Aristotle

Democracy and Political Science

Delba Winthrop, Harvey C. Mansfield

• Publisher: University of Chicago Press
• Year: 2018
• Print ISBN: 9780226840123, 9780226553542
• eBook ISBN: 9780226553689
• Topic: Politics & International Relations
• Subtopic: Ancient & Classical Philosophy
• Index: Politics & International Relations

A thought-provoking exploration of assertiveness within Aristotle's work and how it affects democratic functioning.

Today, democracy is seen as the best or even the only legitimate form of govern­ment. With this book, Delba Winthrop punctures this complacency and takes up the chal­lenge of justifying democracy through Aristotle's political science. In Aristotle's time and in ours, democrats want inclu­siveness; they want above all to include everyone as a part of a whole. But what makes a whole? This is a question for both politics and philosophy, and Winthrop shows that Aristotle pursues the answer in the Politics. She uncovers in his political science the insights philoso­phy brings to politics and, especially, the insights politics brings to philosophy. Through her appreciation of this dual purpose and her skilled execution of her argument, Winthrop makes profound discoveries. Central to politics, she main­tains, is the quality of assertiveness—the kind of speech that demands to be heard. Aristotle, she shows for the first time, carries assertive speech into philosophy, where human reason claims its due as a contribution to the universe. Political science has the high role of teaching ordinary folk about democracy and what sustains it.

This posthumous publication is more than an honor to Delba Winthrop's memory. It is a gift to partisans of democ­racy, advocates of justice, and students of Aristotle.

Appendix 1

A Note on the Translation

For the convenience and occasional frustration of the reader and, ultimately, for the defense of this writer, my own translation of Book III of Aristotle’s Politics is included in this volume. In translating, I have abandoned any attempts at gracefulness because of my greater concern with literalness. It is my opinion that most of the English translations are deficient in the latter respect. Of those translations the best, to my knowledge, is the one done by Thomas Taylor1 at the beginning of the nineteenth century. I became aware of its existence only as I was completing my own translation. I have drawn from it to some extent, as well as from the English translation of H. Rackham2 and the French of J. Aubonnet.3 E. Barker’s translation4 was consulted but not used. The notes and commentaries in editions of the Greek by W. L. Newman5 and by F. Susemihl and R. D. Hicks6 often proved helpful. The text used was that of the Oxford Classical edition.7

The premise guiding my procedure in translating is a conclusion painfully arrived at, not a presupposition. The contention of this book is that the Politics can and should be read literally in order to be understood fully. Once it was thought that the Politics might only be a set of lecture notes. That this is in any case Aristotle’s own work is no longer seriously contested, and that the Politics might indeed be a book is conceded as a possibility.8 The manuscripts of the Politics are late, and are often asserted not to be good; that some passages are exceedingly difficult to read with confidence remains a problem. Nevertheless, that the book may have been written with as much care as, for example, a Platonic dialogue;9 that the manuscripts are not hopelessly corrupt merely for being late; and that there are not arguably better guesses at difficult passages are possibilities that the translator should not foreclose to the reader’s own consideration without serious reflection. My attempts at serious reflection, not any alleged superior knowledge of Greek, have led me to take issue with previous translators. Most authorities are not on my side; my argument must be judged on its merits. The argument, stated briefly, is that the Politics is intentionally written in an ambiguous manner with the understanding that, while philosophers do not tell untruths, not all philosophic truths—or, rather, philosophic speculations—can be baldly announced. The argument is, further, that the explanation of this necessary circumstance of philosophy and a suggestion about what must be done to face it are presented in Book III of the Politics. Thus, an explication of the meaning of the text is a justification of this awkward but literal translation.

The translation presented here will perplex some readers in one respect. In the case of words or constructions that are ambiguous in the Greek and could not be rendered sufficiently so in English, I have often deliberately rendered them in a way that brings out the less obvious meaning. For example, the word oikeios has the primary meaning of “pertaining to the household” and the secondary meaning of “proper, suitable” as well as “akin to.” Because Aristotle seems to use the household to stand for the human things as distinguished from the rest of nature, and for the training of souls for politics and philosophy under the guidance of philosophy rather than convention, I have retained the primary sense of the word whenever it occurs, however awkward it may seem. What I have translated as “management” is also, in its primary meaning, “household management.” A crucial word with several meanings is archē: “beginning,” “first principle,” “rule,” “office,” “magistrate.” I have rendered it consistently as “rule,” even when “office” or “magistrate” may be the intended meaning, or as “beginning” when necessary. Genos is “genus,” the technical term for a class of things, but also “race” or “family”; both translations have been given. Sympherō means “to benefit” or “to bring together”; I have rendered it as “to benefit.”

