Game Theory and Applications
eBook - PDF

Game Theory and Applications

  1. 436 pages
  2. English
  3. PDF
  4. Available on iOS & Android
eBook - PDF

Game Theory and Applications

About this book

Game Theory and Applications outlines game theory and proves its validity by examining it alongside the neoclassical paradigm. This book contends that the neoclassical theory is the exceptional case, and that game theory may indeed be the rule. The papers and abstracts collected here explore its recent development and suggest new research directions.- Explains many of the recent central developments in game theory- Highlights new research directions in economic theory which surpass the neoclassical paradigm- Includes game-theoretical analyses in economics, political science, and biology- Written by leading game theorists, economists, political scientists, and biologists

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Yes, you can access Game Theory and Applications by Tatsuro Ichiishi,Abraham Neyman,Yair Tauman, Karl Shell in PDF and/or ePUB format, as well as other popular books in Languages & Linguistics & Library & Information Science. We have over one million books available in our catalogue for you to explore.

Table of contents

  1. Front Cover
  2. Game Theory and Applications
  3. Copyright Page
  4. Table of Contents
  5. Contributors
  6. Preface
  7. Chapter 1. Refinement of Nash Equilibrium: The Main Ideas
  8. Chapter 2. Supergames
  9. Chapter 3. Repeated Games with Incomplete Information
  10. Chapter 4. Repeated Games
  11. Chapter 5. Bounded Rationality and Strategic Complexity in Repeated Games
  12. Chapter 6. Advances in Value Theory
  13. Chapter 7. Axiomatizations of the Core, the Nucleolus, and the Prekernel
  14. Chapter 8. Consistency
  15. Chapter 9. The Consistency Principle
  16. Chapter 10. Discrete Concepts in n-Person Game Theory: Nondegeneracy and Homogeneity
  17. Chapter 11. Two-Sided Matching Markets: An Overview of Some Theory and Empirical Evidence
  18. Chapter 12. Strategie Market Game Models of Exchange Economies
  19. Chapter 13. Information Transmission
  20. Chapter 14. Monotonie Surplus Sharing and the Utilization of Common Property Resources
  21. Chapter 15. Developments in Stable Set Theory
  22. Chapter 16. Game Theoretic Models of Voting in Multidimensional Issue Spaces
  23. Chapter 17. Israel and the PLO: A Game with Differential Information
  24. Chapter 18. A Survey of Some Results Closely Related to the Knaster–Kuratowski–Mazurkiewicz Theorem
  25. Chapter 19. Selected Abstracts from the Proceedings of the 1987 International Conference, Ohio State University
  26. Chapter 20. On the Core of the Assignment Game
  27. Chapter 21. The Second Welfare Theorem in Nonconvex Economies
  28. Chapter 22. An Evolutionary Game Theory Model for Risk-Taking
  29. Chapter 23. Values of Nonatomic Vector Measure Games: Are They Linear Combinations of the Measures?
  30. Chapter 24. Subgame-Perfect Equilibria in Discrete and Continuous Games: Does Discretization Matter?
  31. Chapter 25. To Vote or Not to Vote: What Is the Quota?
  32. Chapter 26. Some Bounds for the Banzhaf Index and Other Semivalues
  33. Chapter 27. Comparative Cooperative Game Theory
  34. Chapter 28. Escalation and Cooperation in International Conflicts: The Dollar-Auction Revisited
  35. Chapter 29. An Axiomatization of the Nonsymmetric, Nontransferable Utility Value
  36. Chapter 30. A Milnor Condition for Nonatomic Lipschitz Games and Its Applications
  37. Chapter 31. Zero-Sum Nonstationary Stochastic Games with General State Space
  38. Chapter 32. Perfect Equilibrium Points and Lexicographic Domination
  39. Chapter 33. A Two-Person Repeated Bargaining Game with Long Term Contracts
  40. Chapter 34. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives and Revealed Group Preferences
  41. Chapter 35. The Sealed-Bid Mechanism: An Experimental Study
  42. Chapter 36. Rate of Convergence to Full Efficiency in the Buyers' Bid Double Auction as the Market Becomes Large
  43. Chapter 37. Stationary Strategies in Deterministic Games
  44. Chapter 38. Big Boss Games, Clan Games, and Information Market Games
  45. Chapter 39. Large Games and Economies with Near-Exhaustion of Gainsto Coalition Formation
  46. Chapter 40. Values of Large Finite Games
  47. Index