Dangerous Allies

Malcolm Fraser, Cain Roberts

• Publisher: Melbourne University Press Digital
• Year: 2016
• Print ISBN: 9780522867688
• eBook ISBN: 9780522867893
• Topic: Política y relaciones internacionales
• Subtopic: Comunismo, poscomunismo y socialismo

Australia has always been reliant on 'great and powerful friends' for its sense of national security and for direction on its foreign policy—first on the British Empire and now on the United States. Australia has actively pursued a policy of strategic dependence, believing that making a grand bargain with a powerful ally was the best policy to ensure its security and prosperity.
Dangerous Allies examines Australia's history of strategic dependence and questions the continuation of this position. It argues that international circumstances, in the world and in the Western Pacific especially, now make such a policy highly questionable. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, the United States has also changed dramatically, making it less relevant to Australia and a less appropriate ally on which Australia should rely.
Malcolm Fraser argues that Australia should adopt a much greater degree of independence in foreign policy, and that we should no longer merely follow other nations into wars of no direct interest to Australia or Australia's security. He argues for an end to strategic dependence and for the timely establishment of a truly independent Australia.

Part I

Loyal to the Crown, dependent on Empire

‘… there is no pretence of claiming the power of peace or war, or exercising power outside our territories.’

Alfred Deakin

1

Colonial foundations of strategic dependence

Australia’s history of strategic dependence pre-dates the creation of the Commonwealth of Australia, taking root in the early years of the individual colonies. The one thing that stands out in reading our colonial history is the limitation on the aspirations of our legislators for independence over foreign and defence policy. The connection of the colonies to Great Britain and the British Empire was through the Colonial Office, an institution that colonial leaders felt did not always have their best interests at heart.

The colonies wanted to be able to do what they thought was best within their own boundaries but, with rare exceptions, colonists and colonial politicians had no ambition for separate action in relation to foreign affairs or defence. They did, however, wish to strengthen their position within the Empire to make their voice stronger than it might otherwise have been. Although the Colonial Office was the key link to imperial affairs, it was also an impediment to a stronger voice for the colonies.

The notions of what it meant to be a colonist were very different from the way Australians feel about themselves today. Colonists regarded themselves as British, and this overriding sentiment of imperial allegiance remained for many years after Federation.1 Many referred to Britain as home despite the fact that they might not have been born there and might never have visited the United Kingdom. The sense of being British was overwhelming, and led directly to obligations to Britain to help fight Britain’s wars and to dependence on Britain for our own defence. Ties to Britain through race, through economic dependence, through genuine affection for and belief in the Empire would all have made any push for full independence quite impossible. There was a sense of ‘pride of race’ or ‘British race patriotism’. The colonies strongly felt they were part of the best in the world.2

The issues that arose in those earlier years, however, led colonists to believe that they would be better off in one federation. The development of the self-governing colonies, the influence of foreign policy and defence on the attitudes of the colonists and the moves to Federation itself, all influence each other. The themes move in and out of the story reinforcing and leading inevitably to Federation. There was no one reason for Federation.

Yet one thing that stands out clearly throughout the history of the self-governing colonies to their unification in 1901 is that the argument for a fully strategically independent nation, standing free and in its own right, was never part of the story. Although the colonists wanted greater influence and greater authority over their futures, they wanted influence within the Empire, in the belief that dependence upon a great power offered them the best chance of a stable and secure future. That desire for protection, that fear of standing alone, were never openly expressed, but they were very much part of the Australian story. They remain so to this day.

By the end of the 1850s, all Australian colonies, with the exception of Western Australia, had been granted self-government yet, until Federation, the United Kingdom maintained legal and constitutional control of foreign affairs and defence.3 The powers defined, for example in the constitutions of New South Wales and Victoria in 1855, were broad and vague in the extreme; in New South Wales’s case, ‘to make laws for the peace, welfare and good government of the said colony’.4 There were limitations on the powers of the self-governing colonies because certain payments needed to be paid to the United Kingdom for services and for administration. Such matters could not be altered without the approval of the Imperial Parliament. It says much about the attitude of the time that there was no mention in these constitutions of the self-governing colonies of Aboriginals—a sentiment that has yet to be remedied in the Australian Constitution.

Despite being self-governing, the power of the colonies was in many ways strictly limited, particularly when it came to foreign and defence policies. The powers to declare war, negotiate treaties or exchange diplomats with other states were not afforded to the colonies.5 Their only ‘legitimate point of contact’ with the international system was via agents general appointed to London to facilitate business such as immigration and loan funds, which had to be raised in the United Kingdom.6 Even these officers had limited, if any, direct communication with key institutions of the British Government, let alone the British Prime Minister, as colonial matters were strictly managed through the Colonial Office. Direct communication with other states would have been unthinkable. Although the colonial governments might have felt at times restricted by the Colonial Office, they valued the ties to the Mother Country, and the Colonial Office was their conduit to imperial policy.

