German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942)

Barbarossa to Stalingrad: Eastern Front strategy and command decisions, 1941-1942

U.S. Department of Defense

• Publisher: Madison & Adams Press
• Year: 2018
• eBook ISBN: 9788026882671
• Topic: History
• Subtopic: Russian History
• Index: History

The aim of this edition is to present in a comprehensive way the strategy and military operations of the German army in the attack on Russia in World War 2. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. Contents: Strategic Planning Operational Planning The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941) Planning for Future Operations The Diversion and Reassembly The German Attack on Moscow The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941-February 1942) Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942) The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942) Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942 List of German Military Leaders (July 1940-November 1942) Chronology of the Events

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U.S. Department of Defense

German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942)

WW2: Strategic & Operational Planning: Directive Barbarossa, The Initial Operations, German Attack on Moscow, German Offensive in the Caucasus

Madison & Adams Press, 2018. No claim to original U.S. Government Works
Contact [email protected]

ISBN 978-80-268-8267-1

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Table of Contents

FOREWORD

PART ONE PLANNING

Chapter 1 Strategic Planning

Initial Discussions (July 1940)

The Marcks Plan (5 August 1940)

Staff Work (August-September 1940)

Admiral Raeder's Suggestions (26 September 1940)

Strategic Survey (October 1940)

The Preliminary Plan (November-5 December 1940)

General Staff and Command Post Exercises (November-December 1940)

Economic Survey

Directive BARBAROSSA (18 December 1940)

Chapter 2 Operational Planning

The Army's Operation Order (3 February 1941)

Initiation of Subordinate Staffs (February-March 1941)

Changes in Plans (March-April 1941)

Army Group South

Far North

Delay in the Start

The Draft of Directive No. 32 (11 June 1947)

Strategic Concentration (21 June 1941)

Air Support

Other Factors

Estimate of Soviet Strength (June 1941)

Sources of Information

Estimate of Red Army Dispositions

Estimate of Soviet Air Force Strength

PART TWO OPERATIONS IN 1941

Chapter 3 The Initial Operations (22 June-31 July 1941)

D Day

The Situation on 30 June 1941

Developments in Early July 1941

The Mid-July Estimate

Directive No. 33 (19 July 1941)

The Army's Letter to the Armed Forces High Command

The Situation Toward the End of July 1947

Chapter 4 Planning for Future Operations

The Army's Order of 28 July 1941

Directive No. 34 (30 July 1941)

Hitler's Vacillation Over Strategy

The Supplement to Directive No. 34 (12 August 1941)

Developments to Mid-August 1941

The Army Memorandum of 18 August 1941

Hitler's Decision (20 August 1941)

Chapter 5 The Diversion and Reassembly

The Personnel Situation (End of August 1941)

Increasing Logistical Difficulties (Early September 1941)

POL

Track-Laying and Wheeled Vehicles

Developments to Mid-September 1947

Directive No. 35 (6 September 1941)

The Situation at the End of September 1941

Military-Economic Survey (2 October 1941)

The Muddy Period and Its Effect on Operations (October 1941)

Hitler's Plan for the Seizure of Moscow (12 October 1941)

Chapter 6 The German Attack on Moscow

Strategic Factors

Last-Minute Planning and Operations to 13 November 1941

The Course of the Offensive (14 November-5 December 1941)

The Personnel Situation (End of November 1941)

Critique

PART THREE 1942 — THE YEAR OF INDECISION

Chapter 7 The Russian Counteroffensive (December 1941 - February 1942)

The First German Reverses

Hitler's Directive No. 39 (8 December 1941)

The Army High Command Order of 8 December 1941

Intelligence Estimate

Plans

The Mission of the Army Groups

Conduct of Operations

Organization

The Red Army Seizes the Initiative

Developments to 25 December 1941

The German Crisis in Mid-January 1942

The Crisis Reaches Its Climax (Beginning of February 1942)

The Russian Offensive Is Halted (20 February 1942)

