ This handsome return in itself was sufficient inducement for others to engage in banking, but there was another motive. The closed character of the ownership of the bank’s stock and its board membership gave rise to an opposition group among the merchants. Quaker businessmen in Philadelphia were excluded from bank proprietorship and claimed that the directors’ partiality to insiders prevented them from obtaining bank loans.

Their demands evidently compelled the Bank of North America to issue more shares. Meeting on January 12, 1784, stockholders agreed to sell one thousand additional shares at $500 each (although the par value of the original shares was $400) and to treat the new and the old shares as equal.⁴ If we can judge by what Thomas Willing, the president of the bank, wrote William Bingham, his son-in-law, before the stockholders’ meeting, the subscription was intended only for outsiders during the first six months: “. . . you’ll be excluded as well as myself from any more shares before the 1st Aug. next . . . unless you get some other person to act for you in the Matter.”⁵ But when the sale of the new shares started, they were offered to stockholders as well as to the general public.

The terms of the proposed increase in the bank’s capital did not cancel plans, announced nine days after the stockholders’ meeting, for a new institution, to be known as the Bank of Pennsylvania. Shares were priced at 400 Spanish milled dollars. On February 5, when seven hundred shares had been subscribed and apparently paid for,⁶ the holders elected a board of directors, composed mainly of Quaker merchants whom the opposition press satirically dubbed “rigid Presbyterians,” “unshaken Quakers,” and “furious Tories.”⁷ On February 10 the subscribers applied to the Assembly for a charter, and the petition was favorably received by the committee to which the matter was referred. When the legislature tabled a request of February 26 by the Bank of North America to be heard in opposition to the new charter, and two days later appointed a committee to bring in a bill,⁸ the bank hastily called a stockholders’ meeting for March 1.

The meeting passed a resolution increasing the amount of the new subscription from one thousand to four thousand shares and reducing the price to $400. Those who had subscribed to five hundred shares at $500 per share were to be refunded the difference. In a statement to the public—signed by Willing; James Wilson, counsel; Thomas FitzSimons and Gouverneur Morris, stockholders—the original advance in the price of the shares was defended. It was claimed that the price was now reduced not out of private considerations but in the public interest, since a new bank would injure commerce.⁹

The bank’s revised stock offer appeased the discontented merchants who had planned forming a rival institution. On March 16, when the bill creating the Bank of Pennsylvania was reached, its directors obtained leave to withdraw their application for a charter.¹⁰ The general subscription to the Bank of North America was so well received that by the end of March its capital, though less than half of the possible $2 million, had more than doubled. One hundred and thirty new stockholders subscribed six hundred shares; the rest were taken by old stockholders or those who had subscribed before March l.¹¹

The Bank of North America’s anxiety about the scheme to establish another bank cannot be explained simply in terms of the supposed effects that sharing the market would have on its profits, although that apprehension was undoubtedly at the root of its opposition. It also feared for its specie holdings. Subscribers to the proposed Bank of Pennsylvania could pay for their shares with specie in general circulation or with Bank of North America notes. Most of them had chosen the latter. As its notes were at once presented for redemption, the Bank of North America was drained of gold and silver. William Seton, the cashier of the proposed Bank of New York, who was visiting in Philadelphia, wrote to Alexander Hamilton on March 27: “Gold and silver had been extracted in such amounts that discounting was stopped, and for this fortnight past not any business had been done at the bank this way. . . . Therefore, for the safety of the community at large, it became absolutely necessary to drop the idea of a new bank, and to join hand in hand to relieve the old bank from the shock it has received.”¹²

Hamilton, who had originally favored the incorporation of the Bank of Pennsylvania, now saw the competition in a different light. He wrote Gouverneur Morris: “I had no doubt that it was against the interests of the proprietors; but, on a superficial view, I perceived benefits to the community, which, on a more close inspection, I found were not real.”¹³ Robert Morris, concluding that there was not enough capital in the country to support several banks, wrote Jefferson on April 8, 1784: “The establishment of so many banks, instead of aiding credits and facilitating operations, will for some time to come have a contrary effect, and it is not without great difficulty that they will each collect a capital sufficient to support its own operations. The struggle to get such capital places these institutions in a degree of opposition to each other injurious to them all.”¹⁴

At the time Morris was writing, exports of specie exceeded imports, owing to an unfavorable balance of trade and the payment of the claims of English creditors for debts contracted before the war.¹⁵ The consequent tightening of the specie supply seemed to confirm his gloomy foreboding that the creation of a new bank would lead to disaster. But he knew, as he indicated two years later, that the flow of specie from this country w...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Copyright
• Title Page
• National Bureau of Economic Research
• Relation of the Directors to the Work and Publications of the National Bureau of Economic Research
• Contents
• Preface
• Acknowledgments
• Introduction
• I. Money and Banking in Historical Perspective
• II. Monetary Policy
• III. International Monetary Arrangements
• Appendix: Publications of Anna J. Schwartz
• Notes
• References
• Index