NOTES
INTRODUCTION
1. Donald Axelrod, Shadow Government: The Hidden World of Public Authorities—And How They Control Over $1 Trillion of Your Money (New York: John Wiley, 1992).
2. Tennessee Valley Authority, Report to SEC, Fiscal Year 2011, 11, http://files.shareholder.com/downloads/TVC/1868315477x0xS1376986–11–74/1376986/filing.pdf (accessed May 14, 2012).
3. New Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, “Financial Statements as of and for the Years Ended December 31, 2007 and 2006,” 4–5, 7, http://www.njsea.com/Offers/pdf/NJSEAFS12_07_06.pdf (accessed August 31, 2009).
4. Peter Hendee Brown, America’s Waterfront Revival: Port Authorities and Urban Redevelopment (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2009), chap. 2; and Hills-borough County Port District, Florida, “Comprehensive Annual Financial Report of the Tampa Port Authority, Fiscal Year Ended September 30, 2008,” iv, http://www.tampaport.com/content/download/6639/28840/file/FY2008%20CAFR%20PUBLISHED.pdf (accessed September 28, 2009).
5. Springfield Parking Authority website, http://www.parkspa.com/aboutus.shtml (accessed January 31, 2010).
6. Infrastructure Management Group, Assessment Report on the City of Springfield Parking System (August 2005), 9, 12, 14, 18, 43, http://www.mass.gov/Asfcb/docs/reports/parking_study.pdf (accessed January 31, 2010).
7. Robert A. Caro, The Power Broker: Robert Moses and the Fall of New York (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1974); and Robert A. Caro, “The City-Shaper,” New Yorker, January 5, 1998, 40.
8. A 2009 report by the Congressional Reference Service lists seventeen currently existing government corporations but states that there can be no definitive list because “the U.S. Code does not provide a single definition of the term ‘government corporation.’” Thus, each compiler makes her/his own determination. In a 1988 report the General Accounting Office counted forty-four government corporations. Kevin R. Kosar, Federal Government Corporations: An Overview (Washington, DC: Congressional Research Service, 2009), 2, 4n21. See also A. Michael Froomkin, “Reinventing the Government Corporation,” University of Illinois Law Review 1995 (1995): 543–634.
The twelve Federal Reserve Banks are not technically government corporations. They are federally chartered, tax-exempt incorporated institutions owned by their member banks, not the government, although they are coordinated at the national level by the Federal Reserve Board whose members are appointed by the president and confirmed by Congress for fixed terms. Congress established the Federal Reserve system in 1913 to manage the nation’s money supply through market and regulatory interventions into the commercial banking system, and its format influenced the design of many later federal programs.
9. United States Government, Budget of the U.S. Government, Fiscal Year 2010: Analytical Perspectives, table 7–14, p. 86. This figure is for six government-created corporate agencies (or integrated systems of agencies), three that relate to housing (Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, Federal Home Loan Banks) and three that relate to agriculture (Agricultural Credit Bank, Farm Credit Banks, Federal Agricultural Mortgage Corporation).
10. Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt ([1993] New York: Vintage Books, 1994), xi.
11. For estimates of total number, see Nicholas Henry, Public Administration and Public Affairs (Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1999), 373. For definitional issues, see Annmarie Hauck Walsh, The Public’s Business: The Politics and Practices of Government Corporations ([1978] Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1980), 5–6, 353–72, 373n1; and Jerry Mitchell, “The Policy Activities of Public Authorities,” Policy Studies Journal 18 (Summer 1990): 928–42. The U.S. Census, Census of Governments is not a definitive source, as it lumps together special districts with public authorities. While the two share certain characteristics, such as structural independence from elected officials (plus a common history), most scholars differentiate between them—the basic distinction being that special districts are governed by elected boards and have the power to tax, whereas public authorities are governed by appointed boards and have no taxing power. For efforts to identify all public authorities in New York, see Office of the State Comptroller, Public Authorities in New York State: Accelerating Momentum to Achieve Reform (Albany, NY: Office of Budget and Policy Analysis, February 2005), 7.
12. Unpublished Census Bureau data for 1949 cited in J. Richard Aronson and John L. Hilley, Financing State and Local Governments (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1986), 251. U.S. Department of Commerce, Census Office, 2002 Census of Governments, vol. 4, no. 5: Government Finances (Washington, DC: GPO, 2005), table 13, p.15. After 2002, the Census Bureau no longer distinguished between debt that was “guaranteed” and “nonguaranteed,” so no later figures are available. Dollar value adjustments were done based on Bureau of Economic Analysis, U.S. Department of Commerce, National Income and Product Accounts Tables, table 1.1.4, Price Indexes for Gross Domestic Product (options selected: annual series and all years), available at http://www.bea.gov/national/nipaweb/TableView.asp?SelectedTable=4&ViewSeries=NO&Java=no&Request3Place=N&3Place=N&FromView=YES&Freq=Year&FirstYear=2008&LastYear=2010&3Place=N&AllYearsChk=YES&Update=Update&JavaBox=no#Mid (accessed March 5, 2011).