Critique

Chapter 8 Preliminary Planning for a German Offensive in the Caucasus, 1942

Exploratory Steps (July 1940-September 1941)

The First Plan for a Caucasus Operation (October 1941)

Caucasus Planning in November 1941

Effects of the Moscow Setback (January 1942)

The First Preparatory Orders (February 1942)

The Navy's Role (February 1942)

Intelligence Estimate (20 February 1942)

Hitler's Preoccupations in Early March 1942

The Situation at the End of March 1942

Chapter 9 Preparations for the German Summer Offensive

Directive No. 41 (5 April 1942)

Estimates, Delays, and Disappointments in April 1942

Intelligence Estimate

Delay in the Preliminary Operations

The Situation at Army Group Center

Chain of Command

Transportation

Turkey Remains Neutral

Logistical Preparations

Timing

Chain of Command

Supplies

Motor Vehicles

Rail Transportation

Summary

Organizational Problems

Rehabilitation of Units

Shortage of Technicians

Construction of Fortifications

Oil Brigade Caucasus

Casualties and Replacements

The Participation of Germany's Allies

Rear Area Security

Army Group South's Defense Line

The Role of Army Group A

Feint and Counerfeint

Warning Notes (May 1942)

The Armed Forces Potential in the Spring of 1942

The Preliminary Operations (May-June 1942)

Last-Minute Incidents and Impressions (June 1942)

Chapter 10 Initial Operations and New Plans (July 1942)

The First Phase (28 June-6 July 1942)

The Second Phase (30 June -7 July 1942)

Changes in the German Order of Battle (July 1942)

The Army Group A Offensive

The Operation Plan

The Army Group A Attack

German and Russian Weaknesses

Directive No. 43

The Continuation of Operations

The Situation of the Other Army Groups by 20 July 1942

Directive No. 44 (21 July 1942)

Directive No. 45 (23 July 1942)

German Shortages

Tanks

Gasoline

Stalingrad Takes Priority Over the Caucasus (End of July 1942)

Chapter 11 The Period of Stagnation (August-October 1942)

Developments to Mid-August 1942

Personnel and Other Problems (16-18 August 1942)

The Situation in the Caucasus (Second Half of August 1942)

The Opening of the Battle for Stalingrad (End of August 1942)

The German Leadership Crisis (September 1942)

Faulty Intelligence and its Interpretation

The German Offensive Grinds to a Halt (26 September 1942)

German Estimates in October and Early November 1942

Army Group A

Army Group B

The Estimate of 6 November

The Oil of the Caucasus

German Efforts at Production

Russian Supplies

Local Engagements (October-Mid-November 1942)

Chapter 12 Critical Analysis of the German Summer Offensive in 1942

Different Concepts of Strategy

Differences over the Choice of Objective

Mistakes in the Execution of the German Offensive

Appendixes

Appendix A List of German Military Leaders July 1940 - November 1942)

Appendix B Chronology of Events

FOREWORD

Table of Contents

Clausewitz observed of Russia that "it was a country which could be subdued only by its own weakness and by the effects of internal dissension. In order to strike these vulnerable spots of its body politic, Russia would have to be agitated at the very center." In reading this study, the military student will realize how dearly the Germans had to pay for ignoring Clausewitz's advice.

The purpose of this study is to describe German planning and operations in the first part of the campaign against Russia. The narrative starts with Hitler's initial plans for an invasion of Russia and ends at the time of Germany's maximum territorial gains during the battle for Stalingrad. A subsequent volume will depict the course of events from the Russian counteroffensive in November 1942 to the capture of Berlin in April 1945.

The material for this study was obtained from German military records now in the custody of The Adjutant General, Department of the Army. Monographs by former German general officers who had an active part in the planning and operations provided additional information. The authors of these monographs, prepared for the Historical Division, United States Army, Europe, include Generaloberst (Gen.) Franz Halder, Chief of Staff of the German Army from 1938-42; Generaloberst Gotthard Heinrici, a former corps, army, and army group commander on the Russian front: and several others.

