A Foucault Primer
A Foucault
Primer
Discourse, Power and the Subject
Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace
Š Alec McHoul and Wendy Grace 1993
First published in 1993 by Melbourne University Press
Published elsewhere (excluding Australia, New Zealand and
North America) in 1995 by
UCL Press Limited
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ISBN: 1-85728-553-0 PB
Contents
Preface
Acknowledgements
1 Foucaultâs Counter-history of Ideas
General background: discourse, power and knowledge
Marxism
History of ideas
Structural linguistics
Critique
2 Discourse
Non-Foucauldian conceptions of discourse
Foucaultâs rethinking of discourse
Discourse and politics
3 Power
An ontology of the present
A disciplined society
Scientia sexualis
Analysis
4 The Subject
The sexual subject in ancient Greece
Sex and the self from Plato to Plutarch
Gender and sexuality: continuing problems
Bibliography
Index
Preface
This book is intended as a brief introduction to the work of the philosopher and historian, Michel Foucault (1926â84). It is directed at undergraduates and others who are beginning to read his work and may be in need of a conceptual overview. The book comes out of a much larger project on Foucaultâs work. So what we present here is very much a cut-down version of our writing on the topic. It began when we were working as lecturer and student in a course on discourse analysis at Murdoch University, and continued via Wendy Graceâs honours thesis (1992) on Foucaultâs feminist reception. It is very much a collaborative project between teacher and student, working in as collegial a way as that institutional arrangement can allow.
In this book we have very few axes to grind, and we have deliberately omittedâfor reasons of available spaceâmany of our misgivings about both Foucaultâs work and, more especially, other peopleâs commentaries on it. Our aim here is exegetical rather than critical. This said, however, a few basic assumptions underlie our attempt to describe Foucaultâs work for beginners.
First, for complex reasons which we have no space to elaborate on here, we do not believe that Foucault provides a definitive theory of anything in the sense of a set of unambiguous answers to time-worn questions. In this respect, there is little benefit to be gained from asking what, for example, is Foucaultâs theory of power? Nevertheless, his work clearly involves various types of theorisation. This is because we regard Foucault as first and foremost a philosopher who does philosophy as an interrogative practice rather than as a search for essentials. His investigations are conceptual, and the main concepts he approaches in his workâdiscourse, power and the subject (among others)âseem to us to be geared towards what he called an âontology of the presentâ. That is, Foucault is asking a very basic philosophical question: who are we? Or perhaps: who are we today?
Secondly, Foucault, like many continental European thinkers, does not separate philosophy from history in the way that many English-speaking philosophers do. The question of the ontology of the present (who are we today?) entails for him the question of the emergence of the modern human subject along a number of conceptual fronts. If, that is, we want to know who we are in terms of either the disciplines (or forms of knowledge) we have of ourselves, or the political forces which make us what we are, or our âinternalâ relations to ourselves, we are necessarily faced (according to Foucault) with historical forms of enquiry. But at the same time Foucault is no historical determinist. Things, he insists throughout his work, could easily have been different. What we are now is not what we must necessarily be by virtue of any iron laws of history. History is as fragile as it seems, in retrospect, to be fixed. But, for Foucault, history is never simply in retrospect, never simply âthe pastâ. It is also the medium in which life today is conducted. In a brief phrase: Foucault is the philosopher and historian of âotherwiseâ.
Thirdly, it is common nowadays to treat Foucaultâs work in terms of relatively fixed âperiodsâ. According to some commentators, his work divides into three phases: the first concentrates on the description of discourses or disciplines of knowledge (particularly the human sciences); the second turns to political questions of power, and the control of populations through disciplinary (for example, penal) practices; and the third involves some apparently new discovery of a âtheory of the selfâ. More alarmingly, some commentators have tied these radical shifts to changes in Foucaultâs personal biography (J. Miller, 1993). By contrast, we want to say both âyesâ and ânoâ to this periodisation of Foucaultâs work. On the one hand there are clearly differences of focus and intensity as his work alters and develops. On the other, the general question of the ontology of the present remains. Not surprisingly, Foucaultâs own work is a matter of both continuity and discontinuity.
