War in Eleventh-Century Byzantium

Georgios Theotokis, Marek Meško, Georgios Theotokis, Marek Meško

• Publisher: Routledge
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9780429574771
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

War in Eleventh-Century Byzantium presents new insights and critical approaches to warfare between the Byzantine Empire and its neighbours during the eleventh century.

Modern historians have identified the eleventh century as a landmark era in Byzantine history. This was a period of invasions, political tumult, financial crisis and social disruption, but it was also a time of cultural and intellectual innovation and achievement. Despite this, the subject of warfare during this period remains underexplored. Addressing an important gap in the historiography of Byzantium, the volume argues that the eleventh century was a period of important geo-political change, when the Byzantine Empire was attacked on all sides, and its frontiers were breached.

This book is valuable reading for scholars and students interested in Byzantium history and military history.

Part I
Tradition and change in the perception of war in Byzantium

1 Between the old and the new, Byzantine battle tactics in the times of the Battle of Manzikert

Łukasz Różycki

In the history of the Roman army, the eleventh century is considered by many authors to have been a transitional period between a force that originated in late antiquity and the Byzantine military of the Middle Ages.¹ The entire organization of the Roman army, its structures, its equipment and its tactics were the culmination of many centuries of evolution, but in the eleventh century, the system began to change, due to external processes, which were the expression of a deeply troubled state of the empire,² but also due to the evolving principles of combat on medieval battlefields.³ This was clearly exemplified during the short but significant reign of Romanos IV Diogenes – the ruler who tried to restore the fighting capabilities of the Byzantine army. The defeat at the Battle of Manzikert, irrespective of its scale,⁴ put an end to these endeavours; the faction that supported the house of Doukas⁵ rose to power, and the empire was once again plunged into civil strife, further stoked by Sultan Alp Arslan.⁶ What followed was a breakdown of classic Byzantine warfare, replaced by forces increasingly reliant on various types of mercenaries.⁷ The traditional belief is that the defeat at Manzikert was caused by three main factors: a significant decrease in military effectiveness of theme troops, the far-reaching changes in the tagmata dominated by western mercenaries,⁸ and betrayal in Byzantine ranks.⁹ Additional factors that we should take into account were the inability to adapt the tactical schemata to the new enemy, which, combined with the deteriorating quality of recruits, could have also contributed to the decline of classic Byzantine warcraft. The purpose of this chapter is to put together a comparative analysis of the Byzantine tactics during the times of the Battle of Manzikert and to determine whether and to what extent the ill-suited tactics of the Roman army were responsible for the losses suffered when fighting the Seljuks.

To understand the ongoing changes in the Byzantine army in the eleventh century, we first need to sketch the political situation that led to the systemic breakdown of the Roman armed forces after the death of Basil II. Following his demise in 1025, Basil II, the ‘Bulgar-Slayer’, left the state without a male heir to the throne. The passing of the last male descendant of the Macedonian dynasty led to a period in which the empire was ruled by two incompetent nieces of the last emperor and five emperors, whom the former either married or adopted. As noted by Warren Treadgold, even the actions of such unfit rulers were not enough to destroy the army,¹⁰ which still achieved victories.¹¹ The following summary focuses on military matters, particularly anything that was important for the defence of the state’s eastern border.

The military policies of the successors of Basil II

The military situation of the empire began deteriorating drastically under the rule of Constantine IX Monomachos (1042–55), who was a member of the bureaucratic faction.¹² Already at the beginning of his reign, the new head of state had to deal with military emergencies. In 1042, Constantine decided to dismiss the immensely popular katepánō, George Maniakes, from his command in Italy.¹³ This led to a rebellion of the local armies that proclaimed their commander emperor. Although the usurper died on the battlefield in the Balkans¹⁴ the following year, Constantine IX became acutely aware that he could not trust any force that was led by a provincial aristocrat. In 1047, another serious military rebellion broke out, headed by the emperor’s nephew, the doux of Melitene,¹⁵ Leo Tornikios, who was popular among the military aristocracy. It began in the western provinces,¹⁶ and the rebel forces even managed to lay siege to Constantinople. At that time, the Seljuks did not yet pose a serious threat,¹⁷ although Stephen’s defeat in Vaspurakan¹⁸ was the first taste of the troubles to come. In 1047,¹⁹ a large invasion of the Turks was held off by the commander of the armies of Iberia, Katakalon Kekaumenos,²⁰ who employed battle tactics reminiscent of those included in De Velitatione Bellica.²¹ During the following year, the combined Byzantine armies defeated the forces of Abram, driving them back in a pitched battle;²² notably, the whole engagement was resolved on the flanks, where the Turks were unable to stand against the Byzantine assault.²³ The Turks suffered a similar fate during an offensive led by the sultan himself in 1054, launched in an attempt to capture a portion of the Byzantine strongholds in Armenia.²⁴