The separate colonies therefore had no aspirations beyond the domestic provisions enshrined in their individual constitutions—the notion of greater autonomy, let alone strategic independence, was non-existent. The unstated bargain was that the government of the United Kingdom would protect the self-governing colonies and the colonies would themselves fulfil their duty to respond to the call of the Empire.7 Foreign affairs and defence matters were regarded as the exclusive province of the Imperial Parliament.

This might seem a naive position for colonial governments to have taken, yet the colonies were very conscious of the worldwide dominance of the Royal Navy. Colonial leaders believed that it was ‘the solid basis on which the defence policy of Australia may safely rest’.8 This was particularly so because none of the colonies had the industrial capacity nor the population to support significant military forces of their own. Colonial governments took great comfort in the security provided by such a powerful protector, believing that the British Government had a responsibility to protect them and that, in reward, London could regard the colonies of the South Pacific as a British preserve.9 This colonial sense of strategic dependence would act as a tie to the Mother Country for decades to come. Yet during this period communication was obviously slow and understanding often imperfect and, as these self-governing colonies matured, they came to resent what they regarded as the heavy hand of the Colonial Office. Despite having achieved self-governing status, which for some colonies occurred not long after their settlement, it was not long before leading colonial politicians started to look to the future.

The colonies slowly understood that they needed greater influence with imperial policy-making structures if they were to preserve and enhance their own identity and avoid dangers for the future. This was true even in the area of external affairs and defence, with reluctant colonial governments voicing concerns over actions of European powers in Australia’s vicinity throughout the 1800s. The colonies’ concern with foreign affairs seemed very much restricted to the actual or possible ownership of territories close to Australia by potentially hostile powers. This included the French, the Germans and later the Japanese. Papua New Guinea, the New Hebrides and Fiji were mentioned on a number of occasions.10 It was the view of all the colonies that British control of these territories was the best guarantee to avoid a potentially hostile neighbour.

Of particular strategic importance to the colonies was the status of New Guinea, specifically the eastern regions that were not under Dutch control. In 1874 Henry Parkes, Premier of New South Wales, wrote a sharply worded memo to the British Government drawing attention to the possible colonisation of New Guinea by a foreign power. He argued that such an event would be ‘an embarrassment’ and emphasised that Australians would approve colonisation of the territory by Britain. In 1875 the Parliament of Queensland, the colony most concerned about the future status of New Guinea, passed a resolution urging all parts of the island not under Dutch authority to be annexed by the British.11 New Guinea was the largest island close to Australia and was both productive and fertile. It was important for it to be in friendly hands to preserve freedom of the seas surrounding it, which were increasingly important to Australian trade. For this territory to be in the hands of a foreign power would have been intolerable for political, trade and cultural reasons. Parkes’ approach and the Queensland resolution were both rejected by the British Government.

In 1882 a number of colonies expressed concern regarding French activities in the New Hebrides. The British did no more than inform the French that annexation would ‘give offence to Australia’.12 It did, however, lead to a declaration by both Great Britain and France that the New Hebrides would be neutral territory and to the establishment of a joint naval commission in 1887 to protect the rights of their respective citizens.13 This would ultimately lead to the Anglo-French Condominium, which was agreed to in 1906 and was negotiated without reference to the new Federation.14 It was designed to limit the rights of both powers and to limit competition between them.

More broadly, the self-governing colonies, especially New South Wales, Queensland and Victoria, showed special concern at the activities of other European powers in the Pacific. For example, New South Wales appealed to Britain to annex the Fijian Islands.15 Lord Kimberley, Secretary of State for the Colonies, replied in 1871 that New South Wales could act on its own account if it wished to take responsibility for so doing.16 New South Wales took no action, and Britain finally annexed Fiji in 1874.17

The concern of the colonies over the fate of the Pacific Islands had intensified as the British had withdrawn their military regiments from all colonies by 1870. The colonial governments raised small forces of volunteers ‘supplemented gradually by small bodies of permanent colonial soldiers for safeguarding fixed defences’.18

Any proposed annexation in the Pacific was not for the purpose of colonisation but was rather related to the protection of Britain’s colonies in Australia. While annexation of New Guinea was raised by the colonies in 1874, Australia was unwilling to cover the costs of such an undertaking, and the British desire for expansion seemed to have waned.19 However, when German newspapers indicated that there was real German interest in New Guinea, Queensland took full possession of southern New Guinea in 1883.20 This action was beyond Queensland’s powers and was rejected by Britain as ‘altogether indefinite and unfounded’.21 Victoria then pushed for annexation of all Pacific Islands between New Guinea and Fiji. Britain in part agreed and declared a protectorate over the south coast of New Guinea on 6 November 1883.

The colonies certainly had pressed harder to persuade Britain to act mor...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Title
• Contents
• Acknowledgements
• Introduction
• Part I: Loyal to the Crown, dependent on Empire
• Part II: All the way with the USA
• Part III: A time to end strategic dependence
• Conclusion
• Postscript
• Notes
• Bibliography
• Index