Countdown to Space War

Bhupendra Jasani, Christopher Lee, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute

• Publisher: Taylor & Francis
• Year: 2020
• eBook ISBN: 9781000199154
• Edition: 1
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Military & Maritime History
• Index: History

Only two years after Sputnik, weapons were created for attacking spacecraft. These were based on land. But now there is talk of weapons in space-instant-kill beams like lasers. President Reagan has offered a vision of new inventions that could stop nuclear missile attacks. But will they work? Can lasers make nuclear weapons obsolete? Or would they merely be used to wage Stars Wars?

Originally published in 1984, this is mainly the story of the military use of space. It shows how the new technology could trigger nuclear world war. And it looks for a way out...

1.
Countdown to crisis

If the two superpowers go to war any time after, say, 1990, it is very likely that the war would start in space. The military use of outer space is so far advanced that by around 1990 both the United States and the Soviet Union will have sure means of damaging and perhaps destroying some of the satellites that would be crucial to commanders on either side. The Soviet Union may already have this capability. The United States appears confident that its current anti-satellite (ASAT) test programme will give it an ASAT weapon within the time scale that we are viewing.

The development of ASAT weapons started in the late 1950s. The need for them was apparent to the military in Moscow and Washington once it was seen that space flight was a reality and that the exchequers in both capitals were willing to support this modern form of exploration. Today, less than 30 years after the first Sputnik, the military commander has come to accept space as a legitimate environment into which he might extend his defence systems. About 75 per cent of satellites have some military application. They are used for spying, for sending and intercepting signals, as early warning systems and, in the case of the Soviet Union, are capable of hunting down and destroying spacecraft that could give an enemy too much of an advantage during wartime. It is not long since talk of orbital Big Brothers and hunter-killer satellites and beam weapons was considered to be the realm of fantasy. It was something for fireside reading and big-budget movies, stretching the imagination to the limit.

But, in 1983, Ronald Reagan spoke of a vision that modern technology could be developed to produce systems that one day might make ballistic nuclear weapons obsolete. He wanted American scientists to use their massive technological resources to build weapons that could knock out those missiles while they were still in space. There was talk of beam weapons, of lasers, of death rays. What Mr Reagan said on March 23, 1983, was soon built up into something that it was not. It became known as the ‘Star Wars’ speech—in short, it caught the imagination. The reality of it was that Mr Reagan’s speech (in fact only part of a general address) was in 1983 nothing more than reflections. The systems to do what he was talking about did not exist. Nor do they today.

The problems of producing a ground-based or a space-based system that could pick up a massive invasion of ballistic missiles, lock onto each one and destroy them before they reached their target areas are enormous. The cynics have said that the problems are almost insurmountable. However, the research and development is under way. It is getting huge funding. The technology is emerging technology. It is growing in form and feasibility before the eyes of the space and chemical scientists and engineers. Furthermore, because of the way it has been sold to the public—as a protection against nuclear weapons and therefore against the concept itself—the Reagan vision of a futuristic ballistic missile defence system is gaining credibility.

This is especially so in the minds of those who have watched the space industry grow so rapidly since the first spacecraft in 1957. On top of all this there is the almost casual acceptance of these advances. The ‘general public’ finds no difficulty in accepting such a concept. Talk of beam weapons, lasers and spy satellites is so commonplace that there is an atmosphere that suggests that whatever people think of the ideas or whatever arguments there are against the principles, it will happen anyway.

Interestingly, many people who willingly accept the ‘Star Wars’ concept of being able to knock out ballistic missiles reject the principle that the superpowers should be allowed to knock out each other’s satellites. Yet the two systems are linked, as we shall see later.

Unfortunately even among those who concern themselves with arms control and strategic studies, there is a lack of technical knowledge and understanding of just how and why space is being used today and what will inevitably follow during the rest of this decade. Even the peace groups have not added space studies to the growing portfolio of campaigns. There are problems of time and understanding. Society is only just coming to terms with the concept that wanting to know more about major military programmes is not a sign of pacifism nor of any one political persuasion. Furthermore, for those caught up in the seemingly endless debate on the nuclear systems here on Earth, space must indeed seem light years away in the importance of things. It is not.