The reading of the text is facilitated by recalling several reasonable procedures that are useful for reading any book unless one simply assumes that it need not be read with special care. First, an example, especially when said to be an example, is to be understood as being no more than one example. Merely because a statement is illustrated with a political example, one should not infer that the principle stated has only political application. Also, two nouns or verbs connected by “and” are not necessarily identical to one another, no matter how similar they may appear. For example, Aristotle once speaks of political rules over citizens put together according to equality and according to similarity. Reasonably, equality should apply to quantities and similarity to qualities. If things equal in mass can still differ from each other as might a big baboon from a small philosopher, then the “citizens” referred to are not necessarily the same. Furthermore, there is no reason to suppose that repetitions with the phrase “exactly as was said before” should not be exactly, not almost, as they were said before. Differences should, therefore, be noted. Finally, conclusions that are “apparent” should perhaps be distinguished from those that are not so qualified. Other suggestions will be offered as necessary in the body of the commentary.

Appendix 2

Translation of Aristotle’s Politics, Book III

1274b32–1275a2

For one inspecting the regime [regimes],1 what each is and of what sort it is, almost the first examination is to behold the city, what the city is. For now they dispute, some asserting the city to have done a deed, some not the city but the oligarch or the tyrant. And we see all the business of the statesman and legislator to be with the city. And the regime is some ordering of those who make their homes in the city. Since the city is of composed things, like some other whole organized from many parts, it is manifest that first the citizen must be sought. The city is some multitude of citizens, hence, who must be called a citizen and who is a citizen must be examined.

1274b41–1275b21

The city is some multitude of citizens, hence who must be called a citizen and who is a citizen must be examined. The citizen is often disputed, for not all agree that the same one is a citizen. He who is a citizen in a democracy is often not a citizen in an oligarchy. We omit those who have chanced upon the title in some other way, for example a made citizen. A citizen is not a citizen in making his home someplace, for even resident aliens and slaves share in domicile. Nor are they (citizens) who have a part in the just things, in such a way as to submit to right and to try [or be tried]. For this also belongs to those who share in contracts and they have these things, while resident aliens everywhere partake in these things, though not completely; but they must have a patron because they partake somehow incompletely in this sort of community. But, like children who because they are not yet of the age to have been enrolled, and like the old who because they have been discharged, they must be asserted to be citizens; not quite absolutely, but adding, on the one hand, incompletely, and on the other, passed the prime or some such thing. It makes no difference, as is manifest from what has been said. We seek the citizen simply, one who has no such accusation needing to be straightened out, since the same difficulties are raised and solved concerning the dishonored and exiled. The citizen simply is defined by nothing so much as by partaking in judgment [krinō] and in rule [archē, also office, the first principle or cause, the beginning]. Of rules, some are limited in time, so in some for the same one to rule wholly twice is not possible, or (he rules) only through some defined time. But another is unlimited, for example, the juror and assembly member. Perhaps someone would assert that these are not rules, nor does one partake in rule through these things. Yet it would be ridiculous to defraud the most sovereign ones of rule. But let it make no difference, for the argument [logos, argument, reason, or reasonable speech] is about a name. What is common to a juryman and assembly member is nameless; that is, what ought to be called the matters of both. For the sake of definition, let it be unlimited rule. We set down as citizens those who partake in this manner.

A definition almost like this would best fit all the citizens spoken of. But it is necessary not to forget that among things in which what underlies them differs in form and among which one is first, another second, another next, and being such as they are, either there is nothing of what is common in them or a niggardly amount. But we see regimes differing in form from each other, some being later, others prior. The erring and divergent necessarily are later than the unerring. What we mean by divergent will be apparent later. Thus, a citizen is necessarily other according to each regime. Because of this, the one spoken of is a citizen especially in a democracy, while in the others it is a possibility, but not necessary. For in some there is no people [dēmos], nor do they customarily believe in an assembly, but rather in specially summoned councils. And they try lawsuits according to parts. For example, in Sparta those about contracts are tried by different ephors in different cases, and the elders try murders, and perhaps some other rule others. And it is the same way in Carthage, where some rules judge all lawsuits. But the definition of a citizen admits of correction. In the other regimes, the assembly member and juryman is not an unlimited ruler, but is defined according to the rule. It is given either to all or some of these to deliberate and judge about either all or some things. Therefore, what a citizen is is apparent from these things. He who has the possibility [or right] of sharing in the rule of deliberating with skill and judging with skill we say is already a citizen of this city, the city being a multitude of such men sufficient for self-sufficiency of life, to speak loosely.

1275b22–1276b15

For use, a citizen is defined as one from citizens on both sides, not one or the other only, for example, father or mother. But some seek further, for example, for two or three or more ancestors. Given this political [or statesmanlike] and brief definition, some raise a difficulty about that third or fourth man. How will he be a citizen? Thus Gorgias of Leontini [“Little Lion”], perhaps at a loss about some things and being ironic about others, asserted that exactly as mortars are the things made by mortar makers, so the Larissaeans are those who have been made by the demiurges, for some of them are Larissa makers. [The name given Larissaean magistrates was demiourgos; demiourgos also means craftsman, and the city of Larissa was famous for its kettles, called Larissas.] But this is simple: if they had a part in the regime according to the mentioned definition, they were citizens. It is not possible to fit the qualification of being from a citizen father and a citizen mother to the first who made their homes or were founders.