Foucaultâs early work (from Madness and Civilisation to The Archaeology of Knowledge) pays a great deal of attention to epistemic questions, or questions of knowledge. The âunitsâ of knowledge, at this time, are called âdiscoursesâ. But political questions and questions about the subject are never far from the surface. Likewise, in the supposedly âmiddle phaseâ of his work (marked mostly clearly by Discipline and Punish and the first volume of The History of Sexuality), Foucault is often presumed to have taken on the more overtly political questions of control, management, surveillance and policing, and shifted his attention from discourse and knowledge to the body and its politicisation. Yet Discipline and Punish, to take only one example, openly declares itself to be âa correlative history of the modern soul and of a new power to judgeâ (1977a:23). It is easy to remember the power and the judgement but to forget the question of the subject (âthe soulâ)âand indeed to forget the fact that the famous powers of judgement are exercised in, as, and through, disciplines or discourses. Then in the last works (especially the second and third volumes of The History of Sexuality), it is common enough to find that âthe subjectâ has suddenly burst on to the sceneâat the expense, as it were, of the discursive and the political (McNay, 1992). Yet âthe subjectâ is in evidence throughout Foucaultâs workâalbeit under different aspects, tensions and methods of analysis. This supposedly new âethicalâ questioning of the subject (in terms of the relations one has with oneself) is just as political a question, however, as that of âexternalâ surveillance or the coercion of the confessional. Perhaps it is true that in ancient Greece and Rome (the periods Foucault studies in these last volumes) there was less disciplinary (scientific) or political-legal control over human conduct. But it was controlledâperhaps, for some, almost entirely by oneself. And this, too, is a political question.
In this way, then, we find a similar question being askedâwho are we now?âthrough a variety of different means and thematised concepts: discourse, power and the subject. Indeed, Foucault himself offered strikingly similar descriptions of the seminal works from each of his supposed periods. The Archaeology of Knowledge, he writes, is not about (the then fashionable) question of structure; rather, âlike those that preceded it . . . [it] belongs to that field in which the questions of the human being, consciousness, origin, and the subject emerge, intersect, mingle and separate offâ (1972:16). Similarly, Discipline and Punish offers an analysisâalbeit with a different focusâof a similar set of questions about who we are. It is âa genealogy . . . of the modem âsoulââ and, moreover:
It would be wrong to say that the soul is an illusion, or an ideological effect. On the contrary, it exists, it has a reality, it is produced permanently around, on, within the body by the functioning of a power. (1977a:29)
Then, having detailed this âtheoretical shiftâ of focus from discursive practices to studies of power, in the introduction to the second volume of The History of Sexuality Foucault goes on to describe his second âshiftâ as follows: âIt seemed appropriate to look for the forms and modalities of the relation to self by which the individual constitutes and recognizes himself qua subjectâ (1986a:6). In these shifts of concentrations from discourse to power and the subject, something is therefore retained: the broad philosophical question about who we are, constituted historically in terms of both what has been and its fragility.
In this book, therefore, we treat each of these concepts as a separate but related aspect of Foucaultâs ontology of the present. His approaches to these aspects of ourselves today can be framed as a set of questions:
- who are we in terms of our knowledges of ourselves?
- who are we in terms of the ways we are produced in political processes?
- who are we in terms of our relations with ourselves and the ethical forms we generate for governing these?
These amount to separate questions, respectively, about discourse, power and the subject. But their proximity to one another, and the historical fragility of each of them, cannot be ignored.
Our ways of approaching the concepts of discourse, power and subjection in Foucault are not identical in each case. In Chapter 1 we offer a general overview of Foucaultâs disciplinary areaâthe history of ideasâand his critical interventions into this field. The approach we take, however, is not a particularly âFoucauldianâ or âgenealogicalâ one at this stage. Rather it is, in itself, more like a traditional history of ideas. But, for this reason, we hope it is more accessible for the beginner. Chapter 2 consists, again, of a general discussion of Foucaultâs concept of discourse and puts particular stress on his own reflections on this concept rather than looking at how it works in actual analyses such as Madness and Civilisation or The Birth of the Clinic. In Chapter 3, we change direction somewhat. Although this chapter gives a general introduction to Foucaultâs ideas on power, and gives examples of his use of the concept, it also goes somewhat further than this and queries some of the secondary interpretive work in the area. The final chapter attempts to introduce Foucaultâs work on the subject and subjection via a detailed exegesis of the contents of his last works on sexuality. But in addition, at the end, it looks at how this work has been read by (particularly feminist) critics and suggests that there remain problems with their criticisms. To this extent, we end by arguing that Foucaultâs work has not yet been fully exploited for its possible contributions to contemporary debates on questions of gender and sexuality.
Acknowledgements
Several colleagues have helped our understanding of Foucault to develop into this book. In particular we would like to thank Toby Miller, Tom OâRegan, Bob Hodge, Teresa Ashforth, Jeff Malpas, Alison Lee, John Frow, Ian Hunter, Niall Lucy and Gary Wickham. Kind assistance with the editing and production of the book was provided by Susan Hayes, Garry Gillard, Nicola Rycroft, Venetia Nelson and Ken Ruthvenâand we extend our thanks to them. We would especially like to thank Ken for his continuing encouragement of the project and, above all, for the sympathetic and meticulous work he has done on our drafts.
This book is dedicated to the memory of H272, Discourse Analysis, and to all who suffered it.
Murdoch University
May 1993
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