Philosophy of War

A Brief Analysis on Principles and Justifications

Joel Steele

• Publisher: Resource Publications
• Year: 2020
• Print ISBN: 9781725285262, 9781725285279
• eBook ISBN: 9781725285286

The focus of this book centers on the importance and continued relevance of proven concepts regarding war and societies, provided by minds with advanced foresight into the subject. Prominent generals from the past and present have studied these theories and military institutions all over the world continue to practice their strategies. During the initial phase of the nuclear age many strategists believed these theories were no longer relevant. However, they soon realized, through proxy wars during the Cold War, that nuclear weapons were a tool for advancement rather than a strategy for war. This contribution is unique because it articulates and analyzes how these theories apply to a variety of scenarios (conflicts) across the historical spectrum. It contains no embellishments as accounts were extracted from primary sources supplemented with historiographical literature by sources that have published extensively on the subject. It will be especially alluring for those interested in military thought rather than those interested in a simple account of events unfolding in a certain war.

1

The Peloponnesian War

Athens’s rise to dominance in the fifth century was primarily attributed to their Navy. They controlled most of the Mediterranean through approximation to location, that is, out of the 179 states the most remote was within a 200–250-mile range from Athens (an eight-day voyage by sea). Still, they did not go unchallenged. The militarized πόλις (polis), that is, city-state, of Sparta organized the Peloponnesian League to engage in a series of land and sea conflicts known as the Peloponnesian War. Athens became overextended as the skirmishes prolonged. Athens’s empire weakened as they lost land after a series of defeats, and in 446 BC they were forced to negotiated a peace. In the winter of 446–445, Athens and Sparta officially agreed on a Thirty Years Peace arrangement. This resulted in two great powers in the ancient world that would remain suspicious of each other until the Second Peloponnesian War broke out in 431.1

Sparta was unique. They had conquered their neighbors, the helots, and subjected them to the forceful service of the state, a form of serfdom. The helots provided food for the Spartans by farming the land. This liberated the Spartans from mundane tedious labor enabling them to engage in continuous military training from age seven and serving until age sixty when military service was no longer a requirement. The alliances Sparta formed with surrounding city-states required them to serve under Spartan command when needed, swearing allegiance to have the same friends and enemies as Spartan in return for the great power’s protection.2 Spartan’s style of government was complex; it contained monarchic, oligarchic, and democratic elements. An elected council of men over sixty, chosen from privileged families, represented the oligarchic element; an assembly of men over the age of thirty represented the democratic element; and two kings that served for life represented the monarchic element.3

Athens had a unique history as well. Athens emerged as the world’s first democratic-style government in the fifth century. Democracy for Athens depended on its maritime empire. During the Persian War, Athenian allies of the Greek city-states invited Athens to take the initiative in the fight for liberation against the Persians. Nearly all members of the Athenian alliance ceased maritime operations, electing to pay into a centralized treasury associated with the alliance which would fund Athens’s Navy and maritime operations. The decision to redirect all funds to the Athenian Navy resulted in the largest and best naval force the world had known. The powerful Athenian Navy provided protection for their merchant ships beyond the Mediterranean.4 After the Persian War, Athens rebuilt their walls around the city and their large empire became concerning for the Spartans. If fact, Sparta protested Athens’s desire to rebuild their walls. However, the walls went up with no regard for the Spartans’ opposition. The Spartans remained embittered and resentful of Athens’s powerful empire. Nevertheless, they made no additional complaints.5

Belligerent Allies and Fear

One of many problems with weaker sovereign allies is the possibility of them dragging their greater, much more capable ally into a major conflict with an opposing great power. This scenario materialized for the Spartans when one of their allies, Corinth, became embroiled in a dispute with Corcyra. The Corcyraeans’ Navy was second only to that of Athens. However, the Corcyraeans feared the Corinthians would enlist the help of other alliances within the Spartan league. The Corcyraeans were neutral and did not have an alliance with either of the two great opposing powers, Sparta and Athens. Thus, once the Corcyraeans realized the Corinthians were determined to wage war, the Corcyraeans sought the help of the Athenians. The provisions of the Thirty-Years’-Peace Treaty, ratified in 446–45, allowed for neutral powers to join the alliances of either of the two great powers. So, Athens would have been within the confines of the treaty to accept the Corcyraeans’ request for assistance. Moreover, the Corcyraeans appealed to Athens’s fears, arguing that if they succumbed to the Corinthians their fleet would fall into the control of the Spartan league.6 This would present a major challenge to Athenian maritime power in the region, tipping the balance of power in Sparta’s favor. Still, caution was needed to avoid unintentionally setting off a premature war with the Spartans.

Historian Donald Kagan provides a detailed account of the events that led to the Peloponnesian War in his book, On the Origins of War. Kagan delivers a superb narrative of the tactics used by Corinth and the Corcyraeans to persuade the two great powers to choose a side. This account will be brief because understanding the psychology of the ancients is problematic. It becomes more problematic when modern researchers attempt to understand motivations that extend beyond what has been recorded by those closest to the event, or to speculate on surviving artifacts, forcing them to fit a supportive testimony. The focus will be on what occurred and how those actions fit into a general theory of war and justification developed by one or more of the three theorists introduced at the beginning of this study.

After some debate—mostly rhetoric, embellishment, and hyperbole—the two belligerent city-states had stirred the fears of both the Spartans and Athenians. As previously stated, Athens was cautious. Thus, they decided to send only ten warships to the area rather than a large armada, as presumably this would be less likely to provoke Sparta. Essentially, the Athenians made an alliance with the Corcyraeans that was defensive only. The Greek general Pericles was most likely behind this idea. There are two primary sources used for this interpr...

Table of contents

• Title Page
• Preface
• Introduction
• Chapter 1: The Peloponnesian War
• Chapter 2: The World Wars
• Chapter 3: The Soviet-Afghan War
• Bibliography