The United States, for example, now has a branch of its Service called Space Command. It has its own generals, budgets and secretaries. Space is used for every essential function. Satellites have sensors that identify enemy positions, listen into enemy (and sometimes allied) communications and fix positions for ballistic-missile firing submarines. Others carry up to 80 per cent of all military signals.

Information is crucial to the military. Information about the enemy has to be collected. It has to be transmitted to the commanders who have to send information to command and control their own forces. The information systems used by the military are often brought together under the code name C³1. It stands for Command, Control, Communications and Intelligence and relies heavily on space-based systems. A general or an admiral uses satellites to transmit command signals to his forces. He controls their movements by satellite. He receives their communications through satellites and it is the satellites that provide much of his general and sometimes detailed intelligence.

A major conflict, over a short period of time, relying to some extent on surprise and, initially, on rapid territorial and strategic advances, would need a great deal of management at every level. If the conflict lengthens, the problem of C³I becomes even greater. It follows, therefore, that the commander’s traditional intelligence needs remain unchanged whatever the type of conflict. He must have some good idea of his enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, capabilities and readiness. He needs to know where his tanks are, what supplies have been coming through, whether aircraft have left their normal bases and dispersed to alternative airfields, whether there is an unusual amount of signal traffic, what reserves are mobilized and where they are being sent. His naval staff will want to know if ships are putting to sea in unusually large numbers, what types of ships are in the different task forces and what support vessels are going with them or being pre-positioned.

He will be interested to know if major towns are being evacuated, a sign perhaps that the authorities are preparing for air raids. He will wish to have a good idea of the lengths of his enemy’s supply lines and how much activity is going on in them. Are train services, for example, being cancelled to clear lines for military railway units? The commander will even wish to know what the weather is like; the immediate weather reports and the medium- and long-term reports will be essential, especially to his air commanders, many of whom will not have aircraft capable of operating in bad weather conditions.

And if war does start, the commander will need constant updating on all these vital matters and will want it quickly. The way in which an advancing enemy division moves provides a good example of how an area picture might change during, say, a 24-hour period or even before an engagement. Most military formations are cumbersome and so are difficult to redeploy unless there is some extraordinarily well rehearsed procedure and excellent communications. The commander will want as much detail as possible about any division. How far ahead is the unit’s reconnaissance group? How far behind are such units as chemical warfare detachments? Are the artillery groups also well forward so that they can be quickly deployed? How is the enemy protecting the advance, by putting out patrols on the route’s flanks?

He will also need information about his own units. This may sound far-fetched; after all, a commander should be precisely briefed on where his own men and equipment are. But, in the preparations for a large conflict this may be quite difficult. For example, reinforcements may be experiencing all manner of problems joining up and supply lines may be broken through transport difficulties even before a conflict begins. The commander will need to talk to his own side, but securely, and he will need to get around the probable jamming put out by an enemy.

From all this it is clear that the military is getting to the point where commanders would be struck deaf, dumb and blind should their satellites be destroyed. Hence the added concern among many scientists and strategists: they believe that some future conflict could start in space. More importantly, many believe that, because of the military reliance on space systems, a war could start which otherwise would have been avoided by diplomatic means. The argument runs that in time of tension one side might decide that, to retain any military advantage, anti-satellite weapons should be used. That would be seen as a signal that diplomacy was about to fail and so war would follow.

Having said all this, it should not be thought that the only reason for space exploration is to satisfy the military. The peaceful programmes are important. Furthermore, both military and civilian satellites with their ability to look down, record and transmit in great detail what they see on Earth have great advantages for mankind. Apart from the obvious geological, cartographical and weather-forecasting advantages that satellites bring to every-day life, they can be used to monitor peace agreements. The same satellite that tells the American intelligence community that the Soviet Union has deployed a new missile could be used to tell if an arms control treaty is being broken.

The space age has been with us for some time. It is out of its infancy. In ancient times bands of warriors learned the advantage of sending a scout forward and high to spy out the enemy territory. They learned the advantage of taking the high ground. Space is the new high ground.

The first satellite was launched in October 1957. That was the beginning of the countdown to the crisis in space the world now faces. If space has a crossroads, it has now been reached.