The reign of Constantine IX Monomachos was catastrophic for the military organization of the empire;²⁵ among other things, the emperor weakened the forces led by thematic strategoi.²⁶ Moreover, the politics of the central government regarding provincial aristocracy,²⁷ usually closely tied to the army, bred strong opposition, which was most evidently expressed by the rebellion of Tornikios.²⁸ After the death of Constantine in 1056, the throne went to Michael VI Bringas. In 1057, a delegation of military aristocrats came to the capital for an audience with the new ruler, expecting to be received with honours, but the emperor greeted them coldly and heavily criticized their actions.²⁹ Consequently, a rebellion in the east became only a matter of time. The disgruntled commanders chose Isaac Komnenos from among themselves to be the new emperor and began gathering their forces. Contrary to the revolt led by Leo Tornikios, this time a decisive battle did take place, with the best troops of the empire pitted against each other. The engagement that was fought near Nikaia, in a place called Haides, was victorious for the rebels.³⁰ Once again, the battle was, mostly, fought on the flanks,³¹ although, according to Psellos,³² it was the center of Isaac’s army that actually decided the outcome of the clash.³³ The new ruler had to be aware of which issues were the most pressing for the empire, so he quickly began implementing the first part of his reforms, i.e. improving the finances,³⁴ which had a direct impact on the army.³⁵ Although these were not strictly military reforms, Psellos does laconically note that the emperor restored military discipline.³⁶ The rebellion of the eastern armies, which ended in civil strife, must have affected the security of eastern provinces.³⁷ This is best exemplified by the capture of Melitene in 1058³⁸ or the capture of the extremely wealthy Sebasteia by Samuch a year later.³⁹ Not only did the local troops not attempt to repel the invaders,⁴⁰ but also the city itself did not even have a proper wall and was easy prey for the nomads. Abandoned by his supporters and left in a capital hostile toward him, Isaac was pressed into abdicating when struck down with an illness, and though he later recovered, he nevertheless handed the rule over to Constantine X Doukas.

Nihil novi – the situation on the east border of the empire in the times of Constantine X

Constantine X Doukas was Isaac’s supporter of old and an army veteran. Despite being a member of regional military aristocracy, the new emperor quickly halted Isaac’s unpopular reforms,⁴¹ most likely trying to endear himself to the bureaucrats of Constantinople.⁴²

In the fall of 1062, the nomads once again invaded Roman territories by permission of Sultan Tughril.⁴³ The regions of Paghin, T’lmux, and Arkin were ravaged,⁴⁴ and the invaders took many prisoners, which they later sold to the Emir of Amida.⁴⁵ This time, Constantine reacted swiftly and ordered two of his commanders – Hervé (called Frankopoulos) and the doux of Edessa, Dabatenos – to repel the attack. However, the Seljuks showed no interest in accepting a pitched battle, and as soon as they had found out about the approaching imperial army, they retreated deep within their own lands.⁴⁶ Meanwhile, the Byzantine commanders joined their forces and marched toward Amida, which in the meantime suffered a rebellion and a change of government. Frankopoulos betrayed Dabatenos⁴⁷ before the walls of the city and did not support his troops in combat; as a result, the latter of the two leaders died.⁴⁸ Only after Frankopoulos was openly accused of treachery did his forces actually assault Amida, achieving victory in a clash on the outskirts of the city. Later, those led by Frankopoulos retreated toward Theodosiopolis, where they met a returning detachment of Seljuks, which was then destroyed in a pitched battle, and one of the casualties on the opponents’ side was, supposedly, Emir Yusuf himself.⁴⁹ According to Matthew of Edessa, the Roman commander was to be drowned at the emperor’s order for incompetence and betrayal.⁵⁰ The successful Turkish raid was a clear indication that the tactic of protecting the eastern flank of the empire on the basis of a number of fortresses controlling key communication routes was no longer effective.

An even greater military tragedy befell the empire in 1064, when the new Seljuk sultan, Alp Arslan, led the nomads on a raid against the Byzantine border provinces.⁵¹ The combined force of the nomads besieged the major city of Ani. Despite the resistance mounted by the Byzantine garrison,⁵² the city was taken and plundered. Merely a year later, another raid was organized by Slar-Khorasan,⁵³ who moved against Edessa. A notable incident in this campaign was an engagement with the Frankish cavalry stationed in Sewawerak. The western mercenaries numbered around two hundred and repelled the Turks from the walls with a fierce charge, forced to retreat only once enemy reinforcements arrived.⁵⁴ Next, the forces of Slar-Khorasan clashed with Roman troops at Edessa; the Romans were led by the doux of Antioch, but because of discontent among their leaders, they were unable to rout the Turks. This is yet another case when the western mercenaries came into play; this time, the Franks stationed in Edessa did not participate in the assault on the Turkish camp, and as a result, the whole endeavor ended in disaster.⁵⁵ Later that same year, the forces from Edessa attempted to intercept the army of Slar-Khorasan again, but in this instance, the Frankish hired swords supposedly ran from the battlefield at the mere sight of the nomads.⁵⁶ In the following year, the empire’s border was attacked by Emir Gümüshtigin, who directed his force to the east of the Euphrates, for a short while even besieging Nisibis.⁵⁷ The Romans were swift to react, and a relief party was dispatched under the command of the doux of Edessa, Aruandanos. The ...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title
• Copyright
• Contents
• List of figures
• List of abbreviations
• List of contributors
• Introduction
• Part I Tradition and change in the perception of war in Byzantium
• Part II Enemies and allies – Byzantium’s ‘military peripheries’
• Part III Technical aspects of the organization of the Byzantine army
• Bibliography
• Index