13. Joanna Cagan and Neil DeMause, Field of Schemes: How the Great Stadium Swindle Turns Public Money into Private Profit (Monroe, ME: Common Courage Press, 1998), 155–58, esp. 157; Ziona Austrian and Mark S. Rosentraub, “Cleveland’s Gateway to the Future,” in Sports, Jobs, and Taxes: The Economic Impact of Sports Teams and Stadiums, ed. Roger G. Noll and Andrew S. Zimbalist (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 1997), 355–84; and Cleveland Plain Dealer, June 2, 1995, 4B.
14. Henry, Public Administration and Public Affairs, 396; Jameson W. Doig, “‘If I See a Murderous Fellow Sharpening a Knife Cleverly . . .’: The Wilsonian Dichotomy and the Public Authority Tradition,” Public Administration Review 43 (July–August 1983): 295, 297; and Harold Hestnes, “Public Authorities: Should the State Take Away Their Power?” Boston Globe, November 7, 1986, 28, quoted in Jerry Mitchell, The American Experiment with Government Corporations (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 65.
15. Walsh, The Public’s Business, 3.
16. Alberta M. Sbragia, Debt Wish: Entrepreneurial Cities, U.S. Federalism, and Economic Development (Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1996), 14–15.
17. For example, James T. Bennett and Thomas J. DiLorenzo, Underground Government: The Off-Budget Public Sector (Washington, DC: Cato Institute, 1983); Axelrod, Shadow Government; Thomas H. Stanton, A State of Risk: Will Government-Sponsored Enterprises Be the Next Financial Crisis? (New York: HarperBusiness, 1991); Bert Ely, The Farm Credit System: Reckless Past, Doubtful Future (Alexandria, VA: Ely, 1999); and Peter J. Wallison, ed., Serving Two Masters, But Out of Control: Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac (Washington, DC: AEI Press, 2001).
18. Emmette S. Redford and Charles B. Hagan, American Government and the Economy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), 623.
19. Richard Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (New York: Knopf, 1955).
20. Martin J. Sklar, “Woodrow Wilson and the Political Economy of Modern United States Liberalism,” Studies on the Left 1 (Fall 1960): 41. See also Samuel Haber, Efficiency and Uplift: Scientific Management and The Progressive Era, 1890–1920 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1964); Gabriel Kolko, The Triumph of Conservatism: A Reinterpretation of American History (New York: Free Press, 1963); and James Weinstein, The Corporate Ideal in the Liberal State, 1900–1918 (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968).
21. Jack H. Knott and Gary J. Miller, Reforming Bureaucracy: The Politics of Institutional Choice (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1987), 3.
22. Walsh, The Public’s Business, 25; and Doig, “‘If I See a Murderous Fellow Sharpening a Knife Cleverly . . . ,’” 295. The rise of the Right in American politics in the 1970s and 1980s prompted a reappraisal of liberalism, which is still under way. See, for example: Richard L. McCormick, “The Discovery That Business Corrupts Politics: A Reappraisal of the Origins of Progressivism,” American Historical Review 86 (April 1981): 247–74; Michael Frisch, “Urban Theorists, Urban Reform, and American Political Culture in the Progressive Period,” Political Science Quarterly 97 (Summer 1982): 295–315; Alan Dawley, Struggles for Justice: Social Responsibility and the Liberal State (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1991); Gary Gerstle, “The Protean Character of American Liberalism,” American Historical Review 99 (October 1994): 1043–73; Judith Sealander, Grand Plans: Business Progressivism and Social Change in Ohio’s Miami Valley, 1890–1929 (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1988); and Alan Brinkley, “Liberalism’s Third Crisis,” American Prospect 21 (Spring 1995): 28–34.
23. Roosevelt’s letter quoted in Robert G. Smith, Ad Hoc Governments: Special Purpose Transportation Authorities in Britain and the United States (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1974), 107–8.
24. E. H. Foley, “Legal Problems Affecting the Non-Federal Phases of the Public Works Program,” American Bar Association, Section of Municipal Law, August 1934, 30.
CHAPTER 1
1. Quoted in Jordan A. Schwarz, The New Dealers: Power Politics in the Age of Roosevelt ([1993] New York: Vintage, 1994), 4.
2. Quoted in John J. Broesamle, William Gibbs McAdoo: A Passion for Change, 1863–1917 (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973), 14.
3. Otis L. Graham, Jr., “William Gibbs McAdoo,” Dictionary of American Biography, Supplement 3 (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1973), 479–80. Quote from Broesamle, William Gibbs McAdoo, 12.
4. Broesamle, William Gibbs McAdoo, 16–31; and William G. McAdoo, Crowded Years: The Reminiscences of ...