The study was written by Mr. George E. Blau of the Special Studies Division, Office of the Chief of Military History. In his presentation, the author made every effort to give an objective account of Germany's initial efforts to conquer Soviet Russia in World War II.

PART ONE
PLANNING

Table of Contents

Chapter 1
Strategic Planning

Table of Contents

Initial Discussions
(July 1940)

Table of Contents

After the conclusion of the French campaign in June 1940 Hitler devoted his attention to initiating plans for the seaborne invasion of England-Operation SEELOEWE. On 16 July he issued the directive for the operation. Three days later, in a speech before the Reichstag, Hitler made peace overtures to Great Britain. When they did not produce the expected reaction in Britain, he could only conclude that his last remaining enemy was continuing the war hoping for a change in the U.S. attitude and for future assistance from the Soviet Union.

On 21 July, after discussing the invasion of England with his military advisers, Hitler asked Field Marshal Walter von Brauchitsch, the Commander in Chief of the Army, to study the Russian problem and submit plans for a campaign against the Soviet Union. In regard to the latter the following was mentioned:

1. The concentration of attack forces would take 4 to 6 weeks.

2. The military objective would be to defeat the Russian Army or at least to seize so much Russian territory that the armaments plants in eastern Germany, particularly those in Berlin and Upper Silesia, and the Romanian oil fields would be beyond the range of Russian air attacks. At the same time the German ground forces would have to advance far enough to bring important production centers of European Russia within striking distance of the Luftwaffe.

3. The political aims would include the creation of an independent Ukraine and a confederation of Baltic States under German domination.

4. The Army would need approximately 80-100 combat divisions; the Soviet Union had some 50-75 good Russian divisions in Europe. If the campaign against Russia was launched that autumn, some of the German air power committed against Britain would have to be transferred to the East.

The following day, Brauchitsch informed Generaloberst (Gen.) Franz Halder, Chief, Army General Staff, of the discussions that had taken place at the previous day's conference and asked him to study the various problems involved in an operation against Russia. Halder thereupon requested Lt. Col. Eberhardt Kinzel, Chief, Eastern Intelligence Division, to brief him on Russian troop dispositions and asked Col. Hans von Greiffenberg, Chief, Operations Division, to assign a special assistant to the preparation of a tentative plan for a campaign against the Soviet Union. [See chart 1.]

On the basis of data provided by Kinzel on 26 July, Halder concluded that an attack launched from assembly areas in East Prussia and northern Poland toward Moscow would offer the best chances for success. After the seizure of Moscow the Russian forces defending the Ukraine and the Black Sea coast would be compelled to fight a series of battles with reversed front. [See map 1.]

The first draft of the Operations Division plan placed the main effort south of the Pripyat Marshes. The plan also called for 100 divisions. Halder, however, preferred to place the main effort north of the Pripyat.

Two days later, 29 July, Generalmajor (Brig. Gen.) Erich Marcks was temporarily assigned to Army High Command headquarters to draw up a campaign plan against the Soviet Union. General Marcks was chief of staff of the Eighteenth Army, which had recently been assigned to the Russian border and was preparing plans for defense against a possible Russian attack.

The same day General der Artillerie (Lt. Gen.) Alfred Jodl, Chief, Armed Forces Operations Staff, informed Col. Walter Warlimont, Chief, National Defense Division, and a group of officers working on his staff that Hitler had made up his mind to start a preventive war against Russia. The Army and Luftwaffe were to employ all available forces to eliminate forever the Bolshevist danger in the East. Since an eventual conflict between the National Socialist and Communist ideologies was inevitable, the Fuehrer preferred to extend the war into eastern Europe right then to being forced to resume hostilities after a few years of intermittent peace. Originally, Hitler had intended to invade Russia in the autumn of 1940, but Field Marshal Wilhelm Keitel had pointed out the difficulties of a winter campaign in Russia and had presented convincing evidence that the existing road and rail net in the newly acquired...

Table of contents

• German Campaign in Russia: Planning and Operations (1940-1942)