We have a choice: to take control of this high ground in such a way that it will safeguard the peace of the world, or at least make some contribution to that peace; or to refuse to look up to this new and awesome responsibility.

2.
How it all began

It all started in 1957. Very simply, the Soviet Union went ahead and did exactly what the United States had been talking of doing. On October 4, the Soviet Union launched Sputnik 1. The Sputnik (meaning satellite) took the US space programmers by complete surprise. In 1955 both the USA and the USSR had announced their intentions to launch small scientific satellites by 1957 as a contribution to the International Geophysical Year, but the Americans had no idea that the Soviet Union was anywhere near ready to launch ahead of them. And from Washington there were noises that indicated that the Soviet lead was more daunting for its political and prestige values than it was for its obvious scientific achievement. The message from as high as the White House was clear: “Let’s get this particular show—not on the road—but off the ground.”

But for those who envied the Soviet Union’s propaganda victory, worse was to come. Within days of Sputnik 1’s launch, work had been stepped up in the United States to bring forward its own plans for a space launch. And for three weeks after that launch Sputnik 1 sent out a steady stream of signals as a reminder of the Soviet Union’s lead. Then there was silence. Sputnik 1 was still up there but not transmitting. Work continued on the US Navy’s space project at the American Eastern Test Range at Cape Canaveral, Florida. But on November 3 the Soviets did it again. Sputnik 2 was launched from Tyuratam in Kazakhstan and that almost mocking bleep was heard for the next week over the United States. To make it even more interesting, Sputnik 2 had a passenger, Laika the dog (Laika means husky in Russian).

A month later, the Americans were ready. The Navy’s Vanguard launcher was on site and the countdown going ahead as planned. On December 6, 1957, just two months after Sputnik 1, the Americans were ready for lift off into the marathon space race between the two superpowers. But it was a false start. The Vanguard launch vehicle lost its thrust after just two seconds and the spacecraft failed to go into orbit. It was nearly two months before the United States scientists were successful. On January 31, 1958 Explorer 1 was sent into orbit and its signals monitored until they died out five months later, but not before it identified a belt of natural radiation about the Earth known as the Van Allen belt. The satellite itself continued in orbit until early 1970 when it decayed.

Although the Soviet Union had the early start and lead, its programme of space launches appeared to be limited. Certainly during the next few months and years the Americans were the more active. But in spite of the urgency fostered by prestige and concern that the Soviet Union might be gaining some military advantage, the programme could not be accelerated much faster than the existing schedule. Even then, the Americans were not always successful. For example, between Sputnik 1 in October 1957 and the first landing of a Moon probe in September 1959 there were 35 space launches. Nineteen of them failed—all 19 were American. The Soviets did not have such an active programme: only five of those 35 launches were from the Soviet Union. Sputnik 1 was the first in orbit; Sputnik 2 had Laika on board; in May 1958 Sputnik 3 went into space for two years, sending back signals until it decayed in April 1960; and in January 1959 the Soviets launched their Moon probe, Luna 1. Luna 1 passed within 6 000 km of the Moon and is now in solar orbit. In September of that year, less than two years after the first space shot, the Soviet Union launched Luna 2, again from Tyuratam. On Earth, space engineers held their scientific breath and then, 34 hours after lift-off, Luna 2 landed on the Moon.

Undoubtedly the Soviet success rate made it more difficult for the USA to live with its extensive failures. Perhaps an added problem for the Americans was their habit of telling the world exactly what they were planning to do—and when. Consequently the world was there to watch their failures as well as their successes, while it was and is felt that the Soviet Union’s instinctive sense of secrecy and trait of publicizing only successes allowed them to gain some political as well as scientific credit. Whatever the rights and wrongs of handling the more public side of space exploration, the USA sometimes suffered excruciating growing pains during those first few years—especially i...

Table of contents

• Cover
• Half Title
• Title Page
• Copyright Page
• Original Title Page
• Original Copyright Page
• Contents
• Preface
• 1. Countdown to crisis
• 2. How it all began
• 3. Space-military domain
• 4. The military need
• 5. Space as a battlefield
• 6. Space warfare and beyond
• 7. Stopping ballistic missile attack?
• 8. What are the implications?
• Recommendations
• Further reading
• Index