But perhaps, rather, those who came to partake after a change in the regime have a difficulty; for example, in Athens those made by Cleisthenes [“Lock, of Key, or Strength”] after the expulsion of the tyrants. For many foreign and slavish resident aliens were enrolled in tribes. The dispute about these is not who is a citizen, but whether one is so unjustly or justly. And even about this someone might raise a further difficulty: whether if one is not justly a citizen, is he then not a citizen, as if the capacity of the unjust and the false were the same. Since we see some ruling unjustly, we shall assert that they rule, but not justly. But the citizen is defined by some rule, for a citizen is one sharing in some such rule, as we asserted. It is manifest that even these must be asserted to be citizens, but whether in justice or not is bound to the dispute previously mentioned.

Some raise the difficulty, when did the city do something and when did the city not do it, for example, whenever a democracy comes into being from an oligarchy or tyranny. Then some choose neither to discharge their contracts, alleging them not to have been undertaken by the city but by the tyrant, nor many other such things, alleging that some regimes are because they are strong, not because they are for the benefit in common. Therefore, if some democracies are ruled in the same way, one must assert that the deeds of this regime are of the city in the same way as are the deeds of the oligarchy and the tyranny.

The argument seems to be of the household of this difficulty, somehow: When should one say that the city is the same or not the same, but other? The most superficial search of the difficulty is concerning the place and the human beings. It is possible that the humans have been unharnessed from the place and have come to make their homes some in one and some in another place. In this way the difficulty must be set down as tamer, for in the city being spoken of, such a search as this is often somehow more at ease. Similarly, of humans settling down in the same place, when must one believe the city to be a one? Surely not with respect to walls, for it would be possible to throw one wall around the Peloponnesus [“Dark-colored Toil”]. Perhaps even Babylon is a case of this sort, and all cities that have the outline more of a nation than a city. They assert of it that three days after having been conquered, some part of the city did not sense it. But the examination of this difficulty will be useful for another occasion. The statesman must not forget about the extent of the city and how many and whether one or several nations are beneficial [or brought together]. But of these settling down in the same place, must the city be asserted to be the same as long as the race [genos, also family or genus] of settlers is the same, even though some are always perishing and some coming into being, exactly as we are in the habit of saying that rivers are the same and springs are the same even though some running water is always being added and some gradually disappearing? Or must it be asserted that while the human beings are the same, through such a cause the city is another? If the city is some community, it is a community of citizens in a regime. The regime becoming another in form and differing in regime, it would seem necessary that the city be not the same, exactly as we assert that a chorus that is sometimes comic and sometimes tragic is another chorus, even though it is often of the same human beings. And, similarly with every other community and other compound, should the form of the compound be other. For example, we say that a harmony of the same sounds is other if it is sometimes Dorian and sometimes Phrygian. Therefore, if this is the same, it is apparent that the city must be said to be the same mostly with a regard for its regime. It is possible to call it by the same or another name both when its settlers are the same and when they are entirely other human beings. Whether it is just for the city to dissolve or not dissolve (its contracts) when the regime changes into another is another argument.

1276b16–1277b32

What follows from the things now mentioned is to inspect whether the virtue of the good man and the serious citizen must be set down as the same or not the same. But surely if it is necessary to chance upon this search, the (virtue) of the citizen in some impress must first be taken hold of. Therefore, exactly as the seaman is some one among those who share, thus we assert the citizen to be also. And even as seamen are dissimilar in capacity, for one is a rower, another a pilot, another a helmsman, another having some other name of this sort, it is manifest that the most accurate argument about the virtue of each will be peculiar [private]. But similarly, some common one will fit all. The saving of the voyage is the work of all of these, for each of the seamen reaches for this. Similarly now, also for citizens, although they are dissimilar, the saving of the community is the work. The regime is the community. Because of this, the virtue of the citizen necessarily must be according to the regime. Therefore, if indeed there are several forms of regime, it is manifest that it is not possible for the virtue of the serious citizen to be one and complete. But we assert that a man is good according to a virtue one and complete. Therefore, it is apparent that it is possible for a citizen who is serious not to possess the virtue according to which a man is serious.

But now, by raising great difficulties it is possible to go through the same argument in another way, with reference to the best regime. If it is impossible for the city to be composed of all serious ones, but each must do well a work that is his own [according to the same], this is by virtue. Since it is impossible that all the citizens be similar, then the virtue of the citizen and the good man would not be one. All must have the (virtue) of the serious citizen, for this is necessary for the city to be the best, but it is impossible that (all have the virtue) of the good man, if it is not necessary that all the citizens in the serious city be good. Still, the city is from dissimilars, as a creature is immediately of soul and body, and soul of reason [logos] and desire, and a household of man and woman, and property of master and slave. In the same way, the city is formed together from all these, and besides these other dissimilar forms. Then it is necessary that the virtue of all the citizens not be one, exactly as it is not of dancers, the head dancer and the one who stands beside him. Wherefore that it is not simply the same is apparent from these things.

But then will the virtue of some serious citizen and some serious man be the same? We assert that the serious ruler is ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Contents
• Foreword
• introduction
• one
• two
• three
• Appendix 1: A Note on the Translation
• Appendix 2: Translation of Aristotle’s Politics, Book III
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index